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Abstract: Summary How did the United States, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland design their
foreign policy to- ward South Africa under apartheid? What were the consequences of these policies,
both on the countries’ international relations with regard to apartheid South Africa and on the situation
in South Africa itself? These are the research questions I address in this dissertation. South Africa’s
apartheid system (1948-1994) has been an international, and—in many countries—a domestic political
issue since the 1960s. Particularly in Western countries, some of which had strong economic and cul-
tural ties with white South Africa, foreign relations with the racist regime in South Africa became a
‘hot’ issue in the 1980s, when the international boycott movement against apartheid gained political
influence both at the international and domestic level. The governments of the four Western countries
under investigation in this study responded quite differently to these international and political changes.
Whereas the Swedish government imposed economic sanctions against South Africa together with its
Nordic partners as early as the late 1970s, the United States under President Ronald Reagan pursued
first a policy of “constructive engagement,” trying to change the South African system through dialogue
and cooperation rather than confrontation and punishment. But in 1986, the U.S. Congress adopted with
the Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid Act (CAAA) a sanctions legislation that triggered similar actions
on the part of other West- ern governments, particularly in the European Community. West Germany,
in spite of earlier resistance, eventually also agreed to the E.C. sanctions package. Only Switzerland
maintained its resistance against South African sanctions and never joined such measures against the
apartheid regime (apart from the adoption of an arms embargo in 1963). However, an event data-based
intervention analysis reveals that these major changes in U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa showed
only short-term effects on the international relationship between the U.S. and South Africa during that
time. Even though the imposition of the CAAA resulted in a temporary negative shift in the conflict/-
cooperation level between the two countries, the relation- ship went back to earlier patterns years before
new South African president Frederik de Klerk announced first steps towards dismantling apartheid in
February 1990. Effects of the German, Swedish and Swiss German foreign policies were more difficult
to assess. But, similar to the U.S. case, a temporary worsening of the relationship with South Africa
could also be observed in the case of Sweden and West Germany. Only Swiss-South African relations, as
displayed by the analyzed event data set, showed different patterns. They improved significantly at the
end of 1985 and in the beginning of 1986, due to debt restructuring negotiations between major banking
institutes on the one side and the South African government on the other, with the former president of
the Swiss National Bank acting as a mediator. Overall, international interventions that worked toward
an end to apartheid in South Africa showed only very little direct impact on developments in the country
itself. The systematic analysis of the dynamics of political events on the international, regional and South
African domestic level reveals that only a rather slight effect of the overall aggregate of international ac-
tions toward South Africa can be measured robustly. Conflicts between the apartheid government and
the South African liberation movement can mainly be explained with inner-South African developments.
However, it can be assumed that the international protest movement against the apartheid regime had an
important symbolic effect and gave the South African opposition an important leverage in its negotiations
with the apartheid government during the country’s transitional phase toward a new constitution and a
modern democratic system in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Zusammenfassung Wie gestalteten die USA,
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Schweden und die Schweiz ihre Aussenpolitik gegenüber Südafrika zur
Zeit der Apartheid? Was waren die Konsequenzen dieser Politik, sowohl hinsichtlich der internationalen
Beziehungen dieser Länder zu Südafrika als auch für die Situation in Südafrika selbst? Diese Forschungs-
fragen werden in dieser Dissertation untersucht. Das Apartheidregime in Südafrika (1948-1994) war
Gegenstand der internationalen Politik seit den 1960er Jahren und führte in vielen Staaten auch immer
wieder zu innenpolitischen Kontroversen um die Ausgestaltung der Aussenpolitik gegenüber dem rassis-
tischen Regime in der Kaprepublik. Vor allem westliche Staaten—mit teilweise engen wirtschaftlichen
und kulturellen Beziehungen zum weissen Südafrika—gerieten wegen ihrer aussenpolitischen Zurückhal-
tung gegenüber der südafrikanischen Apartheidregierung zunehmend unter den Druck einer international
mobilisierenden Anti-Apartheid- Bewegung. Mitte der 1980er Jahre wurden internationale Südafrika-
Beziehungen dann zu einem „heissen“ Thema, als die internationale Boykottbewegung an politischem
Einfluss gewann, sowohl auf internationaler Ebene wie auch in der nationalen Politik vieler westlicher
Staaten. Die Regierungen der vier westlichen Staaten, die im Zentrum dieser Untersuchung stehen,
stellten sich dieser Herausforderung unterschiedlich. Während Schweden zusammen mit seinen nordis-
chen Partnern bereits in den späten 1970er Jahren erste wirtschaftliche Sanktionen gegen Südafrika
verabschiedete, verfolgte die USA unter Präsident Reagan zuerst eine Politik des „konstruktiven Engage-
ments“, indem sie der Apartheidregierung mit Angeboten zum Dialog und anderen kooperativen Ansätzen
gegenübertrat. Das Jahr 1986 bedeutete dann ein Wendepunkt in der amerikanischen Südafrikapolitik,
als der Kongress mit dem ‘Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act’ (CAAA) weitgehende Wirtschaftssank-
tionen verabschiedete. Die Sanktionsbestrebungen in den USA lösten in der Folge ähnliche Massnahmen
anderer westlicher Regierungen aus, unter anderem in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Die Bundesre-
publik Deutschland stand diesen Sanktionsmassnahmen anfänglich ablehnend gegenüber, trug das EG-
Sanktionspaket aber schliesslich mit. Nur die Schweiz beteiligte sich bis zum Ende der Apartheid an
keinen Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Südafrika (mit Ausnahme eines Waffenembargos von 1963). Die im
Rahmen dieser Studie durchgeführte ereignisdatenbasierte Interventionsanalyse zeigt allerdings, dass die
Veränderungen in der amerikanischen Südafrikapolitik im untersuchten Zeitraum von 1977 bis 1996 nur
einen kurzfristigen Effekt auf die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Südafrika hatte. Obwohl die Ve-
rabschiedung des CAAA eine temporäre Verschiebung des Konflikt- /Kooperationsniveaus zwischen den
USA und Südafrika bewirkte, normalisierten sich die Beziehungen rasch wieder, und zwar noch bevor
Frederik de Klerk als neuer südafrikanischer Präsident im Februar 1990 erste Schritte zur Beseitigung
des Apartheidsystems ankündigte. Effekte der deutschen, schwedischen und schweizerischen Aussen-
politik auf die Beziehungen dieser Länder mit Südafrika sind aufgrund der Datenlage schwieriger zu
beurteilen. Trotzdem konnte im Falle Schwedens und Deutschlands—ähnlich dem amerikanischen Fall—
im Verlaufe der 1980er Jahre eine Verschlechterung der Beziehungen zu Südafrika beobachtet werden.
Nur die schweizerisch-südafrikanischen Beziehungen zeigten ein anderes Muster; sie verbesserten sich
Ende 1985 und zu Beginn des folgenden Jahres merklich. Diese positive Entwicklung, wie sie sich auch
im analysierten Ereignisdatensatz widerspiegelt, ist vor allem auf die in diesem Zeitraum stattfindenden
Umschuldungsverhandlungen zwischen wichtigen internationalen Bankinstituten und der südafrikanis-
chen Regierung zurückzuführen, bei denen der frühere Präsident der Schweizerischen Nationalbank als
Vermittler fungierte. Insgesamt zeigten die internationalen Interventionen gegen das Apartheidregime
nur geringe direkte Wirkung auf die politische Entwicklung in Südafrika. In der systematischen Anal-
yse politischer Ereignisse auf der internationalen, regionalen und inner-südafrikanischen Ebene kann nur
dann ein relativ geringer Effekt von internationalen Interventionen festgestellt werden, wenn alle inter-
nationalen Aktionen gegenüber Südafrika in aggregierter Form berücksichtigt werden. Vielmehr erklärt
sich die Konfliktivität zwischen der Apartheidregierung und der südafrikanischen Befreiungsbewegung
in erster Linie durch Entwicklungen innerhalb Südafrikas selbst. Es kann jedoch davon ausgegangen
werden, dass der internationalen Protestbewegung gegen das Apartheidsystem eine grosse symbolische
Bedeutung zukam. So diente sie der südafrikanischen Opposition Ende der 1980er und Anfang der 1990er
Jahre als wichtiges Druckmittel während der Verhandlungen mit der Apartheidregierung zur Beseitigung
des rassistischen Systems und für die Etablierung einer demokratischen Verfassung.
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Summary 
How did the United States, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland design their foreign 
policy toward South Africa under apartheid? What were the consequences of these policies, 
both on the countries’ international relations with regard to apartheid South Africa and on the 
situation in South Africa itself? These are the research questions I address in this dissertation. 
South Africa’s apartheid system (1948-1994) has been an international, and—in many coun-
tries—a domestic political issue since the 1960s. Particularly in Western countries, some of 
which had strong economic and cultural ties with white South Africa, foreign relations with 
the racist regime in South Africa became a ‘hot’ issue in the 1980s, when the international 
boycott movement against apartheid gained political influence both at the international and 
domestic level. 
The governments of the four Western countries under investigation in this study re-
sponded quite differently to these international and political changes. Whereas the Swedish 
government imposed economic sanctions against South Africa together with its Nordic part-
ners as early as the late 1970s, the United States under President Ronald Reagan pursued first 
a policy of “constructive engagement,” trying to change the South African system through 
dialogue and cooperation rather than confrontation and punishment. But in 1986, the U.S. 
Congress adopted with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) a sanctions legisla-
tion that triggered similar actions on the part of other Western governments, particularly in 
the European Community. West Germany, in spite of earlier resistance, eventually also 
agreed to the E.C. sanctions package. Only Switzerland maintained its resistance against 
South African sanctions and never joined such measures against the apartheid regime (apart 
from the adoption of an arms embargo in 1963). 
However, an event data-based intervention analysis reveals that these major changes 
in U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa showed only short-term effects on the interna-
tional relationship between the U.S. and South Africa during that time. Even though the im-
position of the CAAA resulted in a temporary negative shift in the conflict/cooperation level 
between the two countries, the relationship went back to earlier patterns years before new 
South African president Frederik de Klerk announced first steps towards dismantling apart-
heid in February 1990. Effects of the German, Swedish and Swiss German foreign policies 
were more difficult to assess. But, similar to the U.S. case, a temporary worsening of the 
relationship with South Africa could also be observed in the case of Sweden and West Ger-
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many. Only Swiss-South African relations, as displayed by the analyzed event data set, 
showed different patterns. They improved significantly at the end of 1985 and in the begin-
ning of 1986, due to debt restructuring negotiations between major banking institutes on the 
one side and the South African government on the other, with the former president of the 
Swiss National Bank acting as a mediator. 
Overall, international interventions that worked toward an end to apartheid in South 
Africa showed only very little direct impact on developments in the country itself. The sys-
tematic analysis of the dynamics of political events on the international, regional and South 
African domestic level reveals that only a rather slight effect of the overall aggregate of inter-
national actions toward South Africa can be measured robustly. Conflicts between the apart-
heid government and the South African liberation movement can mainly be explained with 
inner-South African developments. However, it can be assumed that the international protest 
movement against the apartheid regime had an important symbolic effect and gave the South 
African opposition an important leverage in its negotiations with the apartheid government 
during the country’s transitional phase toward a new constitution and a modern democratic 
system in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wie gestalteten die USA, die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Schweden und die Schweiz ihre 
Aussenpolitik gegenüber Südafrika zur Zeit der Apartheid? Was waren die Konsequenzen 
dieser Politik, sowohl hinsichtlich der internationalen Beziehungen dieser Länder zu Südafri-
ka als auch für die Situation in Südafrika selbst? Diese Forschungsfragen werden in dieser 
Dissertation untersucht. Das Apartheidregime in Südafrika (1948-1994) war Gegenstand der 
internationalen Politik seit den 1960er Jahren und führte in vielen Staaten auch immer wieder 
zu innenpolitischen Kontroversen um die Ausgestaltung der Aussenpolitik gegenüber dem 
rassistischen Regime in der Kaprepublik. Vor allem westliche Staaten—mit teilweise engen 
wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Beziehungen zum weissen Südafrika—gerieten wegen ihrer 
aussenpolitischen Zurückhaltung gegenüber der südafrikanischen Apartheidregierung zuneh-
mend unter den Druck einer international mobilisierenden Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung. Mitte 
der 1980er Jahre wurden internationale Südafrika-Beziehungen dann zu einem „heissen“ 
Thema, als die internationale Boykottbewegung an politischem Einfluss gewann, sowohl auf 
internationaler Ebene wie auch in der nationalen Politik vieler westlicher Staaten. 
Die Regierungen der vier westlichen Staaten, die im Zentrum dieser Untersuchung 
stehen, stellten sich dieser Herausforderung unterschiedlich. Während Schweden zusammen 
mit seinen nordischen Partnern bereits in den späten 1970er Jahren erste wirtschaftliche Sank-
tionen gegen Südafrika verabschiedete, verfolgte die USA unter Präsident Reagan zuerst eine 
Politik des „konstruktiven Engagements“, indem sie der Apartheidregierung mit Angeboten 
zum Dialog und anderen kooperativen Ansätzen gegenübertrat. Das Jahr 1986 bedeutete dann 
ein Wendepunkt in der amerikanischen Südafrikapolitik, als der Kongress mit dem ‘Compre-
hensive Anti-Apartheid Act’ (CAAA) weitgehende Wirtschaftssanktionen verabschiedete. 
Die Sanktionsbestrebungen in den USA lösten in der Folge ähnliche Massnahmen anderer 
westlicher Regierungen aus, unter anderem in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Die Bundes-
republik Deutschland stand diesen Sanktionsmassnahmen anfänglich ablehnend gegenüber, 
trug das EG-Sanktionspaket aber schliesslich mit. Nur die Schweiz beteiligte sich bis zum 
Ende der Apartheid an keinen Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Südafrika (mit Ausnahme eines 
Waffenembargos von 1963). 
Die im Rahmen dieser Studie durchgeführte ereignisdatenbasierte Interventionsana-
lyse zeigt allerdings, dass die Veränderungen in der amerikanischen Südafrikapolitik im 
untersuchten Zeitraum von 1977 bis 1996 nur einen kurzfristigen Effekt auf die Beziehungen 
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zwischen den USA und Südafrika hatte. Obwohl die Verabschiedung des CAAA eine tempo-
räre Verschiebung des Konflikt-/Kooperationsniveaus zwischen den USA und Südafrika 
bewirkte, normalisierten sich die Beziehungen rasch wieder, und zwar noch bevor Frederik de 
Klerk als neuer südafrikanischer Präsident im Februar 1990 erste Schritte zur Beseitigung des 
Apartheidsystems ankündigte. 
Effekte der deutschen, schwedischen und schweizerischen Aussenpolitik auf die Be-
ziehungen dieser Länder mit Südafrika sind aufgrund der Datenlage schwieriger zu beurteilen. 
Trotzdem konnte im Falle Schwedens und Deutschlands—ähnlich dem amerikanischen 
Fall—im Verlaufe der 1980er Jahre eine Verschlechterung der Beziehungen zu Südafrika 
beobachtet werden. Nur die schweizerisch-südafrikanischen Beziehungen zeigten ein anderes 
Muster; sie verbesserten sich Ende 1985 und zu Beginn des folgenden Jahres merklich. Diese 
positive Entwicklung, wie sie sich auch im analysierten Ereignisdatensatz widerspiegelt, ist 
vor allem auf die in diesem Zeitraum stattfindenden Umschuldungsverhandlungen zwischen 
wichtigen internationalen Bankinstituten und der südafrikanischen Regierung zurückzuführen, 
bei denen der frühere Präsident der Schweizerischen Nationalbank als Vermittler fungierte. 
Insgesamt zeigten die internationalen Interventionen gegen das Apartheidregime nur 
geringe direkte Wirkung auf die politische Entwicklung in Südafrika. In der systematischen 
Analyse politischer Ereignisse auf der internationalen, regionalen und inner-südafrikanischen 
Ebene kann nur dann ein relativ geringer Effekt von internationalen Interventionen festgestellt 
werden, wenn alle internationalen Aktionen gegenüber Südafrika in aggregierter Form be-
rücksichtigt werden. Vielmehr erklärt sich die Konfliktivität zwischen der Apartheidregierung 
und der südafrikanischen Befreiungsbewegung in erster Linie durch Entwicklungen innerhalb 
Südafrikas selbst. Es kann jedoch davon ausgegangen werden, dass der internationalen Pro-
testbewegung gegen das Apartheidsystem eine grosse symbolische Bedeutung zukam. So 
diente sie der südafrikanischen Opposition Ende der 1980er und Anfang der 1990er Jahre als 
wichtiges Druckmittel während der Verhandlungen mit der Apartheidregierung zur Beseiti-
gung des rassistischen Systems und für die Etablierung einer demokratischen Verfassung. 
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1 Introduction 
How to deal with South Africa’s apartheid regime (1948-1994) has been a controversial issue 
within the international community since the 1960s at the latest. Western foreign policy to-
ward the South African system of racial segregation and political and economic discrimina-
tion against nonwhites posed a severe challenge to both the central foreign policy beliefs of 
these states on the one hand and their political, economic and strategic interests on the other. 
From a moral point of view, the rejection of apartheid was largely considered beyond contro-
versy. Only a minority in some countries’ political and economic elite showed sympathy for 
the white minority regime. But political, economic and strategic considerations in the region 
prompted many Western governments to treat the South African government with kid gloves. 
Foreign relations with South Africa became a “hot” issue particularly in the 1980s 
when the international boycott movement against South Africa gained political influence on 
the international political level and in domestic politics in many Western states, particularly in 
North America and Scandinavia. Internationally, several United Nations bodies called upon 
Member States to take measures against South Africa. A mandatory arms embargo against 
South Africa imposed in 1977 (Resolution 418) was only one of two cases in which the U.N. 
Security Council adopted compulsory sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (“Ac-
tion with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”) 
during the Cold War period.1 On the domestic political level too, media reports on the con-
tinually worsening human rights situation in South Africa and an increasingly organized 
international apartheid-movement put the racist policies of the white minority regime in South 
Africa and Western relations with that country on the political agenda. 
This doctoral dissertation thesis investigates the foreign policies of four Western 
states and the consequences of their relations with South Africa during this time of increasing 
international and domestic preoccupation with the apartheid regime in South Africa. The 
study includes the United States of America, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland as case 
studies because the governments of these four countries designed their relations toward apart-
heid South Africa quite differently and are therefore expected to be illuminative cases to 
                                                
1 The other case included mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe), after the 
self-governed British colony unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom in 1965 (Resolution 
232, 16 December 1966). 
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analyze the implementation of varying foreign policies toward a so-called “problem regime” 
(Haass and O'Sullivan 2000b: 2). 
The research project thereby analyzes the causes and the consequences of the simi-
larities and differences of the four selected countries’ foreign policy conceptions regarding 
apartheid South Africa. Different instruments of influence (sanctions, incentives, dialogue and 
mediation) attempting to change the South African government’s behavior in a more favor-
able way will be tested using an extensive data set containing systematic information on 
around 79,000 international events related to South Africa under apartheid from 1977 to 1996. 
The data is coded from international news wire services (Associated Press and Reuters) using 
the automated coding systems of the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) and Text Analysis 
By Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI) (Schrodt and Gerner 1994; Gerner et al. 
1994; Schrodt et al. 1994). 
The study covers the period from January 1977 to December 1996. It starts with the 
intensifying international debate on specific international action against apartheid in 1977 as a 
reaction to the violent crackdown by the apartheid government on uprising students and 
school children in the townships of Soweto outside of Johannesburg in June 1976. Hundreds 
were killed while protesting inferior education. This incident reinforced international concern 
with apartheid and paved the way for a tightening of the U.N. arms embargo against South 
Africa in November 1977 (Resolution 418). The study ends in 1996 when the South African 
democratic transition came to its preliminary end under the new Government of National 
Unity under President Nelson Mandela, around two-and-a-half years after the first all-race 
democratic elections in April 1994. 
Beyond its empirical contribution to a clarification of the question of how liberal 
democracies dealt with one of the most severe “problem regimes” of the 20th century, the 
study also contributes to scientific and political debate on linkages between domestic politics 
and international relations. The study contains a discussion of the international dimension of 
specific concepts mostly originating from the field of public policy (policy design and policy 
instruments, implementation and evaluation) and demonstrates the significance of these con-
cepts for the research stream of foreign policy analysis. The main thesis of this research pro-
ject is that U.S., West-German, Swedish and Swiss bilateral relations with South Africa were 
affected in different ways largely by two elements: the governmental design of the foreign 
policy toward South Africa incorporating different actors and policy instruments (according 
to the concept of “policy design”) and the countries’ international structural configuration, 
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such as their general geopolitical position, interests and beliefs, and their specific historical 
‘closeness’ to South Africa. 
1.1 Overall Research Question and Aim of the Study 
How did the United States, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland design their foreign 
policy toward South Africa under apartheid (1948-1994)? What were the consequences of 
these policies, both on the countries’ international relations with regard to apartheid South 
Africa and on the situation in South Africa itself? 
This is the overall research question I address in my dissertation. Whereas foreign 
policy-making toward South Africa under apartheid has been widely explored over the last 
two decades2, the consequences of the resulting policies remain widely ambiguous and are 
subjected to controversy. In assessing such policy consequences in a comparative perspective, 
the study also contributes to a broader theoretical and empirical understanding of the debate 
on Western foreign policy toward South Africa during the apartheid era. 
Empirically, the study investigates the foreign policy of four Western countries that 
shaped both their foreign policies toward South Africa and international action against apart-
heid quite differently. The four states also reacted in a different way to the intensified interna-
tional debate on international sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s: 
The United States changed its foreign policy toward South Africa almost fundamen-
tally in the mid-1980s. In the first half of the decade, the administration of President Ronald 
Reagan pursued a policy of “constructive engagement”, trying to change the South African 
government’s political behavior rather with dialogue than protest or even sanctioning. But this 
policy came more and more under domestic political pressure. In 1986, the U.S. Congress—
overruling President Reagan’s veto against this piece of legislation—adopted the Comprehen-
sive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) and imposed extensive economic sanctions against South 
Africa. 
West Germany, as did Britain, worked against European-South Africa sanctions. Af-
ter the imposition of CAAA in the U.S., however, Germany agreed to impose a package of 
                                                
2 For the United States see, e.g., Baker (1989, 2000), Coker (1986), Danaher (1984), Hesse (2001), Irogbe 
(1997), Klotz (1995b); for Germany: Wenzel (1994); for Sweden: Bangura (2004); for Switzerland: Kreis 
(2005), Vatter et al. (2005), Widmer and Hirschi (2005). 
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economic sanctions against South Africa in line with other European Community (EC) mem-
ber states. 
Sweden, not an EC member until 1995, had been leading the way in Western gov-
ernmental anti-apartheid protest going as far back as the 1960s, pursuing a distinct “moral 
foreign policy”. The Swedish government rendered significant financial support to South 
African opposition groups (in particular to the African National Congress) and imposed eco-
nomic sanctions against the apartheid regime together with its Nordic partners (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland and Norway) as early as of 1978, followed by a total embargo in 1987. 
Switzerland, on the other hand, always argued against South Africa sanctions and 
never joined economic sanctions against the apartheid regime (besides the adoption of an 
arms embargo in 1963). Sanctions as an instrument of Swiss foreign policy were declined as a 
matter of principle. And as a non-member of the United Nations until 2002, the Swiss gov-
ernment also saw no obligation to obey U.N. sanction decisions. Clearly, the international 
community was not of one mind on South Africa.  
Apart from their different reactions to international developments regarding South 
Africa under apartheid and important structural dissimilarities between the four countries in 
the international political system, the four states also show evident similarities. Geo-
politically, all four were unambiguously part of the Western group of states in the bipolar 
world order of the Cold War. Economically, the four countries are highly integrated into 
world markets, also with rather close economic ties to South Africa. This raises the question, 
whether the four countries’ foreign relations toward South Africa in fact developed differ-
ently, or if their foreign policies toward South Africa differed more on a declaratory basis 
than on a level of concrete political action. 
The study also ties in with the political and scientific debate on the international di-
mension of the apartheid era after its official end in 1994. From 1995 to 1998, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission investigated certain international aspects of the 
apartheid regime. More recently, various Western multinational corporations—including 
Nestlé, Exxon Mobil, General Motors and Credit Suisse—were targets in the United States of 
class-action lawsuits filed by victims of the apartheid regime. This current political and legal 
controversy on the share of the international responsibility for human rights violations under 
the apartheid system in South Africa, however, is not in the center of this piece of research. 
 17 
Instead, the study takes on the scientific debate on the success and failure of interna-
tional action against apartheid. In particular the question if diplomatic and economic sanctions 
are an effective foreign policy instrument to change an unfavorable behavior in a more prefer-
able direction has prominently been discussed with regard to South Africa under apartheid. 
Both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, the question on the effectiveness of 
sanctions attracted much attention since 1990 both from policymakers and scholars, mainly 
due to the new willingness of the members of the U.N. Security Council to apply such meas-
ures as instruments of influence in the post Cold War era.3 In this debate, the case of South 
Africa under apartheid is an important point of reference that many views as an appropriate—
some might say critical—case to understand how strategic, economic and social isolation 
affects the politics, economy and social relations of the target of international sanctions as 
well as third parties (e.g., Crawford and Klotz 1999; Levy 1999). 
But despite the fairly frequent use of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument in the 
last two decades and extensive research activities on the topic, the debate on the effectiveness 
of international sanctions has come to little resolution on this point. The specific case of 
sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa has not proved to be much more illu-
minating either. The debate rather reveals how an assessment of the effectiveness of interna-
tional sanctions is usually based on a variety of uncertainties and assumptions. The study 
therefore also aims at a theoretical and methodological contribution to the current discussion’s 
raison d’être of international sanctions. 
Conceptually, the study applies a quasi-experimental research design as it is often 
used in evaluation. Theoretical concepts such as ‘policy arena’, ‘policy design’ and ‘policy 
instruments’—three concepts largely developed in the realm of the ‘public policy’ research 
domain—are then discussed from a foreign policy perspective. It can be demonstrated that 
these concepts of predominantly domestic origin have potential for the analysis of foreign 
affairs. From a methodological point of view, the study applies a specific method that has 
rarely been employed in a study on international sanctions: event data analysis. 
                                                
3 In the 1990s, the Security Council imposed mandatory U.N. sanctions in the following cases: Iraq 1990, former 
Yugoslavia 1991, 1992 & 1998, Libya 1992, Somalia 1992, Khmer Rouge-controlled areas of Cambodia 1992, 
Haiti 1993, UNITA faction in Angola 1993, 1997 & 1998, Rwanda 1994, Sudan 1996, Sierra Leone 1997 and 
Afghanistan 1999, see Cortright and Lopez (2000) and Elliot and Hufbauer (1999). 
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1.2 Specific Research Questions and Steps of Analysis 
Three sets of specific research questions each investigate a particular sub-question of the 
overall research question of this study. Each set of specific research questions involves a 
particular step of analysis with a distinct methodological approach. Figure 1 gives an over-
view of the intersections between the three sets of research questions and the corresponding 
steps of analysis and applied methods. 
Figure 1: Research Design 
 
South Africa policy 
(foreign policy design) 
 
South Africa measures 
(foreign policy intervention) 
 
South Africa relations 
(foreign policy behavior) 
 
Situation in South Africa 
(foreign policy impact) 
(Policy Design)  (Output)  (Outcome)  (Impact) 
Research question 1 (qualitative case study)     
  Research question 2 (intervention/outcome analysis)   
    Research question 3 (impact analysis) 
 
 
The three steps of analysis are designed as follows: 
1. How did the United States, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland design their foreign 
policy toward South Africa under apartheid? What were the major foreign policy inter-
ventions? 
 (Qualitative Case Studies) 
Although the study concentrates on the implementation of foreign policy rather than 
on its making, the political process that led to specific foreign policies cannot be ignored. I 
therefore examine first the design of the four countries’ foreign policies in general and toward 
South Africa in particular through qualitative case studies (Yin 2003; Yin 1998; Yin 1993; 
King et al. 1994; Eckstein 1975). The ‘design’ of a policy, as it is understood here (according 
to Linder and Peters 1991), refers to both policy content and related policy processes that 
generated the particular policy. 
2. How did the four states’ international relations with South Africa change over time? What 
were the effects of changes in the foreign policy design and particular foreign policy in-
terventions on the four states’ international relations with South Africa? How can these 
effects be explained? 
(Intervention/Outcome Analysis) 
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The second step of analysis includes a systematic investigation of the four states’ in-
ternational behavior toward South Africa under apartheid and an intervention analysis of the 
effects of major foreign policy changes and interventions on the international relations of the 
four states. This part of the study is based on a systematic analysis of events that happened in 
the four states’ international relations toward South Africa in the period of 1977 to 1996. 
Event data—nominal or ordinal codes for recording interactions between international actors 
as reported in the open press (Schrodt and Gerner 1994: 826)—provide a rich set of variables 
for the analysis of interactions between international actors by breaking down complex politi-
cal activities into a sequence of basic building blocks (comments, visits, grants, rewards, 
protests, demands, threats, military engagement, etc.). For each state’s international relations 
with South Africa (so-called dyad), an event data set will be created that can be analyzed 
using time series analysis (Enders 2004; Mills 1990; McCleary and Hay 1980). The investiga-
tion of effects in this particular step of analysis is eventually based on a particular quasi-
experiment as it is often used in policy evaluation (interrupted time-series design, see Cook 
and Campbell 1979: 207-32; Shadish et al. 2001: 171-206). 
3. What were the effects of different foreign policy interventions on the situation in South 
Africa? How can these effects be explained? 
 (Impact Analysis) 
In the third step of analysis I investigate the potential effects that different foreign 
policy interventions might have had on the actual situation in South Africa. Within South 
Africa, I am mostly interested if behavioral changes of the South African government have 
been linked with the activities against apartheid on the international political level. Then, the 
behavior of the anti-apartheid movement within South Africa has to be taken into account as 
well, both as a potential explaining factor for changes in South Africa and a dependent vari-
able influenced by international action against apartheid. Considering the regional dimension 
of the policies of South Africa’s apartheid government, links with regional developments 
have to be analyzed too. Such a systematic analysis of these different, potentially influential 
developments on the political situation in South Africa is widely missing and also the causali-
ties between the different developments on the domestic, regional and international level 
remain mainly unclear. I therefore estimate in this third part of analysis the evolution and the 
interdependencies between different developments on the national, regional and international 
level using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models (Freeman et al. 1989; Enders 2004: 264-
318). 
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1.3 Outline of the Study 
The study is structured as follows:  
The following Chapter 2 outlines first the significance of apartheid in South Africa as 
an international political issue and its relevance for national foreign policy making from the 
1960s to 1990s. Then, the literature on international sanctions as an instrument of coercive 
diplomacy is discussed. Two main questions are in the foreground of this literature review: 
the general knowledge on the effectiveness of such instruments and the role sanctions might 
have played in South Africa’s democratic transition in the beginning of the 1990s. 
Chapter 3 examines the effects of different foreign policy instruments of diplomatic 
coercion (negative and positive sanctions, dialogue and mediation) from a theoretical perspec-
tive. Also in this chapter, international sanctions as they are understood in the field of Interna-
tional Relations will be related to the hybrid research stream of foreign policy analysis and the 
predominantly domestically oriented field of ‘public policy’. The theoretical considerations 
result in a set of hypotheses on the effects of different foreign policy concepts at the interna-
tional political level. 
In Chapter 4, the methodological framework of the study will be introduced. First of 
all, I outline the applied case selection strategy and explain the comparative design of the 
study. The main part of the chapter then deals with the different steps of the event data analy-
sis that resulted in two major data sets on international events concerning South Africa under 
apartheid for the time period of 1977 to 1996. The applied statistical data analysis techniques 
will also be described in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 presents the four times-series case studies of American, German, Swedish 
and Swiss relations with South Africa under apartheid from 1977 to 1996. For each case, I 
will first explore the foreign policy design that each respective government applied toward 
apartheid South Africa and how the respective foreign policy evolved over time. Then, the 
countries’ international relations with South Africa will be analyzed and the effects of specific 
policy decisions on these relations tested. 
Chapter 6 discusses the effects of the four countries’ foreign policies toward apart-
heid South Africa from a comparative perspective. In this chapter, I will examine the major 
changes in the international relations with South Africa and discuss possible impacts thereof 
on the political situation in South Africa. 
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Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings and points out some directions for further 
research. 
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2 International Dimensions of South Africa under Apartheid 
2.1 South Africa under Apartheid 
Apartheid, Afrikaans for ‘apartness’ or ‘separateness’, was a series of laws and acts that were 
implemented over the period from 1948 to 1991 by the Afrikaner dominated white-nationalist 
South African government under the lead of the National Party. The main purpose of this 
legislation was to enforce the segregation of different races in South Africa and to cement the 
power and dominance of the white minority (substantially of European descent) over the other 
racial groups (mostly African descent). It included the following main laws and acts: 
The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) prohibited marriages between people 
of different races. 
The Population Registration Act (1950) required all citizens to be registered as 
‘Black’, ‘White’, ‘Coloured’ (mixed-raced), or ‘Asian’ (consisting of Indians and Pakistanis, 
that is, South Asians from former British India).4 In the apartheid system, social rights, politi-
cal rights, educational opportunities and economic status were largely determined by which 
group an individual belonged to. The Office for Race Classification was responsible for this 
racial classification using criteria such as outer appearance and social standing. 
The Group Areas Act (1950) represented the very heart of apartheid by partitioning 
the country into different areas, with these areas being allocated to different racial groups. The 
Group Areas Act was built upon the Native Land Act implemented in 1913, which assigned 
only 7.5 percent of the Union of South Africa (1910-1961) to ‘black’ South Africans. The 
Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 later assigned about 14 percent of the South African terri-
tory to ‘black’ people, which represented about 75 percent of the then South African popula-
tion. 
The Immorality Act (1950) made it a criminal act for ‘white’ people to have any sex-
ual relations with a person of different race. 
The Suppression of Communism Act (1950); this law banned the South African 
Communist Party and any other party the government chose to label as ‘communist’. The 
definition of communism in the wording of the act was so broad that almost anybody seeking 
                                                
4 The terms ‘Blacks’, ‘Whites’, ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Asians’ are used in this study as categories of the apartheid 
system and by no means as a justification of such classifications. 
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to change a law could be considered a communist, especially if it was a law enforcing apart-
heid (Clark and Worger 2004: 54). Major anti-apartheid leaders and organizations (such as the 
African National Congress, 1960-1991) were banned under this act. 
The Bantu Authorities Act (1951) created separate government structures for ‘black’ 
areas. 
The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951) allowed the government to demolish 
‘black’ shackland slums. 
The Native Building Workers Act and Native Services Levy (1951) forced ‘white’ 
employers to pay for the construction of proper housing for ‘black’ workers recognized as 
legal residents in ‘white’ cities. 
The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act (1952), 
commonly known as the Pass Laws, led—despite its title—to a rigid application of pass laws 
and acted as an instrument to control the mobility of ‘blacks’ inside South Africa. 
The Bantu Education Act (1953) brought racial separation to all educational institu-
tions. 
The Bantu Urban Areas Act (1954) restricted ‘black’ migration to the cities. 
The Mines and Work Act (1956) formalized racial discrimination in employment. 
The Promotion of Black Self Government Act (1958) established separate territorial 
governments in the ‘homelands’ (or ‘bantustans’), the tribal reserves for black inhabitants of 
South Africa and South-West Africa (now Namibia). 
The Bantu Investment Corporation Act (1959) set up a system to promote and en-
courage economic development in the homelands. 
The Extension of University Education Act (1959) put an end to black students at-
tending white universities (mainly the universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand) and 
created separate tertiary institutions for ‘whites’, ‘coloureds’, ‘blacks’ and ‘Asians’. 
The Black Homeland Citizenship Act (1970), this law withheld South African citi-
zenship from inhabitants of the ‘homelands’, aiming at a ‘white’ demographic majority within 
‘white’ South Africa. 
The Afrikaans Medium Decree (1974) required the use of Afrikaans and English on a 
fifty-fifty basis in high schools outside the homelands. 
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In this way, the South African government set up a distinguished legal system that 
extended existing racial segregation and discrimination. The most significant apartheid laws 
were the Group Areas Act of 1950 which led to over three million people being relocated 
through forced removals, the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 which was so broadly 
worded that almost any dissident group could be banned, the Bantu Authorities Act of 151 
which led to the ultimately ‘independent’ (but internationally never recognized) ‘homelands’ 
and the rigid Pass Laws of 1952 which were designed to regulate movement of black Africans 
into urban areas. 
The reasons for this dramatically regressive turn of events have been debated inten-
sively by scholars, politicians and human rights activists. For some, apartheid was the logical 
extension of South Africa’s own history, a continuation and intensification of a long history 
of segregation. Indeed, apartheid rested on a long legacy of racial discrimination. Many apart-
heid laws merely elaborated previous colonial policies and segregation legislation. Thus, 
racial discrimination in South Africa did not begin in 1948 (Clark and Worger 2004). 
In fact, policies of racial discrimination can be traced back to the beginning of Dutch 
colonialization of the Cape in the mid 17th century and thereafter with the establishment of an 
economy based on the use of slaves brought in from East Africa and Southeast Asia. After the 
end of slavery in the 1830s, racial discrimination continued in myriad forms as European 
settlement expanded. Until the first half of the 20th century, neither racial discrimination nor 
segregation policies distinguished South Africa from many other societies, especially those of 
the colonial world. The practice of apartheid has thus come to be viewed as a continuation, 
magnification and extension of the segregationist policies of previous white colonial admini-
strations. 
But South Africa’s apartheid laws differed from segregation and racial discrimina-
tion in other countries in the systematic way in which the ruling National Party formalized the 
policies through the law. And after the defeat of national socialism and fascism in World War 
II as well as the ending of colonialism in Asia and Africa in the 1940s and 1950s, apartheid in 
South Africa became an anachronism: while former colonies in Africa and Asia were becom-
ing independent, the civil rights movement was making gains in the United States and else-
where, and the world in general seemed to be moving towards a greater consideration of 
human rights, South Africa appeared to be moving backwards at an alarming rate (Clark and 
Worger 2004: 35). With the extension of the apartheid legislation and its strict enforcement, 
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every aspect of people’s life in South Africa was basically determined under law by race 
(Clark and Worger 2004: 35-86).  
The South African government faced severe resistance because of its policies. In the 
years following the National Party’s victory in 1948 and the introduction of apartheid as a 
legal system, Africans began to organize massive protests against the new government and its 
policy of racial segregation and discrimination. Already in 1949, the African National Con-
gress (ANC) adopted—as proposed by the Congress’ Youth League including the later ANC-
leaders Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu—a ‘Program of Action’ to chal-
lenge the new South African government’s plans for apartheid (Mandela 1994: 113-115). 
With its programs of boycotts, civil disobedience and non-cooperation, and a national day of 
work stoppage, the ANC become the central resistance movement against apartheid in South 
Africa. The South African Communist Party (SACP), a multi-racial party, also called for 
greater action, staging a national strike for the first time on May Day 1950 (Clark and Worger 
2004: 54). 
In addition to the ANC, other opposition groups were formed. Robert Sobukwe es-
tablished in 1959 the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) as an alternative to the ANC because he 
believed that the ANC should take more direct action to challenge the apartheid government. 
Opposition against apartheid was also rooted in a white political minority (organized in the 
‘Congress of Democrats’, later called the ‘Democratic Party’), in political organizations that 
represented the Indian (South African Indian Congress, SAIC) and coloured (Coloured Peo-
ple’s Congress) population and the multiracial South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) (Clark and Worger 2004: 56). 
But repressive measures such as house arrests, bannings and other forms of govern-
ment restrictions limited the ability of these anti-apartheid organizations, especially the ANC, 
PAC and SAIC, to organize publicly. Moreover, apartheid legislation usually followed the 
familiar pattern that government repression led to new legal restrictions (Clark and Worger 
2004: 45). In response to the so-called ‘Defiance Campaign’ (Clark and Worger 2004: 55-56) 
that aimed at a collective disobedience of the apartheid laws, for example, the government 
appropriated the right to suspend all laws and shifted the burden of proof to the accused. The 
Public Safety Act (No. 3) of 1953 allowed the government to declare a state of emergency and 
suspend all laws if it believed that any action or threatened action might endanger public 
safety or the maintenance of public order. As such, the government continuously increased its 
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suppression of the non-white population, especially during the 1960s and 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s. 
By the early 1980s, the practical failure of the idea of ‘grand apartheid’—that is, the 
belief that the complete separation of all races and ethnic groups would ensure stability and 
control (Clark and Worger 2004: 64-69)—and the increasing political and economical costs to 
maintain the repressive apartheid system (Lowenberg 1997; Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998) 
prompted the South African government to political reform. It was apparent—by the end of 
the 1970s at the latest—that neither the implementation of apartheid nor police intimidation 
was successful in halting continuing resistance and unrest within South Africa (Clark and 
Worger 2004: 79-83). In a November 1983 referendum, a majority of white voters therefore 
approved Prime Minister Pieter Willem Botha’s proposal for a new constitution to include 
separate parliamentary representation for Coloureds and Asians, but still to exclude Africans. 
But in fact, Prime Minister Botha established under the new constitution an even more power-
ful presidency, which sparked widespread protests across South Africa and rioting in black 
townships that continued sporadically for the following two years (Hufbauer et al. 1990b: 
221, Economist, March 1985, p. 27). 
On 20 July 1985, in response to ongoing protests and violence in the townships, the 
South African government declared a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts (Clark and 
Worger 2004: xii). In a speech expected to include announcements of significant new re-
forms, President Botha took a hard line, saying he had “crossed the Rubicon” on the road to 
reform, but that he will set the pace and choose the terms (Baker 1989: 32-33; Hufbauer et al. 
1990a: 223, Washington Post, 16 August 1985, p. A1). However, Botha ruled out significant 
political power-sharing and blamed “barbaric communist agitators” (Washington Post, 16 
August 1985, p. A1) for disturbances in South Africa. The government maintained the state of 
emergency until March 1986 (Washington Post, 12 June 1986, p. A26), before it went back 
on the “path of repression” (Hayes 1987: 2) with the announcement of a second, nation-wide 
state of emergency on 12 June 1986. 
After suffering a stroke and in response to expressions of increasing dissatisfaction 
with him from members of his own party, Botha resigned in August 1989. Botha’s minister of 
internal affairs and leader of the National Party since February 1989, Frederik Willem de 
Klerk, replaced him as state president. De Klerk had not been a prominent member of the 
cabinet and was widely seen as an unremarkable foot soldier of apartheid (Clark and Worger 
2004: 103; Mandela 1994: 551; Sparks 1995: 91). But he dramatically captured the world’s 
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attention when he announced at the opening session of parliament on 2 February 1990 his 
plans to unban the ANC, SACP, PAC and 31 other organizations, release Nelson Mandela 
after imprisonment for nearly 28 years, officially negotiate with the ANC on the abolition of 
apartheid and establish a new, democratic constitution for the country (New York Times, 3 
February 1990, p. 1). Since 1986, government officials had held secret meetings with the 
imprisoned Mandela, and—as de Klerk pointed out in his speech before the South African 
Parliament—“the Government has noted that he [Mandela] has declared himself to be willing 
to make a constructive contribution to the political peace process in South Africa” (speech 
excerpts in The New York Times, 3 February 1990, p. 6, see also Clark and Worger 2004: 146-
148). Most authors attach great importance to these series of meetings with Mandela to the 
change in the government’s attitude towards the ANC, especially those meetings held from 
May 1988 onwards between a government committee (consisting of the minister of justice, 
the commissioner of prisons, the director general of prisons and the head of the National 
Intelligence Service) and Nelson Mandela (Clark and Worger 2004: 101-104; Sparks 1995: 
21-36; Waldmeir 1997: 86-106). 
After the ANC declared an end to its armed struggle against apartheid in 1991, for-
mal negotiations on a new constitution and multiracial government began under the Conven-
tion for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) on 20-21 December 1991. On 17 March 1992, 
a national referendum of white voters supported President de Klerk’s political initiatives 
(Clark and Worger 2004: xiii). During 1990 and 1991, the South African government re-
pealed cornerstones of the apartheid legislation such as the Natives’ Land Act, the Population 
Registration Act, the Separate Amenities Act, and the Group Area Act (the Pass Laws and the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act were repealed already in 1986, see Clark and Worger 
2004: xii-xiii). In spite of this significant legal mitigation of apartheid, the transition phase 
between 1990 and 1992/1993 was affected by violence time and again due to an intensifying 
rivalry between the factions of the ANC and Chief Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
against white right-wing extremists who stemmed against political change. Mandela—and 
virtually the whole of black South Africa—accused the de Klerk government of involvement 
in massacres against ANC supporters and inhabitants of black squatter camps. In response, 
they temporarily pulled out of the negotiations (Mandela 1994: 603-604; Waldmeir 1997: 
191-203). 
In July 1993, de Klerk and Mandela agreed that the first free democratic elections 
would be held in April 1994. In December 1993, the Transitional Executive Council as a 
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multi-party interim government began to operate. On 26-28 April 1994, the ANC won South 
Africa’s first democratic elections and Nelson Mandela became the first president of the new 
government of national unity. The new constitution was eventually adopted in May 1996 and 
took force in 1999 (Clark and Worger 2004: 106-110; Waldmeir 1997: 206-219). 
2.2 South Africa’s Involvement in Regional Conflicts 
After World War II and throughout the 1950s and 60s, not only South Africa’s apartheid 
system but also the country’s policies towards its neighboring countries were of major inter-
national concern. In Namibia (South-West Africa), the South African government refused to 
surrender its earlier mandate from the League of Nations to administer the former German 
colony and did not agree to a U.N. trusteeship with closer international monitoring of the 
territory’s administration. South Africa never officially integrated South-West Africa into its 
territory but administered the country as its de facto fifth province, with the white minority 
being represented in the whites-only South African parliament. 
International pressure on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia mounted during 
the 1960s as the European colonial powers granted independence to their colonies and trust 
territories in Africa. The U.N. General Assembly definitively revoked South Africa’s mandate 
to administer Namibia in October 1966 (Resolution 2145). Also in 1966, the South Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) launched an armed struggle to liberate Namibia. In a 1971 
advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice confirmed U.N. authority over Namibia 
and ruled that South Africa was obligated to withdraw its administration from Namibia im-
mediately and thus put and end to its occupation of the territory. 
In 1977, Western members of the U.N. Security Council, including Canada, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and the United States (known as the Western Con-
tact Group) intensified their diplomatic efforts to bring an internationally acceptable transition 
to independence for Namibia. These efforts led to Security Council Resolution 435 of 29 
September 1978. This settlement plan, known as the U.N. Plan, was elaborated after lengthy 
consultations with South Africa, the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tan-
zania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), SWAPO, U.N. officials and the Western Contact Group. The 
plan included elections in Namibia under U.N. supervision and control, the cessation of all 
hostile acts by all parties as well as restrictions on the activities of South African and Namib-
ian military, paramilitary forces and police (Resolution 435). 
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But it was not until 1988 that South Africa agreed to end its administration of Na-
mibia in real terms. This settlement was linked to developments in other countries in the 
region, especially Angola. 
In Angola, the ideological differences between the liberation movements of the 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the União Nacional para a Inde-
pendência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Frente Nacial da Libertação de Angola (FNLA) 
led immediately to a civil war in Angola after the new military government in Portugal agreed 
in 1975 to hand over power to a coalition of the three movements. South Africa became in-
volved in the conflict because of its interests in Namibia; SWAPO started to fight South 
African troops in Namibia from bases inside Angola, while South Africa, on the other hand, 
intervened in Angola on behalf of UNITA. The Zaire military supported the FNLA, while 
Cuban troops arrived in Angola on behalf of the ruling MPLA government. Within a few 
months in 1975, the conflict had become effectively internationalized. Whereas the FNLA 
became increasingly marginalized due to internal divisions and abandonment by international 
supporters, the internationalized conventional civil war between UNITA and the MPLA 
continued until 1989. For much of this time, UNITA controlled vast parts of the country and 
was backed by U.S. resources and South African troops. Tens of thousands of Cuban troops 
stayed in Angola in support of the MPLA, regularly fighting South African military along the 
front lines. 
In May 1988, the United States made new efforts to mediate between the conflicting 
parties, initiating negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, with the Soviet Union 
as an observer. The goal of the intensive diplomatic maneuvering over the following seven 
months was to work out an agreement to bring peace to the region and make implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 435 possible (U.S. Department of State 2007a). On 13 De-
cember 1988, Cuba, South Africa and Angola agreed to a total Cuban troop withdrawal from 
Angola. South Africa agreed at the same time to withdraw its troops from Angola and Na-
mibia and to comply with the U.N. plan for an independent Namibia. The implementation of 
Resolution 435 officially began with South Africa’s appointment of General Louis Pienaar as 
the administrator of the transition under the supervision of the U.N. Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG). This settlement in Namibia carried important implications for the political 
situation in South Africa. Both scholars and contemporary witnesses stress that the solution of 
the conflict in Namibia offered hope that a more pragmatic approach to solving the South 
African problem was also possible. Or as Sir Robert Renwick, British ambassador in South 
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Africa at that time, put it, “Namibia showed the South Africans that this kind of change would 
not necessarily have catastrophic results” (cited in Sparks 1995: 98). 
Mozambique, neighboring South Africa to the Northeast and, like Angola, a former 
Portuguese colony that gained independence after the April 1974 coup in Lisbon, established 
under the lead of the Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in 1975 a one-party 
government allied with the Soviet bloc. The new government supported the liberation move-
ments in South Africa (ANC) and Zimbabwe (ZANU); its foreign policy was therefore inex-
tricably linked to the struggles for majority rule in the two countries. Both the Rhodesian 
government under Ian Smith and South Africa tried to destabilize Mozambique by fostering 
and financing the armed rebel movement of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana 
(RENAMO). 
In Zimbabwe, South Africa supported the white minority regime led by Ian Smith af-
ter it declared unilateral independence from Britain in November 1965. No other government 
except the one in South Africa recognized the racist government of then named Southern 
Rhodesia. After the breakpoint of the Smith Regime in March 1978 and successful British and 
U.S. mediation in the civil war that had broken out, the new Zimbabwean government of 
Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) followed a nonaligned foreign 
policy and tried to pursue a pragmatic relationship with South Africa. While opposed to 
apartheid and supporting democratic change in South Africa, Zimbabwe never provided for 
anti-South African guerrillas. 
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2.3 South Africa under Apartheid as an International Issue 
The South African government’s apartheid policies appeared for the first time prominently on 
the international political agenda in the 1960s. On 1 April 1960, the United Nations Security 
Council recognized that “the situation in South Africa was one that had led to international 
friction and, if continued, might endanger international peace and security” and called upon 
the South African government to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination 
(Resolution 134). In November 1962, the U.N. General Assembly requested Member States 
for the first time “to take specific measures to bring about the abandonment of apartheid, 
including breaking of diplomatic, trade and transport relations” (Resolution 1761). Since 
1968, South Africa’s apartheid system was regarded as “contrary to international law and 
international morality” (final declaration of the 1968 World Conference on Human Rights in 
Teheran). In 1973, the General Assembly passed the International Convention on the Punish-
ment and Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid, which declared apartheid to be crime 
against humanity.5 Apartheid has also been labeled a war crime under the Geneva Conven-
tions.6 Both the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council repeatedly called on South 
Africa to obey Security Council Resolution 134. By the mid-1970s, South Africa was ex-
cluded from numerous international organizations and conferences (including the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly from 1974 to 1994). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
today defines apartheid as one of eleven crimes against humanity.7 
Despite the almost unanimous international condemnation of apartheid as a severe 
violation of fundamental human rights, an arms embargo against South Africa from 1977 
(Resolution 418) remained to be the only U.N. Security Council resolution on South Africa 
that was binding on member states (United Nations 1994). Several international attempts to 
pressure the South African government to serious political reform and an eventual abolition of 
                                                
5 The convention was ratified by 101 members states and entered into force on 18 July 1976. No Western coun-
try either signed or ratified the convention (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2007). 
6 Although the Geneva Conventions originally made no specific provision for wars of national liberation, the 
U.N. General Assembly, from 1968 onwards, expressed “grave concern over the ruthless persecution of oppo-
nents of apartheid under arbitrary laws and treatment of freedom fighters who are taken prisoner during the 
legitimate struggle for liberation and condemns the Government of South Africa for its cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment of political prisoners” (Resolution 2396). 
7 The statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), was opened for signature on 17 July 
1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. By spring 2007, 104 governments ratified the statute. The United 
States, although a signatory to the statute, informed the U.N. Secretary-General in a communication in May 2002 
that it “does not intend to become a party to the treaty” (United Nations 2007). 
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apartheid failed because of the divergent strategic, political and economical interests of indi-
vidual U.N. member states, particularly—but not exclusively—the permanent members of the 
U.N. Security Council (for the individual country’s policies, see below). 
Not until 26 July 1985, after the South African government declared a state of emer-
gency in 35 selected areas on 20 July 1985, did the U.N Security Council urge Member 
States—for the very first time—to adopt a wide range of economic measures against South 
Africa (Resolution 569). However, Resolution 569 was not binding on Member States be-
cause the United States and Britain vetoed mandatory economic sanctions. Nevertheless, 
Resolution 569 symbolized clearly a tougher stance of the international community vis-à-vis 
the South African government. But the international community, and in particular Western 
governments, still disagreed on appropriate measures to promote political change in South 
Africa and adopted quite different foreign policy strategies to deal with South Africa under 
apartheid. 
2.3.1 United States 
The United States, like most of the European countries, had paid little attention to apartheid at 
the time of its inception. Some apartheid laws actually were based on the same idea of racial 
segregation imposed by law in southern states in the U.S. (Borstelmann 1993). With the in-
tensifying of the civil rights movement in the United States from the late 1950s and the start 
of decolonialization in Africa in the 1960s, apartheid had drawn increasing attention both 
within the bodies of the United Nations and in U.S. politics. The U.S. government regularly 
condemned apartheid during the 1970s and 1980s but maintained formal diplomatic relations 
with Pretoria throughout the apartheid era. Moreover, all administrations—from Nixon and 
Ford to Carter and Reagan—opposed broad economic sanctions against the apartheid regime, 
arguing that such measures are not effective instruments to force the South African govern-
ment to change its policies, and if they are effective they harm the wrong people, in particular 
those who suffer under apartheid.8 South Africa was also considered an important country for 
geostrategic reasons, mainly as an ally against Communism. U.S. foreign policy towards 
                                                
8 After the vote in the Security Council on a resolution on 22 May 1986, to give an example for this repeated 
argumentation, the American delegate, Patricia M. Byrne, said, “We do not believe that the destruction of the 
South African economy serves anyone’s interests, least of all those who suffer under apartheid” (New York 
Times, 24 May 1986, p. 4). 
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southern Africa therefore had also been driven largely by the aim of reducing Soviet influence 
in this politically unstable region (Baker 1989: xi-xiii). 
Apart from its geostrategic role in a decolonializing Africa, South Africa had been an 
important market for American business. According to the U.N. Centre Against Apartheid, 
the United States was the second largest investor in South Africa (after Britain) during the 
apartheid era. By 1985, 350 American companies and 125 banks had invested 14 billion US-
dollars in South Africa. Over half of that dollar total was controlled by companies and banks 
based in New York City (Martin 1985). The U.S. had also been South Africa’s biggest trading 
partner with exports and imports at more than 1.6 billion US-dollars per year (Byrnes 1996) 
until it was surpassed by Japan in 1987 (Bates 1988). 
Because of its myriad interests in the region, the U.S. maintained formal diplomatic 
relations with Pretoria throughout the apartheid era. It also voted regularly against U.N. 
moves for economic sanctions against South Africa and vetoed—usually in line with Brit-
ain—such attempts in the Security Council. An arms embargo, imposed in 1964 as demanded 
by the Security Council with Resolutions 181 and 182 (1963), remained the only significant 
restrictive measures for years. In 1977, the United States supported efforts within the Security 
Council for a mandatory U.N. arms embargo against South Africa (Resolution 418, unani-
mously adopted by the Security Council on 4 November 1977). Like every government—
except for the South African—the U.S. refused to recognize the “independence” of South 
Africa’s black homelands between 1976 and 1984. It also became strongly involved with an 
international settlement for the independence of Namibia, cooperating with Canada, France, 
West Germany and Britain in the so-called Western Contact Group. But U.S. resistance to 
economic sanctions against South Africa within an U.N. framework remained and became 
apparent again when it vetoed on 20 February 1987 a Security Council resolution that would 
have imposed mandatory sanctions similar to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act ap-
proved by the U.S. Congress over President Reagan’s veto in October 1986. This particular 
vote put the U.S. government in the unusual position of vetoing a measure that was approved 
by its own national legislature just a few months earlier (see, e.g., New York Times, 21 Febru-
ary 1987, p. 3). 
2.3.2 Western Europe 
South Africa’s closest European ties have been with Britain. More than 800,000 white South 
Africans retained the right to live in Britain, although official ties with Britain weakened after 
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South Africa left the British Commonwealth in 1961. Britain supported the 1977 Common-
wealth decision to exclude South Africa from sporting events but refused together with the 
United States broader economic sanctions—a decision that exposed the British government to 
criticism from other Commonwealth members. After the South African government declared 
a state of emergency on 21 July 1985, Britain made clear that it was “firmly opposed to eco-
nomic sanctions of any kind” (Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, according to the Associ-
ated Press, 26 July 1985). At that time, the British had an economic stake in South Africa 
officially estimated at 14.5 billion US-dollars, more than one-third of all foreign investments 
in South Africa (Associated Press, 26 July 1985). 
Apart from corporations of U.S. and British origins, transnational companies based 
in France, West Germany and Switzerland held the biggest share of the total foreign invest-
ment in South Africa (Bates 1988). From the European countries with rather close economic 
ties to South Africa, France took the most critical stand on the apartheid government. After 
the declaration of the South African state of emergency in July 1985, the French government 
recalled—as the U.S. did, but not Britain—its ambassador in South Africa, banned new in-
vestments in or loans to South Africa, and proposed a resolution in the U.N. Security Council 
calling for voluntary sanctions against South Africa, including bans on new investments, 
imports of krugerrands, new contracts in the nuclear energy sector and exports of computers 
for use by South African army or police (Hufbauer et al. 1990b: 223). The proposed resolu-
tion also called for an immediate lifting of the state of emergency, the unconditional release of 
all detainees and the freeing of political prisoners, including ANC leader Nelson Mandela 
(Resolution 569). Britain and the United States vetoed a draft resolution backed by several 
African nations calling for mandatory sanctions, but abstained on the French proposal, allow-
ing it to pass and marking the strongest anti-apartheid measure adopted by the Council since 
the proclamation of the mandatory arms embargo in 1977 (New York Times, 27 July 1985, p. 
4; Washington Post, 25-27 July 1985). 
For Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, the Associated Press (26 July 1985) summa-
rized the governments’ positions on economic sanctions in 1985 as follows: 
The Federal Republic of Germany opposed sanctions and retained its ambassador in 
Pretoria. In 1984, West Germany exported goods worth about 1.5 billion US-dollars to South 
Africa and was therefore the country’s second-largest trading partner, after the United States, 
which sold 2.27 billion US-dollars worth of goods. The Social Democratic and Green opposi-
tion demanded punitive German action against South Africa, but—according to AP—an 
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estimate of 130,000 jobs in West Germany would have been endangered by such boycott 
action. 
Sweden was believed to be the only Western nation to have stopped its investment in 
South Africa by law. Against massive protest from Swedish industry, the Swedish govern-
ment led by Prime Minister Olof Palme’s Social Democrats tightened the law in April 1985. 
Switzerland, which had strong trade and financial ties with South Africa, followed 
the situation in South Africa “with concern” (Foreign Ministry spokesman to the AP) but was 
not planning immediate actions against Pretoria. Swiss anti-apartheid groups had urged the 
government to break relations and force Swiss banks to halt credits to South Africa. 
On 10 September 1985, eleven of twelve members of the European Community 
eventually agreed on a package of limited sanctions, including a tighter enforcement of the 
existing arms embargo and a ban on all nuclear, military cooperation with South Africa. Only 
Britain withheld its approval (Hufbauer et al. 1990b: 225, Washington Post, 11 September 
1985, pp. A1, A20). Two weeks later, on 25 September 1985, Britain agreed to adopt meas-
ures previously approved by the E.C. ministers (Washington Post, 26 September 1985, p. 
A22). 
2.3.3 Soviet Union and China 
Bilateral ties between South Africa and the Soviet Union took a totally different shape. Preto-
ria broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, mostly because of Soviet sup-
port for the South African Communist Party, a major anti-apartheid combatant in South Af-
rica (Ellis and Sechaba 1992). Beginning in 1964 and continuing through the early 1980s, the 
Soviet Union provided weapons to the ANC’s military struggle against the apartheid regime. 
In the U.N., the Soviet Union voted—in line with China, other Communist U.N. member 
states and the newly independent African countries with Marxist governments—in favor of 
tougher sanctions against the apartheid regime. 
The People’s Republic of China, given its own rivalry with the Soviet Union, was re-
luctant to support liberation groups backed by Moscow. Beijing therefore supported the Pan-
African Congress (PAC), the main rival of the ANC. And due to its opposition to the apart-
heid regime, China did not establish diplomatic relations with South Africa (Payne and Veney 
1998: 874-875). Taiwan, on the other hand, did work to establish ties with South Africa. As 
more Third World states recognized the People’s Republic of China and South Africa was 
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increasingly isolated in the late 1970s, Taipei and Pretoria strengthened their political, eco-
nomic and military ties (Payne and Veney 1998: 874, 878). 
2.3.4 African Countries 
African countries in particular had been confronted with a profound dilemma in their foreign 
policy toward South Africa: almost all of them depended on South African trade, despite their 
strong rhetorical condemnation of the apartheid regime. The dependence on South African 
products even continued during the sanctions era; in 1991, South Africa’s trade with the rest 
of the continent was at least US$ 3.5 billion (Byrnes 1996). The five landlocked countries of 
southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi) have always been 
strongly dependent on South Africa’s well-developed system of roads, railroads and port 
facilities that provide a vital trade link. 
2.3.5 Other Countries 
Iran had been South Africa’s primary oil supplier until the fall of the shah in 1979, when the 
revolutionary government imposed an oil embargo against South Africa and cut off all official 
ties with Pretoria. Already in 1973, the Summit Conference of Arab States decided to impose 
a complete oil embargo on South Africa, but the former Iranian regime repeatedly rebuffed 
the implementation of this decision (MERIP Reports 1978). The U.N. General Assembly 
adopted a voluntary international oil embargo in November 1987 (Resolution 42/23, see also 
Hengeveld and Rodenburg 1995). 
Israel had one of the most hidden but critical strategic relationships with South Af-
rica during the apartheid era. Officially opposing the apartheid system, the Israeli government 
also opposed broad international sanctions against Pretoria. According to Byrnes (1996), 
Israel’s opposition to international embargos in general and specifically against South Africa 
has largely come to be seen as a consequence of its own vulnerability to international sanc-
tions. Moreover, South Africa and Israel had been collaborating on military training and 
weapons development and production until the mid-1980s (Byrnes 1996). 
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2.4 The Role of International Action in South Africa’s Transition 
The majority of the literature on international dimensions of apartheid in South Africa con-
cerns international sanctions and their effect on South African apartheid policies. The most 
disputed question is whether and to what extent punitive (negative) sanctions contributed to a 
democratic transition in South Africa in the early 1990s. However, the effects of other types 
of sanctions such as incentives and rewards (so-called negative sanctions) toward apartheid 
South Africa have been much less explored. In this section, I review the existing knowledge 
on the effects of these two basic types of international sanctions, starting with an overview on 
the findings from mostly quantitative studies on the “success” of negative sanctions in terms 
of their effectiveness. Then, I summarize the more case study-oriented research on positive 
sanctions. Negative and positive sanctions in the particular case of South Africa under apart-
heid, as discussed in the literature, are addressed in separate subsections. Finally, mediation as 
a third type of international interference is discussed in light of the South African case. 
2.4.1 Negative Sanctions 
Scholars debate the effects of international sanctions in the case of South Africa under apart-
heid mainly from two perspectives. The broader, more theoretically and quantitatively ori-
ented debate concerns the “success” of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy to take 
influence on another actor’s behavior. The specific discussion focuses on the role of sanctions 
in promoting South Africa’s transition in the beginning of the 1990s. This second perspective 
is more empirically oriented and mostly based on case study research. 
1. Negative Sanctions as Instruments of Influence 
The effectiveness of international sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy has been debated 
at length with little resolution so far (McGillivray and Stam 2004; Drezner 1999b; Haass and 
O'Sullivan 2000c; Baldwin and Pape 1998; Pape 1998; Martin 1992; Hufbauer et al. 1990a; 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988). The question of whether and to what extent sanctions are 
successful instruments of coercion has always been of particular concern to both scholars and 
policymakers. 
Most scholarly studies assess the success of sanctions as instruments of foreign pol-
icy in terms of their effectiveness in achieving various goals (see, e.g., Hufbauer et al. 1983, 
1990a; Tsebelis 1990; Bergeijk 1994; Smith 1996; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Morgan and 
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Schwebach 1997). Specifically, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990a: 41-42)—still the most 
thorough and comprehensive study of economic sanctions—address the matter of sanction 
success by creating a measure called “policy result”. A “policy result” is defined as the policy 
outcome of international sanctions and is judged against the foreign policy goals as they were 
declared by the sender of the sanctions. The success of a so-called “sanction episode” (as 
viewed from the perspective of the sender country) has two parts: the extent to which the 
policy outcome sought by the sender country was in fact achieved, and the contribution made 
by the sanctions to a positive outcome (as opposed to other factors such as military action). 
Empirically, Hufbauer et al. (1990a) found in their extensive study of 116 uses of economic 
sanctions from 1914 to 1990 that sanctions are effective roughly one-third of the time.9 
Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff (1997) explored the potential of different specific 
types of sanctions to attain different policy goals. The analysis is based on the extensive data 
collection of Hufbauer et al. (1990a), utilizing logistic regression with various independent 
empirical variables such as cost to target, import/export “trade linkage” between target and 
sender, ordinal values for the health and stability of the target, length of the sanctions episode 
and type of sanction. It turned out that the factors affecting success depend upon the goals of 
the sending nation. When that goal is simply destabilization, the principal determinant of 
success is the initial stability of the target. For other goals, financial sanctions are most effec-
tive (Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997: 608). 
According to Lisa Martin (1992, 1993), David Baldwin (1985) and others, a critical 
variable in determining the success of sanctions is the degree of international cooperation that 
is achieved in imposing such measures. The greater the degree of international cooperation, 
the greater the probability of imposing an unacceptable cost on the target country, thus the 
more the target country is forced to alter its behavior in a manner consistent with the interests 
of the senders of such sanctions (see also Selden 1999: 7). However, William Kaempfer and 
Anton Lowenberg (1999) showed that multilateral economic sanctions are often less effective 
than unilateral sanctions in bringing about desired political results in the target country. Based 
on an interest-group model, the scholars demonstrate that multilateral sanctions can under-
mine the political effectiveness of opposition groups in the target country, or strengthen those 
groups supporting the objectionable policy of the ruling regime (“rally around the flag” effect, 
see also Selden 1999: 24). Unilateral sanctions, on the other hand, imposed by a country with 
                                                
9 A forthcoming third edition of the study will include 170 cases of economic sanctions imposed since World 
War I (Elliot et al. 2007). 
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close ties to the target, are according to Kaempfer and Lowenberg’s (1999) analysis often 
more effective in achieving their intended political objectives. 
Whereas rather (neo-)liberal theorists of international relations (such as Baldwin 
1985; 1993; or Martin 1992; 1993) stress the potential of international cooperation, represen-
tatives of a realist school of thought (e.g., Drezner 1999b) base their analyses on the behavior 
of individual states that are seen to be rationally acting nation-states with given interests 
(“unitary actor”). Drezner’s (1999b) “conflict expectation model” puts out two major factors 
to explain the decision of a sender country to impose sanctions on a target: 1) the expectation 
on the future conflict level with the target; 2) the economic costs of the sanction policy, that 
is, the economic advantage over the opponent (whereas the distribution of economic costs is 
seen as a zero-sum-game). According to Drezner’s study, the magnitude of relative cost ad-
vantages for the sender country correlates positively with the target’s willingness to concede. 
But relative cost advantages for the sender decrease if the expectation for future conflicts with 
the target rises. In such situations, concessions of the target are less likely because conces-
sions would weaken the target’s future negotiating position (Drezner 1999b: 54). The correla-
tion between relative cost advantages of sanctions in favor of the sender of sanctions on the 
one hand and the success of such measures on the other has been widely supported by empiri-
cal studies (Drezner 1999b; Drury 1998; Hufbauer et al. 1983). 
Besides the significance of the cost distribution between sender and target of sanc-
tions, institutional factors within the target country have been proved to be statistically sig-
nificant explaining variables for the success of sanctions. Dashti-Gibson et al. (1997: 608-
618) identified regime instability of the target country to be a critical factor to ease effective 
sanctions. Kim Nossal (1999) elaborated the connection between democratic structures in the 
target country and the chances for success of sanctions against such a country. According to 
Nossal (1999: 147), sanctions are generally rarely successful, but the target states of the few 
successful sanction episodes (among them South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s) all 
show—at least rudimentarily—democratic structures (see also Kaempfer and Lowenberg 
1992; Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Hart 2000; McGillivray and Stam 2004). 
On the part of the sender country, Martin (2000), reveals for the case of U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions that internal dispute does not necessarily undermine a democracy's ability to 
conduct international relations. Moreover, she argues that legislatures—and particularly the 
apparently problematic openness of their proceedings—may actually serve foreign policy well 
by giving credibility to international commitments that are made. Poeschke (2003: 115) even 
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identifies a parallel to the “democratic peace” theory (Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russet 1992, 
1993; Ray 1998; Russet 1993) and argues that there is some evidence that sanctions are most 
effective if both sender and target are democracies. In fact, in ten of Nossal’s (1999) 14 suc-
cessful sanction episodes, not only the targets but also the senders of the sanctions were at 
least partly democratic. 
The most recent literature on international sanctions eventually embarks on a search 
for ways to increase the political effectiveness of sanctions while reducing unintended nega-
tive consequences by the application of so-called “targeted” or “smart” sanctions (Cortright 
and Lopez 2002; Biersteker and Eckert 2006; Biersteker et al. 2001). This type of sanctions is 
intended to be directed at individuals, companies and organizations, or restrict trade with key 
commodities, as opposed to “comprehensive” economic sanctions. Advocates of smart sanc-
tions argue that sanctions will be most successful when targeted against the target state’s 
political elite because such sanctions will reduce the resources available to this elite and thus 
limit its ability to implement their policies. Smart sanctions also seek to limit the unintended 
consequences of hurting the very opposition groups in the targeted country that they are actu-
ally supposed to help (Haass 1998: 202; Kaempfer et al. 2004). As Major and McGann indi-
cate (2005: 340), however, the body of work on smart or targeted sanctions is quite diverse 
including theoretical contributions (such as Major and McGann 2005; McGillivray and Smith 
2000; Smith 1996), empirical case studies (e.g., Haass 1998; Morgan and Schwebach 1997) 
and combinations of the two (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992). 
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Table 1: Summary of Explaining Factors for Success of Sanctions (based on Poeschke 2003: 118-119) 
Category Factor Correlation with 
sanction success 
Empirical evidence References 
Trade relations Trade volume 
between sender and 
target 
irrelevant solid Hufbauer, Schott and 
Elliot 1990, Dashti-
Gibson, Davis and 
Radcliff 1997 
Financial sanctions positive disputed Hufbauer, Schott and 
Elliot 1990, Dashti-
Gibson, Davis and 
Radcliff 1997 
Instruments 
Selectivity of sanc-
tions 
positive disputed Cortright and Lopez 
2002; Bolks and Al-
Sowayel 2000 
Cooperation Multilateral imple-
mentation regime 
positive/negative disputed Baldwin 1985, Martin 
1992&1993; Hufbau-
er, Schott and Elliot 
1990, Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg 1999 
Relative cost advan-
tages 
positive solid 
Costs for sender positive solid 
Economic costs 
Costs for target positive solid 
Hufbauer, Schott and 
Elliot 1990, Drury 
1998, Drezner 1999 
Expected future 
conflict level 
negative solid Drezner 1999 Interaction mode 
Threat of violence negative disputed Hufbauer, Schott and 
Elliot 1990; Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg 1999, 
Drezner 1999,  
Sender is democratic positive disputed Poeschke 2003, 
Martin 2000 
Domestic institutions 
Target is democratic positive solid Nossal 1999, Bolks 
and Al-Sowayel 2000, 
Hart 2000, McGil-
livray and Stam 2004 
 
The findings on possible influencing factors for the success of sanctions are summa-
rized in Table 1 above. Overall, empirical studies have drawn a generally pessimistic picture 
of the effectiveness of international sanctions as a foreign policy tool of influence. However, 
scholars have begun to challenge this earlier, markedly pessimistic assessment since the mid-
1980s (see, e.g., the dabate in International Security, Pape 1997; Elliot 1998; Pape 1998). 
There is also evidence that the use of sanctions will likely continue to increase for the fore-
seeable future (Major and McGann 2005; Cortright and Lopez 2000). 
In order to interpret the findings from quantitative studies on the effects of sanctions, 
three main methodological challenges must first be considered: 
First, most of the potential explaining factors for the success of sanctions (such as the 
power differential between sender and target, the strength of economic ties, aims of sender or 
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the domestic condition of the target) are abstract concepts and remain difficult to operational-
ize for empirical measurement. This particular issue is discussed in the literature as the 
“measurement problem” of studies on international sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 1990a: 41; 
Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997: 611-2; McGillivray and Stam 2004: 157-8). 
Other scholars argue that quantitative studies on international sanctions suffer less 
from a measurement problem than from a weak theoretical foundation of such empirical 
studies. Empirical sanction studies are often confronted with a selection bias that leads to 
misleading conclusions about the effectiveness of sanctions. Selection bias—that is, the bias 
introduced into the analysis when inferences are based on a nonrandom sample of cases that is 
not representative of the universe of cases from which it was drawn (King et al. 1994: 128-
139; Smith 1996; Baldwin 1999/2000: 97; McGillivray and Stam 2004: 158)—arises from the 
fact that the (expected) success of sanctions and the decision to impose sanctions are strongly 
interdependent. When sanctions are likely to succeed and when there is a political willingness 
to impose them, no sanction will actually be imposed because their mere threat is sufficient to 
force the target to change the policies in dispute. At the other extreme, if sanctions are insuffi-
cient to force concessions from the target country, then they are an ineffective tool for the 
sender to continue to use (if the goal of the sanctions is to achieve a policy change). 
Furthermore, almost all the quantitative sanction studies are based on the extensive 
Hufbauer et al. (1990a) data set. Apart from some coding problems (discussed, e.g., by 
Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Drury 1998), the study’s biggest drawback is its age: the study 
only covers sanction episodes up to the year of 1989. Subsequent years, characterized by a 
wide use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold-War era (Cortright and Lopez 2000), remain 
excluded (for an exception and systematic analysis of economic coercion in the former Soviet 
Union, see Drezner 1999b; an updated third edition of the Hufbauer et. al study has been 
announced, see Elliot et al. 2007). 
A fourth restriction is only partly based on methodological considerations: nearly all 
systematic studies on international sanctions, including the Hufbauer et al. (1990a, 1990b) 
project, focus on (negative) economic sanctions. This focus may be due to the wide availabil-
ity of economic data that allows for a quantitative analysis of different target variables of 
economic sanctions (most used are trade flows and investment statistics). But the emphasis on 
negative sanctions is also rooted (at least partly) in a one-sided view of international sanc-
tions, as will be elaborated in more detail in the next section. Before, however, let me address 
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the question of the role that negative sanctions might have played in the specific case of South 
Africa under apartheid, as it is discussed in the literature. 
2. The Role of Sanctions in South Africa’s Transition 
In spite of the largely pessimistic findings of quantitative studies on the “success of sanc-
tions”, a specific consideration of the case of South Africa is justified given that it demon-
strates the potential for sanctions to elicit political change, thereby allowing advocates of 
international sanctions to argue their case. According to Hufbauer and his colleagues’ 
(Hufbauer et al. 1990a: 221-248) overall assessment, international sanctions against the apart-
heid regime failed.10 However, a large body of case study based research indicates that sanc-
tions contributed significantly to South Africa’s rather peaceful transition in the early 1990s. 
In fact, as pointed out earlier, sanctions taken against South Africa in the mid-1980s are in-
voked frequently as a “success story” of international sanctions (see, e.g., the contributions in 
Crawford and Klotz 1999) given that apartheid was just a few years after such measures were 
implemented by a wide group of countries—a development that proved elusive for a long 
time prior to their implementation (e.g., Waldmeir 1997). 
Another important factor has contributed to a positive assessment of international 
sanctions against South Africa: the main resistance movement against apartheid within South 
Africa itself, the African National Congress (ANC), repeatedly called for international sanc-
tions, thereby undermining one of the main arguments against sanctions, namely that they 
harm first and foremost the population they intend to help. The ANC’s position on interna-
tional sanctions was articulated by ANC leader Oliver Tambo in a communication to impris-
oned Nelson Mandela regarding his secret negotiations with the apartheid government in the 
1980s: 
Look, there is only one problem. We are very concerned that we should not get 
stripped of our weapons of struggle, and the most important of these is sanctions. 
That is the trump card with which we can mobilize international opinion and pull 
governments over to our side. (quoted in Sparks 1995) 
But to what extent international sanctions in fact contributed to the changes in South 
Africa in the early 1990s remains a controversial issue. Philip Levy (1999) makes the case for 
                                                
10 International sanctions against South Africa scored in the overall assessment on a scale from 1 (failed) to 4 
(success) a 2 for effectiveness and a 3 for sanctions contribution, resulting in a success score of 6 (policy result 
times sanctions contributions), scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant success). If the result were 9 or 
greater on the success score, the sanctions would have been deemed successful (Hufbauer et al. 1990: 221-248). 
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and against the effectiveness of sanctions in the particular case of South Africa by telling an 
“effective” and an “ineffective sanctions’ story”. According to the “effective sanctions’ 
story”, one can argue that sanctions against the apartheid regime, despite its small direct 
economic impact, represented the “final straw” by making economic conditions so intolerable 
as to force political change. But in Levy’s judgment, the “ineffective sanctions’ story”, in 
which any positive contribution of economic sanctions was trivial and may have even de-
ferred the achievement of the anti-apartheid campaign’s objectives, is more compelling. Levy 
points out that the international economic sanctions against South Africa taken by private 
actors (such as business corporations or universities in the United States) were most damag-
ing. Actions taken by governments, on the other hand, were not particularly damaging at all 
(Levy 1999: 419-20). 
Audie Klotz (1999: 268), to illustrate a more optimistic view, reaches a different 
conclusion: 
Sanctioners strengthened the anti-apartheid movement, and added political and 
economic incentives for the ruling National Party (NP) to repeal apartheid laws 
and enter into negotiations with the extra-parliamentary opposition [the ANC]. 
Or, as Baker (2000: 108) puts it, 
of course, many factors account for the final political turnaround in South Africa, 
the most important being events in South Africa itself. Nonetheless, in addition to 
the cooperation between the United States and the USSR in southern Africa, U.S. 
economic sanctions were among the most important international variables that had 
a meaningful, and perhaps decisive, impact. 
As apparent, scholars paint different pictures of South Africa’s democratic transition 
because they emphasize different domestic and international factors and potential connections 
between these factors to explain political processes as they occurred in South Africa and on 
the international political level in the early 1990s. 
2.4.2 Incentives and Rewards (Positive Sanctions) 
The strategy of engagement, that is, the use of incentives or rewards—usually alongside other 
foreign policy instruments—to persuade a foreign government to change one or more aspects 
of its behavior, has received only little attention in the field of International Relations (IR), 
although the strategy of embracing an indisposed regime rather than isolating it is widely used 
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in international politics (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000b: 1, 159). Analysts refer frequently to 
“carrots and sticks” as a combined strategy of incentives and punishment, but most of their 
attention is devoted to the latter (Cortright 1997a: 5). Baldwin (1971: 19) traced this disregard 
back to the fact that classical power theorists such as Lasswell (1950) and Dahl (1961) said 
little about the role of such positive sanctions in power relations; most of their discussion of 
power focused on severe negative sanctions. 
Positive sanctions had long been seen as just the other side of the coin of negative 
sanctions, as an opposite strategy to achieve the same goal, namely to change the behavior of 
a social actor in a more preferable way then it would do otherwise. There is in fact a wide 
agreement among scholars that all sanctions are in essence social punishment or rewards for 
the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of certain desired behavior (e.g., Coker 1986: 37). In their 
behavioral consequences, however, positive and negative sanctions are quite different. Both 
the sender and the target of sanctions behave differently in positive as opposed to negative 
sanction situations, as shown by Baldwin (1971) in an elaborate theoretical article. Baldwin 
(1971: 27-36) hypothesizes differences between the two situations in several respects: 
1. the sender of incentives to response: when the sender’s influence attempt is based on a 
promise, the target’s compliance obligates the sender to respond with a reward; 
2. the role of costs: promises tend to cost more when they succeed, while threats tend to cost 
more when they fail; 
3. propensity to use and prospects of success: since the sender’s incentive to use promises 
instead of threats tends to increase as the probability of success decreases, one may hy-
pothesize that the sender is more likely to use positive sanctions when he thinks his pros-
pects of success are poor; 
4. indicators of success: whereas a successful threat requires no action by the sender, a 
successful promise obligates him to implement the sanction; 
5. deterrence: because of the asymmetrical way in which threats and promises are related to 
success, the sender is likely to use threats rather than promises in attempting to deter the 
target from doing X because the probability of success tends to be relatively high; 
6. the target’s immediate response: is usually different when confronted with promises 
rather than threats; 
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7. after-effects and side-effects: while positive sanctions tend to enhance the target’s will-
ingness to cooperate with the sender, negative sanctions tend to impede such cooperation; 
8. legitimation: it is usually easier to legitimize demands based on positive sanctions than 
demands based on negative sanctions; 
9. symbolic importance: positive and negative sanctions often differ in their psychological 
functions in politics; whereas negative sanctions have become psychologically linked with 
such characteristics as courage, honor and masculinity, positive sanctions run the risk of 
being perceived as soft, weak, or lacking of toughness; 
10. human nature: the propensity to use either positive or negative sanctions is partially de-
termined by the sender’s view of human nature; 
11. efficacy: although the precise conditions under which one type of sanction is more effec-
tive than the other have yet to be spelled out, it is quite unlikely that positive and negative 
sanctions will be equally effective in any given influence attempt; 
12. systemic stability: there is a limit to the amount of deprivation allowed with negative 
sanctions; while positive sanctions are different because there is no upper limit on the 
amount by which the sender may reward the target; 
13. surveillance: influence attempts based solely on negative sanctions provide the target with 
no incentive to comply with the sender’s demands if the target can find a way to avoid de-
tection; as a consequence, the sender must spend more on monitoring the target’s activi-
ties when he uses negative instead of positive sanctions; 
14. blackmail: habitual use of positive sanctions is more likely to encourage blackmail at-
tempts than is habitual use of negative sanctions. 
These specific mechanisms will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 3. 
More recent research on positive sanctions attempts to include such a conceptual distinction 
between incentives and rewards on the one hand and punitive measures (or threats thereof) on 
the other. Most of the studies thereby consider incentives and rewards mainly in terms of their 
effectiveness relative to punitive (economic) sanctions (Dorussen 2001: 251). South Africa 
under apartheid, again, is one of the prominent cases this research stream empirically refers 
to. 
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1. Incentives and Rewards as Instruments of Influence 
Studies on the effectiveness of incentives and rewards are almost without exception based on 
case study research and attempt to synthesize lessons learned from specific cases into a coher-
ent analytical framework in order to understand when and how incentives and rewards can be 
used as an effective foreign policy instrument. The available case studies focus on conflict 
resolution (Cortright 1997b), arms control (Bernauer and Ruloff 1999), or bilateral coopera-
tion (Long 1996). Drezner (1999b) finally analyzes incentives and rewards as a subordinate 
issue, secondary to his main concern with negative sanctions. 
Dorussen (2001) makes an attempt to compare the findings of available case studies 
with the objective of synthesizing existing knowledge on the effects of incentives and rewards 
as foreign policy instruments. Overall, he concludes that the body of available case studies 
presents a long list of reasons why incentives should work, each case study based on a differ-
ent theoretical framework that structured the study (Dorussen 2001: -253-255): the studies in 
Cortright (1997b) consider in general terms the impact of costs and benefits that arise to the 
sender and the target of such measures; Long (1996) emphasizes sender market power and 
total benefits to both sender and target as the most important variable; Bernauer and Ruloff 
(1999) point out the use of incentives for addressing asymmetries in preference and capacity, 
with special attention to critical actors; and, in Drezner’s (1999b) framework, as discussed 
earlier, conflict expectation becomes the central independent variable. 
Traditionally, however, incentives and rewards are viewed as even less effective than 
negative sanctions. As Wagner (1988; cited in Dorussen 2001: 253) pointed out, a country is 
more likely to be swayed by punishment than by incentives because it usually values the 
marginal unit of a good taken away (via sanctions) more highly than the benefit of the same 
amount added (via incentives or reward). Moreover, a country usually tries to resist bribes as 
a matter of principle, especially in the realm of national security. There is also a risk for the 
sender of incentives: a country that offers incentives makes itself vulnerable to future extor-
tion attempts (see also, Baldwin 1971: 27-26). 
In spite of the general pessimism towards the effectiveness of positive sanctions as 
foreign policy instruments, there is little reason to expect incentives and rewards to be equally 
(in)effective in all possible circumstances. In case study-based research scholars use their 
expert knowledge to place assumedly critical independent variables in a historical context 
which allows for case specific explanations for the use of positive sanctions and their effec-
 48 
tiveness under particular circumstances. Though expert knowledge provides valuable insight 
into various cases, a lack of logical and inferential constraint and generalization of the case 
specific findings often remain a problem (Dorussen 2001: 254-7). 
2. Constructive Engagement and Positive Sanctions Toward South Africa 
With regard to South Africa, incentives and rewards were the key elements of the policy of 
“constructive engagement” as it was pursued by the United States during the first term of 
President Ronald Reagan in the first half of the 1980s (Coker 1986; Baker 1989). The policy 
was mainly conceptualized by Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Chester Crocker, and attempted to influence positively what was described as a “modernizing 
elite in South Africa” to take the steps needed to end the region’s conflicts and induce domes-
tic political reforms (Crocker 1980). This positive influence was to be attained by offering 
broad incentives of closer diplomatic ties based on common strategic objectives, publicly 
expressing sensitivity to the dilemma of the white population in South Africa, and reshaping 
South Africa’s image to end its international pariah status (Baker 2000: 96). 
The strategy of supplementing negative sanctions (as had been used by the interna-
tional community since the imposition of the U.N. arms embargo in 1963) with a policy of 
constructive engagement was also rooted in the dismal record of universal sanctions imposed 
on Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) from 1965 to 1979 (Crocker 1980; Herbst 1997). It 
was the first time, and until the imposition of the mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa in 1977 the only case, where the U.N. Security Council resorted to mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions to try to bring down a government (Resolution 232, 16 December 1966). 
According to Robin Renwick (1981: 33-52), three factors seem to have been crucial for re-
garding economic sanctions as ineffective or even counterproductive in the Rhodesian case: 
1) The impact on politically significant sections of the population in Rhodesia was limited: 
although the tobacco farmers lost two-thirds of their income by 1968, living standards 
among the three-quarters of the white population who live in the cities were hardly af-
fected. 
2) Rhodesian ‘natural resources and technical skills’ were sufficient to counteract most of the 
short- and medium-term effects of sanctions. The Rhodesian government implemented 
wide economic controls in an attempt to mitigate the impact of sanctions (petrol procure-
ment was coordinated and supplies rationed, import controls conserved foreign exchange, 
manpower and prices were controlled, etc.). 
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3) The wider political setting was crucial too. South Africa and Portugal were able to stand 
by Rhodesia in the 1960s and early 70s and economic pressures thus largely lost their ef-
fect in the region. The setting did not change until the revolution in Lisbon changed Por-
tugal’s ambitions in the region and militant African liberation groups gained power, com-
bined with a consequent agonizing reappraisal on the part of the South African govern-
ment. After that, “it was the war, not sanctions, which was exerting the real pressure on 
the economy” (Renwick 1981: 52). 
South Africa was not only a similar case in terms of its problematic white-minority 
government. Additionally, it seemed even less vulnerable to sanctions than Southern Rhode-
sia because South Africa had a more advanced economy, its exports were primarily composed 
of high-value, low-volume materials, and there were doubts that economic pressure alone 
would prompt the Afrikaner-nationalist government to dismantle the racist system they had so 
painstakingly constructed (Herbst 1997: 205). 
But with the increase of violence in South Africa in the 1970s, it was widely recog-
nized throughout the world that change was coming in South Africa and that it was essential 
for action to be taken before the country plunged into civil war (see, e.g., Study Commission 
on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa 1981). The Reagan administration, notably Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, launched a new debate over the use of 
incentives versus sanctions and formulated with the policy of “constructive engagement” a 
better defined, but also more controversial, U.S. South Africa policy than had been in place 
with its immediate predecessors (Herbst 1997: 206). Although encouragement and a tone of 
empathy might not normally be considered strong incentives, they were salient in the case of 
South Africa. As Jeffrey Herbst (1997: 207) points out, South Africa had already gone 
through close to three decades of approbation (including the arms embargo and effective 
expulsion from the Commonwealth) and its relationship with the United States had been 
deteriorating for many years. Easing this pressure therefore had to be seen as a clear incentive 
toward the South African government to change its policies in a more favorable way. 
In retrospect, however, the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ is widely regarded as 
a failure. Both Haass and O’Sullivan (2000a:166) and Herbst (1997: 217) attribute this failure 
in part to the domestic opposition against this policy in the United States itself. The policy 
failed, according to these scholars, because it failed to convey the moral outrage against 
apartheid that an increasing share of the American public felt was necessary. Because of the 
South African government’s increasing repression against anti-apartheid protesters and its 
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failure to impose substantial political reforms in the beginning of the 1980s, more and more 
Americans started to view the American engagement toward (white) South Africa as morally 
repugnant. The policy came to a definitive end in 1986, when the U.S. Congress overwhelm-
ingly—and against the veto of President Reagan—adopted the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act (CAAA) that implemented extensive economic sanctions against South Africa 
(Baker 2000: 113; Haass and O'Sullivan 2000a: 166). 
The failure of “constructive engagement” revealed clearly the problematic character-
istics of incentives and reward toward a “problem regime” in a highly politicized environ-
ment: if the policy is an issue of domestic politics, policymakers can hardly avoid the charge 
of appeasement with the questionable regime. On the contrary, incentives and rewards are 
probably used most effectively when the issues involved are not widely publicized and, thus, 
policymakers are better able to avoid potential charges of appeasement (Herbst 1997: 217). 
Apartheid, however, became in the 1980s an immediate, sensitive public issue in the United 
States due to ongoing and increasing repression and violence in South Africa itself, and also 
because the anti-apartheid movement contrived to set apartheid in South Africa on the public 
and political agenda in the United States, partly because of America’s own poor historical 
record of civil rights (for this perspective, see Borstelmann 1993, 2001). As such, the policy 
of “constructive engagement” became inexecutable in the mid-1980s with the Reagan admini-
stration increasingly being accused of appeasing the apartheid government in South Africa. 
Whereas the policy of “constructive engagement” was directed at the South African 
government, so-called “positive measures” were mainly targeted at the non-white population 
in South Africa. On the part of the United States, the CAAA contained a set of positive meas-
ures in the form of scholarships for victims of apartheid to study in the U.S., legal assistance 
and financial support to oppositional groups in South Africa, and requirements for the Export-
Import Bank (EXIM) “to take active steps to encourage the use of its facilities to assist black 
South African business enterprises” and to relax “certain current statutory restrictions on 
EXIM activities in South Africa” (Baker 1989: 143). 
Other countries adopted similar measures, even though the financial engagement was 
usually very limited compared to other development aid projects (for an overview of positive 
measures of E.C. members toward South Africa, see Holland 1988b; Raux 1989). An excep-
tion was the Swedish government—not yet an E.C. member at that time—which had already 
decided by 1969 to give direct financial assistance to African liberation movements. Sweden 
was the only Western country to do so for a decade or more. During the 1970s, the Swedish 
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government increased the assistance year by year and contributed over 700 million Swedish 
Crowns to liberation movements in Southern Africa by 1986.11 
2.4.3 Mediation 
A third instrument has become a central topic of research in international conflict resolution: 
mediation. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) define mediation as “a process of con-
flict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer to help from, an 
individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences 
without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.” In its conceptualiza-
tion, mediation includes at least four components: a) parties [to the dispute], b) a mediator, c) 
a process of mediation, and d) the context of mediation (according to Bercovitch 1992). The 
process of mediation involves typically an effort by the mediator to “affect or influence [the] 
perceptions and behavior [of the disputants], without resorting to physical force or invoking 
the authority of the law” (Bercovitch 1992: 7). Three types of mediation strategies are typi-
cally at a mediator’s disposal (Taber 2004: 153-4): 1) mediators might try to manipulate 
communication (for example, restating a disputant’s official position to reduce mispercep-
tions); 2) they might alter incentives (for example, offering side payments or threatening to 
reduce existing aid); 3) or they might control negotiation procedures (for example, setting a 
neutral site or establishing basic protocol for negotiations). 
Kyle Beardsley and colleagues (2006) analyzed the effectiveness of three similar 
mediation styles—facilitation, formulation and manipulation—on international crises in a 
systematic way, using data from the International Crisis Behavior project (1918-2001). The 
effect of the different mediation styles on crisis outcomes was assessed in terms of three 
outcome variables, namely whether or not a formal agreement between the conflicting parties 
was reached, whether the post-crisis tension could have been reduced and to what degree 
mediation efforts contributed to crisis abatement. It could be shown that manipulation has the 
strongest effect on the likelihood of both reaching a formal agreement and contributing to 
crisis abatement (Beardsley et al. 2006:80-81). Facilitation has the strongest influence on 
increasing prospects for lasting tension reduction (Beardsley et al. 2006: 79-80). The authors 
also explored how the different styles affect the strategic bargaining environment to explain 
these differences in impact. The findings suggest that mediators should use a balance of styles 
                                                
11 More information on the Swedish engagement can be found on the website of the African National Congress 
(ANC), online in internet: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/solidarity/palme-b.html. Accessed 4 June 
2005. See also Section 5.3 on the Swedish South Africa policy. 
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if they are to maximize their overall effectiveness (Beardsley et al. 2006: 81). Philip Schrodt 
and Deborah Gerner (2004) came to similar conclusions in their case studies on third-party 
mediation in the Middle East and the Balkans. Their time-series analysis of event data shows 
that a reduction in violence is generally associated with mediation combined with conflictual 
action directed toward both of the antagonists and combined with cooperative action directed 
at the weaker antagonist (Schrodt 2004: 320-324). 
Regarding South Africa under apartheid, mediation stood mostly under the auspices 
of concrete and practical conflict resolution and promoting democratic transition on the 
ground in South Africa (Van der Merwe 1988, 1989, 1990; Rosenthal 1998). But also from a 
theoretical point of view, the case provided useful insights for effective mediation (Van der 
Merwe 1990; Hirschsohn 1996). International mediation as a facilitative function external 
practitioners and policy-makers can play in supporting political change attracted much atten-
tion in the late 1970s and 1980s on the issue of Namibian independence, in particular in the 
United States (Baker 1989; Coker 1986; Baker 2000). In the 1990s, the U.S. tried to play an 
active role in the South African transition process, by mobilizing international and domestic 
support for the process and working to bring recalcitrant parties into the negotiations (Lyman 
2002). 
2.5 Conclusions from the Literature Review 
The conventional wisdom about the “success” of international sanctions in general and the 
case of international action against South Africa under apartheid in particular reveals little 
regarding the general “laws” of the effectiveness of international sanctions. Two main re-
search streams with specific characteristics can be identified: 1) the development of highly 
abstract theoretical models aiming at a high degree of generalization but providing very lim-
ited potential for empirical testing; 2) detailed case study research delivering extensive em-
pirical material for a deep understanding of specific cases of international sanctions and me-
diation but allowing only for very little generalization. Each research stream is confronted 
with specific theoretical and methodological challenges. Regarding the more theory-oriented 
research stream that aims at a generalization of efficiency and effectiveness of international 
sanctions, these challenges are mainly threefold: 
First, the goals behind the imposition of sanctions are multilayered. Apart from the 
publicly declared goal (usually forcing another international actor to abandon a disagreeable 
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policy), sanction decisions may also be targeted at domestic audiences and/or other interna-
tional actors such as strategic allies or rivals. Many reasons—political, economical and strate-
gic—can prompt a government to impose sanctions. The ambiguity of the goal dimension of 
sanctions complicates the determination of the critical domain where the effects of sanctions 
should be observed. 
Second, the impact of sanctions on a target (power of sender of sanctions, degree of 
international cooperation on sanction measures, international assistance to the sanctioned 
country, its economic health and political stability, prior relations between the sender and 
target of sanctions, estimated costs of the sanctions for both sender and target) can be very 
difficult to measure empirically. Furthermore, differences in institutional settings and the 
historical context across different cases of international sanctions are myriad and can only be 
included in models of high complexity and tremendous scope and are, thus, no longer practi-
cal for empirical testing. 
A third reason is a methodological one and applies to any study of policy interven-
tion: any attempt to discuss the consequences or outcomes of an intervention must deal with 
counterfactual conditions, that is, what would have happened if the intervention had not been 
done. The counterfactuals of such an intervention however can never be assessed completely. 
This problem is especially evident for studies on the effectiveness of international sanctions 
since the decision of whether or not to impose sanctions is strongly based on policy-makers’ 
assumption of such possible counterfactuals (how does the imposition of sanctions possibly 
change the situation compared to a situation with no sanctions?). That is why studies on the 
effects of international sanctions inevitably struggle with one of the most challenging meth-
odological problems in social science, namely the lack of empirical information on such 
counterfactuals. 
The primarily empirically oriented case study based research on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of international sanctions usually lacks theoretically valuable conclusions be-
yond the particular case under consideration. Depending on the case at hand and the respec-
tive approach of the assessment of this case, scholars reach a rather optimistic or pessimistic 
conclusion about the effectiveness of international sanctions. “Famous failures” and (far 
fewer) “success stories” are used to underpin the respective pessimistic or optimistic assess-
ment. 
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In the view of many—scholars, policymakers and policy advocates—the dismantling 
of apartheid in South Africa provides such a “success story”, considering the country’s mostly 
peaceful transition from a white-minority regime to multi-racial democracy with a modern 
constitution in the 1990s. But the case-specific literature on South Africa reveals that this 
particular case is not so clear either. Moreover, it can be shown that nearly any theoretical 
argument about the potential impact of sanctions on a target has been made with reference to 
South Africa. 
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3 Foreign Policy Interventions and Potential Effects 
The purpose of this theoretical chapter is to systematize theoretical knowledge on the effects 
of foreign policy decisions on the behavior of international actors in order to analyze later the 
effects of foreign policy interventions of Western governments regarding South Africa under 
apartheid. First, I specify the concept of ‘intervention’ and how it is applied in different fields 
of political science. Then, the potential effects of different governmental foreign policy inter-
ventions are discussed in the light of theoretical approaches originating from the fields of 
International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Public Policy (PP). Based on 
this theoretical elaboration, hypotheses on the effects of different foreign policy interventions 
on international relations toward South Africa and on the situation in South Africa itself are 
formulated. 
3.1 The Concept of Foreign Policy Intervention 
3.1.1 Basic Analytics 
In international politics, intervention typically designates an actor’s interference in a situation 
with the objective to change the respective situation in a more favorable way (Bull 1984; 
Regan 1996; Regan and Aydin 2006). The intervening actor is typically called the sender, the 
addressee(s) of the intervention the target(s).12 Furthermore it is helpful to distinguish be-
tween the target (or domain) of foreign policy interventions and their objectives (or scope). 
The distinction refers to whom or what is to be influenced (the target or domain) and in what 
ways (objectives/scope).13 
According to this systematization, foreign policy interventions may have different 
domestic and international scopes and can be targeted at actors both in a rather domestic and 
international domain (Figure 2 below). The sender may address actors mainly located in the 
domestic domain (governmental agencies, commercial enterprises domiciled in the own coun-
try, national non-governmental organizations, etc.) to influence their behavior as intermediary 
actors in order to achieve foreign policy goals in the international domain. Potential interme-
                                                
12 This notation is common in the literature on economic sanctions for the initiators and addressees of sanctions 
(Drezner 1999b: 3; Eaton and Engers 1999: 409; Hufbauer et al. 1990a: 35) as well as in event data research to 
delineate source and target of international events (e.g., Schrodt and Gerner 1994: 827-828). See also Section 4.2 
for a methodological elaboration of this analytical structure. 
13 The terms are used in Baldwin’s (1985) study on “Economic Statecraft” and originate from Lasswell and 
Kaplan (1950). 
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diaries exist also in the international domain and include third-party governments, interna-
tional organizations, international non-governmental organizations, or multinational business 
corporations. But the sender can also address the ultimate target immediately and attempt so 
to influence its behavior directly. As a consequence, effects of the sender’s foreign policy 
interventions can be observed both in the domestic and international domain. In evaluation, 
such different intervention effects are labeled as immediate, intermediate and ultimate out-
comes of a political programs (Vedung 1997: 304). 
Figure 2: Domestic and International Scope of Foreign Policy Interventions 
 
 
 
An example from U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa illustrates the importance 
of such a distinction of scopes and domains of foreign policy interventions: 
In spring 1981, the administration of President Reagan announced its policy of “con-
structive engagement” toward South Africa. The policy included a relaxation of diplomatic 
and economic sanctions imposed under previous administrations, allowing South African 
honorary consuls in the U.S., granting visas to the South African rugby team, relaxing con-
trols on non-lethal exports for the South African military and police and on restrictions on 
exports of dual-use military equipment and technology (Hufbauer et al. 1990a: 221) In the 
broader international scope, the measures were mainly targeted at the South African govern-
ment (the ultimate target) to abandon its policies of racial discrimination and destabilization 
of its neighboring states. In the narrower domestic scope, however, the measures were tar-
geted at American and South African individuals (intermediary targets)—from diplomatic 
personnel to business to the South African rugby team—in order to establish a new relation-
ship between the two countries. The argument then goes that a changed bilateral relationship 
between the two countries should then eventually facilitate political change in South Africa. 
Domestic scope 
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3.1.2 Forms of Intervention in International Politics 
The U.S. policy of “constructive engagement” was one specific set of foreign policy interven-
tions targeted at South Africa to bring about change both in U.S. foreign relations toward 
South Africa and eventually in South Africa itself. Other interventions taken by different 
nation-states and international organizations in a unilateral or multilateral framework in-
cluded: 
− Dialogue and persuasive measures targeted at the apartheid government in order to con-
vince policymakers to change their policies. 
− Diplomatic interventions such as protest notes, pullout of diplomatic personnel from 
South Africa to demonstrate disapproval, consultation of South African diplomatic per-
sonnel, public condemnation of the South African government’s policies, exclusion of 
South African delegations from diplomatic bodies such as international conferences and 
international organizations. 
− Empowerment measures targeted at the South African opposition, including financial and 
material support to opposition groups, scholarships for students to study abroad, etc., with 
the eventual objective to ease domestic change within South Africa. 
− Imposition of political, cultural, social and economic compulsory measures such as eco-
nomic sanctions, cultural and scientific boycotts, etc. with the objective of changing inter-
national relations with South Africa and—by doing so—affecting the political, economic, 
social and cultural ability of critical actors to maneuver in order to stimulate behavioral 
change. 
Using Harold Lasswell (1936) classic categorization of intervention instruments (or 
“methods” in his terminology) that are at a government’s disposal to take influence on its 
environment, foreign policy interventions toward apartheid South Africa took many forms: 
Foreign governments used ‘symbols’ (the first type in Lasswell’s taxonomy) com-
prising the ideological component of foreign policy, expressed by verbal moves against the 
apartheid government and its racist policies as appeals to respect international human rights 
standards. ‘Violence’ (the second type) was not exerted in the case of South Africa in its most 
ultimate form through the use of military force. But on a lower intensity level, political, eco-
nomic and social force was partly used to take influence on crucial domestic and regional 
actors. ‘Goods’ (the third type) refer to interventions in order to direct the flow of goods and 
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services. Economic measures—either designed as punishment for disagreeable behavior or 
incentive or reward for agreeable behavior—can be subsumed under this category. ‘Practices’ 
(the forth type) in this context can be translated with activities on a formal diplomatic level or 
within informal networks used for informal talks with key actors such as decision-makers, 
political leaders or influential social actors or businessmen. The literature review (Section 2.5) 
revealed that most studies addressing international engagement against apartheid focus on the 
effectiveness of international sanctions as a foreign policy instrument and the role that sanc-
tions played in South Africa’s democratic transition. This means that most studies actually 
deal with the ‘goods’ category of foreign policy interventions according to Lasswell’s taxon-
omy of intervention types. 
In their classic definition, sanctions are an instrument of coercive diplomacy used by 
one nation-state or a coalition of states (the sender), designed to induce another nation-state 
(the target) to change some policy it would not change otherwise (Baldwin 1985: 35-36). 
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990a: 2) use a more narrow understanding of sanctions and 
define them as “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of 
customary trade or financial relations“, whereas “customary” refers to levels of trade and 
financial activity that would probably have occurred in the absence of sanctions. While 
Baldwin’s definition does not exclude so-called “positive sanctions” (e.g., new aid or credits), 
Hufbauer and colleagues limited their study to restrictive economic measures. But positive 
and negative sanctions in practice often combine. In particular in the case of apartheid South 
Africa, Western governments tried to apply both mechanisms of social control aiming at a 
behavioral modification on the part of the South African apartheid government: both punitive 
measures in the form of negative sanctions and incentive and rewarding measures in the form 
of positive sanctions. 
Negative sanctions are typically associated with ‘economic sanctions’ although they 
are only one type of negative sanctions, comprising also other forms of punitive military, 
political, societal or cultural sanctions. ‘Economic sanctions’, ‘economic coercion’ and ‘eco-
nomic statecraft’, are often used synonymously, although the terms are—strictly speaking—
different in a technical sense.14 The common component of all the three terms is the interest 
                                                
14 According to Baldwin (1985: 35-36) there are at least three common understandings alone for the term ‘eco-
nomic sanctions’. The first is a rather narrow concept that refers to the use of economic measures to enforce 
international law. The second refers to the type of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented in the 
target state. This understanding of economic sanctions emphasizes the intended effects rather than the means for 
achieving those effects. And the third usage corresponds to the concept of ‘economic statecraft’, relying primar-
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that guides the sender of such measures, namely to disrupt (or to threaten to disrupt) exchange 
between sender and target in order to make the target change some policy that it would not 
change otherwise. Table 2 summarizes typical types of negative sanctions. 
Table 2: Typical Techniques of Negative Sanctions 
Trade 
(Baldwin 1985) 
Capital 
(Baldwin 1985) 
Other 
(Crawford and Klotz 1999) 
Embargo 
Boycott 
Tariff increase 
Tariff discrimination (unfavorable) 
Withdrawal of “most-favored-nation 
treatment” 
Blacklist 
Quotas (import or export) 
License denial (import or export) 
Dumping 
Preclusive buying 
Threats of the above 
Freezing assets 
Controls on import or export 
Aid suspension 
Taxation (unfavorable) 
Withholding dues to international 
organizations 
Threats of the above 
Diplomatic isolation including: 
 Exclusion from international organi-
zations  
 Withdrawal of ambassador 
Sports boycott 
Cultural boycott, including arts such as 
theater, literature, architecture, and so 
forth, and academic exchange 
Threats of the above 
 
 
The term ‘positive sanctions’, on the other hand, is rather unfortunate since the term 
‘sanction’ per se generally has a negative connotation. But the term is widely used both by 
scholars and policymakers because positive sanctions are often seen as just the other side of 
the coin of negative sanctions. To avoid the terminological inconsistency, some scholars use 
the terms ‘incentives’ and ‘rewards’. The definition of what constitutes an ‘incentive’ or a 
‘reward’, however, is subject to varying interpretations.15 In general terms, granting an incen-
tive involves “the offer of a reward by a sender in exchange for a particular action or response 
by a recipient” (Cortright 1997a: 6). As a foreign policy instrument, Cortright (1997a: 6) 
defines incentives as “the granting of a political or economic benefit in exchange for a spe-
cific policy adjustment by the recipient nation.” Table 3 summarizes typical trade and capital 
related incentives and rewards (based on Baldwin 1985: 42) and some more strategically, 
politically and socially oriented incentive and reward types (based on Cortright 1997a: 7). 
                                                
ily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money. See also Drezner 
(1999b: 2-3). 
15  Sometimes ‘inducement’ is used instead of ‘incentive’. Although there is a subtle distinction between the two 
terms (Cortright 1997a: 6) the differences are minor in practical terms and it is therefore not necessary to distin-
guish between the terms here. ‘Incentives’ is the more common term and is also used in this study. 
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Table 3: Typical Techniques of Incentives and Rewards (“Positive Sanctions”) 
Trade 
(Baldwin 1985) 
Capital 
(Baldwin 1985) 
Other 
(Cortright 1997) 
Tariff discrimination (favorable) 
Granting “most-favored-nation” treat-
ment 
Tariff reduction 
Direct purchase 
Granting licenses (import or export) 
Promises of the above 
Providing aid 
Investment guarantees 
Encouragement of private capital 
exports or imports 
Taxation (favorable) 
Promises of the above 
Granting access to advanced technol-
ogy 
Offering diplomatic and political support 
Military cooperation 
Environmental and social cooperation 
Cultural exchanges 
Support for citizen diplomacy 
Dept relief 
Security assistance 
Granting membership in international 
organizations or security alliances 
Lifting negative sanctions 
Promise of the above 
 
 
As a whole, scholars of international affairs have always been preoccupied with the 
‘violence’ category (according to the Lasswell taxonomy) as a form of intervention in interna-
tional politics, most of all in the realm of studies on the use of military force. As Baldwin 
(2002: 184) outlines, this privileged place of military power in the study of international 
politics is demonstrated by references to the ‘centrality of force in international politics’ (Art 
1996; Baldwin 1999), to the study of power as ‘a study of the capacity to wage war’ (Cline 
1975), to force as ‘the ultimate form of power’ (Gilpin 1981) and to studies on the ‘threat, 
use, and control of military force’ (Walt 1991). Even Keohane and Nye (1977: 15), who have 
criticized the traditional emphasis on military force, depict force as dominating any other 
means of power in international politics. 
Combined with an increased concern for human rights in international politics, the 
issue of humanitarian intervention—the use of military force for humanitarian purposes—has 
generated one of the most heated debates within the international community over the past 
decade, both among theorists and practitioners (Welsh 2004a: 3). At the heart of the debate is 
the alleged tension between the principle of state sovereignty, a defining pillar of international 
law and the U.N. system, and the evolving international norms related to human rights and the 
use of force (Welsh 2004b). The concept of humanitarian intervention has been significantly 
expanded in recent years. While very few such interventions happened in the Cold War, the 
1990s witnessed a series of military action explicitly taken for humanitarian reasons.16 
                                                
16 Another specific use of the term ‘intervention’ appears in scholarly work on international cooperation and 
humanitarian aid, comprises local and international organizations working in zones of violent conflict or in the 
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Despite the narrow legal scope for ‘intervention’ in international law, intervention in 
international and other nation-states internal affairs in a more general sense has always been a 
normal feature of international politics (Biersteker 2002: 161). Stephan Krasner (1999) de-
scribes this contradiction of asserting the inviolability of territorial boundaries on the one 
hand and the practice of constant interference in other nations affairs on the other as “orga-
nized hypocrisy” in international relations. Especially when it comes to interventions and 
attempts to intervene without the use of military force, interference in other countries’ internal 
affairs is the ‘daily business’ of international affairs. How to induce another nation-state to 
change some policy it would not change otherwise has therefore always been a pivotal issue 
in international relations, and the issue is probably as old as the existence of the state as an 
organizational unit. 
A distinct—but in many ways similar—understanding of ‘intervention’ exists in the 
study of (domestic) public policy (e.g., Parsons 1995). Governments intervene in society in 
their function as a democratically legitimized power in order to influence the behavior of 
citizens in accordance with democratically established norms (Bemelmans-Videc 1998: 4). 
Various instruments of intervention—ranging from regulatory coercion to deliberative infor-
mation—are thereby at a government’s disposal to exert power on society. It is the objective 
of the next section to integrate international and domestic concepts of intervention into a 
theoretical framework that allows for a systematic analysis of the effects of foreign policy 
interventions toward South Africa under apartheid. 
                                                
aftermath of violent conflicts to reduce the suffering of the population by helping to re-establish security, moni-
tor human rights, build peace or support efforts to rebuild the democratic and economic structures (e.g., 
Pfaffenholz 2005). 
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3.2 Foreign Policy Interventions in Theoretical Perspective 
In this section, specific theoretical claims using policy interventions as independent variables 
to explain behavioral change in the realm of foreign policy will be explained. Since this study 
is particularly interested in linkages between the domestic and international domain of foreign 
policy, concepts from different streams of political science theory will be considered to ex-
plain effects of foreign policy decisions both on international relations of the deciding country 
and the situation in South Africa itself. It will be shown that each of the three following 
schools of though contributes to a better understanding of how foreign policy decisions affect 
a nation-state’s international environment. Based on this theoretical elaboration, specific 
hypotheses on the expected effects of specific foreign policy interventions will be formulated. 
3.2.1 International Relations Theory 
The theoretical contest in International Relations (IR) over the last three decades has mostly 
been shaped by the debate between advocates of neorealism and its critics (mostly neoliberals 
and constructivists). The core dispute arose around the ‘nature’ of the international political 
system and its effects on attributes and patterns of international policy outcomes, in particular 
war and peace. Two of the most widely debated questions have been whether multipolar 
systems produce more conflicts than bipolar systems and whether international institutions 
effectively contribute to more international cooperation (Powell 1994). 
Classical realists see the nation-state as a unitary and rational actor that analyzes 
other nation-state’s actual and expected behavior and adapts its own behavior according to 
these international restrictions. Additionally, based on Hans Morgenthau’s (1964) classical 
examination in “Politics Among Nations” (first published in 1948), realist theories share 
several other key assumptions: nation-states are the principle actors in the international sys-
tem; they move towards their own national interest, which is mostly uniform and includes a 
general distrust of long-term cooperation and alliance; the overriding national interest of each 
state is its national security and survival; relations between states are determined by their 
comparative level of power derived primarily from their military and economic capabilities. 
A revised version of the realist approach, neorealism, starts from the same basic as-
sumptions as classical realism but formulates additional conditions under which such explana-
tory factors are critical. Exponents of a neorealist approach (most prominently, Waltz 1979) 
limit the study of international politics to the structure of the international system and argue 
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that a theory of international relations is not systematic anymore when it includes characteris-
tics of single states in an explanation of international politics. The neorealist approach there-
fore confines itself to an analysis of relative factors deduced from the characteristics of the 
international system to explain the international behavior of states (see also, Walt 1985; Waltz 
1996). 
Liberalism represents the second main theoretical stream of IR theory and primarily 
counters a realist approach to international politics. Liberals—embodying an alleviate version 
of the idealism in international relations that can be traced back to the era of President 
Woodrow Wilson after World War I—postulate that the preferences of the acting actors, 
mostly nation-states, rather than restrictions of the international political system are the cen-
tral determinants of international policy outcomes. Different from realism, nation-states are 
not a priori seen as unitary actors and a certain plurality in a nation-state’s foreign policy 
behavior is admitted. Nation-state interests may converge and allow for cooperation. Re-
peated and reciprocal cooperation and the establishment of international institutions (confer-
ences, treaties, organizations, etc.) mitigate the anarchical structure of the international politi-
cal system and create a reliability of expectations, which is in turn a precondition for future 
cooperation (for an overview, Keohane 1990). 
Neoliberalism developed mostly as a response to neorealism. Advocates of the neo-
liberal school of thought (most prominently, Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987) do not deny the 
anarchic nature of the international system on principle but argue that its relevance and con-
sequences are overestimated by neorealists (Milner 1993; Powell 1994). Neoliberals therefore 
focus on the supposedly underestimated possibilities for cooperative behavior in international 
relations. Because its first and foremost concern is with absolute rather than relative gains, 
neoliberalism is often connected with neoliberal economic theory. As a consequence, neolib-
eral theorists often apply game theory to explain when and under what conditions nation-
states cooperate (e.g., Powell 1993). While stressing the possibility of reciprocal gain expecta-
tions, neoliberals are particularly interested in institutions that facilitate such collectively 
profitable arrangements and compromises (e.g., Keohane 1998). 
The relevance of neorealism and neoliberalism as the two main global theories of in-
ternational relations seems to be given also for the study of foreign policy. Although aiming at 
the structural level of international politics, the two schools each provide a set of fundamental 
assumptions on the nature and functionality of the international system which are relevant for 
individual foreign policy processes as well: both policymakers and analysts come to different 
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foreign policy conclusions, depending on their position on central questions such as Are 
nation-states basically antagonistic or cooperative? or Should a nation-state employ its eco-
nomic and military power if it can achieve a comparative advantage? But global theories such 
as neorealism and neoliberalism reach their limitation when they are adopted to explain indi-
vidual foreign policy outcomes. Kenneth Waltz (1979) made this distinction between a theory 
of foreign policy and a theory of international politics in his seminal study on the “Theory of 
International Politics”: 
To the extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior 
and the outcomes of their behavior become predictable […] [but] a theory of inter-
national politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain 
only certain aspects of them. (Waltz 1979: 71-72) 
In Waltz’ view it is therefore an error to mistake a theory of international politics for 
a theory of foreign policy (based on Waltz 1959; see also Waltz 1979: 121; Waltz 1996). For 
a clarification of this distinction it is helpful to differentiate between domestic-political expla-
nations and non-domestic explanations of foreign policy outcomes (as suggested by Fearon 
1998). Fearon’s argument can be formalized as in Figure 3: 
Figure 3: Non-Domestic and Domestic Explanations of Foreign Policy Outcomes 
 Non-Domestic Explanations Domestic Explanations 
 (Theories of International Politics) (Theories of Foreign Policy) 
 
 
System level 
 
 
 
 
National level 
 
 unitary, rational multifaceted 
 policy preferences: policy preferences: 
 given (realism) to be explored empirically 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the two basic approaches to an explanation of foreign policy be-
havior. Non-domestic explanations include principally a structural analysis and concentrate 
on the system level of international politics, trying to explain how such interactions and corre-
sponding “international political outcomes or patterns” (Waltz 1979: 119-121) are determined 
by the structure of the international political system. Such structural explanations are part of a 
realist theory of international politics in terms of Waltz (1979) and apply to a large extent also 
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to other system-level theories such as neoliberal institutionalism and system constructivism 
(Gourevitch 2002). Domestic explanations, instead, attempt to explain how domestic interac-
tions lead to certain behavior on the international political level and thereby stress the rele-
vance of inner-state factors to explain foreign policy. Characteristics of the international 
system are considered as intervening variables. 
The theoretical argument to separate domestic politics form international politics has 
also been supported by empirical evidence from various settings. For the case of Switzerland, 
for example, scholars widely agreed until the 1980s that foreign policy-making has been 
largely disconnected from domestic politics (e.g., Goetschel et al. 2005: 147-151; Klöti et al. 
2005: 27-35; Schneider and Hess 1995: 3-4). One explanation for this traditional separation 
emphasizes the integrating effect of Switzerland’s neutrality status, which prevented latent 
conflicts on foreign policy issues from breaking out at the domestic level (Frei 1974). Another 
explanation is based on the observation that high-ranking civil servants were anxious to settle 
foreign policy decisions below the referendum barrier and by doing so avoided popular de-
bates on many central foreign policy issues (Jaeggi 1983). Particularly regarding foreign 
trade, the political and economic elite contrived to limit the risk of a referendum by establish-
ing corporate negotiation structures (Katzenstein 1984). 
It has to be mentioned that such a distinction between international politics and 
(mostly domestically explained) foreign policy is not uncontroversial. Especially individual 
representatives of a neorealist school of thought (e.g., Baumann et al. 2001; Elman 1996; 
Carlsnaes 2002: 336) made strong counter-arguments. Nevertheless, realist approaches to 
foreign policy often fail to explain individual foreign policy outcomes, for instance in cases 
where two states with similar structural positions within the international political system 
behave significantly differently in a given international situation.17 System-level analysis of 
international politics holds potential domestic explaining factors constant and provides there-
fore an insufficient theoretical framework to explain the foreign policy behavior of individual 
nation-states. 
David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson (Skidmore and Hudson 1993a: 1) therefore 
rightly argue that theories of international relations pitched at the systemic level may com-
plement but cannot substitute for models which specify domestic-centered theories of foreign 
                                                
17 In a realist system-level analysis such differences are regarded as evidence of system effects. For example, 
balances of power may form even though no state deliberately seeks this result in choosing its foreign policies 
(Waltz 1979: 119). But if the particular foreign policies of such nation-states are the dependent variables, such an 
explanation is unsatisfying. 
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policy behavior. In such a model of domestic-foreign explanations (as formalized in Figure 
4), international factors deducted from the structure of the international political system may 
provide important context and intervening variables but do not substitute for an exploration of 
the motives and interests of the acting international actors, typically the nation-states. 
Figure 4: Domestic-Foreign Explanations of Foreign Policy Outcome 
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Over the past two decades intensified attempts have been made to account for ex-
plaining factors rooted in the domestic political sphere to explain foreign policy behavior. 
Meanwhile quite a number of well-developed theoretical threads are available, examining 
such phenomena as institutions, systems, group dynamics, domestic politics, and so forth 
(Hudson 2005: 3). Analyzing foreign policy decision-making, scholars often refer to the “two-
level” games decision-makers have to play, that is, simultaneously considering domestic and 
international politics while negotiating on international issues (Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 
1993). The role of societal groups in foreign policy-making has been explored (Skidmore and 
Hudson 1993b; Della Porta et al. 1999; Hermann 1993) as well as other societal and cultural 
factors affecting state behavior on the international political level (Breuning 1997; Hudson 
1997; Katzenstein 1996). These research efforts contributed to the substantial literature on 
domestic politics and international relations (Keohane and Milner 1996; Beasley and Snarr 
2002; Fearon 1998; Gourevitch 2002; Risse-Kappen 1991).18 
Constructivist approaches to international relations—despite divisions between mod-
ernist, modernist linguistic and critical constructivists—stress the social construction of 
                                                
18 While they have been on the rise over the past two decades, studies exploring domestic/international interac-
tion are not that new, of course. The most highly articulated body of classical work has been done in interna-
tional political economy, a field that has a traditionally strong interest in such linkages because it seeks to under-
stand the causes behind a nation’s choice, particularly in foreign economic policy ( ; Schattschneider 1935; 
Olson 1982: 310). 
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knowledge and the construction of social reality as explanatory factors of international poli-
tics. This common ground of constructivist approaches, to believe Emanuel Adler (2002), 
views the material world not as given per se. The objects of our knowledge are therefore not 
independent of our interpretations and our language. Knowledge is so both a resource that 
people use in their day-to-day life for the construction of social reality, and the theories, con-
cepts, meanings and symbols that scientists use to interpret social reality. In IR, constructive 
approaches consider political patterns of action as endogenous and emphasize the crucial role 
of identities, norms, world views and knowledge as explanatory concepts (e.g., Adler 2002; 
Haas 1990; Adler 1997). 
Audie Klotz (1999; 1995a) has studied the role played by norms, defined as “shared 
(thus social) understandings of standards for behavior” (Klotz 1995b: 14) in international 
action against apartheid in South Africa and analyzed the social-constructivist determinants 
behind selected individual states’ (USA, Britain and Zimbabwe) actions and multilateral 
policies (United Nations, Commonwealth, Organization of African Unity) towards the South 
African apartheid regime. Klotz’ work challenges conventional international relation theories 
which reputedly fail to explain two crucial aspects of international reactions to apartheid: first, 
“why racial discrimination within South Africa emerged as a global issue in a system based 
on sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction” and, secondly, “why most organizations and states 
adopted sanctions despite the strategic and economic interest that had previously ensured 
strong ties with South Africa” (Klotz 1995a: 8). Based on this claimed failure of traditional 
explanations, Klotz seeks to demonstrate that norms such as ‘racial equality’ played an equal 
if not dominant and crucial role in policy formulation as key strategic concerns. In the case of 
the United States, for example, Klotz was able to demonstrate how anti-apartheid norms, 
reinforced by the Civil Rights legacies of the 1960s, superseded ‘realist economic assump-
tions’ and eventually led to the U.S. adoption of sanctions. 
3.2.2 Foreign Policy Analysis 
Already in the 1960s, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) formed as a hybrid approach to the 
study of foreign policy.19 Mostly developed as a sub-discipline within the study of IR, FPA 
can be located at the intersection of international relations theory and public policy—although 
                                                
19 Foreign Policy Analysis can be subdivided into the research streams of Comparative Foreign Policy, Foreign 
Policy Decision Making and Foreign Policy Context, rooted in groundbreaking works by Rosenau (1995a), 
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1966), and Spout and Spout (1954), respectively. For a detailed delineation of the 
field see Gerner (Sprout and Sprout ; Gerner), Neak (1995) and Hudson (1995; 1995). 
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a diffusion of concepts, developed in either of the two research traditions, has hardly hap-
pened. Based on early works of James Rosenau (2005; 1966), FPA rejected the realist para-
digm in the study of international relations from the 1950s and 1960s that domestic and inter-
national factors have to be treated as analytically separately. Instead, Rosenau proposed two 
concepts that connect domestic and international systems. First, he introduced the idea of a 
penetrated political system “where nonmembers of a national society participate directly and 
authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society’s members, in either the alloca-
tion of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals” (Rosenau 1967: 65). 
Second, Rosenau conceptualized linkage politics as the process within a penetrated system. 
Linkage was defined as “any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and 
is reacted to in another” (Rosenau 1966: 231). As Karen Mingst (1969: 231) points out, essen-
tial to this definition of the domestic and international conjunction is the idea that a single 
reaction does not constitute a linkage yet; only sequences of behavior across boundaries be-
tween systems are of interest. 
FPA can thus be characterized by an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument 
that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers 
acting singly or in groups (Mingst 1995). Another characteristic is its dynamic approach to 
studying political processes in the form of sequences of individual events. Following the 
behavioral paradigm and in analogy to the ‘vote’, which had become the fundamental ex-
planandum in behavioralist political studies, foreign policy scholars invented the foreign 
policy ‘event’. The event is the “tangible artifact of the influence attempt that is foreign pol-
icy” (Hudson 2005: 215). With the conceptual breakthrough of the ‘event’, foreign policy 
analysts started to collect data on a variety of possible explanatory factors for international 
policy outcomes and determined the patterns by which these independent variables were 
correlated with foreign policy behavior (for an overview on event data in foreign policy 
analysis, see Hudson and Vore 1995). 
From its inception, FPA has involved the examination of how foreign policy deci-
sions are made and has assumed that human beings, acting individually or in collectives, are 
the source of much behavior and most change in international politics. The main interest of 
FPA has therefore always been focused on the decision-making process employed by the 
legitimate authorities of nation-states (Schrodt 1995: 2). But particular case studies go beyond 
the study of a single act of decision-making or sequences of decisions and analyze the conflict 
behavior of political actors and investigate also into the implementation of specific foreign 
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policies “on the ground” (e.g., Hudson 2005; Moore and Davis 1998). But such an application 
of FPA on the ‘post-decisional’ phase of foreign policy is rather exceptional, although an 
event data approach to foreign policy behavior offers wide opportunities for the testing of 
hypotheses explicitly or implicitly found in the qualitative foreign policy literature. 
In particular the actor orientation as well as the focus on dynamic linkages between 
different political levels allow for a specification of the basic model of domestic-foreign 
explanations of foreign policy outcomes (Figure 4, p. 66), using the basic analytics as intro-
duced in Section 3.1.1. Such a domestic-foreign interaction model (Figure 5) displays differ-
ent forms of interactions between domestic and international actors that could be involved in 
situations of international action against an unfavorable regime such as South Africa’s apart-
heid system.  
Figure 5: Domestic-Foreign Interaction Model 
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In the most simple interaction mode (1), government of the sender state initiates ac-
tions (e.g., diplomatic sanctions) against the government of the target state (or another actor 
whose behavior is disapproved by the sender). The sender may address the target government 
directly and take measures that affect the immediate relations between sender and target 
government (for example, by diplomatic isolation or withholding military assistance). Or the 
sender government may impose measures that mostly effect the relations of intermediary 
actors (such as governmental agencies, commercial enterprises, non-governmental organiza-
tions, etc.) with the target country. Most economic sanctions can be assigned to such indirect 
interventions in international relations between the sender and the ultimate target of interna-
tional sanctions. 
However, there are at least four other interaction modes that have to be considered 
too. These more indirect forms of interventions are displayed in Figure 5 by dashed arrows. 
International 
Actors 
Target 
Government 
Sender 
Government 
Domestic 
Actors 
Domestic 
Actors 
 70 
The first indirect interaction mode (2) includes actions of the sender government targeted at 
domestic actors in the targeted country, assuming that these actors then influence the behavior 
of the ultimate target (usually a disagreeable government or political regime) in more favor-
able way. Any activity of the sender government to strengthen the political opposition in the 
target country can be subsumed under this interaction mode. In a similar way, the sender 
government can also try to prompt other international actors to influence the behavior of the 
ultimate target. This interaction mode (3) seems particularly crucial for international sanctions 
since internationally concerted actions are often regarded as being more effective than unilat-
eral actions, although this assertion has not been supported by systematic empirical studies 
(compare Section 2.4.1). 
The two remaining interaction modes (4 and 5) stem from newer research on social 
movements (Tarrow 2005; Della Porta et al. 1999; Tarrow 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998b). In 
particular Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998a, 1998b) convincingly showed how 
oppressed groups in repressive regimes (for example in Latin America) have spurred transna-
tional advocacy networks including national and international actors collectively engaging in 
favor of the abolishment of those regimes. The transnationalization of such advocacy net-
works has been shaped in two ways (Keck and Sikkink 1998a: 221). First, repression forces 
the externalization of domestic rights struggles. Unable to address issues like human rights, 
disappearance and labor rights in situations in which the chief violators of rights were state 
institutions, activists form alliances with their counterparts abroad. Together, they sought 
recourse either by approaching international institutions or by mobilizing foreign pressure to 
change the behavior of their governments. Second, repression also generates diasporas. Politi-
cal exiles, escaped from the repression at home, develop lasting friendships, political ties and 
relations of trust abroad, not only on a personal level, but also with organizations in their host 
countries—universities, churches, foundations and research institutes. As will be discussed 
later, the international anti-apartheid movement showed many of these characteristics. 
3.2.3 Regime Theory 
Assuming both domestic and international factors to explain the foreign policy behavior of a 
nation-state (Figure 4, p. 66), not only foreign policy decisions within the national political 
system but also changes in the international political system may be crucial. A domestic-
foreign explanation of foreign policy behavior thus also has to consider occurrences in the 
international political system as potential causes for changes in the foreign behavior of a 
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nation-state. Occurrences on the international political level may affect foreign policy behav-
ior indirectly since a changed international constellation may prompt decision-makers on the 
national level to adjust their policies. But national foreign policy behavior may also be af-
fected directly by changes on the international level since national foreign policy may lie in 
the scope of decisions taken by other nation-states or within international organizations. As a 
consequence of such direct system-level effects, it is possible to observe changes in the inter-
national relations of a particular nation-state without national foreign-policy adjustments 
being made. 
Figure 6: Direct and Indirect System-level Effects 
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Direct and indirect system-level effects as illustrated in Figure 6 are particularly cru-
cial for less powerful nations which are more dependent on international developments than 
global powers (compare Keck and Sikkink 1998b; Katzenstein 1985). Theoretical references 
to such effects of international policy decisions on national foreign policy behavior have 
mostly been made in studies on international regimes. International regimes—principles, 
norms and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given 
issue area (Goldstein and Freeman 1990: 185)—can be considered both as dependent 
(Krasner 1982b) and intervening or independent variables (Young and Osherenko 1993; 
Krasner 1982b). Scholars interested in international regimes as explaining factors typically 
analyze how international regimes affect actor behavior and policy outcomes in particular 
issue areas, especially environmental policy (Krasner 1982a; Haas et al. 1993). The same 
logic can be applied to international sanctions regimes, where such a regime may take the 
shape of an internationally concerted sanctions system (for instance within the U.N. frame-
work) or emerge from the policies of dominating international actors (hegemonic power such 
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as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War) whose policies often have an 
international or even global scope. 
From a constructivist perspective, three additional considerations regarding interac-
tion models of international actions as displayed in Figure 5 and Figure 6 above are crucial 
here. The first deals with the perception of the sender’s action on the part of the target. Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz (2001) have shown that explanations of power relations—what 
the sender’s actions towards the target typically are—should specify from whose point of 
view the situation is being viewed. To give an example, a sender may perceive himself as 
employing carrots, but the target perceives the sender as using sticks or vice versa. Whether a 
measure is thus a punishment or a reward depends on the target’s perception of the situation. 
As Baldwin (1963: 23) has worked out for the statecraft literature, positive and negative 
sanctions should therefore be distinguished in terms of the target’s expectation about his 
future value position. 
The second phenomenon that has to be considered includes symbolic politics. Politi-
cal actions such as international sanctions do not necessarily need to be imposed with the aim 
of actually changing the target’s behavior in a more favorable way. Especially negative sanc-
tions can be imposed for symbolic reasons to demonstrate to domestic and international audi-
ences that something is being done or at least it appears that action is being taken in times of 
crisis. When military action is impossible for one reason or another and when doing nothing is 
seen as tantamount to complicity, then often something has to be done to express morality, 
something that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the target has done is 
disapproved of. Sanctions, if not serving instrumental purposes, can have such expressive 
functions (Baldwin 1971: 407; Galtung 1967: 97). 
Thirdly, the sender may pursue other goals than those officially declared. Import 
sanctions, for example, in particular often function as protective tariffs and induce import 
substitution industrialization so that (typically domestic) producers and alternative suppliers 
of the embargoed goods benefit from this protection (for the case of the U.S., see, e.g., 
Baldwin 1985). The possible ambiguity of goals in decisions on sanctions complicates an 
examination of the effects of such decisions. But the complexity and contradictions of the 
goals of political programs pose a challenge to any evaluation of governmental action. The 
effects of sanctions in particular and any international action in general can therefore not be 
analyzed without scrutinizing the decision-making and its explicit and implicit goals and 
objectives. 
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3.2.4 Different Policies—Different Effects: Theoretical Approaches and Hypotheses 
Figure 7 below summarizes the theoretical framework of this study as derived above. It in-
cludes the interaction model outlined in the previous section and assigns the individual inter-
action stages to the research questions as I formulated them at the beginning of the study. For 
research questions 2 and 3, asking for the effects of foreign policy interventions with regard to 
apartheid, I will now formulate hypotheses on the relationship between different forms of 
foreign policy interventions and their potential effect in the domestic and international scope 
of international relations (according to Figure 2 on p. 56). 
Figure 7: Theoretical Framework 
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The first set of hypotheses (Hypotheses 1-3) address the relationship between differ-
ent forms of foreign policy interventions and their effects on relations between the sender 
government of these interventions and the targeted government of South Africa. These hy-
potheses are mainly based on realist theory considerations from IR on the use of ‘sticks’ and 
‘carrots’ as the sender’s basic foreign policy tools to exert influence on a target government’s 
unfavorable behavior. In addition, attempts to influence the target using information, persua-
sion and propaganda techniques (‘sermon’) comprise a third basic mode of foreign policy 
intervention. This alternative perspective is based on a rather constructivist approach to inter-
national relations. 
The second set of hypotheses (Hypotheses 4-8) draws mainly on theoretical concepts 
from the field of (domestic) public policy. As I will show, the public policy field provides 
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several concepts (in particular on ‘policy arenas’, ‘policy instruments’ and ‘policy design’) 
that can be adapted successfully to foreign policy as well. The public policy perspective 
draws attention to the question of how the foreign policy interventions are in fact imple-
mented and therefore takes into consideration the mediating role different governmental and 
non-governmental intermediary actors play between the sender government and the ultimate 
target of a foreign policy intervention. 
The third set of hypotheses (Hypotheses 9-11) then addresses different factors that 
could have had an impact on the developments in South Africa itself and is mainly based on 
empirical modeling. 
3.2.4.1 Intervention Modes: Carrots, Sticks and Sermon 
Studies concerning the question of how nation-states exert power on other international actors 
(typically other nation-states) prove to be conceptually enlightening also with regards to the 
study of foreign policy interventions and their outcomes (Selden 1999; Keohane and Nye 
1977, 1987; Boulding 1989). In the realm of IR, these studies are typically subsumed under 
the concept of ‘statecraft’ that is originally described as the “art of conducting state affairs” 
(Nye 1990; Drezner 1999b). The term ‘statecraft’ is sometimes used to encompass the whole 
foreign policy-making process, but more often it refers to the selection of means for the pur-
suit of foreign policy goals (Baldwin 1985: 187; 2002: 8). The terms ‘instruments’, ‘tools’, 
‘means’, ‘levers’ and ‘techniques’ all refer to such policy options and are here therefore used 
interchangeably. 
Employing a very traditional understanding of international relations, scholars re-
duced foreign policy instruments to two categories: war and diplomacy (e.g., Baldwin 1985; 
Morgenthau 1964; cited in Aron 1966). Charles F. Hermann (1985) developed a more sophis-
ticated taxonomy of foreign policy instruments based on eight categories of resources: diplo-
matic, domestic political, military, intelligence, economic, scientific/technological, promotive 
and natural. Based on Lasswell’s (1982) classical taxonomy, David Baldwin in his thorough 
study on “Economic Statecraft” (1936: 13-14) differentiates four techniques of statecraft: 
Propaganda refers to influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberative manipulation of 
verbal symbols. Diplomacy refers to influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation. 
Economic statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a 
reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money. Military statecraft refers to influ-
ence attempts relying primarily on violence, weapons, or force. 
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The economic statecraft literature has mainly concentrated on elaborating the differ-
ent functionalities and effects of negative and positive sanctions, although the latter is theo-
retically rather sparsely elaborated (Baldwin 1985: 236). Negative and positive sanctions are 
sometimes referred to as ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ to punish a certain behavior of an another actor 
or to reward the target for taking desired actions, respectively (Drezner 1999a; Dorussen 
2001; Drezner 1999b; also in combination with mediation, see e.g. Cortright 1997b; Quandt 
2001). Each strategy has a unique logic of its own (Schrodt and Gerner 2004: 37: 29-50). 
Negative sanctions (‘sticks’) seek to lower the aggregate welfare of the addressee by reducing 
international relations in order to coerce the addressee to change its political behavior. Posi-
tive sanctions (‘carrots’) are either directly or indirectly targeted at the addressee. The meas-
ures can be targeted directly by offering an asset to the addressee in exchange for a change in 
its adverse political behavior, or the attempt to exert influence can be made indirectly by 
supporting oppositional forces which aim at a desirable policy change (see interaction model 
in Figure 5, p. 69). For both basic intervention modes it can then be assumed that a changed 
relationship between sender and target eventually prompts the target to adjust the policies the 
sender disagrees with—if the intervention is to be effective. In the realm of this study, I will 
analyze potential relational changes between the sender and the target of ‘sticks’ or ‘carrots’ 
in two dimensions: the level of interaction and the conflict/cooperation level. 
Two hypotheses derive from these considerations: 
Hypothesis 1: The use of ‘sticks’ results in a decline of interactions between the 
sender and the target whereas the use of ‘carrots’ increases such interactions. 
Hypothesis 2: The use of ‘sticks’ is more likely to result in a higher level of conflict 
between the sender and the target whereas the use of ‘carrots’ is expected to result in a lower 
level of conflict (i.e., an increase in cooperation) between the sender and the target. 
However, such a dichotomous scheme of penalties (‘sticks’) and incentives and re-
wards (‘carrots’) may also generate difficulties: it provides no explicit pigeonhole for the 
transfer of knowledge, education, counseling, persuasion, propaganda, and other techniques 
based on argumentation and persuasion (1985: 26-27). This lack of precision of a twofold 
stick-or-carrot categorization is not only problematic on the domestic level—from where 
Evert Vedung’ s argumentation stems—but is evident on the international political level too 
(compare foreign policy taxonomies of Hermann 1982 and Baldwin 1985 above). In particu-
lar when a nation’s foreign policy toward a disagreeable regime like South Africa’s apartheid 
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system is analyzed, a whole set of foreign policy interventions—including diplomatic meas-
ures such as protest notes, the recall of the ambassador, mediation, and other diplomatic mis-
sions—are hardly covered by a dichotomous punishing-rewarding categorization. The inclu-
sion of the ‘information’ category is therefore crucial also for international politics, especially 
considering the constructivist critic on traditional IR theory as outlined in Section 3.2.1 (pp. 
62-67). 
Information strategies do not necessarily involve either penalties or incentives and 
rewards. ‘Information’ (the ‘sermon’, in Vedung’s terminology) can be defined as attempts of 
influencing people through the transfer of knowledge, the communication of reasoned argu-
ment, and persuasion (Vedung 1998: 33). On the domestic political level, information instru-
ments are regarded as modern forms of intervention, with an emphasis on prevention of 
wrong or simulation of the right conduct by offering insights into consequences of behavior 
(Vedung 1998: 11). Such a provision of information is a major concern of governments in 
post-industrial societies. On the international level, most non-coercive diplomatic interven-
tions show very similar characteristics (Bemelmans-Videc 1998: 13). According to this spe-
cific type of intervention, a government can not only force or animate the target to engage in 
certain behavior but can also try to persuade the target to engage towards a more favorable 
behavior. However, it can be assumed that such information policies are less displayed in 
political events between the sender and the target because such transfer of knowledge or effort 
of persuasion is usually less visible than the transfer or withdrawal of material assets. 
These considerations result in a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The use of ‘sermon’ is expected to have less of an impact on the inter-
actions and the level of conflict between the sender and the target than the use of ‘sticks’ or 
‘carrots’. 
In fact, a general understanding of statecraft conceptually is not restricted to interna-
tional politics but comprises domestic politics as well. However, scholars of domestic politics 
and public policy abandoned the term mostly (compare, e.g., the widely used textbooks of 
Baldwin 1985; Howlett and Ramesh 2003), even though the concept was originally developed 
considering primarily domestic politics (Parsons 1995; Lasswell 1950). But similar to IR 
scholars, public policy researchers have made numerous attempts to identify the policy op-
tions used by policy-makers and classify them into meaningful categories (for a summary of 
various classification schemes, see Lasswell and Kaplan 1950; Howlett and Ramesh 1993). 
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Unfortunately, as Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh (1995) put it, “no two schemes share 
much in common. They are either pitched at a very high level of abstraction or dwell on the 
idiosyncrasies of particular tools.” Another problem can be that they offer a categorization 
scheme in which categories are not mutually exclusive (e.g., Howlett and Ramesh 1995). The 
same criticism also applies to various international policy taxonomies, some of which were 
discussed above. 
I am deliberately not expanding the types of foreign policy interventions analyzed in 
this study. Instead, I argue for a rather minimalist taxonomy including only ‘sticks’, ‘carrots’ 
and ‘sermon’ as independent intervention modes in the analysis of international relations 
between the four selected nations of the U.S., West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland on the 
one side and the South African apartheid government on the other side. This intervention 
analysis will include a time-series analysis of the selected countries’ foreign policies toward 
South Africa over a time period of twenty years (1977-1996). With such a rather long-term 
focus, only the general trends and more fundamental shifts in the countries’ foreign relations 
can be explored. A rather simple and parsimonious classification of policy instruments is 
therefore theoretically more fruitful. Variances over time and cross-sectional differences are 
assumed to be less a source of bias originating from the specifics of the individual time peri-
ods and cases. On the other hand, I can assume that the addressees react differently to basic 
types of foreign policy interventions, and such fundamental behavioral patterns are exactly in 
the core interest of this study. 
However, the taxonomy of ‘sticks’, ‘carrots’ and ‘sermon’ remains theoretically 
weak when the magnitude of the effects and their chronological sequence should be ex-
plained. As it becomes apparent from Hypotheses 1-3, theoretical considerations on the three 
fundamental modes of intervention allow for some assumptions on the kind of effects that 
could result between sender and target after their application. But, only considering Hypothe-
ses 1-3, we have no ground for an assumption on how intense these effects are and for how 
long they are expected to last. 
As I will show next, these questions have been a core issue of Public Policy, the 
scholarly discipline primarily concerned with knowledge about policy content and process 
(Hood 1986: 510). Especially Theodore Lowi’s (1990; revised in 1964) classic typology of 
public policy in the U.S.—including distributive, regulative and redistributive ‘arenas of 
powers’—has had a substantial and lasting impact on public policy analysis. Another research 
stream that has specialized in the study of how policy-makers influence society comprises the 
 78 
works on ‘policy design’ and ‘policy instruments’ (Lowi 1972; Doern 1981; Hood 1986; 
Linder and Peters 1989, 1991; Linder and Peters 1998). These two research streams provide a 
point of departure for a theoretical explanation also of the magnitude of the effects of foreign 
policy intervention, as not only the international scope of foreign policy between sender 
government and target government is taken into account, but also the intermediary sphere 
with different forms of international relations between two countries. 
3.2.4.2 Arenas of Power: Distributive, Regulative and Redistributive Policies 
Lowi (1997) demonstrated that it is not necessarily always politics that determines the policy 
outcome but that policy content also structures the political process significantly. Mainly 
three basic policy types—distribution, regulation and redistribution—with their inherent 
functionality unfold specific effects on the conflicts and decision-making process within a 
political system. 
Distributive policy characteristics (Lowi 1964: 692-695) are attributed to policies 
which provide individuals or groups with goods and services without other individuals or 
groups bearing directly the costs of this provision. Examples for distributive policies are 
specific tariffs or subsidies. Decision-making on distributive policies is usually not very con-
flictive since no disadvantage for other individuals or groups accrues directly from such a 
policy. The distributive arena is therefore pluralistic only in the sense that a large number of 
small, intensely organized interests are operating. 
Regulative policies (Lowi 1964: 695-703) influence the behavior of individuals and 
groups directly by regulating behavioral options. In most cases such regulations are imple-
mented using commands and prohibitions. Similar to distributive policies, regulative policies 
can be designed very specifically and may affect different individuals and groups differently. 
Examples of regulative policies are regulations of different kinds or eliminations of substan-
dard goods, unfair competition or fraudulent advertising. The decisions made on general 
behavioral rules (as inherent in every regulative policy) are perceived individually and are 
often judged on a case-by-case basis depending on the specifics of a given situation. The 
coalitions in a regulative arena are therefore unstable and alter regularly. Since regulative 
policies usually encounter strong opposition from directly affected individuals and groups, 
conflicts in a regulative arena are significantly more intense than in the distributive arena and 
show the typical characteristics of pluralism. 
 79 
Redistributive policies (Lowi 1964: 703-711) include a reallocation of tangible goods 
between social groups and are therefore typically understood as a zero-sum game: gains for 
one social group are usually at another group’s expense. Examples for redistribute policies are 
Federal Reserve controls of credits, progressive income tax, or social security regulations. 
Redistributive policies affect broader social circles than distributive policies since such real-
locations usually have an effect on different parts of society. As a consequence, related con-
flicts often break out along traditional social cleavages, typically between social classes. 
Coalitions in a redistributive arena are therefore very stable and if policy modifications are on 
the political agenda, conflict intensity is significantly higher than in a distributive arena. 
Later, Lowi (1964: 298-300) complemented these three basic types of policies with a 
fourth one: constitutional policies. Policies that fall in this category establish new organiza-
tional structures and responsibilities for a specific policy area. Lowi considered constitutional 
policies mostly as decisions that newly define decision-making procedures in the public-legal 
sphere. Examples are reapportionments or setting up a new agency. Constitutional policies 
involve a readjustment of responsibility and influence and cause therefore usually deep con-
flicts between expected winners and losers. In addition, the political contention is usually 
highly affected by ideology. 
Based on Lowi’s groundbreaking work, the public policy literature is rich in the 
theoretical treatment of how different types of issues may be expected to evoke different sets 
of motives and behavior on the part of different actors in the political system. But few foreign 
policy theorists have taken account of the issue area variable in the construction of foreign 
policy frameworks or in the testing of foreign policy hypotheses. The few exceptions of issue 
area typology applications in foreign policy studies include Rosenau’s (1972) typology of 
foreign policy goals and goal attainment, a theoretical contribution focusing mainly on opera-
tionalizing issues (Rosenau 1967) as well as empirical applications to foreign policymaking 
behavior of American elites (Potter 1980), patterns in Israeli foreign policy behavior (Brewer 
1973) and referendums on foreign policy issues in Switzerland (Brecher 1972). 
Considering the differentiation of the scopes of foreign policy interventions as con-
ceptualized in Section 3.1.1 (see, Figure 2, p. 56), Lowi’s issue area typology provides useful 
theoretical explanations for the potential effects of different types of foreign policy interven-
tions. According to the issue area approach, regulative interventions are expected to show an 
increase in conflict between actors that are directly affected by the foreign policy intervention. 
Since the actors immediately concerned with such measures may be subjected to frequent 
 80 
change, depending on the current contextual situation and the perceived effects of regulation, 
conflicts in a regulative arena can be assumed to be volatile and fluctuating too. These imme-
diately affected actors, including different governmental and non-governmental actors, are 
typically located in the domestic domain of a nation’s foreign policy arena and maintain 
international relations with the target country of the foreign policy intervention. 
Negative sanctions (‘sticks’) are expected to implicate mostly such regulative charac-
teristics. They restrict the ability of governmental and societal actors with ties to the target 
country to maneuver and typically force them to reduce their relations with the target in spe-
cifically defined domains. In these directly affected circles, resistance against such measures 
can be assumed, resulting in higher conflict both within the immediately affected domain and 
between the sender of those measures and the immediate addressees of the new measures. 
Furthermore, conflict level changes can be expected immediately because regulative po-
lices—as soon as they come into force and are implemented effectively—intervene in the 
addressees’ affairs instantaneously. 
Distributive policies, on the other hand, encounter resistance from direct addressees 
if they include tariffs on specific actions. By contrast, if subsidies are distributed, addressees 
are expected to be cooperative. In both cases, distributive policies are not expected to be 
conflictive on a broader scale. Positive sanctions (‘carrots’) show rather this distributive 
characteristic because they usually do not implicate a direct disadvantage for others that do 
not get the same support. The arena is therefore expected to be rather cooperative than con-
flictive and quite stable over time. 
Finally, the regime may even take the shape of a redistributive arena if the gains of 
one group are at another group’s expense. The conflict intensity in such a redistributive arena 
is then expected to be very high and persistent over time. 
As a consequence, three additional hypotheses derive from these considerations: 
Hypothesis 4: Regulative policies cause stronger and more immediate conflict be-
tween sender and target than distributive and redistributive policies. 
Hypothesis 5: Distributive policies cause greater cooperation than conflict between 
sender and target than do regulative and redistributive policies. 
Hypothesis 6: Redistributive policies cause less immediate but more long-term in-
tense and persistent conflicts than regulative and distributive policies. 
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3.2.4.3 Policy Design and Policy Instruments: Inclusiveness and Intrusiveness 
The discussion of different policy types and their potential effects on the conflict structure in 
the corresponding arena reveals that the implementation of a policy can be a crucial factor. In 
the public policy field, an intensified interest in the so-called ‘post-decisional’ phase led 
indeed to a growing literature on policy implementation, defined as “the process whereby 
programs or policies are carried out,” denoting “the translation of plans into practice” (Hirschi 
et al. 2003: 97; cited in McLaughlin 1985: 153). 
As far as the implementation of foreign policy is concerned, however, we have to 
take into account some fundamental differences between the domestic and international po-
litical sphere. This fundamental difference involves the concept of authority, which is differ-
ently conceptualized in the international as opposed to the intra-state domain, due to the prin-
ciples of sovereignty and non-interference in international law. In both the domestic and the 
international domains, the authority to enforce norms lies principally with the nation-state. 
But procedures to legally enforce international norms beyond the competencies of the national 
governments are missing in most cases. A few exceptions include the enforcement of Euro-
pean law on member-states of the European Union through the European Court of Justice, the 
European Court of Human Rights’ enforcement of fundamental human rights according to the 
European Convent on Human Rights, and the rulings of international ad-hoc tribunals after 
the commission of war crimes and genocide.20 International law is for the most part contract 
law and therefore only binding on the contractual parties—in international law usually the 
nation-states and their representatives (United Nations 2007). Only customary international 
law converges more than any other source of international law to achieve a universal validity 
that is comparable to national law within the intra-state domain. 
In the case of international sanctions, only measures that are imposed by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter “to restore international peace and security” 
(Art. 42 U.N. Charter) are binding on U.N. member states. Other Security Council resolutions 
as well as resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding and represent only recommen-
dations to member states to take certain actions (Scott 2004). As a consequence, negative 
                                                
20 The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 as a permanent tribunal to prosecute individuals for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression but lacks international legitimacy 
and authority since important signatories—most of all the U.S.—have not yet ratified the statute (Howlett and 
Ramesh 1995). 
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sanctions (‘sticks’) have to be distinguished according to their legal foundation and their 
scope in order to assess their regulatory power on addressees. 
Such a variable of a foreign policy intervention’s influence on the room of maneuver 
of a particular group of addressees could be described as the degree of intervention. But, as 
Stephan Linder and Guy Peters (2004; 1989) have shown, this variable in fact describes two 
different dimensions of intervention. On the one hand, the degree of intervention as a criterion 
refers to a measure of the level of intrusion into private affairs (Linder and Peters 1991: 40). 
On the other hand, there is the inclusiveness of an intervention, describing the range of the 
measures taken in a horizontal sense, i.e., the scope of addressees (Linder and Peters 1989: 
135-140). Both dimensions of the degree of an intervention are also relevant for the analysis 
of the effects of foreign policy interventions. I will therefore examine two additional hypothe-
ses considering these two specific dimensions of the degree of intervention when I will assess 
the effects of foreign policy interventions in the empirical part of this study: 
Hypothesis 7: The more inclusive a foreign policy intervention, the stronger its im-
pact on the international relations of the particular country. 
Hypothesis 8: The more intrusive a foreign policy intervention, the stronger its im-
pact on the international relations of the particular country. 
The inclusiveness of a foreign policy intervention can be measured by the number of 
policy sectors affected by the foreign policy intervention, whereas the intrusiveness displays 
the degree of regulation that a foreign policy intervention brings about. I will address this 
particular question in the first part of Chapter 6, where I will discuss the different South Af-
rica policies of the U.S., West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland on their effects on the 
countries’ international relations with South Africa from a comparative perspective. 
3.2.4.4 Effect of Foreign Policy Interventions: Impact on South Africa 
The literature on international conflicts provides several hypotheses on the effectiveness of 
different foreign policy interventions in situations of international crises (refer to the 
economic sanctions and statecraft literature for such an elaboration, e.g. Linder and Peters 
1991; Elliot et al. 2007; Kaempfer et al. 2004; Baldwin 1999/2000; Eaton and Engers 1999; 
Drezner 1999b). Qualitative studies on South Africa’s overcoming of apartheid and democ-
ratic transition in the early 1990s emphasize the importance of developments within southern 
Africa and on the international political level to be relevant to understand how change in 
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South Africa happened. The interplay of such domestic, regional and international develop-
ments, however, has not been systematically tested yet. The event data sets generated in the 
realm of this study, however, allow for a systematic analysis of such linkages between differ-
ent developments on different political levels. 
Based on various studies on international conflict and regime change (e.g., Baldwin 
and Pape 1998; Beardsley et al. 2006; Druckman 2005; Maoz et al. 2004; Schrodt 2004), it 
can be assumed that changes in South Africa were caused by a combination of variations in 
different domestic, regional and international developments. On the South African domestic 
level, conflicts within South Africa and the activities of oppositional groups targeted at the 
apartheid system are expected to be crucial explaining variables (see Section 2.1). Regionally, 
the political situation in neighboring Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other 
nations in southern Africa was strongly interconnected with South Africa’s apartheid regime 
(Section 2.2). Changes in the international political system and international policy interven-
tion had presumably an effect on developments in South Africa too (Section 2.3). 
The first of the following hypotheses postulates that developments in South Africa it-
self were primarily path-dependent, that is, a result of the prior conflicts within South Africa 
itself. The second hypothesis sees the main reason for change in activities of the South Afri-
can opposition. The third hypothesis regards foreign policy interventions by major political 
powers such as the Soviet Union and the U.S. as well as activities within the U.N. as factors 
that might have played an important role. 
Hypothesis 9: The improvement in South Africa is mostly a consequence of inner 
South African developments. 
Hypothesis 10: The stronger the South African opposition, the more the political 
situation in South Africa improved. 
Hypothesis 11: International policy interventions resulted in an improvement of the 
situation in South Africa. 
3.2.4.5 Control Variables: Instrument Mix, Policy Styles and Context 
Foreign policy, as a matter of course, is always composed of different policy types and in-
struments. Foreign policy towards South Africa under apartheid usually featured a “give-and-
take” including ‘sticks’, ‘carrots’ and ‘sermon’ in attempting to influence the behavior of the 
targeted actors. Consequently, an analysis of foreign policy interventions and resulting for-
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eign policy outcomes has to consider that the observed foreign policy outcome is caused by a 
mix of different policy interventions over time (Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999). It is therefore 
imperative to examine the foreign policy decision-making in order to identify the cornerstones 
of the relevant policies. A minimalist approach to systematize foreign policy instruments 
(according to van der Doelen 1998: 26) allows then a general characterization of the policy in 
a specific phase. 
Comparing the foreign policy behavior of different countries, individual country spe-
cifics such as political, institutional and other structural variables may have a significant 
effect on observed differences between the countries’ foreign policies that cannot be ex-
plained only with different foreign policy interventions. The literature on the specifics of 
policy fields and policy characteristics in various countries and sectors sometimes employs 
the concept of policy style (Vedung 1998; Richardson 1982; Howlett and Ramesh 1993: 184-
188). Jeremy Richardson (1995: 13) defines policy style as the reflection of the characteristics 
of a government’s approach to problem solving (active or reactive) and its relationship to 
other actors in the policy-making and implementing processes (consensual or impositional). 
Marijke Breuning (1982), for example, has been able to show that the foreign policy differ-
ences between two arguably quite similar states, Belgium and the Netherlands, are due to 
major differences in historical experience that have indelibly marked each nation’s conception 
of its role in international relations to this day (see also, Breuning 1997). 
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4 Research Design and Methods 
In this methodological chapter, I outline the research design of the empirical analysis and 
introduce the applied methodological concepts and techniques. First, the selection of the four 
states under investigation in this study will be elucidated. Secondly, I conceptualize the par-
ticular steps of analysis including the corresponding research questions and methodological 
implications. Thirdly, I delineate the characteristics of the data that form the empirical basis 
of this study and describe the data collection process in detail. Fourthly, the applied data 
analysis techniques will be presented. 
4.1 Research Design 
4.1.1 Selection of Cases 
Empirically, the study investigates the foreign policy of four Western states—the United 
States of America, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland—which shaped their foreign 
policies toward South Africa under apartheid quite differently. The governments of the four 
states also influenced the international debate on international sanctions against South Africa 
in a different way and reacted with quite dissimilar policies to the raising movement towards 
international action against the South African government in the mid-1980s. 
The two main selection criteria include therefore the basic orientation of the four 
states’ foreign policy toward South Africa under apartheid and the evolution of this basic 
orientation over time. The basic orientation of the four states’ South Africa policy can be 
characterized along the two dimensions ‘interference vs. non-interference’ and ‘cooperation 
vs. conflict’. ‘Interference vs. non-interference’ refers to whether the principle foreign policy 
approach was rather interventionist or non-interventionist. ‘Cooperation vs. conflict’ indicates 
whether the policy rather followed the principle of engagement with or isolation of the apart-
heid regime. 
The evolution over time as the second selection criteria considers to what extent the 
basic foreign policy orientation was subject to change over the period of investigation. 
Changes in the four countries’ foreign policies could have happened dramatically or moder-
ately or not at all. Table 4 below illustrates how the four selected states can be characterized 
according to these two criteria. It is obvious that the four selected cases show some significant 
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variance with respect to these two dimensions. Also indicated in Table 4 are relevant context 
variables that have to be considered as important control variables in the realm of this study. 
Table 4: Selection Criteria and Control Variables for Case Studies 
 
 United States West Germany Sweden Switzerland 
Selection criteria:     
SA policy type interference; 
 
strong engagement/ 
strong isolation 
non-interference/ 
slight interference 
moderate engage-
ment/isolation 
interference 
 
strong isolation 
non-interference 
 
moderate engage-
ment 
SA policy evolution dramatically 
changing 
moderately changing stable stable 
 
Control variables:     
Economic links import/export, 
investment, finance 
import/export, 
investment, finance 
export, investment export, investment, 
finance 
Political links anti-communism, 
civil rights struggle 
Namibia, anti-
communism 
sympathy with anti-
apartheid struggle 
“sonderfall”, anti-
communism 
Geopolitical position superpower middle-power small power small power 
 
Political system liberal democracy liberal democracy liberal democracy liberal democracy 
 
Governmental system presidential, federal parliamentary, 
federal 
parliamentary, 
centralistic 
parliamentary/direct-
democratic, federal  
Political majority 
1977-1996 
major chances: 
Presidency Carter to 
Reagan 
(1981) 
Senate majority 
Dem. Rep. (1981) 
Rep. Dem. (1987) 
Dem. Rep. (1993) 
House majority 
Dem. Rep.  (1993) 
major changes: 
Chancellor Schmidt 
to Kohl 
(1982) 
Majority changes in 
the Bundestag 
SPD/FDP 
 CDU/FDP (1982) 
 
major changes: 
Prime Minister 
Fälldin to Palme 
(1982) 
Palme to Carlsson 
(1986) 
Carlsson to Bildt 
(1991) 
Majority changes in 
the Riksdag (1982, 
1991) 
stable 
(multiparty govern-
ment, no coalition 
changes 1959-2003) 
 
 
The U.S. interfered regularly in the political situation in southern Africa and changed 
its foreign policy toward South Africa quite dramatically in the mid-1980s from a policy of 
engagement with the apartheid government to a policy of isolation. West Germany’s policy of 
non-interference changed moderately with the imposition of E.C. sanctions against South 
Africa in the mid-1980s. Sweden and Switzerland, on the other hand, both pursued a rather 
stable and consistent South Africa policy from 1977 to 1994, each with a very different focal 
point: whereas the Swedish government had always been leading the way in Western anti-
apartheid protest, the Swiss government always argued against interference in South African 
affairs. 
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Apart from their different reactions to international developments regarding apart-
heid in South Africa, the four states feature distinct similarities and differences in other rele-
vant dimensions. Geopolitically, all four were unambiguously part of the Western group of 
states in the bipolar Cold War world order. Economically, the four states are highly integrated 
into world markets, also with rather close economic ties to South Africa. Regarding their 
geopolitical position, Sweden and Switzerland are comparable regarding their political and 
economic power and their declared state of neutrality in international conflicts. The United 
States and Germany are both representatives of powerful global economies. 
But, of course, there are major geopolitical differences too: the U.S. as one of the two 
global superpowers takes an exceptional position in the global political system. West Ger-
many can be described as a political middle-power whereas Sweden and Switzerland are 
counted as small nations in terms of population size and political and military power, but with 
comparatively strong economies. Comparatively large differences exist also regarding the 
four states’ political and governmental systems. The U.S. presidential system differs signifi-
cantly from the parliamentary systems in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Switzerland, on 
the other hand, features a well-established direct-democratic system with periodical popular 
votes on policy issues. Switzerland is also the only of the four cases that did not experience 
significant changes in the overall political majority between 1977 and 1996. The U.S., Ger-
many and Sweden had at least one major government reshuffle in this period. 
4.1.2 Design of the Individual Steps of Analysis 
Research Question 1 (Qualitative Case Study) 
The reconstruction of the four states’ foreign policy design towards South Africa draws on the 
available literature and a supplementary analysis of primary documents (Hudson 1997; Hill 
1993). For the Swiss case, additionally 22 interviews (Hodder 1994) with civil servants in the 
administration and the diplomatic corps, members of parliament, NGO representatives and 
scholars were conducted (see, Kvale 1996). 
Research Question 2 (Intervention/Outcome Analysis) 
The classical design for such an investigation of the effects of an intervention would be the 
experiment. In the social sciences, however, experiments are hardly feasible. Quasi-
experimental designs (Widmer and Hirschi 2005; Cook and Campbell 1979) are therefore 
typically applied to assess the effects of interventions. Quasi-experiments share with all other 
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experiments a similar purpose—to test descriptive causal hypotheses about manipulable 
causes—as well as many structural details. But, by definition, quasi-experiments lack random 
assignment (Shadish et al. 2001: 13-14). 
Theory-based evaluation (Shadish et al. 2001; Chen 1990, 2005; Mohr 1995) sug-
gests two basic dimensions in which the effects of a policy intervention can be assessed: 1) 
the goal dimension, 2) the dimension of side effects (not intended effects). The test of the 
hypotheses on the potential effects of different types of foreign policy intervention in this step 
of analysis takes these two effect dimensions into account. Technically, the effect of major 
policy changes and interventions on the four states’ foreign policy behavior will be tested 
using integrated autoregressive moving-average (ARIMA) models (Weiss 1997) for each 
states’ international relations with South Africa. Then, transfer function models (Box and 
Jenkins 1976: 141-203; McCleary and Hay 1980: 247-261) are applied to measure the degree 
of change introduced by individual foreign policy interventions and to estimate the amount of 
time required for these changes to be actualized (for more detail, see Section 4.5.2). 
Research Question 3 (Impact Analysis) 
A systematic analysis of these different, potentially influential developments on the political 
situation in South Africa is widely missing and also the causalities between the different 
developments on the domestic, regional and international level remain mostly unclear. I there-
fore estimate in this third part of analysis the evolution and the interdependencies between 
different developments on the national, regional and international level using Vector Autore-
gressive (VAR) models (Enders 2004; Freeman et al. 1989: 264-318). VAR analysis is basi-
cally a natural extension of transfer function analysis, although each variable is treated sym-
metrically now. VAR analysis is therefore especially beneficial when there is little or no 
confidence whether a variable is actually endogenous or exogenous, as seems to be the case 
regarding the interconnections between domestic, regional and international developments 
regarding South Africa under apartheid. The VAR model includes for each variable an equa-
tion explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the lags of all the other variables in the 
model. Not significant explaining and dependent variables can then be dropped from the 
model, keeping only those variables for which there is empirical evidence that they are actu-
ally connected (for more detail, see Section 4.5.3). 
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The research design for this study as outlined in the three steps of analysis includes 
one time series case study for each of the four selected states’ foreign policy towards South 
Africa under apartheid. Event data, as described in detail in the following section, provides a 
rich set of variables that can be used to identify and systematically analyze the links between 
foreign policy design and intervention as independent variables and the resulting effects on 
the international level as dependent variables. Such a dynamic approach to studying the ef-
fects of foreign policy interventions differs from prevailing cross-sectional studies on interna-
tional politics. Apart from this fundamental difference in the research design, an event data 
based analysis of the dynamics of foreign policy interventions also opens the opportunity to 
consider stronger political variables such as diplomacy, verbal statements, negotiations etc. to 
measure and explain foreign policy outcomes. 
A cross sectional comparison between the four states is carried out only in a descrip-
tive way, based on the findings for each time series case study. The variety of intervening 
variables as listed in Table 4 above does not allow for a systematic comparison of the four 
states’ foreign policies and their effects. But, considering the specifics of the four cases as 
outline in the previous section, the research design allows at least for a few pair-wise com-
parisons of individual aspects: Economic power, in particular exports and investment (U.S., 
West Germany) and finance (U.S., West Germany, Switzerland); region (West Germany, 
Sweden, Switzerland); geopolitical position (Sweden, Switzerland); foreign policy principles 
(Sweden, Switzerland) (according to a most similar systems strategy, see Enders 2004). It is 
clear that the United States of America in particular constitutes a unique case when it comes 
to international politics. The inclusion of the U.S. in this study, however, is not only crucial 
due to its role as a global superpower and its significant role in international relations with 
South Africa under apartheid, but also with regards to the analysis of the other three cases’ 
foreign policies towards South Africa; U.S. foreign policy provides important intervening 
variables that cannot be omitted in a case specific analysis of the foreign policies of West 
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. 
 90 
4.2 Analyzing Foreign Policy Using Event Data 
The concept of event data was invented by Charles McClelland (1975) in the 1960s to sup-
plement the traditional (history oriented) way of studying foreign policy and international 
relations by an approach which follows the behavioral paradigm. Based on the observation 
that political behavior consists largely of discrete actions and communications directed from 
one political actor to another (whether they are individuals or institutions), event data analysis 
breaks down complex international processes into a sequence of individual actions and com-
munication acts in the form of “who did what to whom”. 
Over the last decades, event data have been widely used in international relations re-
search (for an overview see McClelland 1967). But despite the widespread use of the data, 
there is no single, universally accepted definition of what constitutes an ‘event’. Scholars 
often still refer to Charles McClelland’s (1995: 8) original definition of the concept: 
Event-interaction is meant to refer to something very discrete and simple – to the 
veritable building blocks of international politics, according to my conception. The 
content of diplomatic history is made up, in large measure, of event-interactions. 
They are specific elements of streams of exchange between nations. Here are a few 
examples for hypothetical Nations A and B: Nation A proposes a trade negotiation, 
Nation B rejects a proposal, Nation A accuses B of hostile intentions, Nation B de-
nies the accusation, Nation B deploys troops along a disputed boundary, Nation A 
requests that the troops be withdrawn, […] Each act undertaken by each actor as in 
the illustration is regarded as an event-interaction. (cited in McClelland 1967: 94) 
In spite of a variety of other event definitions in the literature (for a discussion see 
Gerner et al. 1994: 93-98), there is at least consensus about the analytical structure of an 
event. At their very basic level, event data consist of a political actor who initiates an event 
(the source), the type of political action involved (the event), and another actor to whom the 
action is directed (the target). A date is also assigned to the event (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: Formalization of the Event Concept 
 
<date>  <source>  <action>  <target> 
 
To give an example, the following lead sentence of an Associated Press (AP) news 
story from 18 February 1977 generates two events according to this event formalization. 
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Lead sentence: 
770218  AP-0001-01 
The United States and Britain have rejected for the time being a 
South African bid for early three-nation talks on the Rhodesian 
crisis. 
 Coded events: 
770218 USA ZAF 123 (Reject proposal) 
770218 GBR ZAF 123 (Reject proposal) 
 
The resulting event data indicates both the United States (USA) and Britain (GBR) as 
the initiator of an action targeted at South Africa (ZAF). The event type (code 123) indicates 
the corresponding action as “reject proposal to meet, discuss, negotiate”. It becomes clear that 
event data do not observe events directly but code reports on events in a systematic way by 
converting natural language into nominal and ordinal data that can be analyzed using formal 
methods. An event can therefore be operationally defined as 
[…] an interaction associated with a specific point in time, that can be described in 
a natural language that has as its subject and object an element of a set of actors, 
and as its verb an element of a set of actions, the contents of which are transitive 
verbs. (Gerner et al. 1994: 95) 
As already seen in the example above, empirical event data analysis draws typically 
on journalistic sources. Event data is therefore basically quantitative content analysis of jour-
nalistic texts. First generation event data projects like McClelland’s (1994) World Interaction 
Survey (WEIS) and Edward Azar’s (1976) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) used 
newspapers as text sources to code the data.21 Later, when electronic sources became widely 
accessible, scholars started to use news stories directly from news agencies. Especially the 
Reuters wire service became an attractive alternative to newspaper sources.22 
Although a journalistic product, too, newswire stories provide denser coverage of 
events because wire services are less subject to an editorial selection process than print news 
because of the limitations on text volume and press deadlines placed on print news. News-
wires produce an enormous amount of day-to-day information that is used by other news 
                                                
21 WEIS coded The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times; COPDAB used The New York Times and a 
number of other news sources, in particular a variety of regional sources to cover events outside of North Amer-
ica and Western Europe better. 
22 Reuters was for example used by sophisticated event data projects such as the Protocol for the Analysis of 
Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) at Harvard University (Azar 1980) and the Kansas Event Data System 
(KEDS) at the University of Kansas (Bond and Bond 1995). 
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agencies as “raw information” for their own news production. This information load can 
usually not be memorized, not to mention analyzed, by political observers. Event data coded 
from newswires stores these hundreds and thousands of reported activities in systematic 
categories. The systematized data can then be analyzed statistically enabling researchers to get 
the larger picture displayed in these hundreds and thousands of single activities. 
Event data research experienced a revival over the last decade-and-a-half mostly due 
to an innovation that enabled the data to be coded automatically (so-called machine coding, 
see Schrodt et al. 1994; Gerner et al. 1994) instead of manually (so-called human coding). 
Machine coding helped to overcome one major problem with event data-based research: the 
high cost to produce the data. Human coding of event data used to be a very slow and labor-
intensive process. Machine coding, on the other hand, can be done by a single researcher in 
nearly real time once the coding system is set up (the process of machine coding is described 
in more detail in Section 4.3.5 below). In addition, machine coding is absolutely reliable since 
coding rules are applied with complete consistency and are not subject to inter-coder dispari-
ties caused by fatigue, differing interpretations of the coding rules or biases concerning the 
texts being coded. 
Another significant improvement over human coding is that machine coding allows 
for experimentation with alternative coding rules. These experiments were mainly done by 
extending the WEIS coding system to improve the coverage of new international events and 
to get more detailed information on inner-state events. The most notable of these extensions 
were done within the KEDS project with the Conflict and Mediation Event Observation 
(CAMEO) coding system (Schrodt and Gerner 1994; Gerner et al. 2002b) and by the PANDA 
project and its successor Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) (Schrodt et al. 2005; 
Bond et al. 1997). 
4.2.1 Existing Event Data Sets (With Special Consideration of South Africa) 
Existing event data sets can be distinguished according to their focus of analysis (actor-
oriented vs. episode-oriented data sets) and their regional orientation (global vs. regional data 
sets) (Bond et al. 2003: 152-6). The following exploration of available data sets that include 
data on South Africa is organized according to the regional criterion. 
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Global Data Sets 
Event data sets were a major focus of quantitative international relations research for the first 
time in the 1960s and 1970s. The two most noticed global event data projects included the 
World Interaction Survey (WEIS) (Schrodt 1995) and the Conflict and Peace Data Bank 
(COPDAB) (McClelland 1976). Both represent global data sets since they attempt to code all 
publicly reported interactions between states and some non-state actors during a certain period 
of time (for a comparison of the two coding schemes see Azar 1980; Howell 1983; Vincent 
1983; McClelland 1983). Other global data sets are the Comparative Research on the Events 
of Nations (CREON) data set (Schrodt 1995), the Global-Event-Data System (GEDS) 
(Hermann et al. 1973) as a continuation of COPDAB and the Behavioral Correlates of WAR 
(BCOW) data set (Davies and McDaniel 1994). 
The WEIS coding system proved to be the most significant global event data set 
since its coding scheme has subsequently been used in a number of other event data studies 
(Leng and Singer 1988: 151-6). The data set contains around 90,000 events for the years 1966 
to 1978.23 Rodney Tomlinson (1995) expanded the data set until 1992, resulting in a total of 
170,657 international events for the period of 1966 to 1992. Figure 9 illustrates South Africa’s 
representation in the data set as source and target of an international event for the period of 
1966 to 1992. 
As demonstrated in Figure 9 below, the number of WEIS events including South Af-
rica either as source or target is rather small. South Africa was only involved in 3,380 or 2 
percent of the total 170,657 WEIS events for the period of 1966 to 1992. Broken down to 
specific dyads—such as United States-South Africa, Germany-South Africa, Sweden-South 
Africa and Switzerland-South Africa—the number of cases per dyad decreases dramatically. 
Only for the dyad U.S.-South Africa the number of cases would allow for some rather simple 
statistical analysis (N = 651 for the whole period from 1966 to 1992). But it has to be men-
tioned that such a region-specific focus has never been the intention of the WEIS project. 
Scholars used WEIS data mostly for studies on political conflicts that were extensively cov-
ered by U.S. media such as interactions between the world superpower (Tomlinson 1993) or 
the conflict in the Middle East (Goldstein and Freeman 1990). 
                                                
23 The WEIS data set, like COPDAB, is available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR), see http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/access/index.html. Accessed 9 May 2006. 
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Figure 9: Number of Events per Year with South Africa as Source or Target, WEIS 1966-1992 
 
 
 
 
Apart from their weak coverage of events in rather peripheral regions such as Africa, 
COPDAB and WEIS became also unsatisfying as coding schemes for international interac-
tions that do not follow a classic view on international relations such as interactions between 
sovereign states reacting to each other through diplomacy and military threats. The coding 
schemes turned out to be ill-suited especially regarding contemporary issues such as ethnic 
conflict, low-intensity conflict, organized crime activity, or multilateral intervention (Schrodt 
and Mintz 1988: 325). The systems have other problems as well: WEIS, for example, has only 
one single category of “military engagement” that includes everything form a shot fired at a 
border patrol to the strategic bombing of cities (Schrodt and Gerner 2004: 39). 
Recently, Gary King and Will Lowe (2001) released a new global event data set in-
cluding 4.3 million international events, covering the years 1990-2000. The data was coded 
from Reuters Business Briefing using the IDEA coding scheme that allows for a more accu-
rate coding of social, economic and political events. An updated version of the data set now 
includes over 10 million international dyadic events.24 The data set covers however only the 
end phase (1990-1994) of apartheid in South Africa and represents therefore an unsatisfactory 
data source for this study. 
Regional Data Sets 
In addition to global event data sets, various regional data sets were developed over the years, 
mainly focusing on specific regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict (King and 
                                                
24 See Gary King’s data website http://gking.harvard.edu/data.shtml. Accessed 2 May 2006. 
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Lowe 2003; Gerner et al. 1994; Schrodt and Gerner 1994), the Balkans (Schrodt and Gerner 
2004; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999), West Africa (Schrodt 
and Gerner 2004), Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and Turkey (the latter three data sets are 
available from the KEDS website25). Moreover, event data studies are not limited anymore to 
the examination of peace and war in the international political system but analyze other types 
of international behavior such as mediation (Huxtable 1997; Gerner et al. 2002b) and other 
stronger socially, economically and politically oriented events (Schrodt et al. 2005; Bond et 
al. 2001). Events within nation states attracted more attention too (Bond et al. 2003; Taylor 
and Jodice 1983; Davenport 1995; Moore 1995; Moore and Davis 1998; Thomas 1999; 
Reising 1999; Moore 2000). 
At least four regionally specific event data projects focus on southern Africa: the 
Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project (VICPD) and the Intranational Political Interac-
tions (IPI) project include an analysis of the Rhodesian conflict (Wood and Peake 1998) and 
investigate international conflict behavior concerning Zaire (Moore 1995). Henrik Sommer 
and James Scarritt (1998) collected data on a river conflict between Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
And the South African Event Data set (SAFE) (Sommer and Scarritt 1999; Van Wyk 1988) 
includes data on South Africa’s foreign policy behavior. To my knowledge, the SAFE project 
remains the only existing event data study specifically on South Africa. The data set contains 
around 15,000 events in South Africa’s foreign policy from 1977-1988 and draws on 105 
South African newspapers and magazines as well as chronologies gained from the Keesing 
Contemporary Archives and the African Contemporary Record. The authors analyzed the data 
looking at symmetries and reciprocities in South Africa’s foreign relations with 36 interna-
tional actors, including the U.N., the U.S., other Western states, and several African countries. 
Because of its specific regional focus and the variety of included regional and local news 
sources, the SAFE data set would provide valuable data also for this study. But, unfortunately, 
the data set is no longer available.26 
                                                
25 http://www.ku.edu/~keds/data.html. Accessed 2 May 2006. 
26 According to correspondence of the author with Radloff and Van Wyk in March 2004. 
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4.3 Data Collection: The South Africa Interaction Data Set (SAID) 
Due to the lack of existing data on South Africa, I developed a new data set named South 
Africa Interaction Data Set (SAID). SAID27 is based on news stories obtained from the Asso-
ciated Press (AP) and Reuters. The wire services were coded with the machine coding sys-
tems of KEDS (Kansas Event Data System) and TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented 
Replacement Instructions) (Van Wyk and Radloff 1993; Gerner et al. 1994; Schrodt et al. 
1994; Schrodt 1998) using the Conflict and Mediation Observation (CAMEO) framework 
(Schrodt 2001; Gerner et al. 2002b). Table 5 gives a summary of the key features of the SAID 
data set. 
Table 5: Summary of the SAID Data Set 
 
Sub Set Total events Time period Source Coding mode  
APSA_leads 10,913 1/1977-/12/1996 AP Lead sentence  
APSA_full 59,950 1/1997-12/1996 AP Full-text  
ReutSA_leads 19,022 7/1987-12/1996 Reuters Lead sentence  
 
 
In the text that follows, I first describe the creation of the SAID data set, including 
the selection of news sources (raw data), the adaptation of coding framework (CAMEO), and 
the process of machine coding using KEDS and TABARI. Then, I discuss the validity of the 
generated data set for the study of international relations with regard to South Africa under 
apartheid, pointing out some general validity issues with event data analysis and performing 
specific validity tests using the SAID data. 
4.3.1 Sources 
In most cases, news stories from newspapers or wire services are not available electronically 
prior to the 1990s. Thus, most of the electronic news sources only cover the end phase of 
apartheid (1990-1994) but not the so-called “high phase” of the 1970s and 1980s. The two 
most widely used news sources in event data research over last few years, Reuters and Agence 
France Press (AFP), are not available prior to June 1987 (Reuters on Factiva) and May 1991 
(AFP on LexisNexis), respectively. 
                                                
27 Not to be confused with the Substance Abuse Information Database of the U.S. Department of Labor or an 
international corporate specialized in producing diamond tools for industrial applications. 
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But, as Table 6 illustrates, there are news sources available from the electronic data-
bases of LexisNexis and Factiva covering the period prior to 1990. LexisNexis28, the data 
service most widely available to academic researchers, provides four English-language 
newswires covering the 1980s and late 1970s: Associated Press, BBC Monitoring and the 
Chinese Xinhua (all available back to 1977), and United Press International (available back to 
1980). Additionally, three internationally oriented English-language newspapers are accessi-
ble back to the late 1970s or early 1980s: The Washington Post (from 1977), The New York 
Times (full articles from 1980, abstracts from 1969), and The Financial Times (from 1982). 
Table 6: Available News Sources from LexisNexis and Factiva prior to 1990 
 
News Source Origin Type Coverage Database 
Associated Press (AP) USA Wire service 1/1/1977 – Lexis 
Xinhua PR China Wire service 1/1/1977 – Lexis 
Washington Post USA Newspaper 1/1/1977 – Lexis 
Globe and Mail Canada Newspaper 11/14/1977 – Factiva 
BBC Monitoring UK Wire service 1/1/1979 – Lexis 
New York Times 
(Abstracts) 
USA Newspaper 6/1/1980 – 
(1/1/1969 –
5/31/1980) 
Lexis 
United Press Int. (UPI) USA Wire service 9/26/1980 – Lexis 
Times (London) UK Newspaper 1/1/1981 – Factiva 
Le Monde France Newspaper 3/2/1981 – Factiva 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Ab-
stracts) 
Germany Newspaper  
(5/26/1981 –) 
 
Factiva 
Guardian UK Newspaper 12/31/1981 – Factiva 
Financial Times UK Newspaper 1/2/1982 – Lexis 
Svenska Dagbladet 
(Abstracts) 
Sweden Newspaper  
(3/28/1984 –) 
 
Factiva 
Reuters UK Wire service 5/27/1987 – Factiva 
Agence France Press (AFP) France Wire service 5/1/1991 – 
9/1/1991 – 
Lexis 
Factiva 
 
 
On Factiva29, another large electronic information database, Reuters, the world’s 
largest newsgathering organization, is currently available from May 1987. Prior to June 1997, 
Reuters articles were accessible via LexisNexis back to the mid-1970s and became in the 
early 1990s the most valuable source for event data research. But Reuters’ relocation from 
LexisNexis to Factiva and the resulting temporal unavailability of the source forced scholars 
to look for alternative sources. They switched largely to Agence France Press (AFP) as the 
new main raw source for event data studies (Schrodt et al. 2005; Sommer and Scarritt 1999: 
1-14; Schrodt and Gerner 2000). Chances are that the situation is changing again in the near 
                                                
28 See http://www.lexisnexis.com/. Accessed 30 June 2007. 
29 See http://www.factiva.com/. Accessed 30 June 2007 
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future due to current dynamics in the media business (see, e.g., Economist, 10 May 2007, 
“Media deals: Down to the wire”). 
Another problem with event data based research could arise from the fact that jour-
nalistic reporting on peripheral regions is usually much less dense and consistent over time 
than it is the case for regions such as North America, Western Europe, and closely watched 
crisis areas such as the Middle East or the Balkans in the 1990s (Mooney and Simpson 2003; 
Huxtable and Pevehouse 1996). Africa is typically considered such a peripheral and weakly 
covered region (Schrodt et al. 2001). South Africa, however, differs in this respect from the 
rest of sub-Saharan Africa: both the apartheid situation in South Africa and its international 
implications had been widely covered by the international media since the 1970s and particu-
larly during the 1980s when the situation developed dramatically. 
Table 7: Number of AP News Stories for Selected Dyads per Year 
 
Year USA-SA DEU-SA SWE-SA CHE-SA 
1977 328 49 6 3 
1978 240 67 3 2 
1979 362 54 13 16 
1980 266 36 6 15 
1981 591 103 16 15 
1982 375 93 13 12 
1983 366 51 16 17 
1984 1212 240 192 141 
1985 988 293 209 130 
1986 2196 377 282 144 
1987 1334 317 235 69 
1988 1370 265 209 73 
1989 744 102 49 18 
1990 1933 123 60 36 
1991 1005 351 304 121 
1992 1387 681 414 235 
1993 2874 893 640 327 
1994 2605 1153 607 278 
1995 2847 1316 670 304 
1996 4278 1587 1207 622 
Total number of stories including “South Africa!” and “United States” or “USA” or “U.S.” or “German!” or 
“Swed!” or “Switzerland” or “Swiss” in headline or lead sentence. SA=South Africa; USA=United States; 
DEU=Germany; SWE=Sweden; CHE=Switzerland. Database: LexisNexis; Source: Associated Press (AP) 
 
 
As far as international relations with apartheid South Africa is concerned, the cover-
age varies from case to case. U.S.-South African relations were well represented in the inter-
national media, whereas German, Swedish and Swiss South Africa relations attracted signifi-
cantly less media attention. Table 7 above indicates the number of news stories per year avail-
able from AP for each of these four dyads. 
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Considering language, it becomes clear that all the news sources that are electroni-
cally available for this study period of investigation (according to Table 6) are English-
language sources (holds also true for the abstracts of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
Svenska Dagbladet). German, Swedish and Swiss news in their respective national language 
is not available electronically from LexisNexis or Factiva prior to the late 1990s. But the 
machine coding of event data is—at least up to this date—restricted to English-language 
sources only. Although the available coding systems (parsers) work in principle with any 
language (at least the ones with a Latin alphabet), the coding works properly currently only 
with English-language text sources. 
This introduces another potential bias into event data analysis, based on the language 
of the raw text material. Such a bias is less significant in studies on international conflicts that 
are closely covered by international media such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the war on the 
Balkans in the 1990s (Huxtable 1997; Schrodt and Gerner 1994). But it can be significant 
with more peripheral regions where the language-regional background of the sources might 
influence the reporting. Regarding South Africa it can be assumed that events within the 
country are well covered by international English-language media. But it has to be examined 
carefully later in this section to what extent the use of an English-language source introduces 
a bias into the analysis of international relations of not natively English-speaking countries 
like Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. 
4.3.2 Source Selection 
The Associated Press (AP) news wire serves as the main data source in this study. AP is a 
U.S.-domiciled news organization with 242 branch offices in 121 countries and is used as an 
information source by 1,700 newspapers and 5,000 television and radio outlets all over the 
world (figures as in 200630). Founded in 1846, the wire service supplies a steady stream of 
news around the clock to its domestic members, 8,500 international subscribers and commer-
cial customers. In academia, the AP newswire is widely accessible via the electronic database 
LexisNexis. 
As demonstrated in Figure 10 below, AP has the highest frequency of news stories on South 
Africa per year from all machine-readable news sources available from LexisNexis for the 
years 1977 to 1996. AP, Xinhua and The Washington Post cover the whole period, UPI and 
The New York Times are available from 1980, The Financial Times from 1982. 
                                                
30 According to AP, http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html. Accessed 24 May 2006. 
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Figure 10: Number of South Africa News Stories per Year for Different Sources (LexisNexis) 
 
 
The selected news stories include the key-word “South Africa!” either in title or lead sentence based on a search query on 
Lexis-Nexis.31 
 
 
A comparison of the performance of wire services of AP, Xinhua and UIP on the one 
hand and the newspapers of The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Financial 
Times on the other reveals clearly that the wire services are preferable to newspapers in terms 
of story density. AP reports on average over 2,000 South Africa related stories per year be-
tween 1980 and 1994, whereas The New York Times provides only about half as many South 
Africa stories per year over the same period. The Financial Times does slightly better than 
The New York Times (almost 1,300 South Africa stories per year), but is not available before 
1982. UPI, available from September 1980, covers South Africa for the years 1981-1986 
almost as intensively as AP, but the coverage decreases dramatically after 1986.32 
Xinhua, the third English-language newswire that is available from LexisNexis back 
to the late 1970s needs some special consideration. The news agency, China’s central media 
agency and official press agency of the Chinese government, covered South Africa decently 
and increased its reporting significantly during the second half of the 1980s. For the years 
1987 to 1992, the reporting was comparable to AP, in terms of number of stories per year. 
                                                
31 The !-appendix indicates a wild-card for subsequent characters to catch stories including the term “South 
African”. I tested story frequencies also for additional key-words such as “apartheid”, “ANC”, or “Mandela”. 
But it turned out that virtually every story containing one or several of these additional key-words was already 
picked up by the “South Africa!” search query. 
32 United Press International (UPI) used to be one of the three biggest news agencies in the world, together with 
AP and Reuters, but has dwindled in size and importance over the last two decades. In the mid-1980s, the news 
agency was struggling to avoid bankruptcy and went through several ownership turnovers after 1986 (see, e.g., 
The New York Times, 10 November 1985, 21 February 1988, and 24 December 1989). 
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Comparing the Chinese and the U.S. news wire it seems interesting that reporting peaks in 
different years (AP in 1986, Xinhua in 1988). Different national interests in South Africa 
could be an explanation for these differences in reporting. Reeves, Shellman and Stewart 
(2004: 10) found in Cambodia, for example, that Xinhua reported intensively on the resis-
tance groups, whom the Chinese government actively supported. Such a focus on the resis-
tance movement could be assumed for the case of South Africa as well since the Chinese 
government also supported oppositional forces in South Africa. Xinhua could therefore serve 
as a complementary source to an American news source like AP. 
But, unfortunately, a use of Xinhua would involve many technical problems. From a 
formal perspective, Xinhua’s reporting is far from being consistently structured in the same 
manner as Anglo-Saxon media report. The validity of the machine coded data highly depends 
on such a structured and consistent report, as will be outlined in more detail below. Xinhua’s 
reporting style is not constant over time either but changed several times between 1977 and 
1996. The linguistic quality of the news reports varies as well. Finally, the vocabulary used 
differs from news stories originating from natively English-speaking countries so that differ-
ent actor and verb dictionaries would be necessary to code the source. Overall, Xinhua is a 
problematic source for automated coding and can therefore not be considered a useful source 
for the purpose of this study. 
Figure 11: Number of South Africa News Stories per Year for Different Sources (Factiva) 
 
 
The selected news stories include the key-word “South Africa*” either in title or lead sentence based on a search query on 
Factiva. 
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Figure 11 illustrates the coverage of South Africa by different sources obtained from 
Factiva. Reuters reported much more densely than the other available news sources for the 
period 1977 to 1996. Even AFP, the other big newswire service available from Factiva, pro-
vides significantly less South Africa stories than Reuters. Unfortunately, Reuters is not acces-
sible anymore for the time prior to May 1987. 
Because Reuters used to be widely used in event data research in the 1980s and 
1990s, scholars tested event data coded from Reuters extensively for its validity (Reeves et al. 
2006; Gerner et al. 1994; Huxtable 1997; Huxtable and Pevehouse 1996; Schrodt and Gerner 
1994; Schrodt et al. 2001). Event data coded from Reuters displayed the political reality fairly 
well and worked technically fine within the machine coding system. I will therefore use 
Reuters both as a complementary source to AP and as a validation of AP’s performance as a 
main data source for this study. But before I turn to this validation of the sources used in this 
study, I introduce the applied coding scheme and machine coding system in more detail. 
4.3.3 Event Coding Scheme 
The SAID data set draws on the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) cod-
ing scheme. Three reasons were decisive in choosing CAMEO for the purpose of this study: 
First, the CAMEO coding framework makes sense from a theoretical perspective. 
CAMEO, specially designed to code events relevant for mediation in violent conflict, pro-
vides a comprehensive set of event types covering activities ranging from verbal comments to 
military action that display the range of potential events for this study, both within South 
Africa and in international relations towards South Africa. In the case of South Africa, too, 
the third party specialization of CAMEO (mediation) is beneficial since international en-
gagement in South Africa played in part a similar role. But also for the case of negative and 
positive sanctions, CAMEO is able to provide information for relevant indicators. 
Second, both the conflicts in South Africa and international relations towards South 
Africa were characterized by a variety of state and non-state actors on the international, state 
and sub-state level. Although contextualized almost completely within the Cold War, the 
conflict situation did hardly follow the “Westphalian-Clausewitzian” political worldview of 
sovereign states reacting to each other as is assumed in a classical coding scheme like WEIS. 
Instead, sub-state actors as well as private actors such as nongovernmental movements 
(NGOs), multinational corporations (MNC) and liberation movements (such as the ANC) 
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played a crucial role. CAMEO established a systematic method to code such various state and 
non-state actors. 
Third, using CAMEO in combination with the KEDS/TABARI has practical implica-
tions too since CAMEO is being implemented by the KEDS project team at the University of 
Kansas. Machine coding involves a labor-intensive development of actors and verb dictionar-
ies. The combination of CAMEO and KEDS/TABARI allows for the use of dictionaries that 
are available for other regions and adapt them for the specific region under study. 
CAMEO was initially intended as an extension of the WEIS coding framework. It 
kept therefore most of the WEIS cue categories intact but incorporated new codes for events 
related to mediation and negotiation, particularly the extended Consult category (CAMEO 
04).33 CAMEO is also more sophisticated in event types that depict violence (CAMEO 18-
20), formerly coded all under one WEIS cue category (WEIS 22 “Force”). Later, some cate-
gories were merged into single cue categories—for example WEIS 07 (Promise) and WEIS 
08 (Agree) became CAMEO 03 (Agree) including codes representing all forms of future 
commitment—since some of the distinctions in WEIS did not make sense for theoretical 
reasons or were simply not possible to make given the textual nature of the news sources. 
(Sommer and Scarritt 1999; Gerner et al. 2002a). 
In addition, CAMEO is consistent with respect to the order of its main cue catego-
ries. Unlike WEIS and IDEA, it starts with the most neutral events and moves gradually from 
cooperation to conflict categories. Although the system provides only nominal categories, the 
CAMEO categories thus displays an ordinal increase in cooperation as one goes from cate-
gory 01 (Make Public Statement) to 09 (Investigate), and an ordinal increase in conflict as one 
goes from 10 (Demand) to 20 (Attack with Weapons of Mass Destruction). 
The specific SAID coding scheme (Table 8) includes three deviations from CAMEO:  
1) Call for Sanctions (SAID 1314): This specification introduces a differentiation between 
official threats to boycott or reduce relations by the government of a state on the one hand 
(CAMEO 1312 and 1313) and calls by a third party (state, sub-state actor, NGO, etc.) 
upon a government to sanction another government (SAID 1314). 
                                                
33 In the following, “cue category” refers to the broader, two-digit categories such as CAMEO 04 “Consult”. 
More detailed categories are three-digit, e.g., CAMEO 045 “Engage in negotiation”. 
 104 
2) Reduce Economic Relations (SAID 167): The original CAMEO framework depicts the 
reduction or break of diplomatic and aid relations (CAMEO 161 and 162) but not the re-
duction of economic relations. 
3) Tighten Embargo/Boycott/Sanctions (SAID 169): There was no specific CAMEO to code 
the intensification of already existing embargos, boycotts and sanction regimes. 
Two other specific events that occur quite often in the context of South Africa under apartheid 
but did not feature a literally corresponding CAMEO code (bans of individuals or organiza-
tions and condemnations of the apartheid system) were assigned to theoretically equivalent 
CAMEO categories (CAMEO 111 and 172, respectively). 
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Table 8: SAID Coding System and Corresponding Goldstein Scale Values 
(Version 2.01, Apr 5 2006; based on CAMEO Version 0.7b3, Nov 10, 2003) 
01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT 
010: Make statement, not specified below [0.0] 
011: Decline comment [-0.1] 
012: Make pessimistic comment [-0.4] 
013: Make optimistic comment [0.4] 
014: Consider policy option [1.0] 
015: Acknowledge or claim responsibility [1.0] 
016: Make empathetic comment [1.0] 
017: Engage in symbolic act [-1.0] 
02: APPEAL 
020: Appeal, not specified below [3.0] 
021: Appeal for information, investigation [0.1] 
022: Appeal for policy support [3.4] 
023: Appeal for material aid, not specified below [3.4] 
0231: Appeal for economic aid [3.4] 
0232: Appeal for military aid [3.4] 
0233: Appeal for humanitarian aid [3.4] 
024: Appeal for protection, peacekeeping [3.4] 
025: Appeal for mediation [3.4] 
026: Appeal for ceasefire, withdrawal [-0.1] 
027: Appeal to settle dispute [-0.1] 
028: Appeal to meet or negotiate [3.0] 
03: AGREE 
030: Agree, not specified below [6.0] 
031: Agree to cooperate, not specified below [3.0] 
0311: Agree to cooperate economically [6.0] 
0312: Agree to cooperate militarily [6.0] 
032: Agree to provide policy support [4.5] 
033: Agree to provide material aid, not specified [5.2] 
0331: Agree to provide economic aid [5.2] 
0332: Agree to provide military aid [5.2] 
0333: Agree to provide humanitarian aid [5.2] 
034: Agree to provide peacekeeping [4.5] 
035: Agree to mediation [4.5] 
036: Agree or offer to mediate [4.5] 
037: Agree to yield [3.0] 
038: Agree to meet or negotiate [1.0] 
039: Agree to settle dispute [3.0] 
04: CONSULT 
040: Consult, not specified below [1.0] 
041: Discuss by telephone [1.0] 
042: Make a visit [2.8] 
043: Host a visit [2.8] 
044: Meet at a “third” location [1.0] 
045: Engage in mediation [4.0] 
046: Engage in negotiation [4.0] 
05: SUPPORT DIPLOMATICALLY 
050: Support, not specified below [4.5] 
051: Praise or endorse [3.5] 
052: Defend verbally [5.0] 
053: Rally support on behalf of [3.8] 
06: COOPERATE 
060: Cooperate, not specified below [6.5] 
061: Cooperate economically [7.4] 
062: Cooperate militarily [8.3] 
063: Grant diplomatic recognition [5.4] 
064: Apologize [1.8] 
065: Forgive [1.8] 
066: Sign formal agreement [6.5] 
068: Meet* [2.8] 
07: PROVIDE AID 
070: Provide aid, not specified below [7.0] 
071: Provide economic aid [7.4] 
072: Provide military aid [8.3] 
073: Provide humanitarian aid [7.0] 
074: Provide peacekeeping [7.0] 
075: Grant asylum [-1.1] 
08: YIELD 
080: Yield, not specified below [1.0] 
081: Ease non-force sanctions, not specified [2.9] 
0811: Ease administrative sanctions [2.9] 
0812: Ease economic boycott, sanctions [2.9] 
0813: Ease civilian boycott, strike [2.9] 
082: Ease, stop military blockade [0.6] 
083: Return, release, not specified below [1.9] 
0831: Return, release person(s) [1.9] 
0832: Return, release property [1.9] 
084: Receive deployment of peacekeepers [8.0] 
085: Observe truce, ceasefire [3.0] 
086: Demobilize armed forces [5.0] 
087: Retreat or surrender militarily [5.0] 
09: INVESTIGATE 
090: Investigate, not specified below [-1.0] 
091: Investigate crime, corruption [-1.0] 
092: Investigate human rights abuses [-1-0] 
093: Investigate military action or war crimes [-1.0] 
10: DEMAND 
100: Demand, not specified below [-4.9] 
101: Demand information, investigation [0.1] 
102: Demand policy support [3.4] 
103: Demand aid [3.4] 
104: Demand protection, peacekeeping [-1.0] 
105: Demand mediation [-1.0] 
106: Demand withdrawal [-1.0] 
107: Demand ceasefire [-1.0] 
108: Demand meeting, negotiation [-1.0] 
109: Demand rights [-0.3] 
11: DISAPPROVE 
110: Disapprove, not specified below [-4.0] 
111: Criticize or denounce [condemn*] [-3.4] 
112: Accuse [-3.4] 
113: Rally opposition against [-2.2] 
114: Complain officially [-2.4] 
12: REJECT 
120: Reject, not specified below [-1.1] 
121: Reject proposal, not specified below [-1.1] 
1211: Reject ceasefire, withdrawal [-1.1] 
1212: Reject peacekeeping [-1.1] 
1213: Reject settlement [-1.1] 
122: Reject request for material aid [-1.1] 
123: Reject proposal to meet, discuss, negotiate [-1.1] 
124: Defy norms, law [-5.0] 
125: Reject mediation [-4.0] 
126: Reject accusation, deny responsibility [-0.9] 
127: Veto [-4.0] 
13: THREATEN 
130: Threaten, not specified below [-4.4] 
131: Threaten non-force, not specified below [-5.8] 
1311: Threaten to reduce or stop aid [-5.8] 
1312: Threaten to boycott or embargo [-5.8] 
1313: Threaten to reduce or break relations [-5.8] 
1314: Call for sanctions* [-5.8] 
132: Give ultimatum [-6.9] 
133: Threaten to halt negotiations [-4.4] 
134: Threaten to expel/withdraw peacekeepers [-4.4] 
135: Threaten to halt mediation [-4.4] 
136: Threaten force, not specified below [-7.0] 
1361: Threaten blockade [-7.0] 
1362: Threaten occupation [-7.0] 
1363: Threaten unconventional attack[-7.0] 
1364: Threaten conventional attack [-7.0] 
1365: Threaten attack with WMD [-7.0] 
 
14: PROTEST 
140: Engage in direct political action, not specif. [-4.0] 
141: Demonstrate [-6.0] 
142: Conduct hunger strike [-4.0] 
143: Conduct strike or boycott [-6.0] 
144: Obstruct physically [-4.0] 
145: Protest violently, riot [-7.0] 
15: EXHIBIT MILITARY POSTURE 
150: Exhibit military power, not specified [-5.2] 
151: Demonstrate or display military power [-7.6] 
152: Increase military alert status [-5.2] 
153: Mobilize troops [-7.6] 
16: REDUCE RELATIONS 
160: Reduce relations, not specified below [-4.1] 
161: Reduce or break diplomatic relations [-7.0] 
162: Reduce or stop aid, not specified below [-5.6] 
1621: Reduce or stop economic assistance [-5.6] 
1622: Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance [-5.6] 
1623: Reduce or stop military assistance [-5.6] 
163: Halt negotiations [-3.8] 
164: Expel or withdraw peacekeepers [-4.1] 
165: Halt mediation [-4.1] 
166: Impose embargo, boycott [-4.1] 
167: Reduce economic relations* [-4.1] 
169: Tighten embargo/boycott/sanctions* [-4.1] 
17: COERCE 
170: Coerce, not specified below [-9.0] 
171: Seize or damage property, not specified [-5.0] 
1711: Confiscate property [-5.0] 
1712: Destroy property [-5.0] 
172: Impose administrative sanctions, not specif. [-4.1] 
1721: Impose curfew [ban (person)*] [-4.1] 
1722: Impose censorship [ban (books, etc.)*] [-4.1] 
173: Arrest, detain [-4.4] 
174: Expel [-5.0] 
18: ASSAULT 
180: Use unconventional violence, not specified [-8.7] 
181: Abduct, hijack [-9.0] 
182: Physically assault (non-lethal), not specif. [-9.0] 
1821: Sexually assault [-9.0] 
1822: Torture [-9.0] 
183: Conduct suicide, car,  other ind. bombing [-8.7] 
184: Assassinate [-9.0] 
19: FIGHT 
190: Use conventional military force, not specif. [-10] 
191: Impose blockade, restrict movement [-9.2] 
192: Occupy territory [-9.2] 
193: Fight with small arms and light weapons [-9.0] 
194: Fight with artillery and tanks [-9.0] 
195: Employ aerial weapons [-9.0] 
20: ATTACK WITH WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION 
200: Use massive unconvent. force, not specif. [-10] 
201: Employ chem.., biol.., radiol.. weapons [-10] 
202: Detonate nuclear weapons [-10] 
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4.3.4 Actor Coding Scheme 
Following the traditional conception of international relations, international actors are typi-
cally nation-states and intergovernmental organizations. More recently, international relations 
scholars have been placing stronger emphasis on sub-state and non-state actors. These devel-
opments have been reflected in event data research too. Both the PANDA/IDEA and CAMEO 
frameworks have developed systematic actor coding schemes to accommodate such changes 
in the ‘real world.’ 
The SAID actor coding scheme is based on the CAMEO actor framework (Gerner et 
al. 2002b) but does not feature its high degree of actor specification. SAID actors are limited 
to six character actor codes (CAMEO: nine character) that identify an actor’s country of 
origin (or, no country can be assigned, the appropriate international or transnational actor 
code) and specify the domestic role of the actor (Table 9). The first group of three characters 
identifies an actor’s country of origin according to the official U.N. country codes. The sec-
ond group of three characters indicates the domestic role of the actor aggregated from the 
more detailed CAMEO codes. The actors are distinguished depending on whether they are 
associated with the government (GOV), its political opposition (OPP), actors from civil soci-
ety (CVS), or business circles (BUS). 
Table 9: SAID Actor Codes and Actor Aggregation based on CAMEO 
 
 South Africa Other States 
Country 
Code ZAF [UN Country Code] 
Domestic 
Role Code *GOV *OPP *CVS *BUS *GOV *OPP *CVS *BUS 
CAMEO 
Codes 
*COP 
*GOV 
*MIL 
*SEC 
*EMB 
*NAM 
 
*OPP 
*REB 
*PRS 
 
*CVL 
*EDU 
*ELI 
*LAB 
*MED 
*REL 
*SOW 
*BUS 
MNC* 
*GOV 
**SUB 
*OPP *CVL 
*EDU 
*ELI 
*LAB 
REL* 
NGI* 
NGM* 
NGO* 
*BUS 
MNC* 
 
Actor codes in italics indicate SAID specific role codes that are not displayed in the CAMEO coding scheme: EMB=Embassy, 
NAM=Occupied territories in Namibia, SOW=Soweto Township. 
 
 
The SAID government (GOV) category has been slightly modified from its use in 
CAMEO. In the SAID framework, governmental actors include not only the governing parties 
or coalition partners but all the actors in the political system by which a nation or community 
is administered and regulated. GOV therefore includes all actors that represent the executive 
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authority, the legislative, or the judiciary of a particular state. However, there is one exception 
to this general rule: 
The opposition (OPP) code applies to actors that are assigned to the political opposi-
tion in a particular political system. The distinction between government and opposition is 
crucial in the case of South Africa under apartheid for obvious reasons: the major domestic 
and regional conflicts in South Africa took place between the apartheid government on the 
one side and political, societal and military forces that waged a determined struggle against 
the racist system on the other side. But also regarding political actors originating outside 
South Africa, this distinction may be important since government and opposition in many 
countries took different stands on the issue of apartheid South Africa. 
Table 10 identifies some important governmental actors as coded in the SAID data 
set. 
Table 10: Codes for Selected Governmental Actors 
 
Code Description Examples 
ZAFGOV Government of South Africa, 
incl. administration, governing parties, coalition 
partners, ministers, etc. 
“South African government” 
“National Party” [<960630] 
“Nelson Mandela” [940510-990701] 
ZAFOPP Political opposition in South Africa, 
including oppositional parties, groups, individuals, 
etc. 
“African National Congress” [<940510] 
“Nelson Mandela “[<940510] 
“National Party” [960701-970826] 
USAGOV Government of the United States of America, 
incl. administration, governing parties, coalition 
partners, ministers, etc. 
“U.S. government” 
“State Department” 
“President Carter” [770120-810119] 
USAOPP Political opposition in the United States, 
including oppositional parties, groups, individuals, 
etc. 
“the Democrats” [740809-770119; 810120-930119] 
“Sen. Edward Kennedy” [do.]  
Numbers in [angled brackets] indicate date restrictions for actor codes. Nelson Mandela, for example, is coded as a repre-
sentative of the South African opposition prior to 10 May 1994 (ZAFOPP [<940510]). Then he became South African presi-
dent and stayed in office until end of June 1999 (ZAFGOV [940510-990701]). Since then, Mandela is coded under the 
category of ‘elite citizen’ (ZAFELI [>990701]. 
 
 
This societal and cultural sphere is subsumed under the actor category ‘civil society’ 
(CVS). Though contested both by historical and contemporary debates, the concept of civil 
society is useful for this study in order to distinguish between the civil and governmental 
sphere of a society. Civil society spans essentially so-called “intermediary institutions” such 
as professional associations, religious groups, labor unions, citizen advocacy organizations, 
etc., which give voice to various sectors of society. The SAID CVS category is consequently 
more comprehensive than the CAMEO code for “civilian individual or group” (CVL). 
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Because of a special interest in the economic dimension of international-South Africa 
relations, the SAID coding scheme also contains a separate business (BUS) actor category. 
This category includes non-state actors from corporate business. Empirically, however, the 
distinction between business and civil society can be problematic, especially in the case of 
business associations. On the one hand, these organizations operate as lobby organizations in 
the institutionalized political sphere and have to be regarded therefore as intermediary actors 
and are consequently part of civil society as defined above. On the other hand, business asso-
ciations accumulate and represent the interests of their members, the individual corporations 
from the business sphere. However, the SAID data indicate that private international eco-
nomic relations are mostly associated with individual firms or economic sectors and not with 
associations. 
4.3.5 Machine Coding 
Machine coding of event data processes an electronic text source as input and produces a 
systematically coded set of event data as output. This process includes several discrete steps 
(Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Steps in Generating Machine-coded Event Data 
 
Source: Schrodt and Gerner (2005: 2/23) 
 
 
The first step of generating machine-coded event data involves the downloading of 
the raw text material (in this study, newswire stories from AP and Reuters) from the online 
databases LexisNexis and Factiva using the search strings “South Africa!” (AP from Lex-
isNexis) and “South Africa*” (Reuters from Factiva) for headlines and lead sentences. Text 
filter programs written in Perl were used to automatize the download process and remove 
irrelevant stories such as sports reports and weather forecasts from text material. Another 
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utility program combines, integrates and downloads into a single data file, it eliminates dupli-
cate stories and reformats the downloaded texts into the KEDS/TABARI input format.34 
The second step is by far the most labor intensive in the coding process and includes 
the development of the actor and verb dictionaries that are used by the machine to code actors 
and events from the text material. The development of the original actor and verb dictionaries 
for the KEDS and PANDA projects, for example, cost the project teams about four-person-
years of working through Reuters lead sentences to identify relevant verb phrases and assign 
these phrases to appropriate event codes (Schrodt and Gerner 2000: 2/24/25). It is therefore 
necessary that new dictionaries are built on existing dictionaries from previous event data 
projects. 
The SAID verb dictionary is based on the standard KEDS verb dictionary and is 
composed of different specific regional dictionaries the KEDS team developed over the years 
(Schrodt and Gerner 2000; Schrodt et al. 1994; Huxtable 1997; Goldstein and Pevehouse 
1997; Schrodt and Gerner 1998). The KEDS verb dictionary was modified slightly using the 
manual coding function in TABARI for selected time periods that allows for a test of the 
validity of the automatically coded lead sentences and a modification of regional specific verb 
phrases. As a result, the SAID verb dictionary contains a total of 7,354 verb patterns that 
assign appropriate event codes to events that are described in the text material. 
The SAID actor dictionary is based on the KEDS West Africa dictionary since 
southern Africa has not been a focus of the KEDS team and therefore no region specific 
dictionary has been developed yet. However, the West Africa dictionary proved to be useful 
to start with since it already contained nearly 2,850 actor definitions (as of January 2005) 
including all major international actors and already some of the important regional actors. The 
actor dictionary also needs a periodical update since actor names and functions vary over 
time. New actors were identified using the Actor_Filter35 program that recognizes new poten-
tial actors in the text material by comparing patterns of consecutive capitalized words with 
actor names already known from an existing actor dictionary. I thereby applied the rule that 
an actor has to show up at least twice over the whole period from 1977 to 1996 to be included 
in the actor dictionary (equivalent to an appearance in 0.01% of the total of lead sentences 
obtained from AP from 1977 to 1996). The modified SAID actor dictionary eventually in-
                                                
34 See the KEDS project website for text filters and additional utility programs: 
http://www.ku.edu/~keds/software.html. Accessed 2 June 2006. 
35 The Actor_Filter program is also available on the KEDS-website: 
http://www.ku.edu/~keds/software.dir/filters.html. Accessed 2 June 2006. 
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cludes 3,688 actor definitions that are used to identify the source and target actors of the 
coded events. 
The third step includes then the actual machine coding of the text material. Machine 
coding of event data was essentially invented by the KEDS project in the early 1990s 
(Schrodt and Gerner 2004, 1994; Gerner et al. 1994). In 2000, Schrodt created a new program 
called Text Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI). Like its predeces-
sor KEDS, TABARI applies a computational method called ‘sparse parsing’ and some lin-
guistic knowledge to identify the role of words in a sentence. But instead of trying to decipher 
a sentence fully, TABARI determines only the parts of the sentence that are required to prop-
erly code the events: the actors, compound nouns, compound verb phrases, and the reference 
of pronouns. The program first employs a large set of verb patterns (as defined in the verb 
dictionary) to determine the appropriate event code. A logarithm then identifies the relevant 
actors (according to the actor definitions in the actor dictionary), while the source of an event 
is usually the first actor in the sentence and the target of the second. This pattern is reversed 
when the sentence is in passive voice. Compound noun phrases generate two or more events. 
Then, the program has to be fine-tuned. This fine-tuning is done in TABARI using 
the ‘coding’ option. Most modifications involve the addition of specific individual actors and 
the addition of verb phrases describing behaviors specific to the research project being under-
taken. The fine-tuning of the dictionaries gives also an indication of the accuracy of the cod-
ing system. Once the fine-tuning of the coding system has reached a satisfying level, the raw 
data gets autocoded. Autocoding ensures that the coding rules have been consistently applied 
across the entire data set. It also allows for the replication of the coding at a later time. Table 
11 illustrates a sequence of the event data that result as output from the machine coding proc-
ess. 
Table 11: Maschine Coded Event Data (Excerpt) 
[Date] [Source] [Target] [Event type] 
850720 ZAFGOV ZAF 172 (Impose administrative sanctions) 
850720 USAGOV ZAF 012 (Make pessimistic comment) 
850722 USAGOV ZAF 112 (Accuse) 
850722 USAGOV ZAFGOV 020 (Appeal) 
850723 GBRGOV GBR 050 (Support) 
850723 GBRGOV ZAFGOV 020 (Appeal) 
850723 USAGOV ZAF 020 (Appeal) 
 
The fourth step includes an aggregation in terms of time and level of measurement. 
The machine coding output consists of categorical time series data on a daily basis. The time 
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unit of one day, however, is often too small and the implied precision not accurate consider-
ing the process that generated the data. Daily event data are therefore typically aggregated to 
weekly or (most of the time) monthly data. The time aggregation is done using the 
KEDS_count36 program that counts events in selected dyads within given intervals (typically 
one month) and provides a spreadsheet that can be imported into standard statistical programs. 
In spite of this temporal aggregation, weekly or monthly event data still show a major advan-
tage over time series data usually gained from official statistics that occur usually on a yearly 
or quarterly basis. Such highly aggregated data tend to “swallow up important interaction 
effects” (Schrodt et al. 1994: 207) whereas smaller temporal units, such as on a weekly or 
monthly basis, are better able to sense the causal mechanisms at work.  
For many analysis techniques the level of measurement has to be increased too. 
Three features were used to generate discrete or continuous interval-scaled time series for 
each dyad under investigation: 1) the number of event counts per dyad, 2) the net-score on a 
conflict-cooperation scale, and 3) the number of specific event types. 
Counting the number of events that occurred in a selected dyad within a particular 
time interval is the simplest measurement to get a rough estimate of the intensity of interac-
tions between a pair of actors (dyad). As a matter of course, this measurement ignores both 
the content of the interactions, whether friendly or hostile, and the relative weight of individ-
ual events, that is, which events have to be considered more relevant than others. 
To include both content and relative weight of individual events, most event data 
projects convert nominal event counts into measurements of conflict and cooperation, based 
on the assumption that all behavior between political actors can be displayed somewhere on a 
hostility-friendship continuum (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 110). For every observation a 
cooperation/conflict score is calculated by weighting each single event according to an inter-
val-like scale. The totaling of these individual scores results in a net cooperation/conflict 
score per dyad and time interval. The most widely used interval-like scale in event data analy-
sis was developed by Joshua Goldstein (2004) and is therefore also known as the Goldstein 
scale. Since the scale is based on the WEIS coding scheme it has to be adapted to CAMEO 
for the purpose of this study. 
                                                
36 KEDS_Count is available form the KEDS-website: http://www.ku.edu/~keds/software.dir/utilities.html. 
Accessed 6 June 2006. A one-a-day filter was also applied to the data. This specific program filters event data 
using the rule that each dyad can have only one event per coding category per day (“daily unique dyad-code 
rule”). This algorithm eliminates all events coded from duplicate stories at the expense of a few false positives. 
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The Goldstein value for the individual event codes of the CAMEO-based SAID cod-
ing scheme are indicated in Table 8 (p. 105). Half of the CAMEO primary categories are 
identical to the according WEIS categories and the corresponding Goldstein values can be 
assigned directly. The remaining categories were weighted as follows: if the CAMEO code 
was a specification of a more general WEIS code, the more specific CAMEO code received 
the Goldstein value of the respective superior WEIS code. If a direct assignment to a broader 
WEIS code was not possible, the most appropriate WEIS code as regards content and its 
respective Goldstein value was assigned to the particular CAMEO code. For 15 CAMEO 
codes, neither of the two approaches allowed a meaningful assignment of a Goldstein value. 
These codes received a value relative to their position in the CAMEO coding scheme, consid-
ering the fact that the CAMEO categories show an increase in cooperation as one goes from 
category 01 to 09, and an increase in conflict as one goes from 10 to 20. 
Apart from their attractiveness due to the quasi-interval scale characteristics, Gold-
stein scores also have their weaknesses. Conflictive and cooperative events that occur in the 
same time unit compensate each other with the result, for example, that dyads with high con-
flict and cooperation appear to include a rather neutral behavior between the involved actors. 
It also does not appear how many events culminated in the respective Goldstein score. The 
score can be the result of low interaction intensity with a few very cooperative or conflictive 
events or emerge from very frequent interactions with a rather low conflict or cooperation 
level. There is also considerable evidence that conflict and cooperation are not one-
dimensional. Nations that cooperate extensively, for example in trade or alliances, also tend to 
have greater conflict than nations that are mutually isolated (Goldstein 1992: 160). 
Due to this particular weakness of score aggregates, event counts for individual event 
categories will be analyzed separately (Table 12). 
Table 12: Event Category Aggregations 
 
Category CAMEO Events 
Verbal Cooperaton (vercp) Cue categories 01, 02, 03, 04, 05 
Material Cooperation (matcp) Cue categories 06, 07, 08 
Verbal Conflict (vercf) Cue categories 09, 10, 11, 12, 13 
Material Conflict (matcf) Cue categories 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 
Mediation and Negotiation (meneg) 025, 026, 027, 028, 035, 036, 037, 038, 039, 066, 105, 106, 107, 108 
Based on Schrodt and Gerner (1995: 315). 
 
The aggregation of event categories as shown in Table 12 also reduces the potential 
effects of coding errors. For example, individual codes for different forms of verbal conflict 
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can be assigned somewhat ambiguously to the different event types both by human coders and 
the machine coding systems. The aggregation of individual events to broader categories 
minimizes such potential ambiguities. 
In a fifth step, such numerically aggregated event data allows now for an application 
of different formal data analysis methods.37 The applied data analysis techniques will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.5. 
Before that discussion, the validity of the data sets that were produced through the 
different steps described above will be examined. Event data, like any data used in the social 
sciences, contain errors due to their source, coding techniques and other factors such as scal-
ing and data aggregation. The advantages and disadvantages of event data have been explored 
extensively in the literature (Hudson et al. 2006; Schrodt 1995; Schrodt and Gerner 1994; 
Gerner et al. 1994; Hayes 1973; Merritt 1994; Duffy 1994; Huxtable and Pevehouse 1996; 
Sommer and Scarritt 1999). In the following, I therefore discuss only potential specific valid-
ity issues regarding the data used in this study. First, I will address some general concerns 
with event data related to the journalistic sources that are used in event data research and the 
applied coding procedures, in particular the machine coding of the data. Then, I turn to spe-
cific questions related to the SAID data set and discuss the data set’s potentials and limita-
tions in more detail, in particular regarding its main source (AP). 
4.4 Validity of the SAID Data Set 
4.4.1 Source Related Validity Issues 
Probably the most widely studied validity problem in event data research is the editorial bias 
introduced to the data by the use of journalistic sources. Several systematic studies demon-
strated that different sources are picking up different events. Different news coverage of 
events is especially significant when comparing regional and international sources. Gary 
Hoggard (2003), for example, showed that The New York Times Index and regional sources 
have an overlap of only 10 to 20 percent in the events that are covered by their reports. Gerner 
et al. (1974) came to similar findings comparing Reuters to two region specific sources (the 
German biweekly Informationen and the U.S. based Journal of Palestine Studies) regarding 
their coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was shown that Reuters captured some events 
                                                
37 Computational analysis of event data, on the other hand, works directly with event sequences without the 
intermediate step of numerical aggregation (see for example Schrodt and Gerner 2004; Schrodt 2004). 
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that the regional sources did not and vice versa. Henrik Sommers and James Scarritt (1994) 
compared Reuters to African regional sources and conclude that the regional sources (the 
Africa Research Bulletin and the Zimbabwe Herald) rather supplement than complement 
news obtained from the international wire service. 
The reasons for such differences in coverage are numerous. At the very basic level, a 
media outlet covers an event if the particular news organization is aware of the specific event 
and when it considers the event newsworthy. Available resources to report the event (such as 
reporters on the ground, available news wire services and other sources of information) play a 
role, too. Most news organizations also have a particular focus on certain types of events 
which they follow more closely than others, depending on the predispositions, preferences 
and interests of their audience and their own editorial orientation, specialization and leader-
ship. And then, as mentioned earlier, very practical restrictions for journalists and editors 
influence the reporting, including text space limitations, press deadlines, etc. 
Big news corporations such as Reuters, AFP and AP are assumably less exposed to 
such restrictions since their goal is to produce news on a continuous and dense basis that can 
be used by other news organizations as source for their own news production. Especially 
when it comes to international news, wire services (originally transmitted by telegraph, there-
fore ‘wire’) play a crucial role. Already in 1980, Anthony Smith (1999) observed that West-
ern news agencies (AP in the United States, Reuters in Britain, and AFP in France) supply 
ninety percent of all the foreign news in the Western world. Over the last decades, the signifi-
cance of international wire services increased even more (Smith 1980). Not just the media 
sector but also the governmental and economic sectors depend highly on information obtained 
from international news wires. Both governmental and economic intelligence draws heavily 
on such public sources. International news organizations therefore resemble nowadays profes-
sional intelligence services in both function and structure. Whether this information is in fact 
sufficient to describe and explain events in the ‘real world’ remains an empirical question. 
But, as Schrodt (1997: 4) puts it, “the incentives [for the media business] to provide the re-
quired information are present.” 
Two other well-studied phenomena are the conflict orientation of news media and 
media fatigue (Schrodt 2000). Conflictive events are usually considered more newsworthy by 
the media than cooperative events. Event data studies show that media attention on a conflict 
increases as soon as the situation becomes more violent. On the other hand, media attention 
decreases when the situation does not significantly change over time. Regional factors can 
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have an impact. Huxtable and Pevehouse (1996) detected coverage disparities for Reuters 
between developed and developing countries. Huxtable (1996) also compared Reuters to AFP 
and the BBC for West Africa and assumed differences in the coverage based on language and 
past colonial links—BBC and Reuters providing better coverage of Anglophone states such as 
Ghana and Nigeria, while AFP provided superior coverage of Francophone states such as 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. This assumption, however, was not supported by empirical data. 
4.4.2 Coding Related Validity Issues 
The coding process is another source of potential threats to the validity of event data. How 
valid are machine-coded event data? Several comparative studies proved machine-coded data 
to be as valid as event data coded by humans. Schrodt and Gerner (1997: 830) have shown 
that their KEDS/TABARI system is able to deal with about 90 percent of Reuters lead sen-
tences correctly. The system’s ability to assign the same codes to particular events is 80 to 85 
percent. Such a level of inter-instrumental reliability between machine and coder is similar to 
the level that was found between different human coders in earlier event data studies (Schrodt 
and Gerner 1994; cited in Burgess and Lawton 1972: 830). King and Lowe (1994), too, found 
in their independent evaluation of another automated coding program (VAR Knowledge 
Manager) that machine-coding was as reliable as coding done by trained individuals. 
Given a comparable level of inter-instrument reliability with human coding, machine 
coding is favorable over human coding not only for lower costs but also due to its inter-coder 
and inter-temporal stability. Unlike human coders, the machine does not get tired or bored and 
is not exposed to different heuristics and preconceptions that may vary from coder to coder. 
The machine applies the same coding rules consistently over time and treats every case in 
exactly the same way. 
The coding scheme, however, incorporates several potential sources for validity 
threats, regardless of whether the data is human or machine coded. The coding scheme itself 
is already an incomplete and biased record of the underlying events. It helps to narrow inci-
dents into analytically manageable units but remains, of course, a simplification of reality. 
The coding scheme might also aggregate some categories incorrectly, as pointed out in Sec-
tion 4.3.5. I therefore use different aggregations of events, including scaling scores (according 
to the Goldstein scores) and event counts in particular event categories (verbal and material 
cooperation, verbal and material conflict, mediation and negotiation) to get an estimate of the 
accuracy of different types of event data measurements for the purpose of this study. 
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4.4.3 The Quality of AP as Event Data Source 
Because AP is the main empirical source for this study and has remained nearly untested as a 
potential event data source (for an exception, King and Lowe 2003), I investigate in this 
section that source’s usefulness and validity for event data analysis. The investigation is based 
on a comparison to Reuters, which has proven to be a rather rich and valid source for event 
data research (Reeves et al. 2006; Gerner et al. 1994; Huxtable and Pevehouse 1996). A com-
parison of the two sources with special consideration of South Africa is possible since both 
wire services are available for the time period June 1987 to December 1996 and cover 
roughly the second half of the period under investigation in this study. 
Density and Types of Reported Events within South Africa 
I first analyze how well the source covers the region studied in this research project. I there-
fore analyze the numbers and types of reported inner-South African events and compare them 
to Reuters’ reporting on the region. Inner-South African events are favored over international 
events concerning South Africa for this particular analysis since coverage of international 
events is expected to be more strongly biased in favor of the two news organizations domicile 
(United States in the case of AP and Britain in the case of Reuters, see next section for a 
detailed consideration of this potential bias). 
Figure 13: Total Monthly Event Counts for South Africa (domestic) for AP and Reuters, 6/1987-12/1996 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 above shows the total monthly counts of coded domestic events in South 
Africa (that is, both source and target of the event are of South African origin). 
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Both time series in Figure 13 include mostly events between the South African gov-
ernment and the ANC as its main opposition. Both series are coded from lead sentences using 
the SAID actor and event coding schemes. It clearly appears that Reuters covers events within 
South Africa two or three times more intensively than AP. However, the two series evolve 
quite simultaneously over time (correlation coefficient of 0.75). As a result, events coded 
from the two sources differ in level (average of number of events per month) but with a rather 
high covariance over time: when Reuters increases its reporting on South Africa, AP does so 
too; in months with only a few AP reports, Reuters reports on a lower intensity level as well. 
Whether these differences involve coverage of different events or are just a differ-
ence of reporting intensity will now be examined with a comparison of the distribution of 
different event types across the two sources. If coverage varies only in intensity but not in 
content, the distribution between different event types over a certain period of time is ex-
pected to be similar between the two sources. 
Figure 14: Event Counts per Event Category and Year for AP and Reuters 
 
 
  
Note: Graphs differ in scale. 
 
 
Figure 14 above illustrates the event distribution across the SAID/CAMEO event 
categories 01 through 20 comparing AP and Reuters for the selected years of 1988, 1990, 
1992 and 1994. 
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The selected years display both intensively covered years (1990: De Klerk elected 
South African president, Mandela released from prison; 1994: first race-free democratic 
elections in South Africa) and rather purely covered years (1988, 1992). As expected, Reuters 
outpaces AP each year in every category. But although the two sources differ in event totals 
per category, AP and Reuters seem to report similar information due to a fairly similar distri-
bution of the events across the different event categories. Table 13 indicates the Pearson 
correlation between the AP and Reuters event distribution for the four selected years. It is 
shown that the yearly event count distribution of AP highly correlates with Reuters’ yearly 
event count distribution. 
Table 13: Correlations of AP and Reuters Event Counts per Event Category for South Africa (domestic) 
 
 South Africa 1988 South Africa 1990 South Africa 1992 South Africa 1994 
Correlation AP-Reuters 0.78*** 0.98*** 0.89*** 0.96*** 
***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
As a result, AP and Reuters cover domestic political events in South Africa with dif-
ferent intensity, but the two news sources generally focus on similar types of events, indicat-
ing that the two sources report similar interaction patterns between actors of South African 
origin. AP therefore proves to be a useful source to monitor events within South Africa, even 
though the intensity of the coverage is lower than in the case of Reuters. 
Density and Types of Reported International Events 
As indicated above, it can be assumed that the domicile of a news source has an effect on the 
source’s focus on international events. International events involving or affecting the domicile 
country are expected to be more closely covered than events without such linkages to the 
home country of a particular news source. AP is therefore expected to report the U.S.-South 
African dyad more closely than Reuters, whereas Reuters covers the British-South African 
dyad better. Regarding third states such as Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, differences in 
the two organizations’ reporting are assumed to be less significant. 
To test these assumptions, I first compare AP and Reuters regarding their reporting 
on international events with an involvement of their respective home country. Then, I will 
analyze the news sources’ coverage of events involving Germany, Sweden and Switzerland to 
find out how differently the two sources report on neither U.S. nor British international 
events. 
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Figure 15 shows that AP and Reuters differ in their reporting on U.S. and British 
South Africa relations. The two series for each news organization differ significantly in level 
and variance over time. Whereas the AP series reports on the USA>ZAF dyad on an average 
of 3.68 events per month (standard deviation 0.38), Reuters covers for the same dyad a mean 
of 6.42 events per month, on average almost twice as many events (standard deviation 0.48). 
For the GBR>ZAF dyad, differences between the two series are even bigger: AP reports on 
average 0.65 events per month (standard deviation 0.11), whereas Reuters has a monthly 
average of 3.98 events (standard deviation 0.41). 
Figure 15: Monthly Event Counts in USA>ZAF and GBR>ZAF, AP and Reuters 6/1987-12/1996 
 
 USA>ZAF  GBR>ZAF 
  
Note: Graphs differ in scale. 
 
 
Consequently, the British Reuters outpaces the American AP not only in its reporting 
on the British-South African dyad but also—contrary to the initial assumption—in its cover-
age of the U.S.-South African dyad. Despite their differences in level (number of events per 
month), the two sources’ reporting evolves at least somewhat similarly over time (covariance 
of 0.54 for the USA>ZAF dyad, 0.46 for the GBR>ZAF dyad). 
Figure 16 below illustrates the number of events in the German-South African 
(DEU-ZAF), Swedish-South African (SWE-ZAF), and Swiss-South African (CHE-ZAF) 
dyads coded from AP and Reuters lead sentences from June 1986 to December 1996. Both 
sources cover the most events in the DEU-ZAF dyad (monthly mean of 0.75 for AP; 1.81 for 
Reuters). The SWE-ZAF and CHE-ZAF dyads are significantly less represented in the lead 
sentences obtained from the two sources. The CHE-ZAF dyad is especially poorly covered by 
AP lead sentences (monthly mean of 0.29). Coded from Reuters leads sentences, the CHE-
ZAF and SWE-ZAF dyads show similar numbers of events (monthly mean of 0.59 for both 
dyads). 
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Figure 16: Total Monthly Event Counts for Selected Dyads for AP and Reuters, 6/1987-12/1996 
 
 AP Reuters 
  
Note: Graphs differ in scale. 
 
 
The statistical significance of the differences between the two sources’ reporting on 
the particular dyads is tested with a t-test (Table 14). The means for each dyad and source are 
calculated from normalized event counts to exclude the fact that Reuters shows an overall 
higher coverage of international events than AP. Normalized event counts are calculated by 
dividing the total number of events reported per dyad and year by the yearly total of all re-
ported events. 
Table 14: Mean of Yearly Normalized Event Counts in AP and Reuters (1988-1996) 
 
 Mean AP Mean Reuters Mean Diff. 95% Conf. Int. t-statistic 
USA .0844 .0428   +.0416***  .0194    .0267 6.4246 
DEU .0043 .0074   -.0031** -.0053   -.0008 -3.0920 
SWE .0023 .0061 -.0038 -.0078    .0002 -2.1745 
CHE .0007 .0033    -.0025*** -.0039   -.0015 -5.5889 
GBR .0193 .0315    -.0122*** -.0189   -.0056 -4.2491 
ZAF .2515 .2820 -.0142 -.0632    .0022 -2.1501 
**significant at the 0.05 level  *** significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
The comparison of normalized means of event counts per year and dyad (Table 14) 
confirms the initially presumed U.S. focus of AP. Between 1988 and 1996, around 8.4 percent 
of all international events concerning South Africa reported by AP include the United States 
either as source or target of the event. In Reuters, the share of U.S. related events is only 4.2 
percent. Apart from the expected difference regarding the reporting of events related to Brit-
ain, significant differences between the two sources exist with regard to Germany, Sweden 
and Switzerland. On these dyads, Reuters reports significantly more events than AP compared 
to the two sources’ overall reporting on international South Africa events. No significant 
differences can be found considering the Swedish-South African dyad. 
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Language 
The poor coverage of Germany, Sweden and Switzerland in both AP’s and Reuters’ reporting 
may not only be due to the fact that these three countries represent less important third states 
for the two big international news organizations. An English-language bias can have an influ-
ence too. I therefore compare the number of South Africa related events with German or 
Swiss involvement (as AP and Reuters reported them) with German-language news sources.38 
The sources of reference are the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland) and the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (Germany). The New York Times (United States) and The Times (England) are also 
included in the analysis. All four newspapers are traditionally considered to have an interna-
tional focus. 
Table 15: Number of South Africa Stories for Germany and Switzerland in different Sources 
 
 Germany Switzerland 
 NZZ SDZ NYT Times AP NZZ SDZ NYT Times AP 
Orig. CH D USA UK USA CH D USA UK USA 
Lang. Germ. Germ. Engl. Engl. Engl. Germ. Germ. Engl. Engl. Engl. 
Type Paper Paper Paper Paper Wire Paper Paper Paper Paper Wire 
1991     - 1)       32)   9 1 10     - 1)   12) 0 5 3 
1992     - 1) 10   5 6   5     - 1) 2 0 1 1 
1993   6 15   6 7   4 30 2 1 2 1 
1994 10 39   4 6   5 35 3 0 3 3 
1995   7 30 11 4 10 23 1 1 1 5 
1996 17 54   9 6   7 28 0 1 1 5 
1) not electronically available before 1993 2) from Feb 11, 1991 
Database: Lexis-Nexis 
Search strings (title and lead-sentence): “südafrika!” AND “deutsch!” (SDZ); “south africa!” AND “german!” (NYT, Times, 
AP); “südafrika” AND “schweiz!” (NZZ); “south africa!” AND (“switzerland” OR “swiss”) (NYT, Times, AP); sports stories 
and stock market reports excluded. 
Sources: NZZ=Neue Zürcher Zeitung, SDZ=Süddeutsche Zeitung, NYT=New York Times, Times=Times and Sunday 
Times (London), AP=Associated Press 
 
 
Table 15 indicates that the two included German-language newspapers, the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, report more South African stories for the Ger-
man-speaking countries of Germany and Switzerland than the English-language news 
sources. It also becomes clear, as expected from the outset, that both the Swiss and German 
newspapers report significantly better on events involving their respective home countries. AP 
reports the most Germany or Switzerland related events but still reports on a smaller scale 
than the two German-language newspapers. 
                                                
38 For Sweden, unfortunately, no similar newspaper was available for this test. 
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Conclusion 
The results from the validity assessment of AP as a source for event data analysis can be 
summarized as follows: 
AP proves to be a valid source for the coding of events regarding South Africa. The 
source covers the region less intensively than Reuters, which has proved to be a valuable 
source for event data analysis in many studies. But the two sources report similar patterns of 
behavior. That is, their respective reporting on South Africa differs rather in intensity than 
content. 
Reuters seems to report international events regarding South Africa generally more 
densely than AP. The British Reuters wire produces more events not only for the British-
South African dyad but also for the U.S.-South African dyad. Reuters also reports more 
closely on events including other European countries such as the three under study in this 
research project, namely West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. When lead sentences are 
coded, English-language sources miss a significant number of events, including those in non-
English-speaking countries such as Germany and Switzerland. 
For less prominent dyads, AP shows a weakness when events are coded from lead 
sentences. Thus, I examine in the next section if full-text coding is able to provide a broader 
data basis for these so-called small dyads. 
4.4.4 Full-Text Coding for Small Dyads 
For rather densely reported dyads such as that on U.S.-South African relations, the coding of 
lead-sentences provides a thorough coverage of political events. The lead is a declarative 
sentence at the beginning of a news story that summarizes the whole story with a rather sim-
ple syntax and is therefore easy to code for the machine. Rather poorly covered dyads, so-
called small dyads,39 are confronted with low frequencies of reported events. 
Event data scholars therefore started to experiment with full-story coding, taking the 
whole news text as a potential source for the coding of events. Huxtable (1985), for example, 
demonstrated that news reports on West Africa, while difficult to code and subject to unreli-
able and inconsistent coverage, would nonetheless produce meaningful event data when 
coded from the whole body of the available news stories. Specific tests by Schrodt and Gerner 
                                                
39 A small dyad is understood as a dyad that includes one or two so-called “small states” (according to Sommer 
and Scarritt 1999). 
 123 
(1997: 1/33) comparing lead-sentence and full-story coding on a data set dealing with the 
Persian Gulf region (which receives more sporadic coverage than the highly covered Middle 
East, for example) are consistent with Huxtable’s findings: states perceived as peripheral by 
the international media are more likely to be discussed only in the body of a news story and 
not in the head. Furthermore, the full story is also more likely to present secondary events that 
occurred but which did not by themselves justify a separate story (and, thus, did not produce a 
lead sentence by themselves). 
On the other hand, full-story coding involves a significant potential problem: it is 
subject to more false positives than lead-sentence coding since the body of the news story 
may return to events that have already been reported in the upper body of the story (and, thus, 
have already been coded). But the use of filter programs helps to mitigate this problem to a 
certain degree. I applied a one-a-day filter40 to the full-story coded data sets that applies the 
rule that each dyad can have only one event per coding category per day. Like this, the algo-
rithm eliminates most of the false positives at the expense of a few correctly coded events. 
To validate full-story coded events gained from AP, I compare in the following 
pages different full-story coded event series to event series coded from AP lead sentences. 
First, I will consider the U.S.-South African dyad (USA>ZAF) for which lead-sentence cod-
ing produces a decent number of events per year and a small-n situation therefore hardly ever 
occurs. USA-South African relations therefore provide a usual dyad to test how adequately 
full-story coding reproduces general patterns found in highly reliable lead-sentence coding. 
Then, I turn to the more critical dyads including Germany (DEU-ZAF), Sweden (SWE-ZAF), 
and Switzerland (CHE-ZAF). 
U.S.-South African Relations 
It was shown earlier (Table 7, p. 98, and Figure 15, p. 119) that the U.S.-South Africa dyad is 
comparatively well covered by international media. It can therefore be assumed that events 
coded from lead-sentences describe events occurring in this particular dyad in a sufficient 
way. Full-text coding of the relevant news stories is just expected to deliver a higher fre-
quency of particular events whereas the relative frequencies of reported event types do not 
differ from lead-sentence coded data. 
                                                
40 Available from the KEDS-Website: http://www.ku.edu/~keds/software.dir/utilities.html. Accessed 18 August 
2006. 
 124 
Figure 17 below confirms that the USA>ZAF dyad features significantly more 
monthly events when the data is coded from the full stories (monthly mean of 17.4, standard 
deviation 1.32) than from lead sentences (monthly mean of 5.65, standard deviation 0.44). But 
the full-story and the lead-sentence event series highly correlate over time (r = 0.93, signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level), indicating that full-story and lead-sentence coded event data differ for 
the USA>ZAF dyad significantly in level but not in variance over time. 
Figure 17: Total Monthly Event Counts in USA>ZAF Dyad Coded from AP Lead and Full-text 
 
 
 
 
Whether full-story and lead-sentence coded data also display similar behavior pat-
terns within the dyad will now be tested by a comparison of event counts across the 
SAID/CAMEO cue categories. 
Figure 18: Event Counts per SAID/CAMEO Category for the USA>ZAF Dyad, 1977-1996 (AP) 
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Figure 18 above shows that events coded from AP full-stories and lead-sentences are 
in fact akin when distributed across the different event categories when the USA>ZAF dyad is 
analyzed. Event frequencies coded from full-stories outpace frequencies obtained from lead-
sentences in every cue category. But the relative distributions across the twenty event catego-
ries highly correlate (r = 0.99, significant at the 0.01 level). It can therefore be assumed that 
events coded from full-stories describe very similar behavioral patterns, at least for the U.S.-
South African dyad. 
Considering individual years, however, minor differences between full-story and 
lead-sentence coded data may occur (Figure 19). 
Figure 19: Event Counts per SAID/CAMEO Category and Year for the USA>ZAF Dyad (AP) 
 
  
  
Note: Graphs differ in scale. 
 
 
In two of the four selected years as displayed in Figure 19, namely 1982 and 1986, 
rather marginal but significantly lower correlation coefficients between full-story and lead-
sentence coded event distribution exist. For both years, the lower correlation is caused by one 
particular event category which is differently coded when full-story and lead-sentence coding 
are applied: in 1982, the full-story coded series displays significantly more events in 
SAID/CAMEO category 01 (Make Public Statement) than is the case for the lead-sentence 
coded series; in 1986, differences are significant in SAID/CAMEO category 04 (Consult). 
Table 16 demonstrates that the exclusion of the respective outlying category increases the 
correlation between full-story and lead-sentence coded event series significantly. 
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Table 16: Correlations of AP Full-story and Lead-sentence Coded Event Counts per CAMEO Category 
 
 USA>ZAF 1982 USA>ZAF 1986 USA>ZAF 1990 USA>ZAF 1994 
Correlation full-lead 0.89*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 
 CAMEO 01 excl. 0.97*** 0.87*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 
 CAMEO 04 excl. 0.81*** 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.96*** 
***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Differences between full-story and lead sentence coding are also displayed in sub-
dyads. Sub-dyads represent a subset of relations of a superordinated dyad. In U.S.-South 
African relations (the superordinated dyad), the following sub-dyads are distinguished: U.S. 
relations towards the South African government (USA>ZAFGOV), the South African opposi-
tion (USA>ZAFOPP), and the South African civil society (USA>ZAFCVS). Table 17 indi-
cates that full-story coding improves the total number of coded events quite uniformly across 
the distinguished sub-dyads of U.S.-South African relations. Compared to lead sentence 
coding, the event coverage can be improved by around 300% for sub-dyad when the full text 
is coded. 
Table 17: Total Number of Events per Dyad and Coding Mode, 1977-1996 (AP) 
 
Coding Mode USA>ZAFx USA>ZAFGOV USA>ZAFOPP USA>ZAFCVS 
Lead-sentence 1356 348 94 60 
Full-story 4179 987 328 203 
Improvement 308% 284% 349% 338% 
 
 
Inter-dyad differences between full-story and lead sentence coding can be located 
when the variance between the two coding modes for each sub-dyad are compared. The corre-
lation coefficients in Table 18 below show that differences in variance between the two cod-
ing modes are significantly higher in the sub-dyad of U.S. relations towards the South African 
civil society (USA>ZAFCVS) than in the case of the other three analyzed sub-dyads 
(USA>ZAFx, USA>ZAFGOV, USA>ZAFOPP). 
Table 18: Correlations Event Counts per Event Category in the USA>ZAF Dyad 
 
 USA>ZAFx USA>ZAF USA>ZAFGOV USA>ZAFOPP USA>ZAFCVS 
Correlation Full-Lead 0.99*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.84*** 
***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
The USA>ZAFCVS sub-dyad with a lower correlation between full-text and lead 
sentence coded event counts (as displayed in Table 18) represents the smallest of the four 
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analyzed sub-dyads in U.S.-South African relations. It can therefore be assumed that full-text 
coding first and foremost improves event coding for such small-dyads. 
German, Swedish and Swiss South African Relations 
The question remains if such an improvement can also be achieved for the small-state dyads 
such as Swedish and Swiss relations towards South Africa. Table 19 indicates that full-story 
coding indeed improves the number of events significantly for these dyads. Rather surpris-
ingly, however, the biggest improvement was not achieved in the small-dyads of Swedish 
(SWE-ZAF) and Swiss (CHE-ZAF) South Africa relations but in the German-South African 
dyad (DEU-ZAF). Taking into account the few number of events (39) that have been picked 
up in the DEU-ZAF dyad in the first place by lead sentence coding, the DEU-ZAF must 
actually to be considered a small-dyad too. 
Table 19: Total Number of Events per Dyad and Coding Mode, 1977-1996 (AP) 
 
Coding Mode DEU-ZAF SWE-ZAF CHE-ZAF 
Lead-sentence 39 24 19 
Full-story 277 105 91 
Improvement 710% 438% 479% 
 
 
Over the whole period from 1977 to 1996, the correlation between full-story and lead 
sentence coded event counts remains rather low for these three dyads (Table 20). Only around 
one half of the variance in lead sentence coded event counts is also displayed in full-story 
coded event counts. 
Table 20: Correlations Event Counts per Event Category in the USA>ZAF Dyad 
 
 DEU-ZAF SWE-ZAF CHE-ZAF 
Correlation Full-Lead 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.69*** 
***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
These differences between full-story and lead sentence coding for the small dyads of 
DEU-ZAF, SWE-ZAF and CHE-ZAF both in level and variance indicate that the two coding 
modes supposedly produce data that carries different information. I therefore test in the fol-
lowing how the coded events are distributed across the SAID/CAMEO event categories. 
The event distribution across the SAID/CAMEO categories for the three dyads of 
DEU-ZAF, SWE-ZAF and CHE-ZAF (Figure 20) in fact confirms that full-story coding not 
only generates higher numbers but also different types of events. Figure 20 below also shows 
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that full-story coding is able to pick up specific event types that are not covered when lead 
sentences are coded. 
Figure 20: Yearly Event Counts per Category for DEU-ZAF, SWE-ZAF, CHE-ZAF 1977-1996 (AP) 
 
  
 
Note: Graphs differ in scale. 
 
 
As Table 21 indicates, the overall pattern of the distribution of the coded events 
across the SAID/CAMEO event categories does not differ strongly from full-story to lead 
sentence coding. But the correlation coefficients are significantly lower for the DEU-ZAF, 
SWE-ZAF, and CHE-ZAF dyads (Table 21) than is the case for the more densely covered 
USA>ZAF dyad (Table 18 above). 
Table 21: Correlations Event Category Distribution in the DEU-ZAF, SWE-ZAF, and CHE-ZAF Dyad 
 
 DEUx-ZAFx SWEx-ZAFx CHEx-ZAFx   
Correlation Full-Lead 0.79*** 0.69*** 0.84***   
*significant at the 0.01 level 
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Conclusion 
This brief analysis indicates that full-story and lead-sentence coding does not result 
in significantly different data when the analyzed dyad is well covered by the international 
media, such as the U.S.-South Africa dyad (USA>ZAF). In this particular case, full-story 
coding picks up more events than lead-sentence coding, but the event series generated by the 
two coding-modes only differ in level but not in variance. Moreover, reported behavioral 
patterns are very similar. 
When it comes to small dyads—that is, dyads less densely covered by the interna-
tional media—full-story coding is able to pick up events when lead-sentence coding is not. 
Event data series generated by full-story and lead sentence coding differ not only in level but 
also in variance, indicating that the two coding modes in fact cover behavioral patterns within 
small-state dyads differently. Analyzing small-dyads, full-story coding is therefore favorable 
over just coding lead sentences since broader information about interactions in such dyads can 
be tapped, at the expense of a few more false positives. 
The better performance of full-story coding on small dyads is partly due to the 
newswires’ style of reporting on such small dyads. As Schrodt and Gerner (2000; 1998: 1/33) 
and Huxtable (2000) noted, international wire services sometimes append a series of event 
reports to the end of a story on a particular region. These “side-events” are often unrelated to 
the main story except for their regional focus. The underlying editorial model appeared to be, 
as Schrodt and Gerner (1997: 17) put it, “Hey, if you’re sufficiently interested in this out-of-
the-way region to read this far, you’ll probably enjoy this other stuff as well.” 
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4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 Qualitative Case Studies 
Each state’s foreign policy design towards South Africa is first investigated through a qualita-
tive case study (Schrodt and Gerner 1998; Eckstein 1975; King et al. 1994; Yin 1993, 2003). 
The policy design of each state’s foreign policy toward South Africa includes a description of 
the main elements of the policy from 1977 to 1996 and accounts for the decision-making 
processes that produced these policy elements. The main focus is thereby on the identification 
of different foreign policy interventions that have been taken with regard to South Africa 
under apartheid over this period of time and on a characterization of these policies according 
to their mode of intervention, policy type and applied policy instruments. 
Each case study is structured as follows: First, an introductory chapter accounts for 
historical developments, the institutional setting and superior policy concepts relevant for the 
particular state’s foreign policy. Second, the pivotal decisions in the state’s South Africa 
policy are identified and the corresponding decision-making scrutinized. Third, the South 
Africa policy in different phases is characterized according to theoretical concepts introduced 
in Chapter 3 (intervention mode, policy type and corresponding arena of power, and the de-
gree of inclusiveness and intrusiveness of the applied policy instruments). The resulting pol-
icy characterization is used in the following quantitative analysis for the theoretical modeling 
of the implementation component of the different intervention models. 
4.5.2 Intervention Analysis 
In a next step, I will test Hypotheses 1-6 on the effects of different foreign policy interven-
tions as formulated in Chapter 3 by performing an intervention analysis for each state’s for-
eign policy towards South Africa from 1977 to 1996. It is the goal of this intervention analy-
sis to examine whether major foreign policy changes and individual interventions affected the 
state’s international behavior toward South Africa and, if so, in what way. Each hypothesis 
postulates particular effects that can be expected from specific policy interventions, based on 
the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter 3. The hypotheses consequently supply this 
analysis with a theoretical foundation and potential explanations for variances that are found 
in the data. Thus, the analysis is not restricted to learning whether policy affects international 
behavior but is supposed to discover also when, how and why foreign policy interventions 
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affect foreign policy behavior. It is not the goal, however, that the hypotheses formulated in 
Chapter 3 undergo a systematic testing. For such a testing, a different research design than the 
time series case study approach used in this study would be more appropriate. 
The main dependent variable of the intervention analysis is the international behavior 
of the four states under investigation vis-à-vis South Africa from 1977 to 1996. Different 
measurements are used for a state’s international behavior (Table 22 below): 
First, the overall cooperative and conflictive behavior towards South Africa is meas-
ures by the number of cooperative and conflictive events, respectively, that occurred in the 
particular dyad at a monthly aggregation. This overall cooperative and conflictive behavior, 
respectively, is qualified by the total number of events towards South Africa in a particular 
dyad-month. In the same way the variables for the overall verbal and material behavior are 
aggregated (refer to Table 12, p. 112, for aggregation of event categories). 
Second, the level of cooperation/conflict is analyzed for each dyad by totaling the 
scaled values for the events for each dyad-month according to the Goldstein scale (Yin 1998). 
Table 8 (p. 105) indicates for each SAID/CAMEO code the corresponding Goldstein scale 
value. The cooperation/conflict level for each dyad in a particular period of time equals the 
sum of the individually scaled events on the cooperation-conflict axis. 
The third set of dependent variables includes measurements for the level of verbal 
cooperation, material cooperation, verbal conflict and material conflict in a particular dyad 
and time period. Individual events are assigned to these four categories using the aggregation 
as illustrated in Table 12 (p. 112). Monthly event counts in these four event categories are 
then used as measurements for the four variables, both in absolute numbers and relative to the 
total number of events towards South Africa in the particular time period. 
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Table 22: Dependent Variables 
 
Variable name Notation Description 
overall cooperative behavior 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: cp 
yt: cp/NSA 
monthly cooperative event counts, absolute/relative 
overall conflictive behavior 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: cp 
yt: cf/NSA 
monthly conflictive event counts, absolute/relative 
overall verbal behavior 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: ver 
yt: ver/NSA 
monthly verbal cooperation and conflict aggregates, 
absolute/relative 
overall material behavior 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: mat 
yt: mat/NSA 
monthly material cooperation and conflict aggregates, 
absolute/relative 
cooperation/conflict level 
 
 
yt: scale monthly aggregated Goldstein scores 
verbal cooperation 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: vercp 
yt: vercp/NSA 
verbally cooperative event counts, monthly aggregates, 
absolute/relative  
material cooperation 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: matcp 
yt: matcp/NSA 
materially cooperative event counts, monthly aggregates, 
absolute/relative 
verbal conflict 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: matcf 
yt: matcf/NSA 
verbally conflictive event counts, monthly aggregates, 
absolute/relative  
material conflict 
 absolute 
 relative 
 
yt: vercf 
yt: vercf/NSA 
materially conflictive event counts, monthly aggregates, 
absolute/relative 
 
 
Major policy changes and specific characteristics of foreign policy interventions are 
treated as independent variables. Different forms of interventions will be analyzed: 
I begin the examination by comparing the mean value of {yt} for periods prior to a 
major policy change (t smaller than tpolicy change) to the mean value of {yt} for periods after a 
major policy change (t equal or bigger than tpolicy change). However, such a test is poorly de-
signed because successive values of {yt} are serially correlated. It is therefore not possible to 
say whether observed changes in the mean level of {yt} are a result of the changed policy or 
due to preexisting trends. As such, some of the effects from pre-policy change periods could 
“carry over” to the post-policy change date. That is why an intervention analysis using time 
series analysis is needed that allows for a formal test of the changes observed in {yt}. A major 
policy change is regarded as an intervention into the course of the dependent variables {yt} as 
outlined in Table 22 above. 
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The first step in intervention analysis is constructing univariate ARIMA models 
(Goldstein 1992; Box and Jenkins 1976: 29-139) for each pre-intervention and post-
intervention phase. The models are developed and estimated using Stata 9.2 for Windows 
through an iterative model-building strategy that accounts for the stochastic processes associ-
ated with the time series that display each state’s foreign policy behavior (or a particular 
aspect thereof). Several statistical assumptions must be met when an appropriate univariate 
ARIMA model is selected. Most important, the time series has to be stationary, that is, show 
constant mean and variance throughout its course. Therefore, unit root tests (McCleary and 
Hay 1980: 10-19) for stationarity are performed. If a series proves to be non-stationary, it has 
to be differenced first. 
Assured that the series do not “trend” or “shift” upward or downward over time, the 
autoregression (AR) and moving average (MA) components of the series can be identified. In 
an AR process, the current value in a series is influenced by an exponentially weighted sum of 
one or more previous values (Cromwell et al. 1994: 53-61). A MA process, on the other hand, 
is determined by the average of the current disturbance and one or more previous disturbances 
(McCleary and Hay 1980: 61-64). 
After having constructed the ARIMA models for the {yt} series, I add the interven-
tion (It) to the ARIMA equation. In the intervention model, the ARIMA model represents now 
the noise component (Nt). The general intervention model is: 
yt = f(It)+Nt 
Or, including the AR and MA components explicitly, 
yt = a0 + A(L)yt-1+c0zt + B(L)εt 
where A(L) and B(L) are polynomials for the AR and MA processes using the lag 
operator L. 
In the basic intervention model that is used to test Hypotheses 1-3, the intervention 
component is a simple dummy variable zt taking the value of zero prior to the intervention and 
unity beginning with the intervention. The initial or impact effect is given by the magnitude of 
c0. The statistical significance of c0 can be tested using a standard t-test. In the case of 
strengthening restraining policies (the use of ‘sticks’), c0 is expected to be negative and statis-
tically different from zero. In the case of strengthening promoting policies (the use of ‘car-
rots’), c0 is expected to be positive and statistically different from zero. In the case of informa-
tion policies (the use of ‘sermons’), c0 is not expected to be statistically significant, indicating 
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that there is no shift in the level of conflict between sender and target due to the introduction 
of the intervention component zt into the intervention model. 
Hypotheses 4-6, based on Lowi’s (1980) theory on policy types and policy arenas, 
assume different types of effects depending on the policy type of the intervention. Three 
different types of intervention models using transfer functions are considered:41 
First, I examine the possibility that a state’s foreign policy behavior changes sharply 
(i.e., increases or decreases in terms of cooperation and conflict towards South Africa) after 
the intervention and then remains at the new level over time. Such an abrupt and constant 
pattern of impact is particularly assumed for regulative and distributive policy interventions 
(Hypotheses 4 and 5, respectively) and can be determined by the zero-order transfer function 
f(It) = ω0It. 
Then, I consider the possibility that the intervention had a small initial impact on the 
state’s foreign policy cooperative or conflictive behavior towards South Africa but that with 
time cooperation or conflict grew larger or smaller. Such a gradual, constant pattern of impact 
is particularly assumed for redistributive policies (Hypothesis 5) and can be determined by the 
first-order transfer function f(It) = (ω0/(1-δ1L))It. 
Finally, I test if the particular foreign policy interventions cause initially an abrupt 
increase or decrease in cooperation or conflict, which then quickly decays, without perma-
nently changing the mean of the series. Such an effect type could be (alternatively to Hy-
potheses 4-6) observed for regulative, redistributive and distributive policies if the impact is 
only temporary instead of permanent. This effect type can be determined by adding a pulse 
function to the intervention model: f(It) = ω0(1-L)It. 
The magnitude of these effects may vary due to the level of intervention as discussed 
in Section 3.2.4. As a measurement for the first dimension of the level of intervention, inclu-
siveness, the number sectors affected by the intervention will be examined. The second di-
mension of the level of intervention, intrusiveness, I will test by introducing a dichotomous 
dummy variable into the introduction model that indicates whether the policy introduced with 
the intervention was compulsory or voluntary. 
According to potential system level effects as conceptualized in Section 3.2.3 (see, 
Figure 6, p. 71), it has to be taken in account that changes in a country’s foreign behavior 
does not necessarily need to result from independent foreign policy decisions of its own gov-
                                                
41 The transfer functions are estimated using RATS 6.02 for Windows. 
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ernment. Moreover, it can be assumed that foreign policy decisions of other nations and inter-
national bodies such as the U.N. may affect a foreign policy behavior significantly, in particu-
lar when the foreign policy of so-called “small” states like Sweden and Switzerland is being 
analyzed. It is therefore crucial to include occasionally important foreign policy interventions 
by third-state governments or international organizations into the intervention model of a 
country’s foreign policy behavior. In particular crucial for the case studies in this study are 
foreign policy decisions by the U.S. government and the U.N. Security Council for the cases 
of West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. But not only for these three states, also for the 
U.S. case, other important developments may have to be considered as independent variables 
in the respective interventions models too (such as major incidents in South Africa, regional 
developments in southern Africa, key events in the East-West conflict). 
Analysis of Sub-Dyads (only for U.S.-South African Relations) 
For the U.S.-South Africa dyad, data on U.S.-South African relations is not only available for 
the aggregated national dyad (superordinated dyad) but also for several sub-dyads. As intro-
duced in Section 4.4.4 (summarized in Table 9), sub-dyads in U.S. relations toward South 
Africa include: U.S. governmental relations toward South Africa (USAGOV>ZAF), U.S. 
business relations toward South Africa (USABUS>ZAF), and relations of the U.S. civil soci-
ety toward South Africa (USACVS>ZAF). Based on the assumption that not only govern-
mental but also business and societal relations determine a state’s foreign policy behavior 
toward South Africa, these sub-dyads can be of importance if U.S.-South African relations are 
assessed. I therefore test the formulated hypotheses not only for the superordinated dyad of 
overall U.S. relations towards South Africa but also for these specific sub-dyads. 
The sub-dyads introduced above constitute the international domain of U.S. foreign 
policy towards South Africa, whereas the U.S. government’s behavior to the related social 
sectors (the U.S. business sector and the U.S. civil society, that is, USAGOV>USABUS and 
USAGOV>USACVS) represents the domestic domain of U.S. South Africa policy. A com-
parison of the effects in these two domains of U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa using 
intervention analysis as outlined above allows for an examination of the differences and simi-
larities between the two domains. The theoretical elaboration in Chapter 3 revealed that such 
intermediate steps of foreign policy implementation can be important when the effects of 
foreign policy interventions are assessed. 
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4.5.3 Impact Analysis 
Hypotheses H-9-11 postulate that political changes in South Africa have been a consequence 
of domestic, regional and international developments. The dependent variable, described as 
the worsening or improving of the political situation in South Africa, will be measured as 
monthly change in the conflictive behavior of the South African government towards the 
South African opposition and civil society. But how the various independent variables in-
cluded in the hypotheses actually affect the conflict level in South Africa remains widely 
unclear. A vector autoregression (VAR) analysis is a means of circumventing this problem 
(Lowi 1964; Freeman et al. 1989: 264-318). 
VARs are dynamic models of groups of times series. It is one of the main uses of this 
methodology to know more about the historical dynamics of processes. In VAR analysis, all 
variables are treated symmetrically by including for each variable an equation explaining its 
evolution based on its own lags and the lags of all the other variables in the model (first-order 
autoregression): 
y1,t = c1 + A1,1y1,t-1 + A1,2y2,t-1 + A1,3y3,t-1 + ε1,t 
y2,t = c2 + A2,1y1,t-1 + A2,2y2,t-1 + A2,3y3,t-1 + ε2,t 
y3,t = c3 + A3,1y1,t-1 + A3,2y2,t-1 + A3,3y3,t-1 + ε3,t 
where y1,t is the conflict level in South Africa, y2,t the magnitude of international ac-
tion against apartheid, and y3,t the conflict level between South Africa and its neighboring 
states. The parameters for yi,t-n represent then the magnitude of the different lagged variables 
effect on the independent variable. 
The VAR analysis is done using Stata 9.2 and RATS 6.02 for Windows. 
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5 Intervening Against Apartheid: Four Case Studies 
5.1 United States of America 
The foreign policy of the United States of America (U.S.) towards South Africa under apart-
heid can be characterized as interventionist, although the U.S. government changed its inter-
vention strategies significantly during the period of investigation of this study. Whereas the 
first half of the 1980s was characterized by a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with the 
South African government, the U.S. launched a rather strict sanctions regime against Pretoria 
in the mid-1980s and triggered similar moves in other Western states. The interventionist 
approach in U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa was situated within the framework of 
the Cold War (1947-1991) and the higher priority U.S. foreign policy objectives such as 
limiting Soviet influence in the region and securing America’s strategic and economic inter-
ests. 
5.1.1 Foundations of U.S. Foreign Policy 
The U.S. as an actor of international politics is clearly an exceptional case (e.g., Enders 2004; 
Hook 2005). Its military and economic power is unsurpassed, and U.S. foreign policy deci-
sions usually have a significant direct or indirect impact on other states’ foreign relations. 
During the Cold War, the U.S. was in a constant rivalry with the Soviet Union—a rivalry that 
dominated international politics for decades. The two superpowers fought several so-called 
surrogate wars in South East Asia and Africa. In southern Africa, Angola in particular became 
one of the focal point of the East-West confrontation, with the Soviet Union and Cuba sup-
porting Angola’s Marxist government on the one side and the U.S. backing the rebel force 
UNITA on the other. Most liberation movements in southern Africa had actually been sup-
ported ideally and materially by the Soviet Union; some of them sympathized openly with 
communism or considered themselves as Marxist movements. And it was the fear that the 
whole region, including South Africa, could turn communist that dominated U.S. foreign 
policy towards southern Africa from the beginning of the 1950s at least until the mid-1980s. 
That is why the U.S. regarded the apartheid government in South Africa as an important ally 
against communism far into the 1980s. 
South Africa’s role as a market for American products and investments was not in-
significant, either. According to the U.N. Centre Against Apartheid, the United States was the 
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second largest investor in South Africa (after Britain) during the apartheid era (Neak 2003). 
The U.S. had also been South Africa’s biggest trading partner with exports and imports at 
more than 1.6 billion US-dollars per year (Martin 1985) until it was surpassed by Japan in 
1987 (Byrnes 1996). Today, U.S. exports to South Africa constitute around nine percent of 
South Africa’s total imports. They are composed of high value-added items and commodities. 
Main exports to South Africa include industrial machinery and parts, motor vehicles, aircraft 
and parts, electric machinery, including telecommunications (Bates 1988). The South African 
market has also always been significant because of its rich mineral resources. South Africa is 
the world’s largest producer and exporter of gold and platinum and also exports a significant 
amount of coal (U.S. Commercial Service 2007). 
From an institutional perspective, the American Constitution divides foreign policy 
powers between the president and the Congress so that both share competences and responsi-
bilities in the making of foreign policy (Lowenberg 1997). In principle, U.S. foreign policy-
making is under the leadership of the executive branch, that is, the president and his admini-
stration. The president has far reaching competences in deciding and implementing foreign 
policies. Subject to the advice and consent role of the U.S. Senate, he negotiates international 
treaties, which then enter into force only if ratified by the Senate with a two-third majority. 
He is also Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, and has as such broad authority 
over U.S. troops once they are deployed. The secretary of state is the foreign minister and 
conducts primarily U.S. diplomacy. The U.S. Congress plays an important role in regulating 
foreign commerce, declaring war, and passing the budget for operations of the government. 
Executive appointments, including those of ambassadors, require concurrence by a majority 
of the Senate. In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs play an important oversight role (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996). Thus, both 
the president and Congress have continuing opportunities to initiate and change foreign pol-
icy, and the interactions between the two branches continue indefinitely throughout the life of 
a policy (Lindsay 1994). 
5.1.2 U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Africa 1977-1996 
5.1.2.1 Preconditions and Policies prior to 1977 
At the time of the inception of apartheid in 1948, the U.S. paid little attention to racial issues 
in South Africa. Indeed, some apartheid laws were based on the same idea of racial segrega-
tion legally imposed in southern states of the U.S. (Hamilton 2002). But already in the early 
 139 
1950s, South Africa emerged for the first time as an issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda 
when other nations criticized the U.S. at the United Nations for its own racial practices and its 
failure to condemn apartheid (Borstelmann 1993). 
The intensifying of the civil rights movement in the United States from the mid-
1950s finally stimulated a more critical U.S. posture towards South Africa. The massacre in 
Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 caused a hardening of U.S. rhetoric and a temporary with-
drawal of American capital, but military, nuclear, intelligence, trade and investment links 
between the two countries continued uninterrupted (Study Commission on U.S. Policy toward 
Southern Africa 1981: xi; Baker 1989: 68-69; Easum 1975: Chapter 16). It was President 
Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) who set out to fundamentally alter the direction of American 
foreign policy, also with regard to apartheid in South Africa. 
5.1.2.2 Policy Phases 1977-1996 
Coming to office in the wake of events such as the Vietnam War and Watergate that brought 
the U.S. significant discredit worldwide, President Carter promised a new direction for 
American foreign policy that would be shaped around the principles of human rights and 
nonintervention in order to help the U.S. regain credibility internationally (Study Commission 
on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa 1981; Hartmann 2001; Petro 1983). The Carter ad-
ministration also supported new South Africa sanctions within the U.N. in 1977 (mandatory 
arms embargo with Security Council Resolution 418, 4 November 1977) and took its own 
actions, intending to change both style and substance of U.S. policy towards Africa. But a 
limitation on the Export-Import Bank’s support for U.S. sales to South Africa remained the 
only anti-South Africa legislation to pass the U.S. Congress before 1985 (Schmitz and Walker 
2004: 389). 
However, the most pronounced feature of U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa 
between 1977 and 1996 is its significant change from a policy of engagement with the South 
African government during the first half of the 1980s to a policy of isolation of the apartheid 
regime from the mid-1980s. Whereas the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ during Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan’s first term (1981-1985) was seeking after an amicable arrangement with 
apartheid government in order to take influence on its policies, the restrictive policy including 
economic sanctions during Reagan’s second term (1985-1989) and until the early 1990s was 
clearly a policy of punishment. 
 140 
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) was enacted on 27 October 1986 
and remained in force until 9 July 1991, when most of the CAAA sanctions were suspended 
under President George H.W. Bush. President Bill Clinton lifted the remaining anti-apartheid 
sanctions after the successful South African election in April 1994. Since the abolition of 
apartheid, U.S.-South African relations improved significantly. As a result of a November 
1993 bilateral agreement, for example, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
can assist U.S. investors in the South African market with services such as political risk insur-
ance as well as loans and loan guarantees. In July 1996, the United States and South Africa 
signed a 120 million US$ OPIC fund to make equity investments in South Africa and south-
ern Africa (Metz 1986). 
Table 23 summarizes these distinct phases in U.S. foreign policy towards South Af-
rica from 1977 to 1996. 
Table 23: Phases in U.S. South Africa Policy 1977-1996 
 
Phase Start End 
Carter era 20 January 1977 
(Inauguration President Charter) 
20 January 1981 
(Inauguration President Reagan) 
‘Constructive Engagement’ 16 May 1981 
(Announcement ‘constructive 
engagement’) 
2 October 1986 
(Senate adopts CAAA and overrides 
presidential veto) 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 27 October 1986 
(CAAA put into force) 
10 July 1991 
(Lift of most CAAA sanctions) 
Relaxation/Lift of Sanctions 10 July 1991 
(Lift of most CAAA sanctions) 
27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
Beginning of the new South Africa  27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
4 December 1996 
(New South African Constitution 
approved)42 
 
5.1.2.3 Policies and Interventions 1977-1996 
Due to its status as superpower, the U.S. has been a crucial international actor in southern 
Africa and has pursued both strategic and economic interests in the region. It is therefore 
essential to analyze U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa in the context of these regional 
policies first. Policies specifically targeted at South Africa under apartheid from 1977 to 1994 
were then mostly shaped by the two distinct approaches that were both introduced during the 
                                                
42 The New Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 Decem-
ber 1996 after South Africa’s highest court rejected it earlier in the year, saying that in several areas it failed to 
meet the criteria agreed to in talks for a peaceful transition from an apartheid government to a non-racial democ-
racy (New York Times, 7 September 1996, p. 7). The new constitution took effect on 4 February 1997. 
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era of President Reagan, namely the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ and the era of eco-
nomic sanctions against South Africa under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. 
Regional Policies (1974-1990) 
Traditionally, U.S. foreign policy towards southern Africa was driven largely by the aim of 
reducing Soviet influence in this politically unstable region.43 Already under President Gerald 
Ford (1974-1977), Secretary of State Henry Kissinger adopted a more flexible approach 
focusing on Rhodesia, departing from the policy of subordinating African rights and moral 
issues to U.S. economic and geopolitical interests he pursued as President Nixon’s national 
security adviser. Diplomatic contacts continued as the Carter administration worked for the 
independence of Rhodesia and Namibia. To achieve a settlement in Namibia, the five Western 
members of the U.N. Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, 
and Canada) formed the so-called “Contact Group.” In this multilateral framework, the five 
Western nations worked closely with the United Nations, South Africa, and the South-West 
African People’s Organization (SWAPO). A plan for a cease-fire and U.N. supervised elec-
tions was drawn-up and approved by the U.N. Security Council as Resolution 435, but im-
plementation was rejected by South Africa at a conference in Geneva in January 1981. 
During its first term (1981-1985), the Reagan administration concentrated on re-
gional diplomacy, with Namibia’s independence given top priority (U.S. Department of State 
2007b: 4). Thus, regarding South Africa, it was the apartheid regime’s aggression against its 
neighboring states that was the U.S. administration’s main concern and not South Africa’s 
domestic system of racial segregation and discrimination. In particular, the presence of large 
numbers of Cuban troops in Angola, backed by the Soviet Union, answered by an invasion of 
South African troops in Angola, presented a long-standing problem. The U.S. support of 
UNITA, fighting a guerilla war against the Marxist government in Angola, also caused severe 
international and domestic friction (Baker 1989: 5). The Reagan administration’s goals in 
southern Africa were similar to its predecessors, but it took a new approach with a new strat-
egy that came to be known as “linkage” by formally tying South Africa’s withdrawal from 
Namibia to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. However, the South African govern-
ment, while participating in diplomatic negotiations, undermined these efforts by launching a 
                                                
43 The following assessment of the developments that led up to the independence of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 
1980 and Namibia in 1990 is based on the report of the Study Commission on U.S. foreign policy towards 
Southern Africa (1981) and the study of Baker (1989). 
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campaign of military and economic aggression against its neighboring states (Congressional 
Research Service 2001: 4). 
Not until the last year of the Reagan presidency, changing military and economic re-
alities in southern Africa as well as a more collaborative relationship between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union created an opportunity to revive this U.S. diplomatic initiative. A series of 
negotiations by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, brokered by the U.S., took place in 1988. 
The outcome was the signing of two treaties in December 1988 under the auspices of the 
United Nations, resulting in South Africa’s agreement to withdraw from Namibia and granted 
the U.N. permission to supervise pre-independence elections. Angola, on the other hand, 
agreed to send all Cuban troops home (Baker 1989: 5). 
Carter Era (1977-1981) 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. government regularly condemned apartheid but maintained 
formal diplomatic relations with Pretoria (and did not break them throughout the entire apart-
heid era). The first restrictive measures against the South African government were taken by 
the administration of President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) when the U.S. imposed a uni-
lateral arms embargo against South Africa, effective 1 January 1964 (Baker 1989: xi). The 
Johnson administration (1963-1969) tightened the embargo, prohibiting sales of material that 
had dual civilian and military use. The Carter administration (1977-1981), under pressure 
domestically and internationally, then supported a mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa within the U.N. framework, resulting in Security Council Resolution 418 of 4 Novem-
ber 1977. 
According to Richard Knight (1989), the U.S. vote for the mandatory U.N. resolution 
was in the context of an increasingly visible movement against apartheid inside South Africa 
in the wake of the 1976 Soweto uprising and the South African government’s brutal response 
to it. The threat of apartheid to international peace was demonstrated in South Africa’s con-
tinued illegal occupation of Namibia and military invasions of the Front Line States, espe-
cially Angola. Many African governments were demanding the Carter administration to sup-
port international action against apartheid in South Africa. In the U.S., too, a dramatic in-
crease in the support for the anti-apartheid movement, especially on college campuses, put 
increasing domestic pressure on the administration to act on the issue. 
The U.N. arms embargo remained in force until 25 May 1994 when the Security 
Council lifted the embargo as a result of the April 1994 elections in South Africa (Resolution 
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919). The embargo was clearly used as a ‘stick’ against the South African government to 
disapprove its violent crackdown on anti-apartheid protesters and to force an abandonment of 
its racial policies. 
Constructive Engagement (1981-1986) 
As briefly outlined above, U.S. policy towards South Africa during the first term (1981-1985) 
of the presidency of Ronald Reagan was characterized by the policy of ‘constructive engage-
ment’. The policy was formulated by Chester A. Crocker, later Reagan’s undersecretary of 
state for Africa, in an article published in Foreign Affairs in late 1980 and in other pieces 
timed for the presidential election of that year (Knight 2001). Crocker had worked under 
Henry Kissinger in the National Security Council and had been a foreign policy adviser to 
Vice President George H. W. Bush during his campaign for the 1980 Republican presidential 
nomination. During the Carter era, he was director of African Studies at Georgetown Univer-
sity (Crocker 1980: 7). 
Incentives and rewards (‘carrots’) and persuasion instruments (‘sermon’) were the 
key elements of ‘constructive engagement’. The policy was intended to positively influence 
the so-called “modernizing elite in South Africa” to take the steps needed to end the region’s 
conflicts and induce domestic political reforms (Baker 1989: 30). The U.S. was to gain posi-
tive influence by offering broad incentives of closer diplomatic ties based on common strate-
gic objectives, publicly expressing sensitivity to the dilemma of the white population in South 
Africa, and reshaping South Africa’s image to end its international pariah status (Crocker 
1980: 96). The policy was in many ways, especially in terms of official U.S. relations with the 
South African government, similar to President Nixon’s ‘policy of communication’ and in-
cluded a radical decline of the anti-Pretoria rhetoric of the Carter administration (Baker 2000, 
1989). Instead of negative pressure (‘sticks’), the administration’s approach was to “positively 
support that which one wishes to see, both by word and deed,” as one official put it to the 
press on the day ‘constructive engagement` was announced (quoted in the Washington Post, 
17 May 1981, p. A15). But reporters were given no details of impending changes in the U.S.-
South African relationship, and were told only that tangible changes were still under discus-
sion (see also, Associated Press, 16 May 1981). 
In order to set the tone of the new policy, the Reagan administration began its tenure 
by sending a number of positive signals to the South African government. In March 1981, 
only two months after Reagan’s inauguration, South African military officials, including 
high-level officers, arrived in Washington to consult with U.S. officials (Coker 1986: 11). In 
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May 1981, South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha visited Washington for two days 
of talks with President Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Crocker, by then a 
nominee for assistant secretary of state for Africa (Washington Post, 14 May 1981; Associ-
ated Press, 16 May 1981). From the viewpoint of the Reagan administration, the new policy 
could lead to progress on a number of issues, both in the southern African region and 
bilaterally between the two nations (Washington Post, 17 May 1981, p. A15). 
In its genesis, ‘constructive engagement’ was mostly a new effort to settle the dispute 
over Namibia, while intensifying diplomatic exchange with the South African government, 
rather than seeking a policy of confrontation (see also announcements made by senior State 
Department officials, Associated Press, 16 May 1981). The Reagan administration also 
authorized more South African honorary consuls in the United States, granted visas to the 
South African rugby team, reestablished military attachés in South Africa, relaxed controls on 
non-lethal exports that could be used by the South African military and police, and adopted a 
more flexible attitude towards the sale of dual-use military equipment and sophisticated tech-
nology. These changes demonstrated a weakening of the regulations placed on U.S.-South 
African relations by the Carter administration. 
These measures taken collectively sent an unmistakable message of a closer relation-
ship between the United States and South Africa (Baker 1989: 11). Whereas the policy itself 
can be described as an incentive (‘carrot’) to the South African government to change its 
policies in a way that is more favorable to the U.S. government, the respective arena remains 
difficult to assess. The removal of certain restrictions on official U.S.-South African relations 
could be an indication for a distributive policy because particular groups and sectors were 
given certain advantages (compared to the prior situation) without harming others. Practically, 
however, anti-apartheid activists in South Africa and around the world regarded the policy of 
‘constructive engagement’ as a U.S. embrace of the South African government that contra-
dicted the principle aim of the anti-apartheid movement to isolate the racist regime. The 
common attribute ascribed to distributive policies, not disadvantaging groups or individuals 
not directly addressed by the policies, is therefore not fulfilled. Rather it showed the policy 
characteristics of a redistributive policy, where support for one conflict party was almost 
automatically perceived as a weakened stance towards the other conflict party. 
Several factors contributed to the failure of ‘constructive engagement’ in the mid-
1980s. The most important was the ongoing and even increasing oppression in South Africa 
itself that was met by the antigovernment protests of large parts of the black population, 
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which, in turn, was responded to with even more heavy-handed repression by the apartheid 
government. In the U.S., the turmoil was shown by the electronic and print media in almost 
daily reports over a period of fourteen months, from the beginning of black protests in Sep-
tember 1984 to November 1985, after which time the South African government banned 
international television cameras (Baker 1989: 30). 
Public pressure increased not only on U.S. companies operating in South Africa but 
also on the Reagan administration’s official policy, which was increasingly seen as one of 
appeasement, indulging the South African government’s crackdown on the black majority 
(Baker 1989; Culverson 1996). Individuals, too, played a key role in shaping American public 
opinion towards South Africa. Jesse Jackson, in his 1984 presidential campaign, ensured that 
the issue of U.S. involvement in South Africa was raised during an election year. Also, the 
award of the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu, announced when he was in 
the United States, drew worldwide attention to the conflict and made the Anglican priest from 
South Africa an international celebrity (Metz 1986: 30). 
Officially, the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ ended with the successful passage 
of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in September 1986, which included a 
decisive rejection of the former policy approach. 
Economic Sanctions (1986-1994) 
All administrations—from Nixon and Ford to Carter and Reagan—opposed broad economic 
sanctions against South Africa, arguing that such measures were not an effective instrument to 
force the South African government to change its policies, and if they were effective, they 
harmed the wrong people (Baker 1989: xi-xiii). For example, after the U.S. voted against the 
imposition of U.N. sanctions in a Security Council vote on May 22, 1986, American delegate 
to the U.N., Patricia Byrne, responded, “We do not believe that the destruction of the South 
African economy serves anyone’s interests, least of all those who suffer under apartheid” 
(quoted in New York Times, 24 May 1986, p. 4). 
Based on such an assessment of the efficacy of sanctions coupled with its myriad 
interests in the region, the U.S. imposed only few restrictive measures against Pretoria for 
decades. It was not until 1986 that the U.S. Congress acted to establish a substantial sanctions 
structure. In the build-up to that legislative initiative, American opposition to apartheid 
reached new levels and became a major concern of American politics. In response, in October 
1986, the Congress imposed with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) a wide 
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palette of economic sanctions against South Africa (see, 5.1.3.3 for a full account of the road 
to U.S. sanctions). 
The CAAA was a watershed in U.S.-South African relations, not only because it was 
the second time44 since World War II that a U.S. president was unable to sustain a veto on a 
foreign policy issue, but also because it demolished a traditional U.S. foreign policy premise 
holding that the threat of sanctions against South Africa was more effective than sanctions 
themselves (Study Commission on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa 1981: 47). In passing 
the CAAA, the Congress concluded that threatening and trying to persuade the South African 
government was no longer sufficient. The adoption of the CAAA showed the political will 
that a credible policy had to be based on tangible pressure, applying unambiguously a strategy 
of ‘sticks’ against the apartheid government. Moreover, this new approach in U.S. foreign 
policy towards South Africa was institutionalized in law and could be changed only with the 
consent of the Congress. The act introduced therefore a clearly regulative policy to U.S.-
African relations since the behavior of individuals and groups was directly influenced by 
regulating behavioral options by implementing commands and prohibitions for international 
affairs with apartheid South Africa. 
Specifically, the CAAA included the following measures (see also summary in Baker 
1989: 138-145): 
- As a first step, the legislation banned new investments in South Africa and new bank 
loans to the South African government (including parastatals). 
- It also banned imports into the U.S. of South African steel, iron, coal, uranium, agricul-
tural products, food, Krugerrand gold coins, arms, ammunition and military vehicles. 
- The bilateral tax treaty (double taxation agreement) including the related protocol in force 
with South Africa was terminated. 
- The legislation put an end to direct air transportation between South Africa and the U.S., 
abrogated U.S. landing rights for South African aircraft and terminated air services 
agreements then in effect between the two countries. 
- Certain exports to South Africa were also banned, including crude oil and petroleum 
products, nuclear material, data and certain computers. 
                                                
44 The other was the enactment of the War Powers Act in 1973 over President Nixon's veto (Herbst 1997: 205-
206). 
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Apart from these major punitive sanctions, a series of so-called positive sanctions 
(‘carrots’) were also an integral part of the CAAA, including: 
- an allocation of up to US$ 40 million to provide aid to those harmed by apartheid, mostly 
scholarships to the victims of apartheid and assistance generally for disadvantaged South 
Africans; 
- contributions to the Human Rights Fund for South Africa for specified purposes (such as 
legal assistance to political prisoners and detainees); 
- a requirement for the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) “to take active steps to encourage the 
use of its facilities to assist black South African business enterprises” and to relax “certain 
current statutory restrictions on EXIM activities in South Africa.” 
The bill provided that the sanctions contained in the CAAA shall terminate automati-
cally if the South African government meets five conditions specified in the bill. These condi-
tions included: 
1. the release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners; 
2. the repeal of the state of emergency and all detainees; 
3. the unbanning of political parties; 
4. the repeal of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts; 
5. agreeing to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the 
black majority without preconditions. 
In addition to the CAAA, twenty-one states, sixty-eight cities, and ten of the nation’s 
largest counties had adopted divestment policies (Baker 1989). Over 100 educational institu-
tions had withdrawn nearly a half-billion dollars from companies with business ties to South 
Africa and big American corporations, including GM, IBM, Coca Cola, Xerox, Kodak, and 
Exxon pulled out of South Africa (Knight 2004: 156). By the end of 1987, more than 200 of 
the 280 U.S. companies in South Africa had withdrawn (Culverson 1996). The Act triggered 
an international loss of confidence by the global banking industry and triggered sanctions 
across Europe and Japan (Knight 2004). 
The CAAA remained in force until 10 July 1991 when President George H.W. Bush 
concluded that South Africa had met the five conditions required for the relief of sanctions as 
outlined in the Act. However, the U.S. continued to oppose loans for South Africa in multilat-
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eral institutions, and the ban on nuclear trade and the arms embargo also remained in place 
(Financial Times, 11 July 1991, p. 14; New York Times, 11 July 1991). 
On 23 November 1993, President Clinton signed a bill repealing all remaining fed-
eral anti-apartheid sanctions, except for the arms embargo and the restrictions on transfer of 
nuclear technology. The sanctions that were lifted included the ban on aid, ban on OPIC45 and 
Export-Import Bank programs, and trade restrictions, including ineligibility for Most Favored 
Nation status. The bill also called on local governments to repeal their own sanctions before 
October 1995. If they failed to do so by that day, they risked the loss of federal transportation 
funds (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 27 November 1993, p. 3281). 
5.1.3 Actor Coalitions and Decision-making 
5.1.3.1 Formation of the U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement 
The U.S. anti-apartheid movement was part of a larger campaign in support of Africans’ 
struggles to rid themselves of colonialism and embrace self-determination and democracy. In 
the wake of World War II, the decolonization of African and Asian countries undermined the 
racist theory of white supremacy and gave black liberation struggles in Africa—and the 
United States—ideological momentum. To this end, the U.S. anti-apartheid movement re-
sponded to the South African liberation movement’s rallying cry to isolate the South African 
apartheid regime (Bates 1988). 
Many anti-apartheid activists felt a kinship with those of the South African liberation 
movement, viewing oppression of African-Americans in the American South as a similar 
injustice. Thus, the connection between the struggle in the U.S. for racial equality and the 
South African solidarity movement remained an important feature of U.S. anti-apartheid 
activities (Nesbitt 2004). From its early days, the anti-apartheid movement was always closely 
connected to the civil rights struggle of the 1950s and 60s. Many of the early leaders of the 
anti-apartheid movement had been active in desegregation initiatives in the U.S. South. 
Prominent, mainstream African-American organizations such as the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People lent resources to the anti-apartheid movement. The 
American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the oldest anti-apartheid organization in the U.S., 
was founded in 1953 by civil rights activists (Avoice 2007: 136). 
                                                
45 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is an agency of the U.S. government that supports U.S. 
businesses abroad. 
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The diversity of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States is one of its defin-
ing characteristics. Hundreds of organizations were involved over decades of struggle. The 
majority of these groups were local, operating within one city or state, or within an institution 
like a university or church. These grassroots organizations were usually independent of, but 
often worked closely with, national organizations lobbying on the same issue in Washington. 
These groups were made up of engaged student, religious, human rights and community 
organizations in nearly every city and state around the country. While some groups were 
exclusively African-American, others were ethnically mixed. Some organizations were cre-
ated specifically to put forward an African agenda, while other already existing organizations 
subsequently chose to incorporate the cause of African self-determination into their platforms. 
Often, these organizations joined together to achieve a specific goal, such as adoption of a 
divestment policy toward South Africa (Culverson 1996, 1999; Knight 2004). 
5.1.3.2 Congress and Early Anti-Apartheid Activism 
Before the mid-1960s anti-apartheid activists had little real access to the decision-making 
process in Washington. However, tangible gains made by civil rights activists in the 1950s 
and early 60s, culminated in passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which enabled Afri-
can-Americans to participate more fully in elections. As a result, African-American legisla-
tors increased their numbers and clout in Congress. Anti-apartheid activists found allies in 
many of these legislators, who enabled their objectives to be placed on the legislative agenda 
for the first time (Metz 1986). 
The increased legislative clout of African-Americans led to the establishment of the 
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in 1971. The CBC included South Africa in its legislative 
agenda from the outset, serving as a forum for numerous anti-apartheid initiatives in Con-
gress. Partly in response to a petition from the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Union, CBC 
member Congressman Ron Dellums, Democrat of California, drafted the first sanctions bill 
introduced in the U.S. Congress in 1972. While the bill proved unsuccessful at the time, it 
became the basis for U.S. sanctions against South Africa that was finally adopted in 1986. In 
those intervening 14 years, CBC members sponsored more than 15 bills regarding apartheid, 
urging the U.S. government to cut off financial support to the South African government. In 
addition to legislative efforts, members held hearings, participated in protests and coordinated 
rallies (Avoice 2007). 
 150 
In addition to the work of the CBC, the U.S. House Subcommittee on Africa also 
provided a forum in Washington for anti-apartheid advocates. In 1959, Congressman Charles 
C. Diggs, Jr., Democrat of Michigan, became the first black chairman of the subcommittee. In 
this role, Diggs used his chairmanship to raise interest in and awareness of the political and 
social situation across southern Africa and to mobilize anti-apartheid activists. Diggs held 
hearings and made floor speeches on southern Africa, thereby providing an important forum 
for discussing alternatives to existing U.S. policy in the region. In a 1966 statement on the 
floor of the House of Representatives, Diggs condemned the “indefensible and nationally 
humiliating gap” between America’s advocacy of human rights at home and abroad and its 
actual policies. He concludes that this gap between words and deeds towards South Africa 
“must be, now, finally and completely closed” (quoted in Congressional Record, 13 July 
1966, p. A3663). 
5.1.3.3 The Road to Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
Prior to 1986, despite decades of struggle, the anti-apartheid movement had consistently 
failed to gain acceptance of its political program in the form of economic sanctions against 
the South African government. However, some important steps were taken after 1977 that 
helped build the momentum necessary to culminate in the passage of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act. 
On the ground in South Africa, the Soweto uprising of 1976 and the government 
crackdown on black opposition in the fall of 1977 greatly increased public awareness of the 
oppressive nature of the regime both at home and abroad. Inside South Africa, black and 
white opposition to apartheid increased, and the U.S. anti-apartheid movement grew and 
expanded its network of alliances. One of the most significant developments in the U.S. 
movement at this time was the formation of TransAfrica, a foreign policy advocacy organiza-
tion designed to focus attention on issues affecting blacks in Africa and the Caribbean. With 
the CBC instrumental to its founding, TransAfrica proved to be “perhaps the most significant 
organizational development in the anti-apartheid movement during this period” because it 
“extended the anti-apartheid network without displacing other groups” and “reflected the 
institutionalization of the black community’s interest in foreign affairs” (Avoice 2007: 141-
142). 
The election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in 1980 appeared to be a set-
back for the anti-apartheid movement. Reagan’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ permit-
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ted closer ties with the South African government and interpreted America’s primary interest 
in the region within a Cold War framework with less focus on the human rights aspects selec-
tively advanced by the previous Carter administration (Culverson 1996). As a result of ‘con-
structive engagement,’ anti-apartheid activists were prevented from regaining the little direct 
influence they had temporarily enjoyed under the Carter administration. In response the 
movement’s organizations “began to channel energy and resources into coordinating the 
activities of local networks and influencing public opinion” (Baker 1989: 143). 
This effort of activists was manifest most prominently in the Free South Africa 
Movement (FSAM). Founder and president of TransAfrica, Randall Robinson, launched the 
FSAM on 21 November 1984. A series of highly publicized arrests outside the South African 
embassy in Washington and around the nation was the most publicized activity of the group. 
Over a period of five months, more than 3,000 individuals, including well-known civil rights 
activists, congressmen and celebrities were arrested at the demonstrations (New York Times, 
21 April 1985, p. 1). The FSAM proved successful at raising national awareness about the 
South Africa issue and garnering significant public support. A January 1985 Washington 
Post-ABC News survey indicated that 70 percent of those polled who had heard of the dem-
onstrations approved of them (Washington Post, 27 January 1985, p. 4). A September 1986 
Gallup Poll revealed that 55 percent of Americans believed that the U.S. government should 
place more pressure on South Africa to give non-whites greater freedom (Gallup Report 
September 1986, cited in Culverson 1996: 146). 
In part, U.S. public opinion was responding to the increasingly oppressive situation 
on the ground in South Africa. Following Pretoria’s introduction of a new constitution in 
1983 that outlined the creation of segregated parliaments while still excluding black people, 
black South Africans took to the streets to make the townships ungovernable, and the apart-
heid regime sent troops into the townships to quell unrest. By the middle of 1984, massive 
protests had erupted across South Africa, and a year later South African President Botha 
imposed a state of emergency (Culverson 1996: 83-86). 
Reagan’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ became more difficult to justify to an 
increasingly aware and disapproving American public. The deteriorating situation on the 
ground in South Africa demonstrated to the American public and many in Congress that 
closer diplomatic ties with the apartheid government were not leading to democratic reform 
within the country. This increasing awareness regarding the failings of ‘constructive engage-
ment’ helped propel passage of the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over President 
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Reagan’s veto. By the time of its passage, support in Congress for such reforms was over-
whelming. Many Republicans and conservative Democrats distanced themselves from the 
administration’s position, in part, for fear that “rising public concern over apartheid [...] could 
trigger domestic racial conflict” (Clark and Worger 2004: 144). As a result, Congress was 
able to override Reagan’s veto by the two-thirds majority mandated by the U.S. Constitu-
tion—a feat even more remarkable considering that Reagan’s Republican Party controlled the 
Senate at the time, and a presidential veto override is a very rare occurrence in U.S. politics. 
5.1.3.4 The Lift of Sanctions 
The question of tightening U.S. sanctions remained on the political agenda in the years fol-
lowing its passage. The CAAA authorized the president to suspend or modify the sanctions if 
the South African government fulfilled the conditions for their relief outlined in the Act. In 
the first annual CAAA report to Congress, President Reagan concluded that sanctions had not 
contributed to achieving the Act’s goals and, he therefore would not recommend additional 
sanctions (Culverson 1996: 84). Reagan’s successor, President George H.W. Bush, came to 
the same conclusion and declined to impose additional measures. Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, spoke out more optimistically, saying that “sanctions 
have played a role in stimulating new thinking within the white power structure of South 
Africa” (quoted in Washington Post, 4 October 1989, p. A8). He added that the Bush admini-
stration would consider imposing additional sanctions if actions towards ending apartheid 
were not taken in the next parliamentary session, to be held from February to June 1990 
(Washington Post, 4 October 1989, p. A8). 
After Mandela’s release from prison on 11 February 1990, President Bush declared 
that U.S. sanctions couldn’t be lifted until South Africa had met the conditions outlined in the 
CAAA (Financial Times, 13 February 1990, p. 1; New York Times, 13 February 1990, p. 
A17). Later in the year De Klerk became the first South African head of state to visit Wash-
ington in 45 years (New York Times, 25 September 1990, p. A1; 26 September 1990, p. A3). 
Following the meeting at the White House, administration officials said South Africa has met 
two of the CAAA’s five conditions—lifting the ban on political parties and agreeing to enter 
good-faith negotiations with the black opposition. President Bush also announced he would 
ask Congress to lift or modify U.S. sanctions if two more conditions were met, namely the 
lifting of the state of emergency in Natal and the freeing of all political prisoners (the remain-
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ing condition being the repeal of the two main pillars of apartheid: Groups Area Act and 
Population Registration Act). 
The termination of the sanctions imposed by the CAAA took then place in two steps: 
On 10 July 1991, President George H.W. Bush concluded that the South African 
government met the five conditions formulated in the CAAA and lifted most U.S. sanctions 
against South Africa. A ban on nuclear trade and the arms embargo remained in place. Man-
dela criticized the decision, saying the U.S. should wait for more progress toward the elimina-
tion of apartheid before lifting sanctions. Top Democratic leaders and the Congressional 
Black Caucus in Congress brought forward the same criticism (Financial Times, 11 July 
1991, p. 14; New York Times, 11 July 1991, p. A1). To counter his domestic critics, President 
Bush tried to counter his critics by announcing a doubling of U.S. assistance to black South 
Africans from 40 million to 80 million U.S. Dollars (New York Times, 11 July 1991, p. A1). 
Remaining U.S. South Africa sanctions, except for the arms embargo and restrictions 
on transfers of nuclear technology, were repealed by President Clinton on 23 November 1993. 
He also announced a trade and investment initiative for the country’s black private sector. The 
law, pushed by Senator Nancy Kassebaum, Republican from Kansas, ended U.S. restrictions 
on South Africa’s ability to obtain loans from the International Monetary Fund, removed 
constraints on Export-Import Bank lending and allowed South Africa to apply for lower U.S. 
tariffs. The bill also called on local governments to repeal their own sanctions (Associated 
Press, 24 November 1993). The arms embargo remained until after the South African general 
elections in April 1994 when the U.N. Security Council lifted the mandatory U.N. embargo 
on 24 May 1994 (Resolution 919; see Associated Press, 25 May 1994). 
5.1.4 Intervention Analysis 
In the following intervention analysis I will now investigate the effects of these developments 
in U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa on the relationship between the two countries 
from 1977 and 1996. The development of this relationship over time will be measured using 
the SAID data set as it was coded from the newswire services of AP and Reuters (refer to 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 for a detailed account of the data collection and coding process as well as 
the validity of the data set). 
I will first describe U.S.-South African relations from 1977 to 1996 as displayed in 
the coded event data set (Section 5.1.4.1). The subsequent time series analysis of the relation-
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ship between the two countries will then address the five major phases in U.S. foreign policy 
towards South Africa from 1977 to 1996 as I have identified them above. Next, the event data 
time series describing the relationship between the two countries over time will constitute the 
dependent variable in the applied intervention models. Major changes in U.S. South Africa 
policy will be modeled as independent variables (interventions). I will first analyze whether 
the different main intervention modes (‘carrots’, ‘sticks’ and ‘sermon’) showed different 
effects on the relationship between the two countries (Section 5.1.4.2). Then, I will test if the 
interventions also changed the conflict structure in U.S. foreign policy, depending on the 
interventions’ dominant policy type (‘regulative’, ‘distributive’ or ‘redistributive) (Section 
5.1.4.3). 
5.1.4.1 U.S.-South African Relations in Different Policy Phases 
Figure 21 shows the level of interaction between the U.S. government and the South African 
government from January 1977 to December 1996 during the different phases in U.S. foreign 
policy towards South Africa. The interaction level is displayed by the number of coded events 
per month with the U.S. government as the source and the South African government as the 
target of the events. 
Figure 21: Interaction Level USAGOV>ZAFGOV 1977-1996 
 
The time plot for the interaction level serves as first measurement of the intensity of 
the relationship between the U.S. government and the South African government in the dif-
ferent policy phases. It shows that U.S. governmental actions towards the South African 
government started to increase significantly in the summer of 1984 and reached their highest 
level in 1985 and 1986, when the U.S. Congress debated the imposition of economic sanc-
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tions against South Africa. After Congress had put the CAAA into force in late October 1986, 
the interaction level declines sharply and evens out at the level before the big sanctions de-
bates in Congress. The period between the lift of most CAAA sanctions in July 1991 and the 
run-up to the first free South African elections in April 1994 is then characterized by a com-
paratively low level of U.S. governmental action towards the South African government. 
Whereas the U.S. government initiated significant action towards the new South African 
government in the first few months after the election, such events can be observed only very 
sporadically thereafter. 
However, the interaction level as displayed in Figure 21 above only accounts for the 
overall number of U.S. initiated events between the governments of the two countries. The 
measurement does not contain any information on the quality of those events. Figure 22 
below takes the cooperative or conflictive nature of these events into account and shows the 
monthly aggregated conflict/cooperation level of U.S.-South African government relations 
from 1977 to 1996 using Goldstein scores (refer to Section 4.3.3 for a detailed account of the 
scaling of the data). 
Figure 22: Conflict/Cooperation USAGOV>ZAFGOV 1977-1996  
 
The visual inspection of the conflict/cooperation level between the U.S. government 
and the South African government (Figure 22) reveals that the relationship between the two 
countries improved during the first two years under ‘constructive engagement’ after the rather 
conflictual Carter era before. But in the middle of ‘constructive engagement’—in the course 
of 1984—the relationship became significantly more contentious again. U.S.-South African 
relations then showed their highest level of conflict in mid-1986 prior to the adoption of the 
CAAA sanctions legislation in U.S. Congress. After the adoption of the CAAA in October 
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1986, the relationship improved again quickly and seemed to show conflict/cooperation pat-
terns very similar to the ones in the first half of the 1980s. The highest level of cooperation 
was reached in the run-up to the relaxation of U.S. South Africa sanctions in 1991. The coop-
erative development reached another height with the first race free South African general 
elections in April 1994, before it decayed again to less intense conflict/cooperation patterns 
during the first years of the new South Africa. 
Consequently, the five phases in U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa from 1977 
to 1996 in fact seem to indicate different conflict/cooperation patterns between the govern-
ments of the two countries. Moreover, the development of this relationship—as displayed in 
the underlying event data set—corresponds fairly well with qualitative descriptions of U.S.-
South African relations during this period (Section 5.1.2). Obvious is the high fluctuation of 
the conflict/cooperation level throughout the whole period of investigation; rather high levels 
of conflict in the relationship follow phases of rather cooperative behavior and vice versa. 
This high volatility in the displayed relationship can be explained to a substantial part by the 
nature of the underlying data. Event data—as the name implies—report events that attracted 
enough media interest to be journalistically covered. Media attention, however, may undergo 
abrupt changes, often as a reaction to dramatic changes ‘on the ground’, that is, in the area 
that is covered by the particular media reports. A closer look at the coded news report reveals 
the significance of media attention, also in the case of U.S. relations towards South Africa 
under apartheid: 
In the Carter era, two peaks in the conflict/cooperation level stand out, namely the 
distinct negative peaks in October 1977 (score=-11.9, N=24) and April 1979 (score=-18.7, 
N=17). The first distinct conflictual peak represents the U.S. reactions to a dramatic develop-
ment in South Africa: On 12 September 1977, South African anti-apartheid activist Steve 
Biko died in police custody. Allegations were made that the leader of the Black Conscious-
ness Movement died as a result of beating at the hands on the South African security police. 
Biko’s death caused outrage both at home and abroad. Later in the month, the South African 
police cracked down massively on black protesters and white sympathizers (Washington Post, 
25 October 1977, p. A14) and the government banned 18 anti-apartheid organizations and two 
major black newspapers (Washington Post, 27 October 1977, p. A1). As a response to the 
repression, the U.S. recalled its envoy from South Africa for consultations and decided to 
support a mandatory U.N. embargo on all arms sales to South Africa. President Carter also 
considered unilateral actions in protest against South Africa’s crackdown, including restric-
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tions on Export-Import Bank loans guarantees to U.S. businesses that export goods to that 
nation (Washington Post, 22 October 1977, p. A1; 27 October 1977, p. A1; Associated Press, 
21-31 October 1977). 
The second distinctively conflictual peak during the Carter era occurred in the fol-
low-up of the so-called “Muldergate” scandal—named after former South African informa-
tion secretary, Connie Mulder—also known as the “information scandal”. In November 1978, 
a former high official of the South African government claimed to have proof of the involve-
ment of current members of the government, including President John Vorster, in plans to 
shift 64 million Rand from the South African defence budget to undertake a series of propa-
ganda projects. Plans included bribes of international news agencies and the purchase of the 
Washington Star newspaper as well as secret payments to members of the U.S. Congress to 
improve South Africa’s image abroad (Washington Post, 25 March 1979: D3). A U.S. inves-
tigatory commission accused President Vorster in April 1979 of deep involvement in these 
secret projects (Associated Press, 2 April 1979; 11 April 1979; 12 April 1979), leading to 
Vorster’s resignation on 4 June 1979 (Washington Post, 5 June 1979, p. A1). 
Later, the announcement of ‘constructive engagement’ in May 1981 resulted in a 
sharp increase of cooperative relations (score=28.5, N=15). The highest conflict-cooperation 
score in this policy phase was reached in January 1984 (score=31.4, N=15) when the U.S. 
began a new diplomatic drive for a settlement in South-West Africa (Namibia), linking a 
South African pullout from Namibia to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from neighboring An-
gola (New York Times, 28 January 1984, p. 5). This cornerstone of the policy of ‘constructive 
engagement’ received a new boost in mid-December 1983 when South Africa offered a one-
month disengagement of its forces in southern Angola, which it had partly occupied two years 
earlier and had last invaded with a raid deep into Angolan territory early December 1983 
(Associated Press, 6 December 1983). End of January 1984, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs Chester Crocker opened negotiations with South African Foreign Minister 
Roelof Botha and started a four-nation tour in the region, trying to convince governments that 
the opportunity offered by the South African bid must not be squandered (Associated Press, 
20-30 January 1983). 
The relationship hit a temporary wall in September 1985 (score=-26.8, N=53) when 
President Reagan signed the executive order under a bill incorporating some limited economic 
sanctions against South Africa. The order barred all computer exports to South African secu-
rity forces and “agencies involved in the enforcement of apartheid”, banned loans to the South 
 158 
African government (with exceptions) and prohibited exports of nuclear goods and technol-
ogy (with exceptions) to South Africa (Associated Press, 9 September 1985). According to 
media reports, President Reagan imposed these (limited) sanctions in an effort to head off an 
embarrassing defeat in Congress, when a House-approved compromise legislation has been 
temporarily stalled in the Senate by filibuster (Washington Post, 10 September 1985, p. A1). 
The lowest conflict/cooperation level in whole period of investigation was reached in 
October 1986 (score=-52.2, N=34) between the Senate’s override of President Reagan’s veto 
against the CAAA legislation on 2 October (Associated Press, 2 October 1986) and the sign-
ing of the presidential executive order to implement the law on 27 October 1986 (Associated 
Press, 27 October 1986). Over the whole month, the U.S. sanctions against South Africa were 
highly debated and South Africa was a focal point of the U.S. media. 
After the imposition of the CAAA, political relations between the U.S. government 
and the South African government seemed to improve fairly quickly. The first period of sig-
nificant improvement can be observed already in August to October 1987 when President 
Reagan, in his first yearly report to Congress required by the CAAA, concluded that sanctions 
had not contributed to achieving the Act’s goals and he therefore would not recommend 
additional sanctions (Associated Press, 2 October 1987; New York Times, 3 October 1987, p. 
5; Washington Post, 3 October 1987, p. A19). 
The U.S.-South African relationship reached the highest peak in September 1990 
(score=58.8, N=21). South African President Frederik Willem de Klerk visited the U.S. and 
held talks with U.S. President George Bush who praised de Klerk and indicated that an ease 
of sanctions could be possible soon (Associated Press, 23-26 September 1990). According to 
U.S. officials, South Africa meanwhile met two of the five conditions laid out in the CAAA 
for the lift of U.S. sanctions, namely the lift of a ban on democratic parties and the agreement 
to begin good-faith negotiations with black representatives (New York Times, 25 September 
1990, p. A1). 
President Bush lifted the CAAA on 10 July 1991, concluding that South Africa has 
met the five conditions formulated in the CAAA, including freeing all political prisoners, 
lifting the state of emergency and repealing the Group Area Act and the Population Registra-
tion Act—the two cornerstones of apartheid, which established segregated living areas and 
required citizens to be classified by race (Associated Press, 10 July 1991). The lift of the 
CAAA resulted in a relatively high level of cooperation in July 1991 (score=48.4, N=15) and 
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marks the start of the phase labeled ‘relaxation/lift of sanctions’. A second peak was reached 
in November 1993 (score=45, N=11) when President Bill Clinton signed into law a bill re-
pealing all remaining federal anti-apartheid sanctions, except for the arms embargo and re-
strictions on the transfers of nuclear technology (Associated Press, 23 November 1993). 
The South African general elections on 27 April 1994 excited worldwide endorse-
ment and admiration for the rather peaceful transition from apartheid to the first elections held 
on a non-racial basis and with universal suffrage. The relatively high number of cooperative 
actions from the U.S. government towards the South African government in April 1994 
(score=24.4, N=12) and May 1994 (score=43.5, N=13) displays the U.S.’ appraisal of the 
latest events in South Africa. 
5.1.4.2 The Effect of U.S. Foreign Policy Interventions 
As discussed earlier (Section 5.1.2.3), the particular policies in the phases of U.S.-South 
African relationship are characterized by different modes of interventions. In the Carter era 
(1977-1981), the U.S. tried to impose verbal and material pressure on the South African gov-
ernment (predominantly a use of ‘sticks’). On the other hand, the policy of ‘constructive 
engagement’ (1981-1986) during President Reagan’s first term tried to embark on a rather 
cooperative strategy (predominantly a use of ‘carrots’ and ‘sermon’). The following phase 
under the CAAA sanctions legislation (1986-1991) included unambiguously a strategy of 
‘sticks’ against the apartheid government. After the South African government had started to 
dismantle the apartheid system (1991-1994), the U.S. government gradually eased these 
constraints on U.S.-South African relations. After the first free South African general elec-
tions in April 1994, the beginning of the last phase under investigation (1994-1996), the 
relationship between the two countries normalized to a large extent. 
In the following, I will now test the effect of these different modes of interventions 
on the relationship between the two countries during the individual phases of U.S. foreign 
policy towards South Africa under apartheid. In a first step, I will systematically compare the 
relational patterns between the two countries with descriptive statistics for the individual 
policy phases from 1977 to 1996. However, such a test based on descriptive summary statis-
tics for every phase is poorly designed yet because successive values of interactions and 
conflict/cooperation levels are very likely to be serially correlated, meaning that some patterns 
from earlier periods may “carry over” to successive periods (compare Section 4.5.2). There-
fore, in a second step, I will model the temporal correlations of the relational patterns between 
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the two countries. The modeling of the time component allows then for a systematic interven-
tion analysis that reveals the potential effects of policy shifts in U.S. foreign policy towards 
South Africa on the relationship between the countries from 1977 to 1996. 
Table 24 below summarizes the aggregates and means of the interaction and con-
flict/cooperation levels for the individual phases in U.S.-South African relations from 1977 to 
1996. As expected, the phases of ‘constructive engagement’ and ‘CAAA’ show the highest 
interaction density with an average of 11.6 and 7.2 reported events per month (1 month = 1 
observation). Rather surprising is that the mean conflict/cooperation level of these two phases 
with supposedly very different predominant intervention modes are actually quite similar 
(mean score of 2.4 and 3.2, respectively). Moreover, the phase of economic sanctions under 
CAAA is on average even slightly more cooperative than the phase of ‘constructive engage-
ment’. But also the range between highest conflict (minimum) and highest cooperation 
(maximum) is larger during the phase where the CAAA was effective, indicating that the 
relationship during this period was more fluctuating than in the prior phase under ‘construc-
tive engagement’. The overall most conflictive phase is the Carter era with a mean con-
flict/cooperation level of -0.8, whereas the period when sanctions were lifted can be attributed 
as the most cooperative phase (mean score of 5.9). 
Table 24: Phases Summary Statistics for USAGOV>ZAFGOV 
 
 Phase Period Obs. Interaction Conflict-Cooperation 
   Agg Mean Agg Mean Min Max 
 Carter Era 01/1977-01/1981 49 177 3.6 -4 -0.1 -18.7 11.0 
 Constructive Eng. 05/1981-09/1986 65 755 11.6 154.3  2.4 -26.8 31.4 
 CAAA 10/1986-06/1991 57 408 7.2 179.9  3.2 -52.2 54.8 
 Lift of Sanctions 07/1991-03/1994 33  84 2.5 195.5  5.9   -6.3 48.4 
 New South Africa 04/1994-12/1996 33  69 2.1 107.5  3.3 -11.0 43.5 
 
The following time series impact assessment (Baker 1989; Box and Jenkins 1976) al-
lows now the evaluation of the effects of changing intervention modes from one policy phase 
to the other on the relationship between the two countries, measured in changing interaction 
and cooperation/conflict levels over time. This method requires first the identification and 
estimation of mathematical components that separately describe the stochastic and determinis-
tic variations in the series (as described in Section 4.5.2). That is, 
yt = f(It)+Nt 
where 
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yt = bilateral relationship (interaction and conflict/cooperation) over time  
It = intervention at time t 
Nt = noise model for stochastic processes and trends 
Prior to the evaluation of the effect of policy interventions on the relationship be-
tween the two countries, the time series “noise component” will be modeled first. As dis-
cussed in the methodological section (Section 4.5.2), times series impact assessment accord-
ing to Box and Tiao (1975) and Box and Jenkins (1975), respectively, is based on the logic 
that the unwanted information found in data gathered across time (autocorrelations and mov-
ing averages) can be modeled empirically and then added as the “noise component” to the 
intervention model. 
The Noise (Nt) 
Prior to the formal intervention analysis, the time series “noise component” should be inde-
pendent for each observation, normally distributed around a mean, and of constant variance (a 
process without drift or trend, i.e. only white noise). Sample autocorrelations (AC) and the 
partial autocorrelations (PAC) help to determine whether the series is actually in such a state 
of ‘statistical equilibrium’ (Box and Jenkins 1976: 26). Both a trend and a systematic ten-
dency in variance would distort the model building and produce unreliable parameter esti-
mates. And in fact, neither the raw interaction-level series (Figure 21) nor the raw con-
flict/cooperation-level series (Figure 22) fulfill these conditions right away. Therefore, the 
series need to be transformed before the noise component of the series can be modeled. Dif-
ferencing removes the non-constant variance from the raw series and makes the series 
‘weakly stationary’ or ‘stationary in the wider sense’, respectively (Box and Jenkins 1976: 7-
8). However, the differenced series then no longer display the level of the series but instead its 
changes in level from one period to the next period. An Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
(Cromwell et al. 1994: 13-19) confirms that differencing transforms the formerly non-
stationary partial series of the interaction level during ‘constructive engagement’ and ‘CAAA’ 
as well as the conflict/cooperation series of the ‘CAAA’-phase into stationary series. 
With constant mean and variance, the series are now weakly but not strictly station-
ary. A strictly stationary series would call for the values being normally distributed around a 
mean (Cromwell et al. 1994: 64). But at least for the interaction-level series, the distribution 
of the monthly frequencies rather shows a Poisson distribution with high frequencies of low 
interaction levels and decreasing frequencies for higher interaction levels. Such a distribution 
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is typical for count variables as the interaction level variable (Mills 1990). The frequencies of 
the raw and differenced conflict/cooperation series, on the other hand, are almost normally 
distributed around a conflict/cooperation level of zero. Thus, the series are even close to being 
strictly stationary. I also conducted the Phillips-Peron (1989) test to make sure that the series 
used for the modeling do not contain a unit root or a unit root was not introduced to the re-
siduals of the series by over-differencing the series. 
Table 25 below show the different ARIMA models for the interaction-level series in 
US.-South African relations in the individual phases from 1977 to 1996. For the Carter era, 
the seasonally differenced partial series is best modeled as a moving average (MA) process of 
first order. The model is quite robust, with a Durbin-Watson statistic very close to the ideal 
vale of 2.0, indicating that there is no first-order autocorrelations in the residuals, and a small 
and statistically not significant Q-statistic. The residuals are serially uncorrelated and there-
fore just white noise. On the other hand, modeling the ‘constructive engagement’ interaction 
series is more problematic. Only adjustments of time limitations (indicated with suffix ‘†’ and 
‘††’, respectively) allow for the building of two meaningful models, both best represented by a 
moving average process. Diagnostic checks of the two models eventually suggest choosing 
the second model; it is less at risk of first-order autocorrelations than the first model, and both 
the two most commonly used model selection criteria—the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC)—support this selection. Moreover, the 
temporal adjustment of the ‘constructive engagement’ phase is empirically reasonable. The 
end of ‘constructive engagement’ is now moved backwards from October 1986 to July 1985 
when the U.S. Congress approved its first anti-apartheid bill (banning of new bank loans and 
exports of nuclear technology, and imposing of further curbs on computer sales to South 
Africa). This adjustment of timely limitation of this particular policy phase is based on the 
fact that U.S. sanction legislation did not actually start with the CAAA but goes back to mid-
1985 when both the House and Senate imposed the first economic sanctions against South 
Africa. At the same time, President Reagan was urged for the first time to publicly call on the 
South African government to lift its state of emergency and to release political detainees. 
 163 
Table 25: ARIMA Model Specification/Diagnosis for Interaction Series (USAGOV>ZAFGOV) 
 
Phase ARIMA-Model DW-Statistic Q-Statistic AIC SBC 
Carter Era (0,0,1)(0,1,0) 12 2.09   4.75 (0.78) 3.48 3.56 
Constr. Eng.† (0,1,1) 1.71 10.71 (0.46) 3.47 3.54 
Constr. Eng.†† (0,0,1) 1.86   5.88 (0.92) 3.40 3.47 
CAAA (0,1,1) 1.73   3.97 (0.99) 4.15 4.22 
CAAA††† (0,1,1)(0,1,0)12 1.96   2.35 (0.99) 4.67 4.75 
Lift of Sanctions †††† (1,0,1) 2.19   8.96 (0.11) 1.97 2.07 
Adjusted time specifications, deviating from original phases: 
† = 1981:5 – 1985:6 
††= 1981:2 – 1985:6 
††† = 1987:11 – 1991:6 
†††† = 1991:7 – 1993:11 
 
Whereas the differenced ‘CAAA’ interaction series can be passably modeled as a 
MA(1) process, the model building process for the phase labeled ‘lift of sanctions’ is trou-
bling again. However, the series can be modeled satisfyingly when the end point of the series 
is moved back to November 1993 when President Clinton lifted all remaining U.S. sanctions 
against South Africa except for the arms embargo and the ban on nuclear technology. This 
period, spanning from the lift of the CAAA in July 1991 to November 1993 (indicated with 
suffix ‘††††’), is best modeled as a combination of autoregressive (AR) and moving average 
(MA) processes of first order. However, a rather low number of observations (29 months) 
were gathered and lie under the minimum of 40-50 observations usually recommended for 
time series modeling. Also for the CAAA-phase, a temporal adjustment of the policy phase 
(indicated with suffix ‘†††’) results in another model of the partial series, including a season-
ally adjusted moving average processes. 
Table 26 summarizes the parameter estimates resulting from the estimated models 
for the interaction series from the U.S. government towards the South African government for 
the different policy phases. All estimated coefficients are statistically highly significant (at 
least the 0.01 level) except for the MA(1) estimate for the ‘Carter era’ series, which is signifi-
cant at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, all parameter estimates lie within the bounds of inverti-
bility (Phillips and Perron 1988: 56). 
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Table 26: Parameters for Interaction-Level Series (USAGOV>ZAFGOV) 
 
Phase Coefficient Estimate Std Error T-Statistic 
Carter Era MA(1)  0.36** 0.16   2.31 
Constr. Eng.† MA(1)  -0.59*** 0.12  -4.95 
Constr. Eng.†† Constant 
MA(1) 
  6.47*** 
  0.50*** 
1.11 
0.12 
  5.85 
  4.03 
CAAA MA(1)  -0.51*** 1.20  -4.26 
CAAA††† MA(1)  -0.60*** 0.12  -4.86 
Lift of Sanctions†††† AR(1)  -0.84*** 0.17  -4.89 
** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level 
 
The specification of the noise model for the conflict/cooperation level between the 
two countries is summarized in Table 27 below. Model identification and specification for the 
Carter era reveal that the conflict/cooperation pattern as displayed by the reported events 
between the U.S. and South Africa during this period is just a random process (white noise).  
Consequently, the series cannot be modeled for this particular policy phase. The con-
flict/cooperation series for the phase of ‘constructive engagement’ incorporates a seasonal 
pattern (yearly), and is—apart from this—a random process too. For the CAAA, again, two 
reasonable models for the noise component of the series can be identified. Both models in-
clude a seasonal pattern (yearly). Both AIC and SBC suggest the second model to be the 
better one. The second model also results in a slightly higher (and therefore closer to 2.0) 
Durbin-Watson statistic, indicating that first-order autocorrelation is (marginally) less likely 
than in the case of the first model. 
For the adjusted phase of ‘lift of sanctions’ (June 1991 to November 1993), two basic 
approaches can be taken. Taking the first approach conflict/cooperation in this particular 
phase has to be regarded as a random process. Both autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
function do not show any indication for any significant correlation of the monthly con-
flict/cooperation scores or the error terms of the series, respectively, indicating neither autore-
gressive nor moving average processes being at stake in this particular phase. Taking another 
approach, the process can be modelled as an ARIMA (1,1,0) process. All the test statistics 
deliver significant estimates. However, it is likely that the AR(1) component was introduced 
while differencing the raw series of the data. In addition, the Durbin-Watson statistic of 
around 2.4 is rather high, indicating that series might be negatively auto-correlated. 
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Table 27: ARIMA Model Specification/Diagnosis for Conflict/Cooperation Series (USAGOV>ZAFGOV) 
 
Phase ARIMA-Model DW-Statistic Q-Statistic AIC SBC 
Carter Era (0,0,0) 1.97   6.91 (0.86) 3.17 3.21 
Constr. Eng.† (0,0,0)(0,1,0)12 1.88 17.79 (0.22) 5.12 5.15 
Constr. Eng.†† (0,0,0)(0,0,1)12 1.64 14.76 (0.47) 4.78 4.82 
CAAA (0,1,1)(0,1,0)12 
(0,1,1)(0,1,1)12 
1.79 
1.82 
10.59 (0.39) 
10.05 (0.35) 
6.14 
6.06 
6.23 
6.18 
CAAA††† (1,0,0) 1.93 15.83 (0.89) 5.33 5.39 
Lift of Sanctions †††† (0,0,0) 
(1,1,0) 
1.85 
2.41 
  4.24 (0.83) 
  3.21 (0.78) 
5.06 
4.96 
5.10 
5.05 
Adjusted time specifications, deviating from original phases: 
† = 1981:2 – 1986:10 
††= 1981:5 – 1986:9 
††† = 1985:6 – 1991:6 
†††† = 1991:6 – 1993:11 
 
Table 28 summarizes the parameter estimates resulting from the individual noise 
models for the conflict/cooperation series in U.S. governmental relations towards South Af-
rica in the different policy phases. All estimated autoregressive and moving average compo-
nents are highly significant (at least at the 0.01 level), except for the seasonal MA(1) process 
in CAAA phase (significant at the 0.05 level), and all the statistically significant parameter 
estimates lie within the bounds of invertibility. 
Table 28: Parameters for Conflict/Cooperation Series (USAGOV>ZAFGOV) 
 
Phase Coefficient Estimate Std Error T-Statistic 
Carter Era (white noise) - - - 
Constr. Eng.† Constant 
SMA(12) 
  2.84 
      0.51*** 
1.85 
0.13 
  1.54 
  3.99 
Constr. Eng.†† Constant 
SAR(12) 
 -0.74 
       0.42*** 
2.90 
1.47 
 -0.25 
  2.87 
CAAA MA(1) 
MA(1) 
SMA(12) 
      0.57*** 
     -0.46*** 
   -0.45** 
0.13 
0.15 
0.17 
 -4.34 
 -3.11 
 -2.55 
CAAA††† Constant 
AR(1) 
  3.16 
     0.22** 
1.82 
0.10 
  1.73 
  2.12 
Lift of Sanctions†††† Constant 
AR(1) 
      5.92*** 
      0.49*** 
2.15 
0.12 
  2.75 
 -4.04 
** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
The Intervention (It): The Effect of Carrots, Sticks and Sermon 
Whereas the discovery of the noise structure is mostly an atheoretical endeavor, the modeling 
of the intervention components is guided by the previously outlined theoretical notions on the 
potential effects of the distinct intervention modes during the different policy phases in U.S.-
South African relations from 1977 to 1996. Based on my Hypothesis 1 (Section 3.2.4.1, p. 
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74), the interaction level of the relationship is expected to decline after a predominantly re-
strictive policy (‘sticks’) was introduced, whereas the introduction of a predominantly incen-
tive-based policy (‘carrots’) should lead to a subsequent increase of the interaction level. With 
regard to cooperation/conflict levels (Hypothesis 2), the use of ‘sticks’ is more likely to result 
in a higher level of conflict, whereas the use of ‘carrots’ is expected to result in a lower level 
of conflict (or higher level of cooperation, respectively). The use of mostly verbal and infor-
mation-based policy instruments (‘sermon’), on the other hand, is expected to have less of an 
impact on the interactions and levels of conflict/cooperation of the relationship (Hypothesis 
3). 
Sticks and Carrots 
To test Hypothesis 1, I examine in the first step if the introduction of the new policies (‘con-
structive engagement’ in May 1981 and economic sanctions under the CAAA in October 
1986) actually changed the trend of interactions based on the interaction patterns as they can 
be observed prior to the intervention. The estimated model for the policy phase prior to the 
intervention (Table 25) thereby represents the interaction trend before the intervention. If 
actual interactions in the post-intervention phase diverge significantly from the forecasted 
interaction trend before the policy was introduced, then I have a strong reason to believe that 
the policy caused a shift in the behavioral patterns between the U.S. government and the 
South African government. A comparison of the two ARIMA models for the phases prior and 
after the introduction of a new policy (Table 26) confirms that the interaction levels follow 
different patterns in the two phases and suggests a confirmation of Hypothesis 1. 
Because developments in international politics or in South Africa itself may result to 
a general shift in international attention towards South Africa, such an increase in interaction 
does not necessarily need to be the result of a policy change but can originate in changes 
external to U.S.-South African relations. To control for such potential external effects, I rela-
tivize time series of the interaction level by dividing the absolute interaction level between the 
U.S. government and the South African government by the total number of international 
events targeted at South Africa during the same period of time (i.e., one month). If there are 
actually observable shifts in behavioral patterns from pre- to post-intervention phase, I will 
finally try to estimate a statistically significant intervention component that explains the po-
tential intervention effects resulting from the policy change.  
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According to Hypothesis 2, the transition from ‚constructive engagement‘ (1981-
1986) to a policy of economic sanctions under the CAAA would be characterized by an in-
crease in conflict between the governments of the U.S. and the South Africa. However, abso-
lute and relative numbers of the conflict/cooperation level between the two countries over 
time remain difficult to interpret. Absolutely speaking, the number of conflictive interactions 
with the U.S. government as the source and the South African government as the target de-
creased sharply after the adoption of the CAAA in October 1986 (compare Figure 22, p. 155). 
But already by the end of 1986, the conflict/cooperation measurement reached a quite stable 
level and did not decrease any further. Instead, cooperative interactions started to increase 
again in 1987. Relative numbers of the conflict/cooperation level—putting U.S. interactions 
with South Africa in relation to overall international relations to South Africa during the same 
period—do not evidence a clear pattern. 
This observation makes clear that the relationship between the U.S. and the South 
African government actually reached its most conflictive momentum when the U.S. Congress 
imposed the CAAA sanctions legislation. Thereafter, the relations improved quickly and went 
back to an equilibrium as could have been observed prior to the debate on economic sanctions 
in the U.S. Hypothesis 2, claiming that the imposition of ‘sticks’ in a sender government’s 
foreign policy necessarily causes more conflict in its relationship to the target government, 
can therefore only be confirmed for the short term. For the intermediate and longer term, 
Hypothesis 2 needs to be rejected. 
In fact, empirical modelling of the policy intervention as it can be observed with the 
imposition of the CAAA reveals that the sanction legislation caused only a very punctual but 
abrupt change in the relationship between the U.S. government and the South African gov-
ernment as it is displayed by political event data. The decline of the conflict/cooperation level 
in U.S.-South African relations in 1986 (see, Figure 22, p. 155) can be explained when a 
temporary effect with numerator lags 0 and 1 and a single denominator lag for October 1986 
is introduced to the regularly and seasonally differenced series of the conflict/cooperation 
level for actions from the U.S. government to the South African government between Feb-
ruary 1981 (President Reagan’s first month in office) and June 1991 (one month before Presi-
dent Bush lifted CAAA sanctions). The intervention model is represented by the following 
equation (see Appendix 1 for model estimation): 
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(1-L)(1-L12)yt = at + .83at-1+.78at-12+.65at-13 + (-36.48I t0-42.13It0-1)/(-.87It0-1) 
where: 
(1-L)(1-L12)yt  = regularly and seasonally differenced conflict/cooperation level 
in actions from the U.S. government towards the South African 
government using the lag operator; 
 It0 = temporary effect during period t0 = October 1986; 
 at = random shock during period t. 
As a result, I can conclude that the imposition of the CAAA resulted in a temporary 
negative shift in the change of the conflict/cooperation level of actions of the U.S. gov-
ernment towards the South African government. The model represents changes in the con-
flict/cooperation level because the raw series of the conflict/cooperation level was differenced 
prior to model identification and estimation. The negative shift is represented by the strongly 
negative parameter estimates for the intervention component. 
Sermon 
Hypothesis 3 is based on the assumption that foreign policy interventions that are primarily 
based on the provision of information or attempts to persuade the target (the use of ‘sermon’) 
are less an integral part of bilateral relationships as they are displayed in event data. Periods 
where foreign policy towards South Africa was predominantly shaped by verbal action are 
therefore expected to show a lower level of interaction, resulting necessarily also in lower 
cooperation or conflict during these particular periods. Phases with a higher frequency of 
material actions, on the other hand, will show both a higher level of interaction and higher 
levels of conflict/cooperation. 
According to the summary statistics in Table 29 below, the Carter era shows the 
highest percentage of verbal actions (0.89) from all the four investigated policy phase in U.S.-
South African relations under apartheid. It is also the phase with a relatively low interaction 
level (3.7). The phase of ‘constructive engagement’ is characterized by a relatively low share 
of verbal action (0.77) but a rather high relative interaction level (14.2). The phase of eco-
nomic sanctions under the CAAA shows both a relatively intermediate percentage of verbal 
actions (0.84) and an intermediate relative interaction level (7.2). The period when the U.S. 
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government lifted its sanctions against South Africa has relatively seen the smallest share of 
verbal actions (0.67) and is also the phase with the lowest relative interaction level (2.8). 
Table 29: Summary Statistics for USAGOV>ZAFGOV 
 
Phase N Verbal_agg1 Verbal_rel2 Interaction_rel3 Conf/Coop_rel4 
Carter Era 49 158 0.89   3.6  -0.1 
Constr. Eng. 55 598 0.77 14.2   3.0 
CAAA 57 342 0.84   7.2   3.2 
Lift of Sanctions 34   64 0.67   2.8   6.5 
1 Total of verbal actions/phase 
2 Percentage of verbal action on total actions/phase 
3 Mean interaction level/month 
4 Mean conflict/cooperation level/month 
 
Thus, except for the phase of ‘lift of sanctions’, Hypothesis 3 can be confirmed for 
U.S.-South African relations under apartheid (for the period 1977-1994): a relatively high 
share of verbal action is associated with a relatively low level of interaction (as seen for the 
Carter era), whereas a relatively low share of verbal action corresponds with a relatively high 
interaction level (as it is the case in ‘constructive engagement’). The ‘CAAA’ phase takes a 
middle-position, both in terms of relative share of verbal action and relative interaction level 
during this particular phase. However, the phase when the U.S. government lifted its South 
Africa sanctions presents an outlier to this pattern; in this particular phase, a relatively low 
share of verbal action is associated with a relatively low interaction level. 
As for the relative conflict/cooperation level, a test of Hypothesis 3 comes to another 
conclusion: a relatively high percentage of verbal action (Carter era) shows a relatively high 
average level of conflict during the phase (-.0.1), whereas a relative low share of verbal action 
(as in the phase of ‘constructive engagement’) is associated with a higher level of cooperation 
(2.97). The phase of economic sanctions under the CAAA with an intermediate share of 
verbal action shows a still higher average level of cooperation. With regard to the coopera-
tion/conflict level, a clear pattern between verbal action and the level of conflict/cooperation 
in U.S.-South African relations cannot be identified. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 must be re-
jected. Only in the phase of ‘lift of sanctions’ a relative low percentage of verbal action is 
associated with a high average cooperation level (and, thus, a low level of conflict), as Hy-
pothesis 3 would predict. 
Types and Forms of Intervention Effects: Arenas of Power and Policy Design 
Lowi’s (1980; 1964) policy arena approach provides a useful concept to analyze how differ-
ent types of (foreign) policies may result in different conflict structures between political 
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actors. As I have outlined in Section 3.2.4.2, we can assume that different types of foreign 
policy interventions (‘regulative’, ‘distributive’ and ‘redistributive’ interventions) affect the 
conflict structure of different spheres of U.S.-South Africa policy quite differently. According 
to Lowi’s approach, the conflict structure in a political system changes, depending on what 
policy characteristics a governmental policy intervention comprises. According to Hypothesis 
4 it can be expected that primarily regulative policies introduced with the tightening of the 
arms embargo in late 1977 and the CAAA sanctions legislation in October 1986 caused im-
mediate and strongly conflictual reactions particularly from U.S. societal circles directly 
affected by these policies. 
On the other hand, following Hypothesis 5, distributive policies as strengthened un-
der ‘constructive engagement’ should provoke predominantly cooperative reactions from the 
actors in the respective arena. Are the policies more perceived as redistributive, Hypothesis 6 
claims that the conflicts within the targeted political arena increasingly harden. The resulting 
conflict structure associated with this particular intervention type is therefore more likely to 
be long-term and persistent. Hypotheses 7 and 8, finally, are specifications of the expected 
effects: depending on the degree of intervention (in terms of inclusiveness and intrusiveness, 
respectively), the specific policy interventions are supposed to show more or less distinct 
effects on the conflict structure in the corresponding political arena. 
For a test of these hypotheses, I distinguish between the different scopes of foreign 
policy interventions as outline in Section 3.1.1 (according to Figure 2, p. 56). Distinguishing 
between the domestic and international scope of U.S. foreign policy, I should be able to ob-
serve significant differences in the relationship between different domestic and international 
actors in U.S.-South African relations during apartheid, depending on whether individual 
policies are perceived as regulatory, distributive or redistributive, as well as their degree of 
intervention. 
The two graphs in Figure 23 below make clear that U.S. governmental and non-
governmental relations towards South Africa in fact developed quite differently from the start 
of the Carter presidency in January 1977 to the official end of apartheid in April 1994. South 
Africa events involving the U.S. government were significantly more densely reported than 
interactions between U.S. societal actors on the one hand and South Africa on the other. It 
becomes also clear that interactions from the U.S. government towards South Africa were 
overall significantly more cooperative than relations of U.S. societal actors towards that coun-
try. 
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Figure 23: U.S. Governmental vs. Non-Governmental Relations Toward South Africa 1977-1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also within the individual phases of U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa, U.S. 
governmental and non-governmental relations towards South Africa developed differently. 
Where U.S. governmental relations towards South Africa during ‘constructive engagement’ 
were on total cooperative (aggregate score of 143.4), the events involving societal actors from 
the U.S. with regard to South Africa were overwhelmingly conflictive (aggregate score of -
173.5). However, both relationships share the pattern of a decreasing conflict/cooperation 
level during the phase of ‘constructing engagement’, resulting in the lowest level of con-
flict/cooperation in the first half of 1986. U.S. societal South Africa relations reach their most 
conflictive month in March 1986 (score=-52.7). In the same month, on 4 March 1986, the 
South African government temporarily lifted the state of emergency declared in July 1985, 
after months of hard repression against the black population (Washington Post, 13 June 1986, 
p. A26). U.S. governmental relations towards South Africa were most conflictive in June 
1986 (score=-47.7), when the U.S. Congress started to decide on new sanctions bills that 
eventually led to the adoption of the CAAA in October 1986. 
When U.S. non-governmental relations are broken down into South Africa actions 
originating from the U.S. business sector (USABUS) and from U.S. civil society (USACVS), 
respectively, other relational pattern are unfolded (Figure 24). The coded events for South 
Africa relations of the business sector are almost completely positive, that is, predominantly 
cooperative and only sporadically conflictive. By contrast, the orientation of the events in-
cluding U.S. civil society as the source is the complete opposite; such South Africa related 
events were strongly negative until the end of the 1980s, that is, overall conflictive and only 
on rare occasions cooperative. 
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Figure 24: Non-Governmental U.S. South African Relations 1977-1996 (Conflict/Cooperation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same pattern appeared in the individual phases of U.S. societal relations towards 
South Africa from 1977 to 1994 (Table 30). Every phase shows a positive aggregate of the 
conflict/cooperation score for U.S. business relations towards South Africa, whereas South 
Africa initiatives originating in U.S. civil society result in every phase in a negative con-
flict/cooperation score, even though the number of reported events remains rather small 
throughout the whole period of investigation for both dyads. The highly conflictive behavior 
of actors from U.S. civil society during ‘constructive engagement’ (score=-217.1) remains 
outstanding, in particular from mid-1985 until October 1986. This was the time when the 
political debate on economic sanctions against South Africa intensified continuously in the 
U.S. Around the same time, the South African embassy in Washington D.C. was the scene of 
anti-apartheid protests of high publicity. 
Table 30: Summary Statistics for USABUS>ZAFGOV 
 
 Phase Obs. USABUS>ZAF USACVS>ZAF 
  Events/Obs. Score Events/Obs. Score 
 Carter Era 49 0.71  73.4 1.47   -53.0 
 Constructive Engagement 65 1.31  41.8 3.79 -217.1 
 CAAA 57 1.67  70.1 2.11   -36.1 
 Lift of Sanctions 33 0.55  37.5 1.39     -2.8 
 
The conflictual behavior on the part of social actors—mostly from the civil society—
with regard to apartheid is not only displayed in U.S.-South African interactions. It becomes 
manifest in inner-societal relations in the U.S. on the issue of apartheid in South Africa, too. 
Whereas in the Carter era several events between U.S. societal actors with respect to South 
Africa are reported in the data, hardly any such events are reported throughout the first half of 
the 1980s. Then, with the intensifying debate on U.S. sanctions against South Africa, inner 
societal relations in the U.S. with regard to South Africa intensified, reaching their highest 
level of conflict in September 1986 (conflict/cooperation score = -24.3) when the sanctions 
debate reached its culmination point. 
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Let me turn now to the individual U.S. foreign policy interventions and their specific 
domestic conflict characteristics: 
Arms Embargo 1977 
The tightening of the arms embargo in the Carter era in line with the mandatory U.N. arms 
embargo of 1977 (Security Council Resolution 418) was compulsory and can therefore be 
categorized as a regulative policy. The same holds true for the implementation of the resolu-
tion on the part of the U.S. government, banning all sales to the South African policy, mili-
tary, Department of Prisons and the Bureau of State Security. Whereas the imposition of the 
embargo is clearly visible in the data on U.S. governmental relations towards South Africa 
(interaction level of 24 and conflict/cooperation score of -11.9 in October 1977), it provoked 
only a slight conflict in U.S. business relations towards South Africa in the same month. Anti-
apartheid organization in the U.S. embraced the tightening of restrictions on military relations 
with South Africa, although many remained skeptical about the complete implementation of 
these regulations by the U.S. government (Lowi 1972). 
The very temporary and only slightly conflictive reaction from the U.S. business sec-
tor is mostly due to the very narrow circle of actors that have been effectively affected by this 
policy intervention. The degree of intervention with the imposition of the arms embargo was 
therefore highly intrusive into military relations with South Africa but included only a small 
target group of direct addressees. Consequently, and in accordance with Hypotheses 7 and 8, 
only little impact on U.S.-South African relations can be observed. 
Constructive Engagement 1981 
‘Constructive engagement’, in its genesis, was mostly a new effort to settle the dispute over 
Namibia. It aimed at an intensifying diplomatic exchange with the South African government 
rather than seeking a policy of confrontation (see also announcements made by senior State 
Department officials, Associated Press, 16 May 1981). The Reagan administration authorized 
more South African honorary consuls in the United States, granted visas to the South African 
rugby team, reestablished military attachés in South Africa, relaxed controls on non-lethal 
exports that could be used by the South African military and police, and adopted a more 
flexible attitude towards the sale of dual-use military equipment and sophisticated technology. 
These changes demonstrated a weakening of the regulations placed on U.S.-South African 
relations by the Carter administration and showed many characteristics of distributive poli-
cies. 
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These measures taken collectively sent an unmistakable message of a closer relation-
ship between the United States and South Africa (also, Knight 2001: 11). Whereas the policy 
itself was introduced as an incentive to the South African government to change its policies in 
a way that is more favorable to the U.S. government, the respective domestic arena in the U.S. 
remains difficult to assess. The removal of certain restrictions on official U.S.-South African 
relations indicates distributive policy elements because particular groups and sectors were 
given certain advantages compared to the prior situation without harming others. 
Practically, however, anti-apartheid activists in South Africa and around the world 
regarded the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ as a U.S. embrace of the South African 
government that contradicted the claims of the anti-apartheid movement for an international 
isolation of the racist regime. The common attribute ascribed to distributive policies, not 
disadvantaging groups or individuals not directly addressed by the policies, is therefore not 
fulfilled. Rather it showed the policy characteristics of a redistributive policy, where allegedly 
support for one conflict party was almost automatically perceived as a weakened stance to-
wards the other conflict party. 
If the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ is seen mostly as a distributive policy by 
loosening restrictions that were previously imposed on particular actors’ room to maneuver, 
an increasingly cooperative reaction from actors in the respective arena can be expected after 
the policy has been introduced (Hypothesis 5). Such cooperative patterns can in fact be ob-
served during the first two years under ‘constructive engagement’. Since distributive policies 
are considered to be less intervening than regulative policies, both in terms of inclusiveness 
and intrusiveness, the effects on the respective actors’ behavior in this arena remain relatively 
small. 
However, the policy was increasingly perceived as an appeasement of the apartheid 
government’s racist policies and its systematic repression of the non-white population in 
South Africa. The criterion for distributive policies that conflict over the policy remains 
mostly absent and was therefore less and less fulfilled. As a consequence, Hypothesis 5 can 
only be confirmed for a limited period of time in this particular case. As discussed above, 
both the later stages of ‘constructive engagement’ and the early decisions to lift sanctions 
against South Africa show characteristics of redistributive policies; the relaxation of restric-
tions in international relations towards South Africa for one group of actors (with mostly 
economic orientation) was perceived as a development that could jeopardize the objectives of 
another group of actors (most of them strongly engaged in the struggle against apartheid). As 
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Hypothesis 6 postulates, the conflicts between these actors were very persistent on a high 
level throughout almost until the official end of the apartheid system in 1994. As holds for 
other countries, the debate in the U.S. on how to intervene politically against apartheid in 
South Africa was highly ideological too, as is typical for redistributive policy arenas. 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 1986 
In passing the CAAA, the Congress concluded that threatening South Africa was no longer 
sufficient and that a credible policy had to be based on tangible pressure, applying unambigu-
ously a strategy of ‘sticks’ against the South African government’s apartheid system. Moreo-
ver, this new approach in U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa was institutionalized in 
law and could be changed only with the consent of the Congress. The Act introduced there-
fore a clearly regulative policy to U.S.-South African relations since the behavior of individu-
als and groups was directly influenced by regulating behavioral options by implementing 
commands and prohibitions for international affairs with apartheid South Africa. 
As emanates from the conflict/cooperation level displayed in Figure 22 (p. 155) the 
adoption of the CAAA was associated with a high level of conflict within the societal arena of 
U.S.-South African relations at the time the sanctions decision was taken by the Congress 
(score=-24.3). Sharp criticism from the part of U.S. civil society against prior U.S.-South 
African relations preceded the sanctions debates in Congress (most conflictive in March 1986, 
score=-52.7, N=22). At the time of the adoption of the sanctions legislation in October 1986, 
reactions from U.S. civil society were overwhelmingly positive (score=9.8, N=11) and civil 
society-rooted South Africa events developed generally in a more cooperative way but re-
mained overall conflictive until February 1990. 
The more inclusive CAAA caused an abrupt increase in conflict within the domestic 
arena of U.S. foreign policy (as clearly visible in Figure 16). After the CAAA was put into 
force, however, the conflict level went mostly back to its equilibrium. Political events within 
both governmental and non-governmental relations between the U.S. and South Africa also 
indicate that a phase of increasing conflict over the future orientation of U.S. foreign policy 
towards South Africa preceded the imposition of the sanctions legislation. The conflict struc-
ture is very typical for regulative arenas. Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected in this particular 
case. Again, Hypotheses 7 and 8 explain the magnitude of these effects; the CAAA included 
restrictive measures on foreign trade, financial transactions, transportation, and highly sensi-
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tive sectors such as nuclear technology and was therefore quite inclusive. As a national legis-
lation bill, the CAAA was also highly intrusive into these economic sectors. 
Ease of Sanctions 1991/1994 
The ease of the sanction regime in July 1991 was then clearly a rewarding signal to the South 
African government for the steps it had taken towards the dismantlement of apartheid. At first 
sight, the decision to lift the CAAA took place in a distributive arena since no immediate 
disadvantage from such a step could be expected from other groups. However, ANC leaders 
(including Mandela) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 
South Africa as well as top Democratic leaders and the Congressional Black Caucus in the 
U.S. criticized the decision and expected a weakening of their position in the negotiations 
with the South African government (Financial Times, 11 July 1991, p. 14; New York Times, 
11 July 1991, p. A1). This perception contradicts the characteristics of a distributive policy 
and shows characteristics similar to those in redistributive policy arenas. 
Thus, as in the later stages of ‘constructive engagement’, the early decisions to lift 
sanctions against South Africa show characteristics of redistributive policies; the relaxation of 
restrictions in international relations towards South Africa for one group of actors (with 
mostly economic orientation) was perceived as a development that could jeopardize the objec-
tives of another group of actors (most of them strongly engaged in the struggle against apart-
heid). As Hypothesis 6 postulates, the conflicts between these actors were very persistent on a 
high level throughout almost until the official end of the apartheid system in 1994. As holds 
for other countries, the debate in the U.S. on how to intervene politically against apartheid in 
South Africa was highly ideological too, as is typical for redistributive policy arenas. 
To counter his critics, President Bush announced a doubling of U.S. assistance to 
black South Africans from 40 million to 80 million U.S. Dollars (New York Times, 11 July 
1991, p. A1). This strengthening of distributive policies can be seen as compensation to the 
anti-apartheid coalition for perceived disadvantages arising from partially suspending regula-
tions on U.S.-South African relations as they were imposed under the CAAA. On 23 Novem-
ber 1993, President Clinton signed a bill repealing all remaining federal anti-apartheid sanc-
tions, except for the arms embargo and the restrictions on transfer of nuclear technology. This 
lift of sanctions then took place in a mostly distributive arena since the decision hardly pro-
voked any conflict on the part of any actors in the international or domestic domain of U.S. 
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foreign policy. Moreover, at the end of 1993, both anti-apartheid organizations and business 
circles concluded that the time was ripe for such a step. 
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5.2 West Germany 
The South Africa policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) can be charac-
terized as mostly non-interventionist with a moderate change in the mid-1980s. The policy 
was for the most part a consequence of West Germany’s strategic position in the Cold War 
and the country’s aspiration to regain its economical power after World War II. Germany also 
has a special historical relationship with southern Africa stemming from its former colonial 
power status in German South-West Africa (today Namibia) and German East-Africa (today 
part of Tanzania). 
5.2.1 Foundations of German Foreign Policy 
After World War II and throughout the early stages of the Cold War, West Germany’s foreign 
policy was a product of the country’s political and economic circumstances (Baker 1989; 
Hanrieder 1989: 72-77; Lantis 2002: 23). Germany was divided by the “Iron Curtain” and 
therefore located on the front line of the confrontation between the western and eastern bloc. 
Divided between the French, British and U.S. sectors on 23 May 1949, the Federal Republic 
was politically and militarily closely allied with the western victors of World War II. For its 
security, West Germany was highly dependent on the U.S. and hundreds of thousands of 
troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) who were deployed there in the 
1950s to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. 
However, West Germany`s cooperation with NATO combined with a conditional re-
armament was domestically strongly contested. The oppositional Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) led a public campaign against Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963) from the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led governmental coalition and its plans to integrate the 
Federal Republic into NATO. Opponents against such a step believed that rearmament would 
be unconstitutional as well as financially and morally too burdensome for the new Germany. 
But after years of debate, Adenauer was able to establish a domestic coalition to allow West 
German participation in militarized, regional collective security arrangements and the Repub-
lic joined NATO in 1955 (Wenzel 1994; Baumann 2001: 73). 
On an ideological level, too, postwar Germany was deeply affected by the weight of 
the past—by the guilt associated with two world wars, in particular the tens of millions of 
casualties and massive destruction of World War II, twelve years of Nazi rule and the geno-
cide of the Holocaust. Against the backdrop of these experiences, Germans adopted a new 
 179 
democratic political culture that was restrained at the international level and included core 
values such as democracy, consensus-building, gradualism in the policy process, and pacifism 
(Lantis 2002: 71). Wolfgang Hanrieder (2002) in his extensive study of West German foreign 
policy from 1949 to 1989 argues that one must examine such linkages between the internal 
predispositions of the country and conditions in the external environment to understand West 
Germany’s foreign policy. Jeffrey Lantis (1989) demonstrates that these historical develop-
ment have significantly affected German foreign policy from the end of World War II to the 
present day. 
West German foreign policy throughout the Cold War had mostly been oriented to-
ward the western world, in particular to the United States and the partners in Western Europe 
(so-called ‘Westpolitik’ or ‘Westbinding’, see Lantis 2002). Anti-communism was an impor-
tant ideological orientation and one of the most important impulses of German foreign policy 
that was rooted in the influence of U.S. foreign policy objectives (Hanrieder 1989: 23). A 
human rights oriented Südpolitik gained importance at the end of the 1970s, at least on a 
rhetorical level. But a West German peace and human rights policy that was independent 
from U.S. foreign policy hardly could have been said to have developed (Wenzel 1994: 25). 
Instead, economic and strategic policies remained dominant and, to believe Wenzel (1994: 
24-25), seemed even to gain importance during the 1980s. As several authors emphasize, 
economic interests clearly determined German foreign policy regarding South Africa during 
the apartheid era (Wenzel 1994; Löwis of Menar 1976; Verheugen 1986). 
From an institutional perspective, the president of Germany (Bundespräsident) is the 
formal head of state. For historical reasons, however, the president’s power in the German 
political system is limited and comprises mainly representative tasks. By tradition, the presi-
dent takes great care not to take a hand in day-to-day politics. But on the rare occasions he 
does so, he can expect to attract considerable attention, mostly on a moral level. Affairs of the 
state are lead by the federal chancellor (Bundeskanzler) who is the head of the federal gov-
ernment and holds de facto the most powerful position in the German political system. Be-
cause of the well-developed ministerial level, the chancellor has the capacity to make its 
marks also on the international political level, and most German chancellors used this plat-
form to heighten their political profile. The German foreign minister, in most post-war gov-
ernments serving as vice-chancellor at the same time, has a significant influence on the design 
and conduct of German foreign policy. As head of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), the 
German foreign ministry, he also presides over the German diplomatic offices abroad which 
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constitute together with the Foreign Office the Foreign Service (Auswärtiger Dienst) of the 
Federal Republic (Wenzel 1994; Hellmann 2006). 
Another important institutional framework for West German foreign policy has been 
provided by the country’s integration into Western Europe after World War II. According to 
Lantis (2007), West Germany’s recovery after the war was directly related to regional eco-
nomic cooperation in the production of raw materials and industrialization. Germany was 
cofounder of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and entered into the Common 
Market of the European Community in 1957 (Lantis 2002: 231-253). Later, especially Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl (CDU, 1982-1998) and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP, 
1974-1992) became leading voices for broadening and deepening European integration in the 
1980s. 
5.2.2 Germany’s Foreign Policy Toward South Africa 1977-1996 
5.2.2.1 Preconditions and Policies prior to 1977 
After World War II and the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, diplomatic and 
economic relations were reestablished fairly quickly between West Germany and South Af-
rica. South Africa became one of West Germany’s most important trading partners overseas. 
Cheap labor and natural resources encouraged German entrepreneurs to invest in South Af-
rica. Southern Africa also holds quite a significant population of German decent; in the 1970s, 
around 28 percent of white South Africans had German origins (Hanrieder 1989: 332-333). 
Because of early German immigration to the region, well-established economic relations and 
an ideological affinity between German National Socialists and Afrikaner Nationalist, the 
relationship between Germany and South Africa has been historically close. A cultural 
agreement (Kulturabkommen) contracted in 1962 revealed the close relationship between the 
two states (Löwis of Menar 1976: 34). By the mid-1980s, Germany has negotiated only with 
Egypt (1960) and Senegal (1969) similar agreements on the African continent.46 
Decolonialization, the foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 
1963, the growing international political weight of the newly independent African states and 
their determined struggle against colonialism and racism increasingly came to undermine the 
good relations between West Germany and the white minority regime in South Africa. In 
                                                
46 In 1987 followed cultural agreements with Benin, Kenya and Morocco and in 1988 with Cameroon, Somalia 
an the Central African Republic. 
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1963, the West German Foreign Ministry criticized apartheid for the first time publicly 
(Wenzel 1994: 35). West Germany also obeyed the U.N. Security Council’s recommendation 
to impose an arms embargo against South Africa by classifying South Africa as an area of 
tension with a ban on arms exports. 
Under the social-liberal governing coalition of Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD, 1969-
1974), criticism of apartheid became more frequent, and political contacts with the South 
African government were reduced. But there were no signs of a substantially new South 
Africa policy. Occasional verbal condemnations of apartheid had always been worded in a 
way that was not compromising to economic relations between the two states (Wenzel 1994; 
Rode 1975: 35). 
With the entry of West Germany into the U.N. in 1973, a new phase of German 
South Africa policy began (Wenzel 1994; Meyns 1987). Although a fundamentally new for-
eign policy towards South Africa did not become apparent, the region itself gained impor-
tance in West German foreign relations following the overthrow of colonial rule in Mozam-
bique and Angola and intensified conflicts in the region (Wenzel 1994: 34). Due to interna-
tional relaxation and Brandt’s new policy towards Eastern Europe (Ostpolitik), West German 
foreign policy gained greater room for maneuvering. On the other hand, being now a full 
member of the U.N., international demands on West Germany increased. Especially the new 
African states in the U.N. observed Germany’s South African relations and its policy posi-
tions towards colonialism and apartheid closely and with skepticism. 
5.2.2.2 Policy Phases 1977-1996 
West Germany’s foreign policy towards South Africa is characterized by a strict refusal of 
economic sanctions until the mid-1980s. This period, again, can be divided into two distinct 
phases: the period prior to 1 October 1982, when West Germany was governed by a social 
liberal coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Liberals (FDP) under Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt (SPD, 1974-1982), and the period from 1 October 1982, when the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), together with the FDP, over-
threw the social-liberal coalition and elected Helmut Kohl (CDU) as the new chancellor. 
From September 1985, West Germany imposed—in line with the other E.C. member 
states—two packages of economic sanctions against South Africa. The first package was 
decided at the Luxemburg summit of the E.C. foreign ministers on 10 September 1985. The 
sanctions included measures such as a strict compliance with the embargo on exports of arms 
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and paramilitary equipment, a halt to oil exports to South Africa, a ban on the export of sensi-
tive equipment destined for the South African armed forces or police, and a prohibition of all 
new agreements on nuclear cooperation. One year later, the E.C. foreign ministers adopted a 
second package of economic sanctions at the summit in Brussels on 16 September 1986 after 
months of intensive debate. The E.C. members agreed on measures such as a ban on imports 
of iron and steel from South Africa, and a prohibition of new investments in South Africa by 
European companies. But the West German government, together with the Portuguese, vetoed 
a ban on the import of South African coal. A majority of the other E.C. members would have 
supported such a ban that was potentially much more damaging to the South African economy 
that the decided sanctions were. 
The European foreign ministers lifted most remaining South Africa sanctions on 15 
April 1991. The lift of the oil embargo was agreed by the community’s foreign ministers on 6 
April 1992 when they also formally lifted sanctions on sporting and cultural contacts (Guard-
ian, 7 April 1992, p. 6). The embargo on imports and exports of arms and sensitive goods for 
the armed forces, along with other measures affecting military and nuclear cooperation, re-
mained effective until the South African elections in April 1994. 
Table 31: Phases in West German South Africa Policy 1977-1996 
 
Phase Start End 
Social-Liberal Coalition 1969 1 October 1982 
(Motion of no-confidence against 
Chancellor Schmidt) 
Conservative-Liberal Coalition 1 October 1982 
(Election of Chancellor Kohl) 
10 September 1985 
(Adoption of first E.C. package of 
economic sanctions) 
E.C. Economic Sanctions 10 September 1985 
(E.C. sanctions put into force) 
15 April 1991 
(Lift of most E.C. sanctions) 
 
Relaxation/Lift of Sanctions 15 April 1991 
(Lift of most E.C. sanctions) 
27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
Beginning of the new South Africa  27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
4 December 1996 
(South Africa’s Constitutional Court 
approves new constitution) 
 
Table 31 above summarizes these distinct phases in West German foreign policy to-
wards South Africa from 1977 to 1994. 
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5.2.2.3 Policies and Interventions 1977-1996 
Critical Dialogue (1974-1991) 
In the first half of the 1970s, new Marxist governments and growing Soviet influence in 
southern Africa, especially manifest in the liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, 
Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, made the West German government cautious about 
changing its very reserved policy towards the main actors in the region (Wenzel 1994: 38). 
However, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), who took office in 1974, became 
actively involved with the western contact group for Namibia in working towards an inde-
pendent Namibia and overcoming racial discrimination in southern Africa. 
The engagement of the German Foreign Ministry in pursuing a non-violent resolu-
tion to the conflicts in southern Africa resulted in the 1980s in a critical dialogue (kritischer 
Dialog) with the South African government. The Christian-liberal governing coalition under 
Chancellor Kohl tried to engage the South African embassy in Bonn and the South African 
government in permanent, critical dialogue in the form of ‘silent diplomacy’ (Wenzel 1994: 
63-73), best categorized as a ‘sermon’. However, all the contacts between the two govern-
ments occurred through the embassies of the two countries. The German government deliber-
ately abstained from official visits of high-ranking government representatives in South Af-
rica. Minister of State Helmut Schäfer’s visit to South Africa in November 1991 was the first 
visit of an official representative of the ministerial level of the German government since 
1978 (Wenzel 1994: 66). 
Refusal of Economic Sanctions (prior to 1985) 
On the level of material measures, West Germany pursued a rather conservative South Africa 
policy (Wenzel 1994; Verheugen 1986). Instead of imposing restrictive economic measures 
against South Africa, foreign policy under Genscher (1974-1992) focused on a cooling down 
of political-diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime. Sanctions were rejected in part 
because they were viewed as likely to compromise political stability in southern Africa even 
more. First and foremost, however, economic sanctions were refused as a matter of principle. 
This policy position did not fundamentally change from the social-liberal administration 
under Schmidt (1974-1982) to the conservative-liberal governing coalition under Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl (1982-1998). The government outlined the following basic principles of its 
South Africa policy several times in responses to demands or requests from the parliamentary 
opposition to take economic action against the apartheid government (Wenzel 1994: 84): 
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The federal government refuses economic sanctions as a means to enforce politi-
cal goals as a matter of principle. 
Due to its high integration in world markets, West Germany has no interest in 
politicizing and exploiting foreign trade. 
Foreign trade relations, as regulated by the foreign trade law, is principle free. 
Capital flows are in principle not subjected to control. 
How banks and other commercial enterprises design their businesses is their own 
responsibility. 
The federal government meets its international obligations without restrictions 
(U.N. arms embargo, decisions within the E.C.). 
These principles revealed clearly that a political intervention in economic relations 
was not an option at that time. On the highest political level this position was strongly sup-
ported too. Chancellor Kohl was a firm advocate against sanctions. In a September 1986 
debate in the Bundestag, he spoke out on the sanction question in detail and gave the follow-
ing reasons for his rejection of economic sanctions in general and against South Africa in 
particular (Wenzel 1994: 98-99): 
The past has demonstrated that sanctions are not an effective foreign policy in-
strument. 
Sanctions are incompatible with an evolutionary change. They lead to radicaliza-
tion and more bloodshed and jeopardize changes for a peaceful conflict resolution. 
Advocates of sanctions (also within the E.C.) seek them for domestic political 
gains. 
South Africa has been taking precautionary measures in the case of an economic 
embargo. 
Economic sanctions reinforce bulk heading and lead to a hardening of the behav-
ior of the South African government. 
Sanctions cause unemployment of tens of thousand black workers and cause hun-
ger and distress. 
The South African government would refer the consequences of sanctions to its 
neighbor states and so increase the suffering in the region. 
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Additionally, as Wenzel (1994: 84-85) points out, it became clear that the federal 
government was not willing to restrict any economic relations with South Africa, even by 
employing measures that fell short of sanctions, including cutting existing export risk, debt 
guarantees or loans. Thus, the use of ‘sticks’ was not an option for the German government 
until the mid-1980s. 
Limited Action in Line with the E.C. (1977-1991) 
Limited revisions to German-South Africa policy had been initiated primarily on the Euro-
pean level. In 1977, the member states of the European Community (E.C.) adopted for the 
first time a collective strategy designed to end apartheid and to encourage the economic inde-
pendence of South Africa’s economically less-developed neighbors. Two respective policy 
instruments were introduced to work towards an achievement these goals: 
1) the E.C. Code of Conduct, an ethical code for European corporations and their subsidiar-
ies doing business in or with South Africa, and 
2) the Lomé Convention, through which assistance was provided for the South African 
Frontline states. 
Besides some coordinated diplomatic initiatives, these two instruments remained the 
only E.C. measures regarding South Africa until 1985 (Holland 1988a; Holland 1988b). The 
Code of Conduct was decided by the foreign ministers of the nine Common Market countries 
on 12 July 1977, following recent efforts by the U.S. Carter administration to force changes in 
South Africa’s racial policies (Washington Post, 13 July 1977, p. A11). But the code was 
purely advisory and put only moral pressure on E.C. companies to grant their black employ-
ees higher wages and better trade union rights than they had done previously. The mode of 
intervention was therefore more ‘sermon’ than ‘stick’ with a quite narrow circle of included 
addressees and only symbolic intrusion in the affairs of European business in South Africa. In 
November 1985, the E.C. member states adopted a slightly stricter code of conduct for Euro-
pean companies operating in South Africa, calling on them to pay equal wages and train and 
promote black workers (Associated Press, 20 November 1985). 
A first package of economic sanctions was decided at the Luxemburg summit of the 
E.C. foreign ministers on 10 September 1985—just one day after U.S. President Reagan 
announced some limited economic sanctions against South Africa, including banning most 
loans to the South African government and limiting trade with computers and nuclear tech-
nology. Nine of the ten Common Market leaders plus incoming members Spain and Portugal 
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supported a similar set of (perceived as rather mildly) punitive measures (‘stick’) against the 
South African government. Only Britain withheld its approval and prevented a unanimous 
agreement on the package. The adopted sanctions included: 
- a strict compliance with the embargo on exports of arms and paramilitary equipment and a 
halt to imports of such equipment from South Africa; 
- the refusal to cooperate on military matters and the recall of military attaches accredited to 
South Africa as well as the refusal to recognize South Africa's military attaches in Com-
mon Market nations; 
- a halt to oil exports to South Africa. Currently no oil is exported to South Africa; 
- a ban on the export of sensitive equipment destined for the South African armed forces or 
police; 
- a prohibition on any new agreements on nuclear cooperation. 
While announcing the sanctions, all of the participating E.C. member states endorsed 
a political statement urging South Africa to lift the state of emergency and to repeal all forms 
of apartheid. The statement also called for the release of black leader Nelson Mandela and 
other political prisoners, as well as the abolition of forced relocation and detention without 
trial (Associated Press, 9 and 10 September 1985; New York Times, 11 September 1985, p. 
A1; Washington Post, 11 September 1985, p. A1). 
West Germany accepted the sanctions package but officials reported that it was, to-
gether with Britain and Belgium, among the firmest opponents of any significant new sanc-
tions (Associated Press, 11 September 1985). This opposition was not surprising since Britain 
and West Germany were South Africa’s biggest trading partners at the time, supplying more 
than 25 percent of South African imports. Belgium opposed meaningful sanctions because its 
gem-cutting industry imports over $1 billion worth of South African diamonds a year. France 
and the Netherlands, on the other hand, which led the campaign for significant action against 
South Africa, had much less significant economic ties with South Africa (Associated Press, 
11 September 1985). 
In the follow-up of the sanctions decision at the E.C. level, a heated debate on the 
consequences of this decision for German foreign policy towards South Africa arose in the 
Bundestag on 3 October 1985. In the lead-up to the debate, the governing coalition partners of 
the CSU and parts of the CDU had criticized Foreign Minister Genscher sharply for his ac-
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ceptance of the E.C. sanctions. Chancellor Kohl, too, did not seem to be willing to make a 
clear public statement in support of the E.C. measures (Wenzel 1994: 100-106). But since the 
European sanctions decision was regarded as rather symbolic with hardly any significant 
changes in policy, the apparent dissent between foreign ministry and chancellery was rather 
more significant to the domestic debate than for the actual foreign policy towards South Af-
rica itself. At that time, Germany—together with the other Common Market countries—
already had banned exports of armaments and nuclear material and prohibited military coop-
eration with South Africa (Associated Press, 11 September 1985). Thus, for the most part, the 
measures adopted at the September 1985 Council meeting brought into harmony bilateral 
practices that were already in place. The only contentious move was the ending of the accredi-
tation of military attachés with Pretoria (Wenzel 1994: 415). 
At the European Council in The Hague on 26 and 27 June 1986, the heads of gov-
ernment from the twelve E.C. member countries debated new restrictive measures against 
South Africa but were unable to agree on new sanctions. Instead, the governments of the 
Community members announce some rather mild measures and urged the South African 
government to free Nelson Mandela. They also announced that they would send the British 
Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to South Africa. His mission was to try to persuade the 
apartheid government to open talks on South Africa’s political future with the black majority 
(Associated Press, 26 and 27 June 1986,; New York Times 27 June 1986, p. A7, 28 June 1986, 
p. A3; Washington Post, 28 June 1986, p. A19). The heads of government of the twelve also 
tentatively agreed on a ban on purchases of South African coal. But West Germany vetoed 
this proposal later, saying such a measure would create unacceptable hardship among black 
mine workers (New York Times, 17 September 1986, p. A1). 
On 16 September 1986, the foreign ministers of the twelve E.C. countries agreed at 
their summit in Brussels to impose limited new economic sanctions on South Africa, saying 
that the South African government had failed to respond to their appeals to dismantle apart-
heid (New York Times, 17 September 1986, p. A1; Washington Post, 17 September 1986, p. 
A1). The officials agreed on: 
- a ban on imports of iron and steel from South Africa, 
- a ban on imports of Krugerrand gold coins from South Africa, 
- a prohibition of new investments in South Africa by European companies. 
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Germany’s lead in blocking efforts to ban imports of South African coal was sharply 
criticized by France, Denmark and the Netherlands, which urged other E.C. members to em-
brace tougher economic sanctions against South Africa (Associated Press, 16 September 
1986; New York Times, 17 September 1986, p. A1; Washington Post, 17 September 1986, p. 
A1). The opposition parties in the German Bundestag, too, criticized the government’s suc-
cessful move to weaken E.C. sanctions (Associated Press, 16 September 1986; Washington 
Post, 18 September 1986, p. A28). 
Again, the tightening of sanctions coincided with new South Africa sanctions that 
had been adopted by the U.S. Congress and sent to President Reagan for approval. However, 
the European sanctions fell well short of the newest U.S. sanctions moves and were clearly 
less interventionist than the measures to be adopted in the U.S. one month later, both in terms 
of inclusiveness and intrusiveness. In addition to banning imports of gold coins, iron and steel 
and stopping new investments, the U.S. Congress has barred purchases of South African coal, 
uranium and textiles. The exclusion of coal imports from the E.C. measure weakened the 
expected economic and social effects of the European sanctions significantly. According to 
the New York Times (17, September 1986, p. A1) the Common Market countries spent in 
1985 about 1.2 billion U.S. Dollars for South African coal, more than twice as much as the 
500 million U.S. Dollars they spent on iron, steel and gold coins. Moreover, experts believed 
that South Africa would have had difficulty to find alternative outlets for its coal in the glutted 
energy market if Europe were to ban imports. 
Despite its previous opposition to economic sanctions, the German government sup-
ported and was willing to implement the latest E.C. measures. The new sanctions decision did 
not meet with the domestic opposition the sanctions of 1985 did. Differences within the gov-
erning coalition, like those from the year before, were mostly missing. According to Meyns 
(1988a) and Wenzel (1987), two main developments contributed to this stronger agreement 
between the governing parties of the CDU, CSU and FDP: First, since the adoption of the first 
E.C. sanctions package in 1985, Chancellor Kohl spoke out publicly on the sanctions question 
several times and intervened on the E.C. level successfully against more restrictive sanctions 
(together with Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and representatives of the Portu-
guese government). 
The Common Market ban on iron and steel imports took effect on 27 September 
1986 (see Holland 1988a for a detailed overview of adopted measures and their level of appli-
cation). On 15 April 1991, the European foreign ministers lifted most remaining sanctions 
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against South Africa. The lift of the E.C. oil embargo against South Africa was agreed by the 
Community’s foreign ministers on 6 April 1992, when they also formally lifted sanctions on 
sporting and cultural contacts (Guardian, 7 April 1992, p. 6). The (only recommendatory) oil 
embargo of the U.N. General Assembly, however, was not lifted before December 1993 when 
the Assembly announced that South Africa had fulfilled the requirements for such a lifting 
when the South African Transitional Executive Council had started effectively to act. This 
announcement marked at the same time the end of all U.N. sanctions against South Africa 
(United Nations 1994). The E.C.’s embargo on imports and exports of arms and sensitive 
goods for the armed forces, along with other measures affecting military and nuclear cooper-
ation, remained effective until the South African elections in April 1994. 
Positive Measures (1985/1986) 
Parallel to the beginning of the imposition of restrictive measures against South Africa from 
September 1985, the E.C. members started to adopt so-called positive measures to assist the 
disadvantaged people in southern Africa. These aid programs were designed to assist (1) non-
violent anti-apartheid organizations, particularly the churches, (2) the education of the non-
white population, including grants for university studies, (3) the South African Development 
Coordination Conference (S.A.D.C.C.) and the Frontline states, (4) the cultivation of more 
awareness among the citizens of the E.C. member states residing in South Africa, and (5) the 
intensification of contacts with the non-white community in a variety of sectors (Wenzel 
1994: 312). The goal of these distributive measures was to strengthen South African civil 
society, as they were regarded as an incentive to shore-up democratic development within 
South Africa. 
At The Hague European Council summit of June 1986, the Community further en-
dorsed a “concerted European programme of assistance to the victims of apartheid” (Associ-
ated Press, 27 June 1986). The responsibility for its implementation was to be shared by the 
Community and the member states bilaterally. The September 1986 statement added no new 
aid programs, although the ministers underlined the importance they attached to the strength-
ening and more effective coordination of the positive measures being taken (Holland 1988b: 
312). 
The German Federal government supported the positive E.C. measures financially 
with a share of 27 percent (Holland 1988b: 108). Already in 1981, the German foreign minis-
try initiated a special program on southern Africa (Sonderprogramm Südliches Afrika) to 
improve the quality of educational opportunities available to the non-white population in 
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South Africa. Between 1981 and 1990 the government spent 33 Million Deutsche Mark in 
total on the program (Wenzel 1994: 107). 
5.2.3 Actor Coalitions and Decision-making 
The investigation period from 1977 to 1996 spans two German federal governing coalitions: 
the social-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP under Chancellor Helmut Schmitt (1974-1982), 
and the conservative Christian Democrat-liberal coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP under Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl (1982-1996). In the parliamentary system of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the main political conflict line typically runs between the governing coalition on 
one side and the parliamentary opposition on the other. Foreign policy during the period from 
1974 to 1992, however, differs from this traditional pattern. The foreign ministry was occu-
pied for the whole 18 years (with a short break during the SPD minority government in 1982) 
by the same foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. As a key leader of the junior coalition 
partner FDP, Genscher was able to moderate policies of the major coalition partners, working 
both with SPD and CDU. 
Genscher stood for continuity in West German foreign policy. However, during the 
social-liberal governing coalition (until 1982), the oppositional CDU/CSU criticized him 
heavily for his new policy approaches in southern Africa, especially with regard to Namibia. 
The CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag accused the liberation movements of massacres 
against civilians, and the federal government’s contacts with such organizations were con-
demned. In contrast, official CDU/CSU representatives called for support of the Botha gov-
ernment and recognition of its purported economic and political achievements for southern 
Africa (e.g., in the Bundestag’s Africa debate on 18 January 1980). Within the major govern-
ing party, the SPD, factions critical of West German policy toward South Africa also began to 
emerge in response to their sympathy for the cause of the liberation movements in southern 
Africa, and their desire for stronger international action against white-minority rule. But these 
critical voices met with little new response from their party’s representatives in the Bunde-
stag, and their claims hardly penetrated the social-liberal coalition governing South Africa 
policy (Wenzel 1994: 41). 
Substantial controversies over South Africa emerged from the start of the conserva-
tive-liberal governing coalition under Chancellor Kohl (1982-1996). The main conflict mani-
fested between Foreign Minister Genscher and the leader of the coalition partner CSU, Franz 
Josef Strauss, minister president (prime minister) of Bavaria (1978-1988). Strauss lobbied 
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fiercely against a continuation of the social-liberal coalition’s South Africa policy under the 
new conservative-liberal government. Still in the opposition, the CDU/CSU faction in parlia-
ment, and especially CSU chairman Strauss, criticized Genscher’s South Africa policy 
sharply and demanded a reorientation in West German-South African relations (Wenzel 1994: 
60). 
The controversy between Genscher and Strauss created tension between the foreign 
ministry and the CSU-led Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, as 
well as between the junior coalition partner FDP on the one side and CSU and parts of the 
CDU majority coalition partner on the other. With regard to upcoming coalition talks at the 
outset of the conservative-liberal governing coalition, CDU and CSU elaborated an internal 
paper with theses (Thesenpapier) on the future orientation of the coalition’s foreign policy.47 
The theses diverged, at least partly, from former policy positions that were advocated by the 
FDP-dominated foreign ministry. Whereas the CDU later distanced itself from the paper, the 
CSU wanted to negotiate the individual claims with Foreign Minister Genscher. 
Differences between the CSU and Genscher were obvious also with respect to Na-
mibia. The CSU demanded a suspension of purported German support for the “pro-
communist and terrorist” SWAPO and called for a disengagement from U.N. Resolution 435, 
which Genscher had always referred to as a key to the resolution of the Namibia question. 
Regarding South Africa, too, the CSU formulated different goals for a future German foreign 
policy. The party did not explicitly call for an abolition of apartheid. Instead, the CSU made 
demands on “establishing equal treatment of the different population groups in their access to 
public facilities,” “ending discrimination at work” and called for “preserving the enormous 
industrial and agricultural South African forces.” The theses also included approval of sepa-
rate development of the different ethnic groups in South Africa and criticized international 
support for the South African liberation movement (Wenzel 1994: 46-49, 60-61). 
In conjunction with the elaboration of a governmental response to a parliamentary 
motion of the oppositional SPD entitled “Die Politik der Bundesregierung im südlichen Af-
rica” (The policy of the federal government in southern Africa) later in 1983, the different 
policy positions on South Africa within the governing coalition once again became apparent. 
Already the six months that were taken to answer the parliamentary request indicated coordi-
                                                
47 See Frankfurter Rundschau, 30 March 1983, pp. 10-11: “Entspannung muss unterbrechbar sein: Ein internes 
Papier von CDU und CSU für die noch ausstehenden Koalitionsgespräche über die künftige Orientierung der 
deutschen Aussenpolitik.“ 
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nation problems within the governing coalition (Wenzel 1994: 61). According to Wenzel 
(1994), the CSU cabinet members Warnke (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and 
Development) and Zimmermann (Federal Ministry of the Interior) in particular, but also 
Defense Minister Wörner (CDU), resisted the federal ministry’s initial proposal to the parlia-
mentary motion. However, in spite of interference from CSU chairman Strauss, Genscher 
stood up to the internal coalition attacks, and the cabinet approved the foreign ministry’s 
position with only minor changes (Wenzel 1994; Hofmeier 1989: 61-62). 
This decision, however, did not prompt CSU and Strauss to accept the foreign minis-
try’s policy guidelines regarding South Africa. Moreover, the controversies between the 
foreign ministry and the political circle around Strauss became a permanent issue in the 
1980s, partly because Chancellor Kohl hardly made use of his policy-making power (Richt-
linienkompetenz) on the South African issue. As Wenzel (1994: 62) noted, Kohl avoided a 
clear statement in favor of Genscher’s position for some time out of respect for the CDU’s 
sister-party CSU and because of his rivalry with Strauss. In addition, South Africa seemed to 
have played only a minor role in Kohl’s policy considerations. Not until 1988, when a visit by 
Strauss to South Africa attracted domestic and international attention and irritation (see, e.g., 
New York Times, 31 January 1988, p. 19), did Kohl defend the principles of German foreign 
policy towards South Africa under apartheid and criticize Strauss for acting on his own 
authority without prior consultation of the government (Bundestag session on 4 February 
1988). 
5.2.4 Intervention Analysis 
Figure 25 shows the level of interaction for West German relations towards South Africa from 
January 1977 to December 1996 as displayed in the dataset. This interaction level is generated 
by the number of coded events per month with the West Germany as the source and South 
Africa as the target of these events. The chart also shows the different phases in West German 
foreign policy towards South Africa under apartheid as they were identified in Section 
5.2.2.2: 1) the social-liberal coalition under Chancellor Schmidt until 1 October 1982, 2) the 
first period under new Chancellor Kohl when the German government explicitly rejected 
economic sanctions against South Africa (10/1982-09/1985), 3) the era of economic sanctions 
in line with the other E.C. members (10/1985-3/1991), 4) the phase of relaxation and lift of 
these sanctions (4/1991-3/1994) and 5) the time of the beginning of the democratic South 
Africa from 27 April 1994. 
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Figure 25: Interaction Level DEU>ZAF 1977-1996 
 
The time line makes clear that West German South African relations were only co-
vered sporadically by international media being the empirical source in this study. The rela-
tionship, as reported by the news source used to code the dataset, shows two phases of intensi-
fied interactions from West Germany towards South Africa. The first of these two phases 
occurred during the second half of 1981 after South Africa invaded Angola in August 1981 
and the West German government condemned this action sharply, both bilaterally with formal 
diplomatic protest and within the U.N. (e.g., Associated Press, 26 August 1981). In the same 
period, the U.N. General Assembly held a special session on the future of Namibia (Associ-
ated Press, 9 September 1981). Together with the U.S., Britain, France and Canada, the West 
German government had been involved for more than three years by then in negotiations with 
South Africa to organize U.N.-supervised elections in this former German colony. 
The second phase of higher reported interaction in the West German-South African 
dyad spans the period of the debate and adoption of economic sanctions within the framework 
of the E.C. (September 1985 to September 1986). It is also remarkable that after the settle-
ment in Namibia with the free democratic elections in November 1989, hardly any interna-
tional events between West Germany and South Africa were reported anymore. Not until the 
official end of apartheid in South Africa with the country’s general elections in April 1994, 
the reported interaction level starts to slightly increase again. 
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Figure 26: Conflict/Cooperation DEU>ZAF 1977-1996 
 
The conflict/cooperation level between the two nations (as displayed in Figure 26) 
indicates that the reported relationship between West Germany and South Africa during apar-
theid was predominantly cooperative. Especially in the time of the social-liberal coalition in at 
the end of the 1970s, the conflict/cooperation level was consistently positive (Table 31). Only 
two negative peaks can be identified during this period. The first slightly conflictive month 
was May 1979 when representatives of the U.S., Britain, France, Canada and West Germany 
met with South African President Vorster and rejected South Africa’s latest plan for Namib-
ian independence (e.g., Associated Press, 15 May 1977). 
Also the second conflictive period in April-May 1979 was associated with the situa-
tion in Namibia when the five Western nations brought forward a new proposal for a settle-
ment (e.g., Associated Press, 2 April 1979). The conflictive pattern at the end of the liberal-
coalition then was a result of sharp international criticism—including a formal protest note 
from the West German government—because of South Africa’s invasion of Angola in late 
August 1981 (e.g., Associated Press, 26 August 1981). 
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Table 32: Phases Summary Statistics for DEU>ZAF 
 
 Phase Period Obs. Interaction Conflict-Cooperation 
   Agg Mean Agg Mean Min Max 
 Social-Lib. Coalition 01/1977-09/1982 69 55 0.80 88.2 1.3 -6.9 11.0 
 Cons.-Lib. Coalition 10/1982-09/1985 36 18 0.50 7.5 7.5 -8.2 7.0 
 E.C. Sanctions 10/1985-03/1991 66 56 0.85 46.4 0.7 -12.9 8.6 
 Lift of Sanctions 04/1991-03/1994 36 5 0.13 1.1 0.0 -6.0 6.5 
 New South Africa 04/1994-12/1996 33 11 0.33 28.4 0.9 0 10 
 
The first half of the new 1980s were characterized by a series of cooperative events 
between West Germany and South Africa, resulting from new proposals targeted at the South 
African government aiming at a political solution on the Namibia question. The relations then 
reached their so far most conflictive momentum from Mai to September 1985 when the E.C. 
members debate on a first package of economic sanctions against South Africa. In September 
1986, the relationship hit its rock bottom when the German government—in line with the 
other E.C. members—adopted the second package of economic sanctions at the E.C. foreign 
ministers’ summit on 16 September 1986 (e.g., Associated Press, 16 September 1986; New 
York Times, 17 September 1986, p. A1). 
Throughout to September 1987, events between West Germany and South Africa were 
occasionally reported by the international media, indicating a continued improvement of the 
relations between the two countries. In May 1988, U.S. media reported a study from the Gen-
eral Accounting Office saying that Japan and West Germany have replaced the U.S. as top 
trader with South Africa (Associated Press, 18 May 1988; 19 May 1988) and portrayed the 
relationship between West Germany and South Africa as rather cooperative. From summer 
1989, as already mentioned, practically no German-South African events were reported any-
more. 
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5.3 Sweden 
Sweden’s foreign policy towards South Africa under apartheid can be characterized as inter-
ventionist with a distinct policy of isolating the apartheid government. The Swedish govern-
ment intensified this policy time and again from 1977 to the early 1990s and remained an 
opponent of the South African government in the United Nations throughout that time. Swe-
den provided substantial humanitarian and development aid to black-rule countries neighbor-
ing South Africa and gave significant political and financial support to southern African 
liberation movements, particularly the ANC and SWAPO. With its firm opposition to apart-
heid, Sweden took—together with its Nordic partners—an exceptional position in the Western 
South Africa boycott movement. In the 1980s, Sweden’s complete trade embargo against 
South Africa went farther than any other Western nation’s anti-apartheid sanctions. 
5.3.1 Foundations of Swedish Foreign Policy 
The foreign policy of Sweden, a monarchy with a modern constitution (e.g., Larsson 1997), is 
based on the premise that national security is best served by staying free of alliances in peace-
time in order to remain neutral in the event of war. Sweden declared its neutrality for the first 
time in 1914, together with Denmark and Norway, and renewed this declaration in September 
1939. Especially after World War II, neutrality became a key element of Swedish national 
identity. With its self-image as a small (but not unimportant) peaceful country that wisely 
avoided war, believed in human rights, and kept itself neutral in the divided world of the Cold 
War, the Swedes developed a very positive view of neutrality. According to Wilhelm Agrell, 
Swedish neutrality was first and foremost an emotional concept (Wenzel 1994: 181). On the 
political level, however, neutrality gave Sweden a specific political influence. The number of 
non-aligned industrialized western states was small, and Sweden enjoyed the benefit of a 
well-established international network and considerable goodwill as a proponent of the “mid-
dle way” between the two superpowers (Agrell 1998: 183). In the 1950s and early 1960s, for 
example, Sweden mainly used this international influence in promoting negotiations for dis-
armament within the U.N. framework. 
Sweden joined the U.N. in 1946, and its active involvement in the world organization 
heavily influenced its foreign and security policy. However, the potential obligation as a U.N. 
member to participate in military and economic sanctions against an offending country was 
seen as problematic in terms of Sweden’s neutrality. Sweden’s concern was also rooted in the 
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failure of the previous collective security system under the League of Nations and in its non-
alignment policy. But since all permanent Security Council members had to agree on such 
actions (a similar veto option did not exist in the League of Nation), U.N. membership was 
regarded as compatible with Sweden’s policy of neutrality (Agrell 1998). 
The east-west intransigence within the U.N. Security Council during the Cold War 
was determinant for Swedish foreign policy. For example, the Swedish government referred 
explicitly to the U.N. Security Council as the only body that could impose economic sanctions 
based on Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Swedish government also used this argument 
when explaining its (negative) position on such measures against the racist regimes in South 
Africa and the Portuguese colonies in southern Africa in the 1960s and early 1970s—knowing 
that there was no risk that such measures could be taken given the current world political 
order. The strong connection between Swedish foreign policy and the U.N. can also be ex-
plained by Sweden’s position in the international political system as a relatively small state 
with only little political, economic and military power. Strengthening international law is 
considered more beneficial to small states than to large ones, because international law is 
equally applicable to everyone, taking no account of how powerful the individual parties are. 
Individually or in joint action with the other Nordic countries, Sweden participated actively in 
international organizations and has always demonstrated a strong commitment to international 
law. But this Nordic model of foreign policy, to believe Hans Mouritzen (1998) has become 
less important since 1991, when Sweden shifted its foreign policy attention more strongly 
towards the European Union, to which it gained membership in 1995. 
But Sweden’s active role as an opinion leader and critic as well as mediator in inter-
national politics has not been without contradiction and has displayed some—at least poten-
tial—divergence from these key goals of traditional Swedish foreign policy. On the one side, 
there is Sweden’s moral foreign policy with its active and public participation in international 
opinion-building and its contribution to strengthening international law. On the other side, 
through various types of mediation and bridge-building efforts, Sweden engages in interna-
tional mediation as a contribution to international security and peace and to improve its inter-
national status and prestige. Combining the two strategies, as depicted by Ulf Bjereld (1995), 
could prove problematic since their objectives may not coincide. Exactly because of such a 
conflict, for example, Sweden was not able contribute troops to U.N. peacekeeping forces in 
Namibia to monitor the implementation of the U.N. plan for the country’s independence after 
74 years of South African rule. Sweden was expected to contribute troops, but South Africa 
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vetoed the Swedish participation, fearing the Swedes would not be impartial due to the coun-
try’s longstanding support for the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO (Associated Press, 
23 February 1989). 
5.3.2 Sweden’s Foreign Policy Toward South Africa 1977-1996 
5.3.2.1 Preconditions and Policies prior to 1977 
Until the 1950s, relations between Sweden and South Africa were generally friendly. Only 
few raised their voices against white minority rule and oppression of the non-white majority 
in South Africa. There were a fair number of travelers between the two countries, and trade 
and commerce blossomed. At the time when the apartheid system was consolidated after the 
National Party came to power in 1948, South Africa occupied the third position among Swe-
den’s non-European trading partners, only surpassed by the United States and Argentina. For 
example, Sweden was the world’s second largest buyer of South African fruit (Bjereld 1995: 
3). 
However, the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 was a watershed for public opin-
ion formation in Sweden towards South Africa (Sellström 2004, 1999). After this event, 
public awareness of the oppression in southern Africa rose quickly, and the governments of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden initiated the first and deeply symbolic meetings with repre-
sentatives from the liberation movements in southern Africa, especially SWAPO in Namibia 
and the ANC in South Africa (Sellström 2004: 23; Bjereld 1995: 5-6). In December 1961, the 
Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded ANC President, Chief Albert Luthuli with the Nobel 
Peace Prize. The nomination was initiated by the former Swedish missionary in South Africa 
and leading anti-apartheid activist, Gunnar Helander. Thirty-four members of the Swedish 
parliament supported Luthuli’s candidacy (Sellström 2004: 112-113; 1999: 6). Both the ANC 
and Luthuli had just been banned from the South African government, and the award was 
therefore a clear political signal of disapproval towards the apartheid regime in South Africa 
on the part of Sweden. 
After the Social Democratic government had started to take a closer interest in inter-
national development issues in the mid-1950s, partly in response to mounting pressure from 
student and youth organizations, the Swedish government extended its continuous support for 
the liberation movements in southern Africa in the following years. In May 1969, the Swedish 
parliament endorsed a policy of direct assistance to the liberation movements in southern 
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Africa, and Sweden became the first western country to enter into a relationship with organi-
zations that were elsewhere in the West shunned as ‘communist’ or ‘terrorist’ (Sellström 
2004: 232-238). The Swedish government’s support to the ANC was mostly financial and 
diplomatic in nature. Strongly motivated by humanitarian considerations, the government’s 
efforts aimed at strengthening the ANC as an organization that is able to develop its capacities 
in various (non-military) fields (Sellström 2004: 238; 1999: 11). 
5.3.2.2 Policy Phases 1977-1996 
In spite of popular demands from the politically well-organized and broadly supported anti-
apartheid movement, the Swedish government had taken a reserved position on economic 
sanctions until the second half of the 1970s, just as other western government’s had done. A 
strategy to restrict economic relations between Sweden and South Africa was then adopted 
during Prime Minister Olof Palme’s first term as Swedish prime minister (1969-1976). But 
Sweden’s first economic sanction, a freeze on Swedish investments in South Africa, became 
possible only during the short rule of a minority government led by Ola Ullsten from the 
Liberal Party (18 October 1978 to 12 October 1979). Palme’s Social Democratic opposition 
supported this decision, and Sweden was the first western country to impose such a freeze on 
investments in South Africa (Associated Press, 5 May 1985). 
Governing coalition changes in the 1980s and early 1990s did not have a fundamen-
tal effect on the country’s foreign policy. The Swedish anti-apartheid policy was broadly 
supported and the Swedish government had only little room for maneuver. Palme, back in 
office as prime minister from 1982, continued Sweden’s anti-apartheid course vehemently. 
After Palme’s assassination in February 1986, new Prime Minister Ingvar Carlson (Social 
Democrat) stemmed first against stricter South Africa sanctions but had to give in under 
political pressure (Associated Press, 8 August 1986). The complete trade embargo, decided in 
March 1987 that became effective on 1 July 1987, stood for a new interpretation of Swedish 
neutrality, which had previously ruled out Swedish participation in trade sanctions unless they 
were agreed to by the U.N. Security Council (Financial Times, 13 March 1987, p. 4). But 
such sanctions in the U.N. failed in February 1987 in the face of vetoes from the U.S. and 
Britain. The unilateral Swedish trade embargo resulted in a complete break of economic 
relations between Sweden and South Africa and can therefore be regarded as a second phase 
of intensified Swedish opposition against the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
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Table 33 summarizes these distinct phases in Swedish foreign policy towards South 
Africa from 1977 to 1994. 
Table 33: Phases in Swedish South Africa Policy 1977-1996 
 
Phase Start End 
Towards Economic Sanctions (1977) 1 July 1979 
(South Africa Act comes into force) 
 
Investment Freeze 1 July 1979 
(South Africa Act comes into force) 
 
12 March 1986 
(Adoption of the trade embargo) 
Complete Trade Embargo 1 July 1987 
(Trade embargo becomes effective) 
30 September 1993 
(Lift of Swedish sanctions) 
 
Relaxation/Lift of Sanctions 30 September 1993 
(Lift of Swedish sanctions) 
27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
Beginning of the new South Africa  27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
4 December 1996 
(South Africa’s Constitutional Court 
approves new constitution) 
 
5.3.2.3 Policies and Interventions 1977-1996 
Financial Aid to the ANC (from 1969) 
Swedish aid to the Frontline states and liberation movements in southern Africa started as 
early as the 1960s. The Swedish government has supported refugees from South Africa since 
1962 and continuously increased the contributions to different funds (such as the U.N. Trust 
for South Africa, U.N. Education and Training Programme for Southern Africa, International 
Defence and Aid Fund) over the following years. The most significant part of Swedish sup-
port, however, was the humanitarian aid that had been given directly to liberation movements 
in South Africa. Sweden was the biggest single contributor to the ANC, supporting the orga-
nization with 110 million Kronor (13.3 million U.S. Dollars) (according to press information, 
see Associated Press, 11 December 1993). The Swedish government even continued support-
ing the ANC financially until January 1994, when the aid stopped three months before the 
South African elections (Associated Press, 11 December 1993). The goal of this financial aid 
was to strengthen the South African opposition and civil society in order to promote democ-
ratic development in South Africa. 
Nordic Action Program (1978/1985) 
Sweden developed the Nordic policy program together with its Nordic partners of Denmark, 
Norway, Finland and Iceland. The Nordic states remained the only Western states that im-
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posed significant economic sanctions against South Africa before the mid-1980s. Their action 
program was adopted in a meeting in Oslo in March 1978 and included the four governments’ 
intention to ban new investments in South Africa, to limit operations of Nordic countries 
there, to cut cultural and sports links with South Africa and to increase their support for the 
liberation movements and the refugees and victims of apartheid in southern Africa. However, 
the Nordic Action Program was mostly a coordination instrument with a rather low level of 
intervention. Both in terms of their inclusiveness and intrusiveness; the individual measures 
had to be taken by the national governments. 
On a two-day meeting in Oslo in October 1985, the five Nordic countries stiffened 
sanctions against South Africa by banning the import of Krugerrand gold coins along with 
other measures aimed at restricting investment, trade and transport. All new contracts in the 
nuclear field and export of computer equipment that may be used by the South African secu-
rity forces were also prohibited under a tightened Program of Actions (Times, 15 August 
1986; Inter-Press Service, 18 October 1985). This ‘stick’ against the South African govern-
ment in the form of tightened sanctions came against the backdrop of growing demands to 
impose mandatory sanctions against Pretoria at the 40th session of the U.N. General Assembly 
in New York. Against the opposition of Britain and the United States in the Security Council, 
the Nordic foreign ministers reaffirmed their support for such measures (Inter Press Service, 
18 October 1985). The Nordic governments therefore called for the U.N. Security Council, 
the E.C. and other international forums to increase pressure on South Africa. 
Ban on Investments (1979/1985-1993) 
The Swedish government banned all new Swedish investments in South Africa from 1979 
(Washington Post, 12 July 1979, p. F2). The so-called “South Africa Act” came into force on 
1 July 1979 as an implementation of the decision that had been taken one year before in the 
Nordic Council. The ban prohibited the formation of any new Swedish companies in South 
Africa or Namibia. Swedish-owned subsidiaries already operating in those countries were 
forbidden from making any further investments in fixed assets (Sellström 2004: 24). How-
ever, the ban excluded ventures based on license agreements. 
In November 1984, the government of Prime Minister Palme presented a bill to par-
liament that extended the law to also cover-leasing arrangements, an exception by which 
Swedish companies had skirted the earlier ban. After a fierce debate, the Riksdag approved 
the proposal on 20 February 1985, thereby significantly tightening the regulation (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1985). 
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The ban on investments was lifted at the end of September 1993, two weeks after the 
cabinet approved the lifting of the Swedish trade embargo against South Africa. According to 
media reports (e.g., Inter-Press Service, 30 September 1993), the government was influenced 
by a call from ANC leader Mandela to the international community two weeks before to lift 
investments embargoes against South Africa. During separate but simultaneous visits to Swe-
den in December 1993, both de Klerk and Mandela called for new investments in their home 
country and claimed that economical stability was a prerequisite for political stability in South 
Africa (Associated Press, 11 December 1993). 
Trade Embargo (1987-1993) 
Sweden was the first country to announce a complete trade embargo against South Africa in 
May 1987 after attempts to impose mandatory sanctions failed in the U.N. Security Council 
earlier in the year. Disappointed about this failure, Sweden’s Social Democratic government 
decided to take unilateral action and abandoned its previous policy governed by the principles 
of Swedish neutrality, which had ruled out such a step (Financial Times, 13 March 1987, p. 
4). The trade embargo took effect on 1 July 1987 and imposed a deadline of 1 October for 
Swedish companies to end all trade with South Africa (New York Times, 13 March 1987, p. 
A3). A full-scale ban on trade with South Africa was later announced on 9 October 1987. The 
Swedish trade embargo was the most restrictive sanction that had been implemented against 
South Africa and included all trade relations between the two countries. Only three Swedish 
companies in South Africa have been exempted from the ban, and three requests for exemp-
tions reserved judgment. Two hundred and ninety-four companies with trade relations with 
South Africa were ordered to stop their business with that country (SA Report, 9 October 
1987). 
The Swedish government announced a gradual end to its commercial sanctions 
against South Africa for the first time in April 1992, when the E.C. foreign ministers agreed 
to scrap the E.C. oil embargo against South Africa. But the lift of sanctions had to be in line 
with advances in the democratization process in South Africa, and the Swedish government 
proposed an end to the 1987 trade prohibition as soon as an agreement on transition to an 
interim government could be reached. However, the South African government did not meet 
the Swedish conditions for another one-and-a-half years. On 13 September 1993, Sweden 
lifted the ban on trade with South Africa but kept the ban on investments (Associated Press, 
13 September 1993, Financial Times, 14 September 1993, p. 4). According to the BBC (13 
September 1993), referring to an announcement made on Swedish public radio, the decision 
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was based on recent developments towards democracy in South Africa, including setting-up a 
transitional council, deciding on an election date and appointing independent election com-
missions. In October 1993, Sweden lifted the ban on investment and was one of the last coun-
tries to lift all remaining economic sanctions against South Africa (Associated Press, 11 De-
cember 1993). 
5.3.3 Actor Coalitions and Decision-making 
In Swedish politics, the Social Democrats take a dominant position (International Council of 
Swedish Industry 1983). Since the 1930s, the Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet (SAP)—the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party—has always controlled the Swedish government, with two 
exceptions: from 1976 to 1982 and 1991 to 1994. The party is closely tied to the Swedish 
labor movement, which organizes more than 80 percent of employees. In 1976, the Social 
Democrats of Prime Minister Olof Palme were defeated in the national elections for the first 
time since 1932, and for the following six years, they were not part of the government coali-
tion. Instead, the non-socialist bloc consisting of the Center Party, Liberals, and Conservatives 
build the government. After the Conservative Party and the Center Party resigned in 1978, the 
Liberals formed a minority government. In 1982, after six years in the opposition, the Social 
Democrats won in a narrow election outcome and returned to government. It was also the 
return of Palme as Swedish Statsminister (prime minister). After the assassination of Palme in 
1986, Ingvar Carsson became prime minister and SAP party leader. But in the elections of 
1991, the Social Democrats were defeated again, and a four-party coalition led by Carl Bildt’s 
Moderate Party took over. In the October 1994 elections, the Social Democrats under the lead 
of Carlsson, returned to power. Later in 1996, Göran Persson succeeded Carlsson as prime 
minister and party leader. 
Swedish South Africa policy from the 1960s to the 1980s had been intimately con-
nected with the person of Olof Palme. Leader of the Social Democratic Party from 1969 to 
1986, Palme served as Swedish Prime Minister from 1969 to 1976 and from 1982 until his 
assassination in 1986. Together with Raoul Wallenberg (Swedish diplomat who saved the 
lives of many Hungarian Jews during World War II) and Dag Hammarskjöld (second Secre-
tary General of the U.N., 1953-1961), he became one of the most internationally known 
Swedish politician of the 20th century. Already as a student politician, as elected Chairman of 
the National Swedish Union of Students, Palme got involved with issues such as racial dis-
crimination and colonialism and developed a deep interest in the situation in southern Africa. 
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Tage Erlander, then Swedish prime minister, appointed him as his personal secretary in 1952. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Palme was a member of the Swedish Agency for International 
Assistance and was also in charge of inquiries into assistance to the developing world. In 
1963, he became a cabinet member of the Swedish government. He was president of the 
International Conference on South West Africa, held in Oxford in 1966, which recommended 
the termination of South Africa’s mandate over what is today known as Namibia. In October 
1969, Palme succeeded Erlander as Chairman of the Social Democratic Party and took office 
as Swedish prime minister. During his first term as prime minister, the Swedish government 
increased humanitarian and social assistance to the South African liberation movement sig-
nificantly, and Palme became one of the most prominent western advocates for the cause of 
the struggle against apartheid.48 
Sweden has been a country with a long history in nongovernmental, anti-apartheid 
activities. One of the oldest, worldwide anti-apartheid group, the Funds for Victims of Racial 
Oppression in South Africa, was founded in Sweden in 1959 (Schori 1994). The Swedish 
South Africa Committee (SSAC) was founded in 1961 as an umbrella organization of various 
human rights groups and church organizations and dominated the anti-apartheid work in 
Sweden during the 1960s. Its goal was to initiate a Swedish consumer boycott of South Afri-
can goods and to get the Swedish government to impose sanctions against the apartheid re-
gime. Later, the committee included the support for the armed liberation struggle in South 
Africa in its platform (Asmal and Asmal 1974; Afrika Grupperna 2005). In 1978/79, several 
Swedish anti-apartheid groups and organizations consolidated under the lead of the African 
Groups of Sweden (AGS) and established the Isolate South Africa Committee (ISAC). ISAC 
became an influential lobby organization in Sweden and ran several campaigns over the years 
and organized tours with representatives of the ANC, SWAPO, and African trade unions in 
Sweden and other European countries. The Committee represented almost every sector of 
Swedish society, except for the business sector, the Conservative Party and the extreme right-
wing parties (Linvall and Uhrus 2004: 2). 
The Swedish anti-apartheid movement—in parallel with the movements in Denmark, 
Norway, and Finland—was borne by a broad public support from the social-democratic and 
social-liberal political camps, as well as by strong public opinion (Linvall and Uhrus 2004). It 
was therefore not surprising that decision-makers from private businesses and the public 
sector identified themselves with the movement’s ideas or, at least, felt compelled to take the 
                                                
48 Biographical notes based on Reddy (1987) and Schori (1990). 
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movement’s claims into consideration when planning activities that involved South Africa in 
some way. Sellström (2004) provides a comprehensive account of the involvement of the 
Swedish civil society and government in the struggle for independence, majority rule and 
democracy in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, from the move-
ments’ modest beginnings in the 1950s to the electoral victory of the ANC in 1994. 
However, the pronounced Swedish foreign policy towards South Africa had been 
met with criticism, too. This criticism originated not only from the South African government 
but also from the Swedish business sector. In particular, the ban on South Africa investments 
had been heatedly debated over years. In the mid-1980s, when the Swedish government 
planned to tighten the 1979 investment freeze by outlawing leasing agreements, the Swedish 
industry vehemently resisted such a move. But the Social Democratic government of Prime 
Minister Olof Palme had the intention that Swedish companies “hibernate” in South Africa 
without expanding, “until conditions have changed” (Associated Press, 5 May 1985). In fact, 
Swedish companies had skirted the ban of 1979 mostly by renting equipment to their factories 
in South Africa. Critics, on the other hand, argued that the world had widely ignored Swe-
den’s example of freezing investments in South Africa. The freeze would only punish the 
Swedish industry and not South Africa’s white-ruled government. In addition, a government 
report from June 1984 acknowledged that the economic impact of an investment freeze solely 
imposed by Sweden would be economically negligible (Associated Press, 19 November 
1984). The Swedish Federation of Industries, leading the drive against a tightening of the law, 
not only rejected the idea but advocated abolishing the law altogether, arguing that “business 
in South Africa promotes business without apartheid” (Associated Press, 19 November 1984). 
This political pressure prompted the Swedish government to drop its initial plan to 
ban any investment in South Africa without exemptions and to soften parts of the proposal by 
giving the right of exemption for investments necessary to replace worn-out equipment. On 
20 February 1985, the Riksdag approved this revised proposal and passed it by 220 votes to 
78 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1985). Against the backdrop of these 
difficulties, Palme’s successor as prime minister—Ingvar Carlsson—first refused to impose 
tougher sanctions against South Africa. However, this refusal turned into the new prime min-
ister’s first political crisis since having taken over from Palme (Associated Press, 8 August 
1986). Members of Carlsson’s own Social Democratic Party as well as those from the opposi-
tion (except for the Conservatives) called upon the government to make the voluntary trade 
boycott of 1985 a legally binding act. 
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Carlsson regarded such a move as incompatible with international trade agreements 
signed by Sweden and recalled Sweden’s traditional position on economic sanctions, saying 
“only a decision by the Security Council could make concrete demands on South Africa’s 
most important trade partners and have a chance of leading to a change in South Africa” 
(Associated Press, 8 August 1986). But after the U.N. Security Council failed to impose 
binding economic sanctions against South Africa, domestic political pressure to impose trade 
sanctions against South Africa led to the announcement of the Swedish trade embargo in 
March 1987. According to a statement of the Swedish foreign minister, Sweden was acting 
out of frustration over the veto cast in February in the U.N. Security Council (Associated 
Press, 13 March 1987, New York Times, 13 March 1987). A resolution proposed by Argen-
tina, the Congo, Ghana, the United Arab Emirates and Zambia would have imposed measures 
very similar to those approved by the U.S. Congress with the CAAA. But the adoption of the 
resolution failed due to the U.S. and British veto (New York Times, 21 February 1987, p. 3). 
Thus, Swedish foreign policy towards South Africa from the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s was largely the product of the Social Democratic Party and its charismatic leader Olof 
Palme. Ingvar Carlsson, Palme’s successor as party leader and prime minister, continued the 
traditional Social Democratic foreign policy for the most part. But after the Social Democratic 
Party was defeated in the general elections of September 1991 by a four-party coalition led by 
Carl Bildt’s Moderate Party (Associated Press, 16 September 1991), the political landscape in 
Sweden changed. The new minority government under Prime Minister Bildt, the first conser-
vative Swedish government installed in sixty years, aimed at “changing the face of the coun-
try from social democracy to a more free-market economy with a speed and self-confidence 
that has surprised most observers” (Financial Times, 13 November 1991, p. 2). But regarding 
South Africa, these domestic political changes hardly affected the country’s foreign policy. 
Too strong was the sympathy for the ANC and its liberation struggle, not only within the 
Social Democratic Party but also within the Liberal Party and wide parts of the Swedish 
public. 
5.3.4 Intervention Analysis 
Figure 27 shows the level of interaction for Swedish relations towards South Africa from 
January 1977 to December 1996 as displayed in the dataset. This interaction level is generated 
by the number of coded events per month with Sweden as the source and South Africa as the 
target of these events. Also indicated are the different phases in Swedish foreign policy to-
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wards South Africa as they were identified in Section 5.3.2.2: 1) the time prior to the en-
forcement of the ‘South Africa Act’ on 1 July 1979, 2) the period under the ‘South African 
Act’, including a freeze on Swedish investments in South Africa (7/1979-6/1987), 3) followed 
by the era under the complete trade embargo (7/1987-9/1993), 4) the time of relaxation and 
lift of the sanctions (9/1993-3/1994), and the beginning of the new South Africa (4/1994-
12/1996). 
Figure 27: Interaction Level SWE>ZAF 1977-1996 
 
Even more than in the case of West Germany, Figure 27 shows clearly that only very 
few international events involving both Sweden and South Africa were reported by the inter-
national news source used to code such events in this study. Only a total of 58 events with 
Sweden as the source and South Africa as the target have been coded throughout the whole 
period of investigation (Table 32). 
Table 34: Phases Summary Statistics for SWE>ZAF 
 
 Phase Period Obs. Interaction Conflict-Cooperation 
   Agg Mean Agg Mean Min Max 
 Early Action (1977)-06/1979 30 1 0.03   -2.2 -0.07  -2.2   0.0 
 Investment Freeze 07/1979-07/1987 96 22 0.23  -34.6 -0.36  -9.8   6.0 
 Trade Embargo 07/1987-08/1993 74 25 0.34   23.8   0.33  -4.4 11.4 
 Lift of Sanctions 09/1993-03/1994 7 6 0.86     3.9   0.56   0.0   3.9 
 New South Africa 04/1994-12/1996 33 4 0.12     3.8   0.12  -4.6   7.4 
 
The relatively high number of reports on Swedish-South African relations in the sec-
ond quarter of 1985 is mainly due to two decisions of the Swedish government under Prime 
Minister Palme to impose more restrictions on Swedish relations towards South Africa. In 
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April 1985, the government tightened law against investments in South Africa over a storm of 
protest from Swedish industry (Associated Press, 5 May 1985). Later in June 1985, the gov-
ernments of Sweden, Norway and Denmark decided to cancel their air traffic agreement with 
South Africa (Associated Press, 27 June 1985). 
The highest number of interactions between Swedish and South African actors was 
reported in the first quarter of 1990 (n=11, score=16.6) when South African President de 
Klerk announced first steps to dismantle apartheid in his parliamentary speech early February 
1990 and Mandela was released after 27 years in custody just a few days later that month. AP 
as the data source also gave an account of Sweden’s pivotal sanctions decision on South 
Africa (announcement of the trade embargo in March 1987, see, e.g. Associated Press, 12 
March 1987). 
The last peak in the third quarter of 1993 stems from reports when Sweden lifted its 
ban on trade in September 1993 but kept, for the time being its, the freeze on investments 
(Associated Press, 13 September 1990). On the same time, media reports remembered 
Sweden’s determined struggle against apartheid and pointed out that the Swedish government 
was the largest single contributor to the ANC. In November 1993, the Swedish government 
then announced that it will suspend the aid to the ANC in January 1994, three months before 
South Africa held its first multiracial elections (Associated Press, 13 November 1993). 
Figure 28: Conflict/Cooperation SWE>ZAF 1977-1996 
 
According to the low number of reported events throughout the whole period of in-
vestigation, the chart displaying the conflict/cooperation level in Swedish South Africa rela-
tions (Figure 27) has to be interpreted conservatively. However, the time plot reflects the 
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general pattern of Swedish foreign policy as described in Section 5.3.2 fairly well. The tight-
ening of Swedish sanction legislation throughout to mid-1987 resulted in a negative con-
flict/cooperation score. After President de Klerk’s historical speech and the release of Man-
dela in February 1990, the conflict/cooperation level jumps up before Swedish foreign policy 
towards South Africa appeared again mostly from international media’s attention. 
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5.4 Switzerland 
Swiss foreign policy toward South Africa under apartheid can be characterized as non-
interventionist and highly stable from 1977 to 1994. The policy mirrored exemplarily the 
traditional conception of Swiss foreign policy, based on principles such as neutrality and 
universality on the one hand and a liberal practice in foreign trade policy on the other. As 
such, Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa under apartheid was typical for Switzer-
land’s foreign relations during the Cold War. I therefore outline first the cornerstones in Swiss 
foreign policy after World War II. Then, I demonstrate how these foundations of Swiss for-
eign policy were important prerequisites for Swiss relations with South Africa under apart-
heid, before I describe and analyze specific policy decisions on South Africa that shaped 
Swiss South Africa policy from 1977 to 1996. 
5.4.1 Foundations of Swiss Foreign Policy 
Swiss foreign policy during the Cold War was generally based on two pillars (Sellström 1999; 
Gabriel 2003: 14-17): a rather isolationist foreign policy in political terms based on neutrality 
and non-interference in world politics, with a liberal and highly internationalized foreign trade 
policy. 
Neutrality has been a central concept in Switzerland’s foreign policy since the 17th 
century. It had been introduced initially as a subtle instrument to secure the country’s sover-
eignty and trans-border trade in times of war between surrounding states (Goetschel et al. 
2005: 6-9; Gabriel 2003: 14). Within Switzerland, neutrality prevented the cantons of the old 
confederation from becoming divided by the conflicts of their neighbors or from being broken 
up into antagonistic religious and cultural parts (Linder 1998: 6-9; Gabriel 2003: 14). After 
World War I, neutrality was the subject of an intense political debate within Switzerland. As a 
member of the League of Nations, Switzerland had then adopted (temporally) what is also 
called ‘differential’ neutrality, meaning that the country was willing to participate in eco-
nomic sanctions while preserving its military neutrality (Linder 1998: 49). 
After World War II, neutrality gained a stronger ideological component and became 
an integral part of Swiss national identity. Such an ‘integral’ understanding of neutrality was 
even strengthened during the Cold War, and by the end of the East-West confrontation, neu-
trality was deeply anchored in the minds of wide parts of the political elite and the electorate 
as a unique Swiss trait that guaranteed national independence (Möckli 2003: 14). In a nut-
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shell, as Wolf Linder (Goetschel et al. 2005: 14) puts it, neutrality has had two main historical 
functions: external independence and internal integration. 
Economic international integration became a central characteristic of Swiss foreign 
policy after World War II. Having escaped the war’s destruction, Switzerland’s economy had 
largely remained intact and emerged even strengthened from the war because it was able to 
intensify trade and business relations with Western Europe and the rest of the world rapidly 
after the war (Linder 1998: 18). Switzerland strived for membership in mainly economically 
oriented international organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Coop-
eration (OEEC, Swiss entry in 1948), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, 1960), the 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT, 1966), the Bretton Woods Institutions (In-
ternational Monetary Fund and World Bank, 1992) as well as most of the other U.N. special-
ized organizations (Goetschel et al. 2005). Switzerland was therefore well integrated in the 
so-called ‘technical’ international organizations long before it became a full-member of the 
U.N. in 2002 (Senti 2003). Switzerland’s resistance against a full-membership in the U.N. 
was mainly rooted in its extensive interpretation of neutrality. 
Switzerland’s policy on international sanctions consisted until the late 1980s basi-
cally of freezing the exchange of goods at the pre-sanctions level (so-called “courant nor-
mal”), aiming at preventing the country from becoming a party in an international conflict or 
an attractive place for circumventing international sanctions (Möckli 2003). However, this 
seemingly elegant policy showed serious weaknesses already in the 1960s and 1970s when 
first Britain and then the U.N. Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Rhode-
sia. A strict application of the concept of Swiss neutrality would have required Switzerland to 
practice “courant normal,” not only towards the internationally sanctioned regime of Rhode-
sia, but also towards the other party of the conflict, that is, Britain and later all the members of 
the U.N. that obeyed the Security Council’s decision. But such a two-sided freezing of trade 
was neither politically nor economically feasible (apart from hardly being practically possi-
ble). The one-sided “courant normal” as exercised in the case of Rhodesia, was therefore—
strictly speaking—in contradiction to the principle of neutrality (Gabriel 1992: 123). 
Another critical situation for the traditional Swiss policy towards international sanc-
tions occurred in August 1990 when Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The inva-
sion was immediately condemned sharply on the international political level as a fundamental 
break of international law (U.N. Security Council Resolution 660). Only four days after the 
Iraqi invasion, on 6 August 1990, the U.N. Security Council imposed mandatory economic 
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sanctions against Iraq (Resolution 661). The Swiss government was unexpectedly and sud-
denly under pressure to act if it did not wish to be out of step with the international commu-
nity. Inaction could have been interpreted as a lack of solidarity and betrayal of confidence 
and might even have provoked retaliatory action on the part of international partners. The 
Swiss public, too, condemned the Iraqi act and showed its solidarity with the “defenseless 
small state” of Kuwait. Within a few hours, the Swiss government therefore formulated a 
regulation to impose economic sanctions against Iraq (Official Collection of Federal Law 
1990: 1319) and put it into force on 7 August 1990. Although officially “autonomously” 
imposed, Swiss regulations were for the most part identical with U.N. Security Council Reso-
lution 661 of 6 August 1990 (Goetschel et al. 2005: 206-214). 
The decision to impose economic sanctions against Iraq was striking for three rea-
sons (Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 229-238): First, by imposing comprehensive economic 
sanctions against another state for the first time, the Swiss government began a new era in its 
foreign policy. Second, the international pressure of events meant the government had to 
make a decision very quickly and under less than ideal conditions, as several key, high-
ranking civil servants were absent on holiday. Third, the decision was welcomed by all politi-
cal and societal groups, whereas decision-making on Swiss foreign policy was traditionally 
strongly contested between the political left and the conservative political right (Widmer and 
Hirschi 2005: 50-52). Since then, Switzerland has regularly taken part in sanctions imposed 
by the U.N. Security Council and, since 1998, also participates in sanctions adopted by the 
European Union (Goetschel et al. 2005; Interdepartmental Working Group 2000). 
In Swiss domestic politics, foreign policy has been a rather unspectacular issue with-
out major controversy for decades (Swiss Federal Council 2007: 19; Klöti et al. 2005: 79). 
However, a government project to join the U.N. led to politicization of Swiss foreign policy 
that shaped domestic politics on foreign policy issues until the mid-1990s. Although sup-
ported by the government, three of the four governing coalition parties and a majority of the 
parliament, the government proposal for Swiss entry into the U.N. overwhelmingly failed in a 
popular referendum in March 1986: 75.7 percent of the voters and all 26 cantons rejected the 
proposal and caused a foreign policy Waterloo for the governing political elite. In particular, 
the right-wing of the conservative Swiss People’s Party (SPP), although it was a coalition 
partner, launched an effective campaign against the Swiss government, positioning the U.N. 
as a threat to Swiss independence and neutrality (Linder 1998: 60-62). 
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This debate over the 1986 U.N. referendum shifted the main conflict lines in Swiss 
foreign policy: a national-conservative movement led by Christoph Blocher (member of 
parliament for the SPP) superseded the Social Democrats as the main oppositional force 
against official Swiss foreign policy in parliament. A governmental project of joining the 
European Economic Area failed in 1992 in a hard-fought referendum mainly because of a 
strong national-conservative opposition. A full entry into the U.N. was approved by the Swiss 
people not before 2002. The referendums on European integration and joining the U.N. are 
seen as cornerstones in Swiss foreign policy and reveal that Switzerland’s semi-direct politi-
cal system became a crucial factor in foreign policy-making as well (Möckli 2003: 57-58; 
Goetschel et al. 2005; Marquis 2006). 
5.4.2 Switzerland’s Foreign Policy Toward South Africa 1977-1996 
5.4.2.1 Preconditions and Policies prior to 1977 
Swiss foreign policy toward South Africa during apartheid has to be seen against the back-
drop of general developments in Swiss foreign policy after World War II. On the one side, the 
policy is rooted in the Swiss principles of neutrality and universality, which help explain 
Switzerland’s reserved behavior on the international political level. This reservation resonated 
also in the Swiss government’s positioning towards human rights violations in foreign coun-
tries. On the other side, Swiss foreign policy has been dominated by foreign trade considera-
tions. After World War II, Switzerland adopted a very liberal foreign trade policy that was 
almost exclusively based on economic considerations. Based on these foundations, Swiss 
foreign policy towards South Africa during apartheid contained two core elements: a mainly 
rhetorical policy of moral condemnation of fundamental human rights violations in general 
and a strict refusal of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy (Marquis and 
Sciarini 1999: 176-180). The definition of both core elements reaches back to the 1960s when 
the Swiss government spoke out on apartheid for the first time. 
The policy of “moral condemnation” was based on a declaration at the International 
Conference on Human Rights, held in Teheran in 1968 (Widmer and Hirschi 2005). The head 
of the Swiss delegation, Ambassador August R. Lindt, criticized the apartheid system at the 
time as a deliberate, continuing violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
stating that Swiss authorities could not help but condemn the system in moral terms, given 
Switzerland’s democratic and humanitarian tradition. Ambassador Lindt’s Teheran declara-
tion was new inasmuch as a Swiss official had not previously accused the apartheid system of 
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flouting fundamental human rights. Up to that time, the Swiss government had only con-
demned human rights violations in general. In subsequent years, the Teheran declaration 
became the touchstone for a number of similar declarations at international conferences, 
including at the 1977 U.N. World Conference against Apartheid (Swiss Delegation to the 
International Conference on Human Rights 1968). The Swiss Federal Council also referred 
several times to this declaration in explaining its policy, for example in answering parliamen-
tary motions in the Swiss Parliament in the 1970s and 1980s (Swiss Federal Council 1977). 
Secondly, the strict refusal of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy 
was justified with basic international legal considerations. In particular, participating in U.N. 
sanctions and peace enforcing measures imposed by the U.N. Security Council was consid-
ered a threat to Switzerland’s neutrality (Swiss Federal Archives 2000: 14). That is why Swiss 
officials always referred to Switzerland’s status as a non-member of the U.N. and explained 
that it could not comment on measures such as economic sanctions imposed by that organiza-
tion. But the Swiss absence from international sanctions was also congruent with the Swiss 
policy of universal foreign trade relations, regardless of political criteria such as the trading 
partner’s political system or (non-) compliance with human rights standards. Alois Riklin 
assigned an economic function to neutrality: the “free-trade function” (Linder 1998: 6). In 
proportion to the total of Swiss foreign trade, South Africa has always represented a small 
market for the Swiss economy. But for some Swiss businesses and economic sectors the 
South African market was quite significant. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland imposed an arms embargo against South Africa in 1963 
(on 6 December) after the U.N. Security Council adopted its first two resolutions on apartheid 
(Resolutions 181 and 182) and advised U.N member states to impose such a ban on exports of 
war material to South Africa (Riklin 1991: 6). In 1968, the so-called “Bührle Affair” made 
illegal Swiss arms exports to South Africa, Israel and other states public, and six high-ranking 
managers of the Swiss industrial firm Oerlikon-Bührle were convicted in November 1970. 
The Bührle Affair led to a popular initiative in 1970 that aimed at a general ban on Swiss 
arms exports. The initiative failed in a popular referendum on 24 September 1972 only mar-
ginally (Federal Gazette [Bundesblatt] 1972 II 1449). Because of the strong public support for 
the popular initiative, the government formulated an indirect counterproposal to the initiative 
and designed a federal law on “war material,” including a ban on arms exports to so-called 
areas of tensions, including South Africa (entered into force as from 1 February 1973). 
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In 1974, the Swiss government also limited capital exports from Switzerland to 
South Africa to a total of 250 million francs per year for loans and credits over 10 million and 
a maturity longer than twelve months (Interdepartmental Working Group Switzerland-South 
Africa 1999: 29). According to the Interdepartmental Working Group Switzerland-South 
Africa (1999: 15), this capital export ceiling was imposed mostly as a preventive measure to 
ensure Switzerland’s international reputation, which could suffer because of its intensive 
financial relations with South Africa. Particularly the financial sector was worried that Swiss 
capital exports could increase dramatically if other states imposed restrictive measures against 
South Africa. At that time, many states, mostly the newly independent states in Africa, pushed 
the U.N. towards economic measures against the apartheid regime in South Africa 
(Interdepartmental Working Group Switzerland-South Africa 1999: 53).49 
Both the arms embargo and the capital export ceiling played a certain political role in 
Swiss-South Africa policy throughout the following years. On the Swiss domestic level, the 
political majority regarded the two measures as restrictive enough to limit Swiss transfers to 
South Africa and referred regularly to these measures to clarify that Switzerland was not 
inactive on the issue. On the international political level, however, the Swiss government 
deliberately avoided mentioning Switzerland’s economic relations with South Africa (as well 
as related measures such as the capital export ceiling) to evade potential attacks by the inter-
national community (Interdepartmental Working Group Switzerland-South Africa 1999: 181-
182). 
5.4.2.2 Policy Phases 1977-1996 
Clear-cut phases in Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa under apartheid can hardly be 
identified. The policy was mostly determined by international parameters (Widmer and 
Hirschi 2005: 51-60) but remained at its core mostly unchanged for the whole period from 
1977 to the end of apartheid in April 1994. Changes on the international political level, both 
within South Africa itself and in other states’ international relations with South Africa, were 
followed by policy adjustments that were primarily designed to assure the maintenance of the 
traditional and well-established foreign policy conception. Other interventions can be traced 
back to domestic developments, in particular concerns about the international reputation of 
Switzerland as an international business location and financial center. 
                                                
49 In 1980, the capital export ceiling rose to 300 francs per year (Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 15). 
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Halfway through 1986, however, it became apparent that there was a growing readi-
ness on the part of many states to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, triggered 
by the increasing protest activities of the anti-apartheid movement in various Western count-
ries and the fact that African states were putting the issue on the international agenda more 
and more. The group of countries traditionally against economic sanctions (U.S., Britain, 
Germany, and Switzerland) showed signs that they wished to go their separate ways, with the 
Swiss government not deviating from its principled position. In a public statement issued on 
22 September 1986, the Swiss government distanced itself explicitly from economic sanctions 
against South Africa, saying that Switzerland would not change its longstanding policy. 
The policy statement of 1986 made the differences between the policy pursued by 
Switzerland and those of other Western states obvious, even if the Western measures were 
taken largely in economic sectors where they were not expected to harm their own economies. 
The decision to strictly distance itself from economic sanctions against South Africa while 
Western partners started imposing or had already imposed such measures created a new dy-
namic for Swiss-South Africa relations in the form of a marked divergence from the policies 
of other Western governments on that issue. 
Table 35 summarizes these phases of Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa 
from 1977 to 1994. 
Table 35: Phases in Swiss South Africa Policy 1977-1996 
 
Phase Start End 
Implicit Refusal of  
Economic Sanctions 
(1977) 22 September 1986 
(Public statement of the 
Swiss government) 
Explicit Distance from 
Economic Sanctions 
22 September 1986 
(Public statement of the 
Swiss government) 
27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
Beginning of the new South Africa  27 April 1994 
(First free South African 
general elections) 
4 December 1996 
(South Africa’s Constitutional Court 
approves new constitution) 
 
5.4.2.3 Policies and Interventions 1977-1996 
Implicit Refusal of Economic Sanctions (until 1986) 
Until the 1980s, the official position on economic sanctions was for the most part in accord 
with that of other Western governments, in particular of the U.S., Britain and West Germany. 
Together with representatives of these Western governments, Swiss officials had always 
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argued against the imposition of restrictive sanctions against South Africa on a matter of 
principle. Economic sanctions were not seen as an effective tool of foreign policy and 
would—if effective—rather cause unintended negative effects, such as causing harm to the 
population that should be supported and damaging the regional economy. Following—at least 
implicitly—the logic of ‘constructive engagement’, the Swiss government pursued a policy of 
non-confrontation with the South African government, saying that the apartheid government’s 
(disapproved of) behavior could be better influenced through silent diplomacy than open 
confrontation (for a detailed account of this policy, see Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 75-108). 
As the study of Widmer and Hirschi (Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 109-111) shows, the 
Swiss government had not addressed the question of economic sanctions against South Africa 
explicitly until 1985. Even at the occasion of a public statement on 14 August 1985 on the 
latest developments in South Africa, the Federal Council renounced an internal discussion on 
sanctions against South Africa (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 August 1985; 24 Heures, 15 
August 1985). Until then, the Swiss government had referred to its consistent practice of 
refusing to join such measures as a matter of principle. Not until it was forced to respond to a 
parliamentary motion by National Councilor Ernst Leuenberger (Social Democrat), did the 
Federal Council explain its foreign policy toward South Africa in detail through a written 
comment dated 23 September 1985 (Official Bulletin National Council 1985: 1819). Besides 
stressing the principle of universality in Swiss foreign relations, the Federal Council referred 
to its earlier condemnations of apartheid and its practice of abstaining from economic sanc-
tions imposed by other individual or groups of states. The council also doubted sanctions 
would be an effective foreign policy instrument “to change a given situation” (Official Bulle-
tin National Council 1985: 1819). 
Explicit Distance from Economic Sanctions (1986-1994) 
Even at the height of international sanctions against the South African regime (1985-1989), 
the Swiss Federal Council still disapproved of imposing economic sanctions. True, much of 
the sanctions debate both in Switzerland and in other Western nation-states centered on the 
question of whether economic pressure was an effective means of eliminating apartheid. But 
unlike most countries, Switzerland adopted a quite consistent (or dogmatic, depending on 
your point of view) stand, arguing 
that it was Switzerland’s longstanding practice not to participate in sanctions im-
posed by single countries or groups of countries, 
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that sanctions were an inappropriate means for changing a political situation, and 
that sanctions are ineffective, and if they are effective, they affect the wrong ad-
dressees (including neighbor states or economically weak segments of the popula-
tion). 
In a public statement issued on 22 September 1986, the Federal Council cited this ra-
tionale explicitly in explaining its policy towards South Africa (Widmer and Hirschi 2005). In 
view of the several pending parliamentary interventions on the topic and the fact that most 
Western countries had taken economic measures against South Africa, the Federal Council at 
the time felt itself obliged to explain its position on South Africa. Various U.N. bodies pro-
tested the Swiss refusal to use economic sanctions, their protests coming to a head in the early 
1990s when the Swiss government permitted sixty aircraft of the Pilatus PC-7 type to be 
exported to the South African Ministry of Defense. In response, the U.N. Security Council’s 
Special Committee on Sanctions accused Switzerland of violating the U.N. arms embargo 
against South Africa (Swiss Federal Council 1986: 143-179). The installation of a monitoring 
system to avoid circumvention deals was therefore primarily targeted at other Western states 
and the U.N. (INT) to demonstrate that Switzerland did not want to profit from international 
South Africa sanctions. 
Positive Measures (1986-1994) 
In the September 1986 declaration, the Swiss Federal Council not only refused economic 
sanctions as an instrument of Swiss foreign policy but also launched a program of “positive 
measures” to support the victims of the apartheid system. At the same time, the Swiss gov-
ernment announced that it would strengthen its dialogue with the conflicting parties in South 
Africa as a component of official Swiss foreign policy (Widmer and Hirschi 2005). Beyond 
the declared political goals to contribute to the overcoming of apartheid in South Africa, these 
measures were also aimed at an establishment of closer political relations towards the South 
African opposition, namely the ANC. In view of the impending political change in South 
Africa, the Swiss government started to realize that it had neglected such contacts in the past 
(Vatter et al. 2005: 179). 
The main addressees of the Swiss offer for dialogue and positive measures were 
surely the conflicting parties in South Africa. But the dialogue offer was also addressed to 
third states and indicated Switzerland’s readiness to act as an international mediator. The 
announced positive measures were also aimed at appeasing domestic critics and demonstrat-
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ing the government’s willingness to strengthen its engagements in favor of the non-white 
population in South Africa. 
The Federal Council confirmed its South Africa policy as declared in the September 
1986 statement several times in response to parliamentary motions (Widmer and Hirschi 
2005: 127-173). Therefore despite the changing international debate on South Africa under 
apartheid from the mid-1980s, Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa remained mostly 
stable. Swiss-South African relations have indeed been a contentious and polarizing issue 
within the Swiss political system. Hardly any other foreign policy topic was raised as often in 
the national parliament since 1945 as the question of Swiss connections with South Africa’s 
apartheid regime (nearly 200 demands and motions have been made since 1963, see Widmer 
and Hirschi 2005; Swiss Federal Archives 2000: 60-74). But as it will be demonstrated in the 
next section, a broad majority in parliament always backed the official Swiss foreign policy 
towards South Africa. Criticism of this position did not reach the level of public support 
necessary to force a change in Swiss South Africa policy. 
5.4.3 Actor-Coalitions and Decision-making 
Overall, Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa in the apartheid era was dominated by a 
high degree of continuity and considerable stability. The core of Swiss-South Africa policy, 
the policy of “moral condemnation” and the refusal of economic sanctions as a policy instru-
ment, remained mostly unchanged throughout the whole era under investigation. This policy 
had been shaped by a broad majority coalition of political parties from the center and right 
(i.e., Liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives and smaller right-wing parties), employers 
and trade associations as well as interest groups with a conservative or economically liberal 
orientation. The majority of the federal government and a dominant part of the Federal Ad-
ministration were also part of this coalition. Members of the majority coalition (with some 
minor exceptions on the right-wing) were not openly supportive of the apartheid regime, and 
the absence of restrictive measures was explained by the principle of universality in Swiss 
foreign relations. International political activities were only supported as long as Swiss eco-
nomic interests were not negatively affected. Otherwise, the majority coalition stood for a 
cautious foreign policy that promoted free trade in as unlimited a fashion as possible. In this 
sense, the members of the majority coalition have regularly emphasized that their position 
should not be interpreted as supporting apartheid but be viewed through the lens of Switzer-
land’s traditional foreign orientation (Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 6-9; Pfister 2000: 193-197). 
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This majority coalition, which represented in the national parliament about two thirds 
of the seats throughout the whole period of investigation, was opposed by a minority coalition 
comprised of parties from the political left (Social Democrats, Communists, and Progres-
sives), trade unions, as well as clerical, human rights and peace organizations. Members of the 
minority coalition demanded more regulation for international trade relations and more con-
sideration of solidarity in Swiss foreign policy in particular towards the Third World. From 
the mid-1970s, the struggle against apartheid had become an important topic for the members 
of this minority coalition in Switzerland. Political and economic relations with South Africa 
were seen as siding with the apartheid regime and the lack of participation in the international 
protest movement a violation of the international boycott against white South Africa. 
The Swiss anti-apartheid organizations were institutionally and personally strongly 
linked with each other because of their shared history and origins. Interconnections to politi-
cal parties, most of all to the Social Democrats, were at the personal level, in that representa-
tives of anti-apartheid organizations often were members of parliament at the communal, 
cantonal or federal level. The minority coalition was supported through regularly published 
reports in the left-wing media, whereas the centre and right-wing media rarely discussed the 
issue (Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 3-6; Pfister 2000: 197-199). 
The organizational interconnections within the majority coalition were not as dense 
as they were on the opposition side. More important were the personal relations, especially 
within business circles and among the more politically committed groups and organizations. 
Thus, influential entrepreneurs were members of the board of the Swiss South African Asso-
ciation (such as the entrepreneurs Georg Sulzer and Dieter Bührle) or the president of the 
Working Group on Southern Africa (entrepreneur and National Councilor Christoph Blocher) 
(Centre Europe - Tiers Monde 1974: 108; Gygax 2001: 302; Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 197; 
Hug 2007). Apart from these groups with a clear standpoint and close personal connections, 
the broad majority coalition also included parties with moderate positions. But there was—
although the underlying rationales were distinct—a shared consensus within this coalition that 
Switzerland should abstain from any restrictive measures against the South African regime 
(Widmer and Hirschi 2005: 206-300; Vatter et al. 2005: 196). 
Especially economic sanctions were clearly refused by the majority coalition, both in 
government and parliament (an arms embargo against South Africa had been in force since 
1963 and remained the only Swiss sanction against the apartheid regime). The Swiss govern-
ment, however, as the study of Widmer and Hirschi (2005: 109-111) shows, did not address 
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the question of economic sanctions against South Africa until 1985. Even on the occasion of a 
public statement from 14 August 1985 on the latest developments in South Africa, the Federal 
Council renounced an internal discussion on sanctions against South Africa (Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 15 August 1985; 24 Heures, 15 August 1985). The Swiss government simply used to 
refer to Switzerland’s constant practice not to join such measures as a matter of principle. Not 
until it had to respond to a parliamentary motion by National Councilor Ernst Leuenberger 
(Social Democrat), did the Federal Council explain its foreign policy towards South Africa in 
detail in a written comment dated 23 September 1985 (Official Bulletin National Council 
1985: 1819). Besides stressing the principle of universality in Swiss foreign relations, the 
Federal Council referred to its earlier condemnations of apartheid and its practice of abstain-
ing from economic sanctions imposed by individual or groups of states. The council also 
doubted sanctions were an effective foreign policy instrument “to change a given situation” 
(Official Bulletin National Council 1985: 1819). 
One year later, the Swiss government was prompted to reassess and specify its posi-
tion on economic sanctions in another public statement (Widmer and Hirschi 2005). This new 
statement has to be seen in the light of two new developments (Swiss Federal Council 1986: 
109): 
1) Most recent decisions taken by other states (mostly the United States, the E.C., Common-
wealth states and Nordic states) indicated clearly the international community was willing 
to increase economic and political pressure on the apartheid regime. Because the Swiss 
government always oriented its South Africa policy in line with the policies of other 
Western governments, policy changes in these states signaled a need for action on the part 
of Switzerland as well. 
2) At the same time, a petition by the Anti-Apartheid Movement and several parliamentary 
motions on Swiss-South African relations were pending. With 17,454 signatures, the 
Swiss Anti-Apartheid Movement demanded the government and parliament stop granting 
new credits to the South African government and parastatal organizations, to cease im-
porting Krugerrand gold coins, to cancel Swissair flights to South Africa and dispossess 
landing rights of South African Airways in Switzerland. The Social Democratic parlia-
mentary faction criticized the Federal Council for its verbal declarations on exceptional 
foreign policy issues such as the apartheid system in South Africa, which have never been 
implemented via specific measures (see Official Bulletin of the National Council 1986: 
2008). 
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In the statement from 22 September 1986 on “the Relations between Switzerland and 
South Africa” (Widmer and Hirschi 2005), the Federal Council repeated its condemnation of 
apartheid and any other form of racial discrimination and abuse of fundamental human rights. 
The government also condemned the current chain of violence in South Africa and called 
upon the South African government to release political prisoners. Concerning the issue of 
economic sanctions, however, the government persisted in its view that such measures were 
not appropriate “to change a given situation”. To resist potential criticism on this matter, the 
Federal Council clarified that this position can be seen in no way as a support of apartheid. 
The position would be based on the principle of universality in Switzerland’s foreign trade 
relations and the conviction that sanctions are not an effective foreign policy instrument. The 
government also announced that it would consider measures to ensure that Switzerland would 
not be used by third-party states to circumvent sanctions. 
The September 1986 statement was based on a discussion paper (“Aussprachepa-
pier”) between the Federal Departments of Foreign and Economic Affairs from 18 September 
1986 (Swiss Federal Council 1986). Just two days before, the Foreign Ministers of the twelve 
E.C. members agreed to impose limited new economic sanctions on South Africa, saying the 
South African government had failed to respond to their appeals to dismantle apartheid. The 
new sanctions included a ban on imports of iron and steel and Krugerrand cold coins from 
South Africa and a prohibition of new investments in South Africa by European companies 
(Associated Press, 16 September 1986; New York Times, 17 September 1986, p. A1; Wash-
ington Post, 17 September 1986, p. A1). 
In the follow-up of the September 1986 declaration, the Swiss government estab-
lished two working groups that were assigned with the implementation of the declaration. The 
first working group was supposed to monitor trade and capital flows between Switzerland and 
South Africa in sectors where the most important industrialized countries (mainly the U.S. 
and the E.C. states) imposed so-called “convergent” sanctions.50 The Federal Departments of 
Foreign and Economic Affairs jointly presided over this working group. The second working 
group was an internal one with the Department of Foreign Affairs. It was mainly concerned 
with what were regarded as the “non-economic” aspects of the problem and was charged with 
an elaboration of a program of “positive measures” (Interdepartemental Working Group 
Switzerland-South Africa 1999: 119-120). 
                                                
50 Sanctions were regarded as “convergent” when both the United States and all E.C. states bindingly joined the 
sanctions (Federal Departments of Foreign and Economic Affairs 1986: 9). 
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5.4.4 Intervention Analysis 
Figure 29 shows the level of interaction for Swiss relations towards South Africa from Janu-
ary 1977 to December 1996 as displayed in the dataset. This interaction level is generated by 
the number of coded events per month with the Switzerland (CHE) as the source and South 
Africa (ZAF) as the target of these events. The chart also shows the three distinct phases in 
Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa during this time as they were identified in Section 
5.4.2.2: 1) the period prior to September 1986 where the Swiss government took a negative 
position on economic sanctions in general, 2) the following period, after the Swiss gov-
ernment applied this fundamental position explicitly also on the case of South Africa under 
apartheid (September 1986 to April 1994), and 3) the time of the beginning of the democratic 
South Africa after the general elections in April 1994. 
Figure 29: Interaction Level CHE>ZAF 1977-1996 
 
As it holds for Sweden, Swiss interactions with South Africa during apartheid were 
hardly covered by international wire serves as they are used as empirical data source for the 
coding of international events in this study. Only a total of 42 events with Switzerland as the 
source and South Africa as the target have been coded throughout the whole period of inves-
tigation (Table 36). 
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Table 36: Phases Summary Statistics for CHE>ZAF 
 
 Phase Period Obs. Interaction Conflict-Cooperation 
   Agg Mean Agg Mean Min Max 
 Implicit Refusal (1977)-08/1986 116 24 0.21 29.0 0.25 -5.8   10.7 
 Explicit Distance 09/1986-03/1994 92 18 0.21 30.8 0.29 -4.4 13 
 New South Africa 04/1994-12/1996 33   0 0.00   0.0 0.00   0.0     0.0 
 
The dataset records the highest number of international events with Switzerland as 
the source and South Africa as the target in the first quarter of 1986 (n=9, score=21.3). Two 
particular events that gained a strong international recognition contributed to this peak. The 
first one included negotiations between representatives from major international banks and 
the South African government in late 1985. It was the goal of these negotiations to secure an 
agreement to give South Africa a two-year break from paying its debts and 15 years to make 
the repayments. Fritz Leutwiler, former President of the Swiss National Bank, acted in these 
negotiations as a mediator on the behalf of South Africa (Associated Press, several reports 
between September 1985 and January 1986). The second event that attracted international 
attention during this period was a visit of South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha to 
Switzerland where he arrived in February 1986 for talks with the Swiss Foreign Minister 
Pierre Aubert, assistant U.S. secretary of state for African affairs Chester Crocker, and other 
officials (Associated Press, 12 February 1986). 
Figure 30: Conflict/Cooperation CHE>ZAF 1977-1996 
 
As already mentioned for the case of Sweden, the low number of events also for the 
Swiss-South African dyad hardly allows for a meaningful interpretation of the con-
flict/cooperation curve displayed in Figure 30. Nevertheless, it appears that the evolution of 
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the conflict/cooperation level matches the interactions as described in Section 213 fairly well. 
The dept rescheduling negotiations with the former President of the Swiss National Bank (the 
federal reserve bank) as mediator were coded as cooperative interaction between Switzerland 
and South Africa, as were the visits of South African officials to Switzerland in 1986 and 
1987. The cooperative peak in late 1987 in the chart occurs due to a officially private 3-day of 
South African President Pieter Botha to Zurich in October 1987, where he held a press con-
ference to deny reports of an agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. The press conference was hold after Botha returned from Bavaria where he 
attended the funeral for Bavarian prime minister Franz Josef Strauss (Associated Press, 11 
October 1988). 
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5.5 Comparative Analysis 
The four case studies revealed that the four Western countries under investigation—the U.S., 
West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland—shaped their foreign policy towards South Africa 
under apartheid quite differently. Their governments also reacted differently to the raising 
movement towards international action against apartheid and influenced the international 
debate on South Africa in different ways. In this section, I will elaborate these differences 
based on the findings in the individual case studies from a comparative perspective. The 
comparison will be structured along the main categories of the within-case analysis. I will 
first compare the phases in the four countries’ foreign policy toward South Africa and their 
characterizing policy interventions from 1977 to 1996. Second, similarities and differences in 
both policy phases and interventions will be explained by the specific decision-making con-
text within and outside the particular governments. Third, I will look at the effects of these 
foreign policies and particular types of interventions and ask for consequences of these differ-
ently shaped foreign policies towards South Africa from 1977 to 1996. 
5.5.1 Policy Phases and Interventions 1977-1996 
The two main selection criteria for the four cases included the countries’ basic foreign policy 
orientation toward South Africa under apartheid and the evolution of this basic orientation 
over time  (Table 4, p. 86). The individual foreign policy phases of the four countries, as 
summarized in Table 37 below, reveal these different characteristics clearly. 
Table 37: Policy Phases 1977-1994 
 
 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
USA Carter Era Constructive Engagement CAAA Lift of Sanctions  
DEU Social-Liberal Coalition Cons.-Lib. Coal. E.C. Economic Sanctions Lift of Sanctions  
SWE Early Sanct. Investment Freeze Complete Trade Embargo Lift  
CHE Implicit Refusal of Economic Sanctions Explicit Distance from Economic Sanctions  
    
  Overall conflictive  Overall cooperative   
 
U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa changed significantly from predominantly 
conflictual to rather cooperation phases. In all these phases, the U.S. government pursued a 
rather interventionist foreign policy approach. The South Africa policy of West Germany 
included one major shift from previously rather cooperative patterns to a mostly conflictive 
behavior when the German government supported E.C. sanctions against South Africa from 
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the mid-1980s. In other respects, German foreign policy toward South Africa can be de-
scribed as mostly reactive to developments in international politics, particularly related to 
U.S. foreign policy decisions and political processes within the E.C. As a consequence, Ger-
man South Africa policy is characterized as mostly non-interventionist until the end of apart-
heid in 1994. Sweden, on the other hand, strengthened its foreign policy that aimed at an 
isolation of the apartheid government continuously from the late 1970s until the early 1990s. 
Policy phases were only distinct regarding their increasing level of interference in Swedish-
South African relations. The Swedish government did not ease its sanctions until September 
1993 when an election date for the South African elections was decided and an independent 
election commission appointed. In sharp contrast, Switzerland distanced itself several times 
from economic sanctions against the apartheid government in South Africa and maintained 
this policy position throughout the whole period of investigation. The Swiss government only 
took some measures that should prevent a circumvention of international South Africa sanc-
tions via Switzerland. 
In spite of these differences in the four governments’ foreign policy toward South 
Africa from 1977 to 1994, there were also significant parallels. As a matter of fact, all four 
countries adjusted their foreign policies to developments in South Africa. In all the four coun-
tries, dramatic developments in South Africa—such as massacre of Sharpeville (1960), the 
trials against ANC leaders and their imprisonment during the 1960s, the violent reaction of 
South African security forces to the Soweto uprising in 1976 and the unrests in the South 
African townships during the 1980s, followed by states of emergency—gained a lot of public 
attention and brought South Africa onto the domestic and political agenda. In addition, the 
situation in South Africa was a permanent issue at international conferences and forced gov-
ernments regularly to position themselves toward the issue of apartheid. 
The years of 1985 and 1986 were then a turning point in all the four countries rela-
tions toward South Africa. In response to ongoing protests and violence in the townships, the 
South African government declared a state of emergency. The first state of emergency was 
declared in July 1985 for 36 magisterial districts, the second one year later for the whole 
nation. This development triggered sanctions movements all around the world. In the U.S., 
President Reagan’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ became impossible to justify to an 
increasingly aware and disapproving American public. Later, in October 1986, Congress 
approved with the CAAA a far-reaching sanctions legislation. The CAAA was a watershed 
both in U.S. foreign policy as well as in international politics toward South Africa in general. 
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Even though the U.S. blocked U.N. sanctions of similar content as the CAAA in the Security 
Council, the reorientation in U.S. foreign policy was a clear sign to South Africa and the rest 
of the world that the U.S. is willing to take a tougher stand on apartheid. 
Within the E.C., political bargaining on tougher sanctions against apartheid South 
Africa had been going on since the late 1970s and resulted in a first package of economic 
sanctions in September 1985. This sanction decision coincided with the first South Africa 
sanctions adopted by U.S. President Reagan. When it became clear that an extended sanctions 
legislation is on its way through the U.S. Congress, the foreign ministers of the twelve E.C. 
member states agreed in one year later to impose further economic sanctions against South 
Africa, even though they fell well short of the later in the U.S. adopted sanctions. The West 
German government has always been critical of these sanctions moves, even though it sup-
ported E.C. sanctions in the end and was willing to implement them. Sweden, not an E.C. 
member until 1995, stiffened its sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s together 
with its Nordic partners and was the first country to announce a complete trade embargo 
against South Africa in May 1987. Before, the Swedish government made several attempts to 
impose mandatory multilateral sanctions against South Africa but respective proposals failed 
in the U.N. Security Council. Only Switzerland—which has refused international sanctions 
against South Africa until the 1980s in accord with other Western governments, in particular 
the U.S., Britain and West Germany—did not change its position on economic sanctions and 
declared in September 1986 the continuation of its prior previous policy. 
Through the developments just described it becomes clear that the years of 1985 and 
1986 were a turning point in all the four countries’ foreign policies toward South Africa. In 
the U.S., the dramatic development of the situation in South Africa as well as the changing 
domestic political debate on the country’s relations with South Africa resulted in a fundamen-
tal reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. The CAAA was a watershed in U.S.-South African 
relations not only because it was only the second time since World War II that a presidential 
veto on a foreign policy issue was overruled by the Congress, but also because it demolished 
a traditional U.S. foreign policy premise holding that the threat of sanctions against South 
Africa was more effective than sanctions themselves. In West Germany, sanctions moves in 
the U.S. and at the E.C. level forced the conservative-liberal government of Chancellor Kohl 
to abandon its traditionally disapproving position on economic sanctions. These developments 
on the international political level also gave Sweden a new momentum to strengthen its policy 
of isolation against the South African government, and the Swedish government—which 
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always been an advocate of a resolute course of action against the apartheid government in 
South Africa—was able to sharpen its profile within the international community as a leading 
campaigner against apartheid. Given this changing international environment, the Swiss 
government was forced to explain its foreign policy towards South Africa but saw no reason 
for a fundamental change in its relations with South Africa. Its main concern was directed to 
the foreign policy of other Western nations, particularly the U.S. and the E.C. member states, 
trying to avoid that Switzerland was seen as a loophole for international South Africa sanc-
tions. 
5.5.2 Actor Coalitions and Decision-making 
The case studies have revealed clearly that the South Africa policies of the four countries 
under investigations were shaped both by international and domestic developments. In addi-
tion to the changing international parameters, domestic politics and a specific political dis-
course both on the situation in South Africa and international relations toward the apartheid 
state had a significant influence on the countries’ official foreign policy toward South Africa. 
Table 38: Political Leaders and Majorities 1976-1994 
 
 1976 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 1994 
President  Carter (Democrat) Reagan (Republican) Bush (Republican) Clinton (D) 
Maj. Senate Democrats Republicans Democrats Rep. USA 
Maj. House Democrats Rep. 
Chancellor Schmidt (Social Democrat) Kohl (Christian Democrat) 
DEU 
Coalition SPD-FDP CDU/CSU-FDP 
Prime Min. Fälldin/Ullsten Fälldin (Cent.) Palme (Social D.) Carlsson (Social Dem.) Bildt (Conservative) 
SWE 
Coalition Liberal/right-wing Social Democrats Social Democrats Center-right 
CHE Coalition 2 Liberals, 2 Christian Democrats, 2 Social Democrats, 1 Conservative (members of the federal government) 
 
Table 38 illustrates for the four countries the political majorities and governing coali-
tions from 1976 to 1994. Whereas both the U.S. and West Germany were governed by center-
left governments in the late 1970s, a conservative government led traditionally Social Democ-
ratic Sweden during that time. With the conservative turn in the U.S. and Europe (including 
West Germany) at the beginning of the 1980s, the anti-apartheid movements had first difficul-
ties finding an attentive ear in the respective countries’ governments. In Sweden, the elections 
of 1982 brought the Social Democrats back into government, with Olof Palme returning to the 
prime minister’s seat and staying in office until his assassination in 1986. Switzerland was the 
only of the four countries under investigation that did not experience a significant change in 
the political composition of its government throughout the whole period of investigation. 
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In the U.S., the connection between apartheid in South Africa and the struggle in the 
U.S. for racial equality was an important feature of political discourse over apartheid and U.S. 
foreign policy toward South Africa. The election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in 
1980 appeared to be a setback for the anti-apartheid movement. But the deteriorating situation 
on the ground in South Africa demonstrated to the American public and an increasing number 
of members of Congress that closer diplomatic ties with the apartheid government were not 
leading to democratic reforms in South Africa. In the run-up to the mid-term elections of 
1986, many Republicans and conservatives Democrats distanced themselves from the admini-
stration’s official positions on South Africa. As a result, Congress was able to override 
Reagan’s veto against tightened U.S. South Africa sanctions, even though Reagan’s Republi-
can party still controlled the Senate at that time.  
Compared to the U.S., concerns over apartheid in South Africa were clearly on a 
smaller scale in the German public. West German foreign policy toward South Africa had 
long been overshadowed by West Germany’s greater concerns over the situation in its former 
colony in South-West Africa (today Namibia). Conflicts between coalition partners of the 
government—mostly between the foreign ministry, lead by Foreign Minister Genscher from 
the Free Democrats, and the leader of the coalition partner CSU, Franz Josef Strauss—had a 
significant influence on the country conduct of its relations with South Africa. 
In Sweden, the country’s foreign policy on South Africa developed rather continu-
ously even though the government coalition changed several times throughout the period of 
investigation. Although the Swedish foreign policy toward South Africa from the late 1970s 
was largely the product of the Social Democrats and its charismatic leader Olof Palme, the  
Swedish opposition to apartheid in South Africa was deeply rooted in a wide sympathy for the 
ANC and its liberation struggle, not only within the Social Democratic Party but also within 
the Liberal Party and wide parts of the Swedish public. 
As seen above, Switzerland is the only of the four countries under investigation that 
did not change the composition of its governmental coalition throughout the whole period of 
investigation. Swiss foreign policy during this period was clearly shaped by a broad political 
majority of the political center and the right-wing (including Liberals, Christian Democrats 
and Conservatives). The opposing political left (represented by the Social Democrats and 
smaller left-wing parties) was permanently overruled in parliament at the ratio of one to two, 
even though it was always a Social Democrat that led the foreign ministry until 1994. 
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5.5.3 Comparative Intervention Analysis 
The case of U.S.-South African relations has shown that major changes in U.S. foreign policy 
toward South Africa only showed a very short-term effect on the relationship between the two 
countries as it is displayed in the SAID event data set from 1977 to 1996. Even though the 
imposition of the CAAA in 1986 resulted in a temporary negative shift in the con-
flict/cooperation level between the two countries, the relationship leveled off again during the 
late 1980s. A significant worsening of the relationship (in terms of increased conflict in bilat-
eral relations) can also be observed in German- and Swedish-South African relations during 
the years of 1986 and 1987. Only Swiss-South African relations showed a different pattern. 
They improved significantly at the end of 1985 and in the beginning of 1986 due to the debt 
restructuring negotiations between major international banks and the South African govern-
ment. In addition to the involvement of Swiss banking institutes in these negotiations, the 
former president of the Swiss national bank acted in these negotiations as a mediator on be-
half of the South African government. These negotiations attracted significant international 
media attention and are therefore well displayed in the SAID data set. 
A significant improvement of South Africa relations of all the four countries under 
investigation can then be observed in the early 1990s, after the South African government 
released Nelson Mandela from prison and started negotiations on a democratic transition of 
the country. But again, the decisions to lift economic sanctions only showed punctual and 
short-term effects on the bilateral relations of the countries under investigation with South 
Africa. However, this punctual and erratic occurrence of observable foreign policy effects is 
at least partly rooted in specific characteristics of event data. As event data are coded from 
international news sources, they are depending on the international media’s attention toward 
the subject to be analyzed. In the case of international relations toward South Africa, the 
SAID data set clearly displays that the decisions that have been taken by Western govern-
ments on South Africa were well covered by the international media. But it is the nature of 
actual international relations—particularly towards so-called ‘problem regimes’ like South 
Africa under apartheid—that the actual relationship between two countries gets less system-
atic media coverage. 
Nevertheless, as the intervention analysis for the U.S. case has shown, the data set 
displays interaction patterns for densely covered dyads in a fairly exact way. However, as the 
intervention analysis for the German, Swedish and Swiss case revealed, dyads which do not 
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attract international media attention on a regular basis can hardly be analyzed systematically. 
Another problem is language. Automating coding systems for event data only code English 
text sources satisfyingly so far. Sources published in German or Swedish could not be in-
cluded into the analysis. 
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6 Impact on the Development in South Africa 
As portrayed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the political situation within South Africa developed 
dramatically within the period under investigation from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. The 
apartheid government’s repression of the non-white population in South Africa increased 
continuously in the 1980s until the government of new South African president de Klerk took 
first steps to dismantle apartheid laws in 1990. During the last years of apartheid, South Af-
rica was more or less in a permanently declared state of emergency. In this Chapter, I first 
describe these inner-South African developments as they are displayed in the coded event 
data set using descriptive statistics. Then, I will analyze to what degree international action 
against apartheid in South Africa had an impact on the developments on the ground in South 
Africa. For this final step of analysis, VAR modeling provides a useful method to estimate 
how different event dynamics at various political levels could determine each other. 
6.1 Inner-South African Developments 1977-1994 
Developments in South Africa from the mid-1980s were densely covered by the international 
media. Using the international wire service of the Associated Press as data source, 6,802 such 
events with the South African government as the source and the South African opposition as 
the target can be coded from January 1977 to April 1994 (Figure 31). 
Figure 31: Interaction Level South African Government > Opposition 1/1977-4/1994 
 
Inner-South African events were particularly densely covered through the second 
half of the 1980s when the apartheid government expended the state of emergency in South 
Africa and governments worldwide imposed economic sanctions against the racist regime. 
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The highest number of events occurred in February 1990 when President de Klerk delivered 
his historical speech in parliament and opposition leader Mandela was released from prison. 
Figure 32 below illustrates this dramatic development in South Africa throughout the 
period of investigation even more impressively. The time plot displays the monthly con-
flict/cooperation level of actions from the South African government towards the South Afri-
can opposition coded from the international wire service of the Associated Press. The reported 
domestic actions on the part of the apartheid government were consistently conflictive as 
displayed by the distinctly negative pattern of the curve. 
Figure 32: Conflict/Cooperation South African Government>Opposition 1/1977-4/1994 
 
Actions from the South African government towards its opposition as recorded in the 
data reached their highest level of conflict in April 1985 (score of -496.8, N=102). Partly in 
response to a series of police killings that left dozens dead on the 25th anniversary of the 
Sharpeville massacre, the United Democratic Front (UDF) decided in April 1985 to 
strengthen its presence in rural areas and established closer links with the trade union move-
ment. UDF is a non-racial coalition of about 400 civic, church, students’, workers’ and other 
organizations and was one of the most important anti-apartheid organizations of the 1980s. 
Tensions also flared in April 1985 when three key UDF officials were arrested under security 
laws (Associated Press, various dates, April 1985). 
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Table 39: Summary Statistics for South African Government>Opposition 1/1977-4/1994 (208 Obs.) 
 
Interaction Level Conflict/Cooperation 
Mean Min Max Agg. Mean Max Min Agg. 
30.6 0 
131 
(2/1990) 
6802 -57.1 
58 
(9/1991) 
-496.8 
(4/1985) 
-7348.9 
 
As Table 39 illustrates, the month with the highest level of cooperative action shows 
still a relatively low score of 58 (N=29), when cooperative ties were strengthened in Septem-
ber 1991. On 14 September, 23 political parties and organizations—including the ANC, trade 
unions, religious and civic organizations—and the government signed the National Peace 
accord in Johannesburg. The accord outlined a code of conduct for security forces and politi-
cal parties. It also created a National Peace Committee and a Commission of Inquiry Regard-
ing the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation to monitor implementation. Also that 
month, the South African government signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
United National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding amnesty for South 
African refugees and political exiles. The agreement called for comprehensive amnesty and 
complete freedom of movement for returnees in South Africa, as well as the establishment of 
a UNHCR presence in the country (Associated Press, various dates, September 1991). 
Figure 33: Conflict/Cooperation South African Opposition > Government 1/1977-4/1994 
 
 
As Figure 33 illustrates, actions from the anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa 
reached their most conflictive momentum in August 1985 when South African opposition 
groups ramped up activities directed against the government (score=-211.4, N=80). In that 
month, a march was organized to Pollsmoor prison, where a solidarity message was to be 
delivered to Nelson Mandela. However, the government prevented the march and detained its 
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chief organizer. In defiance, march organizers managed to read their message at a press con-
ference. Additionally, clashes between protestors and police in urban townships left 70 dead 
and 140 injured. On 15 August, President Botha made a hard-line speech against oppositional 
forces at the National Party's Natal Conference. In response the following day, ANC president 
Oliver Tambo reaffirmed that the armed struggle against apartheid would be intensified, 
saying that whites would lose their lives and property (Associated Press, various dates, 
August 1985). 
Table 40: Summary Statistics for South African Opposition>Government 1/1977-4/1994 (208 Obs.) 
 
Interaction Level Conflict/Cooperation 
Mean Min Max Agg Mean Max Min Agg 
26.2 0 
115 
(2/1990) 
5982 -35.4 
58.5 
(6/1990) 
-211.4 
(8/1985) 
-12080.7 
 
Most cooperative are coded events with South African oppositional actors as the 
source and the South African government as the target in June 1990 (score=58.5, N=87). On 8 
June 1990, the four-year-old state of emergency was lifted throughout the country, with only a 
partial state of emergency remaining in Natal. Also early in the month, Mandela and de Klerk 
held discussions on the implementation of an agreement to release political prisoners ("the 
Groote Shuur Minute") and on ways to reduce police violence (Associated Press, 8 June 
1990). 
Figure 34: Actions South African Government vs. Opposition 
 
As Figure 34 reveals, conflictive governmental and oppositional actions evolved al-
most simultaneously from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s and showed high reciprocity; op-
positional protests were followed by governmental repression and vice versa. The two series 
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therefore correlate relatively strongly; 75 percent of the variance in one series can be ex-
plained by the variance in the other series (correlation coefficient of 0.75). 
6.2 Impact Analysis of International Action Against Apartheid 1977-1994 
The question remains to what degree international action against apartheid in South Africa 
had an impact on the developments on the ground in South Africa. As the literature review in 
Section 2.4 has shown, this question remains a contested issue both among policymakers and 
within the scholarly. Various political, economic and geostrategic explanations have been 
offered to support the assertion that inner-South African developments were responsible for 
the country’s rather peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. 
Political event data as used in this study allow for taking another approach by con-
sidering the dynamics of parallel running processes on different political levels and how these 
developments might be interlinked. As discussed in the theoretical section of this thesis (Sec-
tion 3.2.4.4), I can be hypothesized that these developments had a different influence on the 
developments on the ground in South Africa over time. Hypotheses 9 to 11 therefore consider 
political developments at different levels as potential explaining variables for domestic devel-
opments within South Africa. 
VAR analysis provides a method to estimate how different political processes could 
determine each other by modeling the processes as a structural equation system, where each 
process is influenced by lags of the other processes in the model. The VAR modeling ap-
proach is appropriate to test potential interactions between different political levels as postu-
lated in Hypotheses 9 to 11 as VAR analysis allows for an examination of the behavior of the 
South African government towards its opposition, while simultaneously controlling for the 
actions of the regional and international actors towards South Africa. Likewise, international 
action toward the South Africa is also a function of developments on the ground in South 
Africa, mainly between the South African government and its opposition and vice versa, 
allowing for feedback between these interactions on different political levels.  
For one specific system a significant model of different processes can be found as 
they are displayed by the conflict/cooperation series in the dataset (Table 41 below, see also 
Appendix 2). However, the time period of investigation had to be restricted in advance to the 
period from January 1977 to February 1990 to receive significant estimates for the parameters 
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in the model. But restricting the impact analysis to the time until February 1990 makes sense 
for two reasons: 
First, within South Africa, February 1990 marks a landmark in the process of over-
coming apartheid when the South African government sent out for the first time a clear signal 
to engage in serious actions that could eventually lead to an abolishment of the apartheid 
system. De Klerk’s speech in parliament and the following release of Mandela from custody 
changed the dynamic between the apartheid government and the South African liberation 
movement significantly (as also emanates from Figure 32 and Figure 33 above). 
Second, towards the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts in southern Africa re-
laxed significantly, too. In 1988, negotiators from Angola, Cuba and South Africa, mediated 
by the U.S. with observers from the Soviet Union, worked out agreements to bring peace to 
the region and make possible the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. In 
December 1988, the conflicting parties signed the New York Accords which included a with-
drawal from Cuban troops from Angola and a cease of Soviet military aid linked to South 
Africa’s obligation to withdraw from Namibia (Associated Press, several dates, May to De-
cember 1989). 
Table 41: Explanatory Variables for Conflict ZAFGOV>ZAFOPP 1/1977-2/1990 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Err. z-Value P>|z| 
Conflict ZAFGOV>ZAFOPPt-1     0.26** 0.11  3.31 0.001 
Conflict ZAFOPP>ZAFGOVt-1    0.52** 0.20  2.60 0.009 
Conflict INT>ZAFt-1    0.15** 0.08  1.99 0.046 
Constant -16.78** 6.03 -2.78 0.005 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
 
For the period from January 1977 to February 1990, actions from the South African 
government in the form of a dynamic development of the cooperation/conflict level (Gold-
stein scores) can at least partly be explained by a combination of prior actions from the South 
African government towards its opposition, prior actions from the South African opposition 
towards the apartheid government and lagged effects resulting from actions from international 
actors towards South Africa. In other words, variations in the dyad including the South Afri-
can government and the South African opposition, as displayed in the underlying event data 
set, are strongly determined by actual and prior actions between these two aggregated actors. 
Hypothesis 9, postulating that the improvement of the situation in South Africa is mostly a 
consequence of inner South African developments, can therefore be confirmed with this 
analysis. 
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Hypothesis 10, predicting that there is a significant positive correlation between the 
strength of the opposition and the improvement of the Situation in South Africa, can be con-
firmed too. Every estimated VAR model including different actual and lagged values of the 
conflict/cooperation level between the South African opposition and the South African gov-
ernment indicates a significant effect of lagged conflict/cooperation values for actions from 
the South African opposition towards the South African government on the actual con-
flict/cooperation level of actions from the South African government towards its opposition. 
The estimated models also include a relatively weak positive relationship between 
the conflict/cooperation levels of the lagged actions originating from international (i.e., non-
South African) actors towards South Africa on the one hand and actual conflict/cooperation 
levels between the South African government and its opposition on the other hand. However, 
the parameter estimates for the coefficients of the upstream international actions remain—
although statistically significant—relatively small. Considering that these international coeffi-
cients represent an aggregate of all international actions towards South Africa, the impact of 
single international interventions on the developments in South Africa has to be regarded as 
negligible. Indeed, U.S. foreign policy interventions—as displayed in international event data 
on U.S.-South African relations from 1977 to 1994—do not show any significant effects on 
the developments within South Africa during that time span (see Appendix 4). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 11—claiming that such an impact of international policy interventions can actu-
ally be observed—needs to be rejected. 
The respective model that best explains the development within South Africa be-
tween 1977 and 1990 (as displayed in the underlying event data set) can be represented with 
following multi equation system: 
GOVOPPt = -16.78 + 0.36GOVOPPt-1 + 0.52OPPGOVt-1 + 0.15INTt-1 + εt 
OPPGOVt = -4.30 + 0.25GOVOPPt-1 + 0.27OPPGOVt-1 + 0.06INTt-1 + εt 
 INTt = -3.76 + 0.28GOVOPPt-1 + 0.33OPPGOVt-1 + 0.30INTt-1 + εt 
where: 
GOVOPPt = the conflict/cooperation level of actions from the South African government to 
the South African opposition during time period t; 
OPPGOVt = the conflict/cooperation level of actions from the South African opposition to 
the South African government during time period t; 
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 INTt = the conflict/cooperation level of actions from international non-South African 
actors towards South Africa during time period t; 
 εt = independent and identically distributed disturbance term during period t. 
International actions included in the model (INTt) consist of an aggregate of all re-
ported events within a month with an international (non-South African) actor as the source 
and South Africa as the target. The international actors include mostly foreign governments 
and international organizations, whereas the U.S. is the international actor best represented in 
the data set. Most of these international actions were targeted at the South African govern-
ment (see also, Section 4.4). 
However, the inclusion of an aggregate of the South African government’s regionally 
oriented actions does not provide significant parameter estimates (Appendix 3). Such regional 
actions include events with the South African government as the source and the governments 
of regional neighbors Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia as the target of these 
actions. These so-called Front Line States established cooperative structures with the objec-
tive of achieving black majority rule in South Africa and were supported by other African 
nations. Also U.S. diplomacy started to engage with the Front Line States during the 1980s. 
U.S. relations with South African neighbors reached their peak during the “human rights” 
initiatives of the Carter administration (Schmitz and Walker 2004). During the Reagan ad-
ministration’s ‘constructive engagement’, the Front Line States were part of the diplomatic 
negotiations to the achieve landmark peace accords between South Africa, Mozambique, 
Angola (Lusaka Protocol) and Namibia (New York Accords). 
A specific account for U.S. actions towards the conflicts in southern Africa does 
have any explanatory power, either, as far as the dynamics in the region are considered as 
they are represented by the coded political events in the data set. Relatively to the high num-
ber of reported interactions between the South African government on the one side and its 
opposition and regional actors on the other side, U.S. actions towards the region are just too 
small in number to show any significant impact on the variation in inner and regional South 
African developments. The same holds true for actions of the Soviet Union actions towards 
southern Africa (Appendix 4). 
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7 Conclusion 
The foreign policymaking of Western governments toward South Africa under apartheid 
(1948-1994) was facing many challenges. Particularly the massacre of Sharpeville in March 
1960 and later the violent reaction to the Soweto uprising in June 1976 lifted the increasingly 
dramatic human rights situation in South Africa on the international political agenda. As this 
study has shown, the second half of the 1980s can then be described as the high-phase of 
international action against apartheid. After the South African government declared a state of 
emergency for 36 of its ministerial districts in July 1985, the U.N. Security Council called for 
the first time on member states to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, strongly 
condemning the apartheid system and the mass arrests and detentions carried out by the Preto-
ria government. Although the respective Resolution 569 was not binding on member states 
due to a British and U.S. veto, it was a clear signal for a tougher stand of the international 
community against the apartheid regime. 
Even without an explicit multilateral framework, several governments imposed par-
tial economic sanctions against South Africa between 1985 and 1987. Particularly the Com-
prehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in the U.S. was an important signal for other Western 
countries, particularly in Europe. E.C. member West Germany, after resisting the sanctions 
first, later also implemented the E.C. measures. The foreign policy of the other two countries 
under investigation in this study, Sweden and Switzerland, were less affected by these inter-
national dynamics of the mid-1980s, for opposite reasons. Sweden has pursued a South Africa 
policy of isolation against the South African government since the 1970s and was so a fore-
runner among Western governments in imposing economic sanctions against South Africa. 
Switzerland, on the other hand, persistently resisted the international movement for economic 
sanctions against South Africa throughout the 1980s until the early 1990s. 
The question of how effective these sanctions were and to what degree they contrib-
uted to South Africa’s rather peaceful transition from a racist regime to a modern democracy 
during the first half of the 1990s has been disputed among policymakers and scholars alike. 
Overall, most of the assessments on this question come to a rather pessimistic conclusion as 
far as the success of these interventions is concerned, whereas success is typically judged 
against the foreign policy goals of the sender of the international sanctions. In this study, I 
took a different approach both conceptually and methodologically to assess the effects of 
international sanctions against South Africa under apartheid. Conceptually, I distinguished 
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between the outcome and the impact of foreign policy interventions such as international 
sanctions. The outcome includes the effects of the inventions on the sender country’s bilateral 
relations with the target country of the interventions (in this case, South Africa). The impact, 
on the other hand, characterizes the potential effects of the changes in these international 
relations on the situation on the ground in the target country. From a methodological point of 
view, I applied event data analysis as a new approach to analyze of international sanctions. 
And it could have been shown that this approach provides a rich set of political variables that 
complement economic data that are usually used in studies that assess the effects of interna-
tional sanctions. 
The main results of this study—according to its empirical, theoretical and methodo-
logical research interest—can be summarized as follows: 
On an empirical level my goal was to put Western foreign policy towards South Af-
rica in a broader perspective by analyzing the policies of four Western states that adopted 
quite different approaches in their relationship with South Africa during apartheid. Every case 
study itself comprises specific characteristics of how Western governments dealt with apart-
heid in South Africa until the early 1990s and reveals the specific challenges each government 
was confronted with in balancing its foreign policy between humanitarian core values and a 
liberal perception on international relations on the one hand, and realist political, economic 
and strategic interests on the other hand. 
The U.S. case shows clearly how foreign policy towards apartheid was a matter of 
international politics during the Cold War. Until the mid-1980s, the U.S. governments re-
garded the apartheid government in South Africa as an important ally against communism in 
decolonializing Africa. President Carter—at the beginning of the study’s period of investiga-
tion in 1977—tried to apply his new approach to U.S. foreign policy with a higher attention to 
international human rights issues also to South Africa. However, both the domestic political 
situation in the U.S. and strategic interests in the region of southern Africa prevented U.S. 
South Africa policy mainly from departing from policy positions taken by previous admini-
strations. Until the mid-1980s, every U.S. government disapproved of economic sanctions 
against South Africa. 
As the event data analysis for the U.S. case demonstrates, the momentum changed 
radically in the mid-1980s. A well-organized U.S. anti-apartheid movement mobilized suc-
cessfully on the grassroots level against President Reagan’s then policy of ‘constructive en-
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gagement’ with the South African government. An important constituency in U.S. domestic 
politics engaged in anti-apartheid activism, in part, because of their own experiences with the 
injustice of racial oppression. These civil rights activists were active in the many anti-
apartheid organizations across the U.S. With the constant worsening of the situation in South 
Africa in the course of the 1980s, anti-apartheid claims found strong resonance with members 
of the U.S. Congress. The imposition of relatively far reaching economic sanctions with the 
adoption of the CAAA in October 1986 marked a cornerstone in U.S. foreign policy that 
transcended U.S.-South African relations alone. It was only the second time since World War 
II that the Congress was able to override a president’s veto on a foreign policy issue. The 
CAAA also had an important signaling effect, triggering governments around the world to 
increase economic pressure on South Africa. 
However, the event data analysis of the international relations between the U.S. and 
South Africa also reveals that these major changes in U.S. South Africa policy had only short-
term effects on the relationship between the two countries. Even though the imposition of the 
CAAA in 1986 resulted in a temporary negative shift in the conflict/cooperation level be-
tween the two countries, the relationship leveled off again during the late 1980s—years before 
new South African president Frederik de Klerk announced the first steps towards a disman-
tlement of apartheid in his historic speech addressing the South African parliament in Febru-
ary 1990.  
The Swedish case represents a completely different approach to foreign policy than 
the one of the U.S. during that time. Dominated by social democratic governments for dec-
ades, Swedish foreign policy had always taken an approach of sharp criticism against the 
apartheid government in South Africa. In Sweden, anti-apartheid organizations were founded 
earlier than almost anywhere else in the western world. From the 1970s, the Swedish anti-
apartheid movement was carried by a broad support from the Swedish public and social-
liberal politicians. Whereas U.S. foreign policy experienced a major shift in the mid-1980s, 
Swedish foreign policy towards South Africa was rather stable throughout the whole period of 
investigation, even though the Social Democrats temporarily lost political power in the 1980s. 
Switzerland was the other case that showed high stability in its foreign policy to-
wards South Africa under apartheid. This stability can be explained to a large extent by the 
existence of a dominant coalition in Swiss foreign-policymaking throughout the whole period 
of the Cold War. The broad coalition of political parties from the political center and right-
wing, employers, trade associations and interest groups with a conservative or liberal orienta-
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tion took an especially reserved stand vis-à-vis restrictive measures against the apartheid 
system, opposing the regime only in moral terms. The majority in government and a dominant 
part of the federal administration were also part of this coalition. Sanctions against South 
Africa were objected to as a matter of principle, as opponents pleaded for entrepreneurial 
liberty and self-responsibility. 
West Germany can be said to represent a middle case. Its government had always 
been among the strong opponents of economic sanctions against South Africa. However, in 
spite of intense political debate both within the governing coalition and between government 
and opposition, West Germany joined E.C. sanctions in 1985 and 1986 and imposed a ban on 
imports on iron and steel from South Africa and prohibited new investments in the country. 
But the extent of European sanctions fell far short of the ones imposed by the U.S. under the 
CAAA. Particularly the exclusion of coal from the sanctions legislation—due to a German 
veto—weakened the expected economic and social effects of the E.C. measures against South 
Africa significantly. 
Effects of the Swedish, Swiss and German foreign policies on their relationship with 
South Africa were more difficult to assess then in the case of the U.S. due to a significantly 
lower number of observations included in the data set. But still, similar to the U.S. case, a 
temporary worsening of German and Swedish relations with South Africa could be observed 
for the years of 1986 and 1987. Only Swiss-South African relations, as displayed by the col-
lected event data set, showed a different pattern. This particular relationship improved signifi-
cantly at the end of 1985 and in the beginning of 1986 due to the debt restructuring negotia-
tions between major international banking institutes on the one side and the South African 
government on the other. These negotiations—with the former president of the Swiss national 
bank acting as a mediator—attracted significant international media coverage and are there-
fore prominently represented in the coded event data set. 
Overall, international interventions with the objective to work towards an end of 
apartheid in South Africa showed only very little impact on developments in South Africa 
itself. The systematic analysis of the dynamics of political events at different political levels 
with regard to South Africa under apartheid (including the international, regional and domes-
tic level) reveals that only a rather slight—but significant—effect of the overall aggregate of 
all international actions towards South Africa can be observed during the period prior to 
February 1990. This particular month represents a watershed both in international action 
towards South Africa and in inner-South African developments when South African President 
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de Klerk announced to take steps towards a dismantlement of apartheid and ordered the re-
lease of ANC-leader Mandela from prison after 27 years in custody. Compared to the signifi-
cant number of events between the South African government and its opposition as they are 
recorded in the generated event data set for the period from 1977 to 1996, international ac-
tions taken against apartheid in South Africa played a rather minor role. 
On the theoretical level, finally, the study tied in with the political and scientific de-
bate on the international dimension of the apartheid era as it has emerged after the racist 
regime’s official end in 1994. Despite the fairly frequent use of sanctions as a foreign policy 
instrument since 1990, the debate on the effectiveness of international sanctions has come to 
little resolution so far. The specific case of sanctions against the apartheid regime in South 
Africa has proved to be an illustrative case for both optimists and pessimists regarding the 
question of whether such interventions are effective. The specific approach to this sanctions 
question taken in this study demonstrates that such policy interventions unfold not only direct 
effects within the international scope of the policy between sender and target country. Foreign 
policy decisions may also show effects in a rather domestic scope comprising intermediary 
actors associated mainly with the sender country’s domestic political domain. As the U.S. 
case study has shown, such an intermediary sphere of foreign policy comprises actors such as 
international business corporations, nongovernmental organizations domiciled in the sender 
country or actors from the sender state’s civil society. In many cases, foreign policy is actu-
ally only able to affect these intermediary actors directly, and not the ultimate target itself. 
The targeted foreign government is eventually expected to be influenced by a changed rela-
tionship between intermediary actors and actors in the target country—if the foreign policy 
intervention successfully initiates such a chain of effects. 
The theory behind most economic sanctions follows such a two step process: the 
sender of sanctions—that is, the government of the sender state—imposes restrictions on 
governmental and non-governmental relations with the target country, assuming that resulting 
shifts in these international relations with the target put pressure on the target government to 
change its policies. As practically all studies on economic sanctions analyze the direct rela-
tionship between sender state and target state, it is worthwhile to analyze the theoretically 
outlined intermediate steps more systematically. As I have been able to show, public policy 
approaches provide useful concepts that help to theoretically clarify such intermediary steps 
of potential effects. 
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As a conclusion, this study mainly confirms the pessimistic findings of systematic 
analyses of the effect of international sanctions on South Africa’s willingness to abandon its 
racial policies. The analysis of the dynamics in political events on the international, regional 
and South African domestic level reveals that only a rather slight effect of the overall aggre-
gate of all international actions towards South Africa can be measures robustly. Conflicts 
between the apartheid government and the South African liberation movement can mainly be 
explained with inner-South African developments. However, it was also shown that the 
movement towards tightened sanctions against the apartheid regime had significant political 
effects, both domestically in many Western states and on the international level. Particularly 
the CAAA in the U.S. was a watershed in U.S. South African relations, not only because it 
was only the second time since World War II that a presidential veto was overruled by Con-
gress, but also because it demolished a traditional U.S. foreign policy premise holding that the 
threat of sanctions was more effective than sanctions themselves. In West Germany, sanction 
decisions in the U.S. and on the E.C. level forced the conservative-liberal government of 
Chancellor Kohl to abandon its traditional disapprovement of such measures. Only in Swit-
zerland—another member of the group of states that traditionally argued against international 
sanctions—reaffirmed its position in the mid-1980s and did not impose economic sanctions 
against South Africa until the end of apartheid in 1994. But still, due to the increasing dis-
crepancy between the Swiss position on sanctions and the changing international willingness 
to impose such measures from the mid-1980s, the Swiss government was forced to explain its 
foreign policy principles and put itself in a position of international isolation on this matter. 
Within South Africa, it can be assumed that the international protest movement against the 
apartheid regime had an important symbolic effect, too, and gave the South African opposi-
tion in the late 1980s and early 1990s an important leverage in its negotiations with the apart-
heid government during the country’s transitional phase towards an new constitution and a 
modern democratic system. 
The coded SAID event data set displays these political processes related to domestic 
and international actions against apartheid in South Africa fairly accurately. The data allows 
not only for the analysis of inter-state political dynamics but also for an incorporation of 
political actors at different political levels, including domestic politics. Particularly for the 
well-covered dyad of U.S.-South African relations, the coded international news wires present 
an enormous reservoir of empirical data. Latest technical developments in processing this 
information allow for a machine-coding of these today widely electronically available sources 
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in combination with a suitable coding system. As I was able to demonstrate with several 
validity checks, machine-coded events from the international wire service of the Associated 
Press display interaction patterns for densely covered dyads in a fairly exact way. However, 
as the study also reveals, dyads that do not attract international media attention on a regular 
basis can hardly be analyzed systematically using event data. Another problem is language. 
Automating coding systems for event data only code English text sources satisfyingly so far. 
German and Swedish sources could therefore not be included in the event data analysis in the 
realm of this study. 
In spite of these drawbacks, future application of automated coding systems remains 
promising. Almost every text source is nowadays electronically available in one or another 
form. Especially the internet provides an enormous universe of information that can—after a 
well elaborated filtering system was applied—be processed with machine coding systems 
similar to the one applied in this study. International wire services, too, deliver detailed in-
formation on political processes in various fields. The main problem today is often not the 
availability of information but to systematize it. Machine-coded event data analysis provides 
an elaborated approach to collect and systematically analyze such information. 
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8 Statistical Appendix 
Appendix 1 
set temp = t==1986:10 
model = SARIMA (0,1,1)(0,1,1)12 
 
Box-Jenkins - Estimation by Gauss-Newton 
Convergence in    13 Iterations. Final criterion was  0.0000075 <  0.0000100 
Dependent Variable SCALE_USAGOV2ZAF 
Monthly Data From 1982:03 To 1991:06 
Usable Observations    112     Degrees of Freedom   107 
Centered R**2    -0.137438      R Bar **2  -0.179959 
Uncentered R**2  -0.102179      T x R**2     -11.444 
Mean of Dependent Variable       2.908035714 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 16.331879721 
Standard Error of Estimate      17.740654847 
Sum of Squared Residuals        33676.199279 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.968968 
Q(28-2)                            25.948256 
Significance Level of Q           0.46595193 
 
   Variable                  Coeff       Std Error      T-Stat     Signif 
******************************************************************************* 
1.  MA{1}                 -0.83186588   0.05518289    -15.07471  0.00000000 
2.  SMA{12}               -0.78216020   0.07052188    -11.09103  0.00000000 
3.  N_TEMP{0}            -36.48009244  16.22937423     -2.24778  0.02664090 
4.  N_TEMP{1}            -42.12944484  16.13901752     -2.61041  0.01033970 
5.  D_TEMP{1}             -0.86890926   0.18983008     -4.57730  0.00001276 
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Appendix 2 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  1977m2   1990m2                           No. of obs      =       157 
Log likelihood = -2443.485                         AIC             =  31.28006 
FPE            =  7.72e+09                         HQIC            =  31.37493 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  6.62e+09                         SBIC            =  31.51366 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafgov2zafopp         4     62.1639   0.5441   187.3602   0.0000 
zafopp2zafgov         4     28.2381   0.6615   306.8021   0.0000 
int2zaf               4     71.2586   0.4462   126.4874   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .3604556   .1087597     3.31   0.001     .1472905    .5736208 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .5238163   .2011548     2.60   0.009     .1295602    .9180725 
     int2zaf | 
         L1. |   .1544594   .0774633     1.99   0.046      .002634    .3062847 
       _cons |  -16.77646   6.028788    -2.78   0.005    -28.59267   -4.960257 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .2514709   .0494043     5.09   0.000     .1546402    .3483016 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .2764397    .091375     3.03   0.002      .097348    .4555314 
     int2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0580481   .0351879     1.65   0.099    -.0109189    .1270151 
       _cons |  -4.301798    2.73859    -1.57   0.116    -9.669335     1.06574 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
int2zaf      | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .2765267   .1246715     2.22   0.027     .0321749    .5208784 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .3332901   .2305842     1.45   0.148    -.1186467    .7852269 
     int2zaf | 
         L1. |   .2989751   .0887964     3.37   0.001     .1249372    .4730129 
       _cons |  -3.758259   6.910815    -0.54   0.587    -17.30321     9.78669 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  1977m2   1990m2                           No. of obs      =       157 
Log likelihood = -3156.525                         AIC             =  40.46528 
FPE            =  4.41e+12                         HQIC            =   40.6234 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  3.41e+12                         SBIC            =  40.85461 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafgov2zafopp         5     61.7661   0.5528   194.1047   0.0000 
zaf2reg               5     27.3755   0.3203   73.98571   0.0000 
zafopp2zafgov         5     28.2495   0.6634   309.4757   0.0000 
int2zaf               5     70.8816   0.4556   131.3964   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .3214354   .1099846     2.92   0.003     .1058696    .5370013 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |  -.3123094   .1781012    -1.75   0.080    -.6613814    .0367626 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |    .486369   .2003547     2.43   0.015     .0936809     .879057 
     int2zaf | 
         L1. |   .2414783   .0913668     2.64   0.008     .0624027    .4205538 
       _cons |  -16.51215   5.972505    -2.76   0.006    -28.21805   -4.806259 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zaf2reg      | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |  -.0477394   .0487465    -0.98   0.327    -.1432808    .0478019 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |   .5271954   .0789366     6.68   0.000     .3724826    .6819083 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .0841283   .0887996     0.95   0.343    -.0899157    .2581723 
     int2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0262173   .0404948     0.65   0.517    -.0531511    .1055857 
       _cons |   .8717154   2.647085     0.33   0.742    -4.316477    6.059907 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .2417889   .0503028     4.81   0.000     .1431971    .3403807 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |  -.0774926   .0814568    -0.95   0.341    -.2371451    .0821599 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |    .267148   .0916348     2.92   0.004     .0875472    .4467488 
     int2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0796399   .0417877     1.91   0.057    -.0022626    .1615424 
       _cons |  -4.236215   2.731601    -1.55   0.121    -9.590054    1.117624 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
int2zaf      | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .3186317   .1262161     2.52   0.012     .0712526    .5660108 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |   .3369997   .2043854     1.65   0.099    -.0635884    .7375879 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .3736979   .2299231     1.63   0.104    -.0769431     .824339 
     int2zaf | 
         L1. |   .2050767   .1048507     1.96   0.050    -.0004269    .4105803 
       _cons |  -4.043465   6.853929    -0.59   0.555    -17.47692    9.389988 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 4 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  1977m2   1990m2                           No. of obs      =       157 
Log likelihood =  -3456.74                         AIC             =  44.41708 
FPE            =  1.34e+13                         HQIC            =  44.65426 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  9.16e+12                         SBIC            =  45.00107 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafgov2zafopp         6     63.0012   0.5378   182.7081   0.0000 
zaf2reg               6     27.0435   0.3411   81.25904   0.0000 
zafopp2zafgov         6     28.6241   0.6567   300.3559   0.0000 
usa2zaf               6     21.5084   0.0802   13.68241   0.0178 
usr2zaf               6     4.67422   0.0653   10.96246   0.0521 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .4074904   .1077669     3.78   0.000     .1962712    .6187096 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |  -.0998536    .159166    -0.63   0.530    -.4118133     .212106 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .6229271   .1991876     3.13   0.002     .2325267    1.013328 
     usa2zaf | 
         L1. |   .3291205   .2590463     1.27   0.204    -.1786009    .8368419 
     usr2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0162531   1.106018     0.01   0.988    -2.151503    2.184009 
       _cons |  -18.75958   6.366328    -2.95   0.003    -31.23735   -6.281803 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zaf2reg      | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |  -.0436795   .0462593    -0.94   0.345     -.134346    .0469871 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |   .5119268   .0683226     7.49   0.000      .378017    .6458366 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .0842785    .085502     0.99   0.324    -.0833023    .2518593 
     usa2zaf | 
         L1. |   .2209481   .1111966     1.99   0.047     .0030069    .4388894 
     usr2zaf | 
         L1. |   .4100736   .4747624     0.86   0.388    -.5204436    1.340591 
       _cons |    -.84374   2.732769    -0.31   0.758    -6.199869    4.512389 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .2779079    .048963     5.68   0.000     .1819422    .3738736 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |  -.0081053   .0723158    -0.11   0.911    -.1498416     .133631 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .3061444   .0904992     3.38   0.001     .1287692    .4835197 
     usa2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0547674   .1176956     0.47   0.642    -.1759117    .2854465 
     usr2zaf | 
         L1. |   .2230652   .5025104     0.44   0.657    -.7618371    1.207968 
       _cons |  -4.620397   2.892489    -1.60   0.110    -10.28957    1.048778 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
usa2zaf      | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .0136655   .0367912     0.37   0.710    -.0584439    .0857749 
     zaf2reg | 
         L1. |   .0283503   .0543386     0.52   0.602    -.0781515    .1348521 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |   .0855421   .0680018     1.26   0.208    -.0477391    .2188233 
     usa2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0845268   .0884374     0.96   0.339    -.0888073    .2578609 
     usr2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0519852   .3775903     0.14   0.890    -.6880782    .7920487 
       _cons |   6.501351   2.173439     2.99   0.003     2.241488    10.76121 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
usr2zaf      | 
zafgov2zaf~p | 
         L1. |   .0094949   .0079955     1.19   0.235     -.006176    .0251658 
     zaf2reg | 
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         L1. |   .0293953   .0118089     2.49   0.013     .0062502    .0525403 
zafopp2zaf~v | 
         L1. |  -.0294852   .0147782    -2.00   0.046      -.05845   -.0005204 
     usa2zaf | 
         L1. |  -.0041686   .0192193    -0.22   0.828    -.0418377    .0335006 
     usr2zaf | 
         L1. |   .0062701   .0820583     0.08   0.939    -.1545611    .1671014 
       _cons |   .0895083   .4723337     0.19   0.850    -.8362487    1.015265 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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